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INTRODUCTION
0. The Global Economy in Search of a Polity
(1) It has become a triviality to say and write that the 
world-economy has become global,^ that for most of the 
products and many services, economic competitors are acting on 
a global market place, and that the elite running this show 
composes a global village. Concomitantly, we witness a rise of 
global issues posed to mankind requiring urgent political 
action. For example, long term environmental menaces such as
ozone depletion, climate change or acid rain pose new dangers
. . . i2) to human survival requiring cooperation among states ;' 7
demographic imbalance between North and South should make of
economic development one of our priorities ; the recent and
dramatic changes in what used to be the Eastern block urgently
require that we find means to develop and thus integrate the
economies of these countries in the world economy. These are
only examples of the many common issues humanity faces, and
their seriousness puts the improvement of the international
political system high on the agenda.
The problem, in effect, is that while there is an increased
need for international cooperation, political action at the
international level seems hindered by the very existence of a
decentralized international political system divided among
states.^ Simultaneously, no state alone is large enough
compared to the global economy to have enough structural
power^ to be able to meaningfully act on it without the
(5)cooperation of other states.v ' Companies and money alike 
being ever freer to move to wherever they find the best 
returns, governments are shorn of the power to set the economic 
rules within their borders, let alone outside them.^ Worse, 
and even though we witnessed encouraging signs of increased 
international cooperation,^ there is a danger to see 
protectionism and nationalism block the necessary reforms. The 
fate of the Uruguay Round of negotiations within the framework 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("G A T T ") is 
striking as an example of a lost opportunity to set the 
foundations of a political system within which costly political 
action could be decided without the fear that any action 
decided is unfairly costing more to some than to others because 
of an underlying tainted trading system.
(2) What we are witnessing is an internationalization of 
society. ^  i.e. the spreading over states' borders of the 
space within which actions by the various actors of such 
society (mostly states and companies) have an impact on the 
life of others, at a distance. In particular, the space over
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which actions of economic actors have an impact on others is 
not limited to the territory of their state of origin. The 
phenomenon of the geographical extension of the impact of 
micro-economic actors' decisions out of the territory of their 
state of origin is only a logical implication of the 
internationalization of markets and c o m panies.For 
example, when Japanese car producers compete at home against 
each other, the social consequences streaming from competition 
(for example, unemployment of the workforce of the failing 
competitors) are located in Japan. Japanese may collectively 
decide that this requires political action, for example under 
the form of temporary assistance to workers while they are 
unemployed, but few would advocate that Japanese auto makers 
should stop competing against each other because this causes 
unemployment for lousy producers. Competition is painful and 
hurts loosers, but market society is built on it.
Societies, be they national, local or international, may decide 
that they should ease the pain by expressing some form of 
solidarity (for example, by paying unemployment benefits), but 
it would be absurd for them to blame competition for the pain 
it might entail. In an international context however, when 
Japanese auto makers compete in the United States or in Europe, 
unemployment rises in those countries, not in Japan. Those who 
have to contribute for the payment of unemployment benefits are 
not Japanese (who obviously benefit from rising exports), but 
Americans or Europeans (who seem to suffer from rising 
imports). Failing American and European auto producers then
- 10
have an interesting alternative to the option of being better 
at producing cars : instead of stopping Japanese cars with 
competition and better cars at equivalent prices, they may use 
their national political system to have it stop the cars at its 
political borders with tariffs or quotas or like measures. And 
at this, at least, they have been pretty good recently, forcing 
consumers to buy their expensive and lousy cars.
The external effect of the actions of competitors as well 
as the attempts to win in the political arena what is lost on 
the market place are not new phenomena. But the intensification 
of international economic competition exacerbates the issue.
The problem is that prot ecti onism,this  form of use 
of the political system for sectional interests (here, the ones 
of American or European car producers), apart from being costly 
to consumers and to the economy as a whole, undermines the 
possibility to effectively use the political system for common 
purposes, at the decentralized level of states, since the state 
apparatus of institutions is in a sense highjacked by sectional 
interests in their favor, as well as at the international 
level, where agreement on principles and rules is difficult as 
long as such uses of the system of public institutions for 
private ends remain possible.
(3) The internationalization of competition and of society 
raises issues therefore both at the international and at the 
national levels :
- 11 -
(i) At the international level, the international economic 
institutions, and in particular the GATT, are put under 
pressure. The problem, broadly speaking, is to maintain the 
openess of the national economies to the international economy, 
which is obviously difficult once self-reenforcing 
protectionist policies tend to be adopted, while preserving the 
capacity of states to adopt policies and measures. This second 
issue is directly connected to the issues at the national level.
(ii) At the national level, it is the mere functioning of a 
market democratic society which is endangered. In democratic 
market societies, public institutions are instruments to be 
used to achieve common purposes which can not be attained 
otherwise. However, with protectionism, the state apparatus is 
used to provide protection from competition to some sectional 
interests, while it is only in unusual circumstances that such 
protection should be provided in a liberal perspective. There 
are failures and imperfections in the market making it unable 
to appropriately weight part of the value choices of 
individuals and which require collective action, possibly under 
the form of a restriction to the possibility to use some types
/13 \of competitive means.v ' Environment, which protection may
require a prohibition of some types of production processes,
(14)for example, is a first example coming to mind ;' but this 
is also true for education, culture, health and safety, etc...
To implement these value choices, transfers of wealth may have 
to be forced by the political system to protect values not 
taken into account by the market system. And as a consequence
12
to such political choices, it may be necessary to discriminate 
against products produced in polities having made different 
value choices. The people in a country, say Canada or France, 
who do not want to see only Dallas or Dynasty or cute American 
cops on their TV screens may choose to discriminate against 
cheap foreign TV series, local series being unable to compete 
on the market due to their necessarily higher costs since they 
are sold on smaller markets. The people in a state, say 
Denmark, may value their environment so much as to prohibit 
sales of beverages in unauthorized, unstandardized cans or 
bottles, which may make life difficult for importers of beer in 
Denmark. In all these cases where the effective implementation 
of a value choice requires discrimination, however, one can see 
little objection to the use of the public system to make such 
discriminations, if such use is made pursuant to the will of 
the people. Value choices imply a cost, a transfer of wealth, 
usually from consumers to the value protected (a clean 
environment, intelligent TV series, ...). This transfer of 
wealth, however, is acceptable in a market liberal society only 
if it is the result of an effective choice and does not 
undermine the foundations of market society. And that's 
precisely where protectionism is a danger for a market 
democratic society : it amounts to a transfer of wealth, from 
consumers to producers while protecting producers may not be a 
value in such a society (if helping failing producers may be), 
and generally without the consent of those paying because it is 
consumers, and not taxpayers, who pay for the protection 
afforded.
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(4) A description of issues to be solved always makes the 
picture of reality look bleak and grim. One should not forget, 
however, that these problems are the result of a success 
story : the one of the liberal market s o c i e t y . A  
comparison between the results achieved by nations organized as 
market societies and nations organized along any other 
principle (planification, notably) shows a striking imbalance 
of results on all accounts, even with regards to the creation 
of such market "externalities" such as p o l l u t i o n , i n  
favor of market society.
At the international level, that liberal trade is a good 
thing is beyond doubt. As recently reminded by The Economist's.
"It can hardly be a coincidence that the expansion of 
global trade since 1945 went hand in hand with 
unprecedented economic growth. Or that the nearly closed 
economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union failed on 
every measure. Or that the most protected economies in the 
third world (India and Argentina, for instance) squandered 
their potential, while neighbours (such as Thailand and 
Chile) embraced trade and thrived. Or that, in otherwise 
fairly open economies, the most protected industries are 
the most backward (steel in America, farming in Japan, 
computing in Europe)."(18)
It is because of the market system that the Western world 
has experienced the rates of growth it has known over the last 
decades it is because of the market system that more
goods are produced, that more services are offered, but also 
that we are more politically united. This is important to 
remember, because it is important to save the liberal market 
system when advocating reforms : only the market can create 
enough wealth to develop the world.
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However, it must also be remembered that the successes of 
the market system have their shortcomings which require 
political action.
(i) Internally, many countries face problems with regards 
to the allocation of the results of economic expansion and in 
many situations, there seems to be developing a dual society. A 
side product of international competition is massive 
unemployment, homelessness and a formidable need for training 
and education in all societies.
(ii) Externally, global warming, deforestation, acid rains,
... remind us that the market can have dramatic destructive 
capacities when it is untamed by an efficient political system 
able to internalize negative e x t e r n a l i t i e s . T o  summarize, 
the international market economy is a great machine, but it 
lacks political guidance. This reminds us that the market is 
inseparable from an effective political system, which we can 
verify at the international level where we have a market 
without a political system to adopt policies, with the negative 
consequences we witness.
(5) Teleologically, the aim to achieve is to develop 
international economic institutions composing a system allowing 
for an efficient functioning of liberal society. We need to 
have a system of public institutions able to adopt the required 
policies and norms when necessary, but only in such cases, to
<*■
limit the bureaucratic overload on society. In this 
perspective, the issue then is to determine what public
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institutions should do in a global liberal society where 
economic power is primarily exercised by micro-economic actors 
(firms), regulated by the public political system, and then how 
to determine the allocation of power in a system where power is 
shared (i) horizontally among institutions (the various states) 
having geographically distinct jurisdictions and, (ii) 
vertically among institutions (firms, states and international 
organizations) having functionally different jurisdictions.
It is necessary to find how such system could be 
structured. But is is also necessary to find simultaneously the 
type of forces which can be used to create and maintain such 
system. One must be aware that the emergence of an 
international society, in which there are powerful actors other 
than states. changes the political forces which can be used to 
create and maintain a new political regime.
(6) The most difficult is to find how to study the
world-economy as a system.^22  ^ The economy is usually,
"naturally", considered and studied in a national perspective,
as if the existence of something like the "French economy" or
(23)the "American economy", etc... was obvious.1 ' As a
consequence, the "international economy" is logically studied
( 2 4 )as the economic intercourse occurring among nations.' ' Free
traders then usually advocate free trade using a rather 
simplistic comparative advantage theory according to which 
states should not "interfere" with the market, and should let 
it decide which country has the best relative comparative 
advantage to produce what goods.
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The "internationalization" of the economy shows that there 
is nothing natural in the economy being considered as something 
"national", and in particular, comparative advantage is now a 
complex product of natural conditions, of state and firm 
p o l i c i e s . T h e  classical apparatus to think the 
world-economy has become outdated.^26  ^ Thus, it is widely 
recognized that the most dramatic change for the functioning of 
the international economy which has occurred is the 
globalization of production,^27  ^ a phenomenon with which 
classical free trade theory can barely cope.^28  ^ By 
globalization of production is meant the coordination by 
multinational enterprises of producing activities taking place 
within plants established in different countries.^29  ^ In 
recent years, the development and increased specialization of 
branch plants has led to a spectacular rise of intra-firm and 
corporate-administered t r a d e . R e s p o n d i n g  to differences 
in cost and profitability worldwide, multinational enterprises 
break down into many separate steps production processes that 
often begin with the extraction of raw materials and end up 
with the distribution and service of final products, each step
in the complex operation being moved to the location most
advantageous to the firm. Given this dramatic change, a
new paradigme is needed to analyse the world-economy which, in
our opinion, should put the emphasis on the analysis of
exchange rather than of production. There is no contradiction 
here with our point that global production is the most dramatic 
change which has occurred over the last decades in the
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world-economy. We only think that to usefully study the 
world-economy as a production system, production must be 
considered in its mirror image, i.e. as a set of transactions 
taking place in order to make production possible.
Additionally, classical free trade theory does not say much 
on what forces to use to improve the existing system, while 
private economic actors are obvious participants in the 
organization of the world economy.
We will therefore attempt to develop an adapted
institutional approach, contemplating the world-economy as a
system of transactions, in which there is division of labor
among firms (and in particular multinationals), states and
international institutions for the coordination of economic
(33)activity at the global level.x ' It is an enrichment of the 
traditional economic analysis of regulation which usually 
considers, on the one hand, the market and its limits and, on 
the other hand, the role of public institutions in filling in 
the gaps. It does not limit itself to a superficial 
understanding of the functioning of the market as an automatic 
mechanism through which supplies and demands are adjusted using 
prices determined by consensual transactions, and which 
imperfections and failures are corrected through public 
interventions. By considering the economy as a system of 
transactions, occurring on markets or within firms, it takes 
into account the institutional role, actual or potential, of 
firms.
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1. The Global Economy Approached in an Institutional
Perspective
In an institutional perspective, the relevant part of the 
activity of economic actors is not that they produce, but that 
they transact : to produce, economic actors need to purchase 
raw materials, lease premises and equipments, hire employees, 
sub-contract what can be done more efficiently in other firms, 
consult lawyers and accountants, advertise, franchise 
distributors, etc...
With this perspective, the internationalization of the 
activities of economic actors raises institutional issues in 
the following manner :
(1) Transactions among economic actors always take place in 
a geographical space, using networks of communication to 
communicate the needs and means of actors, and networks of
/ 3 4  \transportation to move and exchange.1 '
(i) The extent of the geographical space over which any 
given economic actor may develop his transactional activity is 
directly dependent of the state of the technology of 
communication and transportation.*35* Thus, the revolutions 
in transportation technology, with canals, railroads and then 
cars, airplanes etc..., as well as in communication technology, 
with the telegraph, telephone, etc..., have been instrumental 
for the creation of national markets and companies integrating 
mass production and distribution.Today, it is obvious
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that without phones, jets, satellite telecommunications, fax
machines, etc... there would be no companies with economic
activities all over the globe. The fact that the geographical
extension of the extent of companies and markets was made
possible by technological change explains why institutional
issues arose in such a manner that it is often considered that
technology commands institutional change. However, in our
institutional perspective, the relationship there is between
technological change and institutional change is indirect, and
is mediated by the change in the transactional activity of
economic actors as allowed by technological change.
(ii) In addition to progress in communication and
transportation technology, progress in organizational
technology has been key to the extension of the economy over
states' borders.^37  ^ Progress in organizational technology
has allowed, in particular, the development of large companies,
organized along multidivisional-forms, and able to coordinate
( 38 )extended processes of production. ' Among these companies, 
multinationals have developed, coordinating through a single 
managerial hierarchy whole strips of international economic 
exchange. Hence, more and more of the companies we are working 
for have their head offices abroad, and more and more of the 
companies having their head office in our own country have a 
great number of foreign employees abroad, in branches or 
subsidiaries.^39^
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(2) The usefulness of studying the institutional
consequences of the globalization of the economy in a
transactional perspective is that it puts the emphasis on the
absolute need for rules. Rules are needed mostly for two broad
sets of reasons, and fulfill either what can be called a
"facilitative" function or an "interventionist" function.
(i) From a micro-economic institutional point of view,
economic actors need institutions and rules to transact their
property rights : they need to be able to rely on enforceable
contracts ; they need to be able to rely on weights and other
m e a s u r e s . I n  a word, they need to be able to rely on some
system of rules which will canalize competition and limit the
means available to competitors to get a competitive 
( 41)advantage.' 7 They need somebody to provide "rules of the
game" ; something reliable they can predict, allowing them to 
plan.
Communities, be they professional (trade associations, 
guilds, ...) or territorial, can provide the necessary rules, 
and effectively played such a role at various moments in 
history.^42  ^ However, with the extension of the economy since 
the XIth century, a particular form of territorial organization 
has developed which has progressively replaced local rules, 
measures and languages with national ones : the state.(43^
The development of the nation-state has largely corresponded to 
the concomitant development of national tongues, norms, laws, 
measures, currencies, etc ..., facilitating the economic
f 44)activities of economic actors within states' territories,v 7 
but also implying a closure of the economies.
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(ii) From a macro-economic institutional point of view, 
consensual economic transactions may not be sufficient to 
institutionalize all economic wishes of the p e o p l e . o n  
the one hand, the market is unable to provide some types of 
goods, such as roads or early-age education, for example. In 
such instances of market "failures", the public system of 
institutions must provide artificial public goods. On the other 
hand, the market may sometimes create negative side effects 
which are not taken into account by the market itself. A 
typical example of such market negative "externalities" is 
pollution, which requires that norms be imposed by the public 
institutional system to make it more costly to pollute than 
would otherwise be the case if costs were allocated using the 
sole market system. Finally, market mechanisms may not lead to 
an allocation of wealth considered as being "just" in a given 
polity, which requires rules on economic redistribution.
As a consequence to these limits to the market, and 
simultaneously with the extension of the space of economic 
exchange above national territories, the state has developed as 
the political institution progressively taking over the task to 
provide the norms required by the development of the economy to 
fulfill wishes of the people which could not be fulfilled by 
the market. The role of the state has been fundamental in 
uniformizing and stabilizing the rules on its territory. In 
addition, it has progressively assumed itself an economic role, 
not only providing facilitative rules for transactions to 
occur, but also influencing transactions by prohibiting some of 
them, by increasing the cost of, or subsidizing, others.
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(3) In our transactional perspective, the way of looking at 
the changes brought by the globalization of the economy is to 
consider the geographical changes which occured in the extent 
of the networks of economic transactions.
Economic exchange - transactions - always take place using 
networks : the roads, railways or canals used to reach 
suppliers or customers, to go to markets or fairs, the phone to 
buy at a distance, the computer networks to transfer 
currencies, etc...
States have built their national e c o n o m i e s i n  
particular by building, or subsidizing, their national networks 
of communication and transportation.Using these national 
networks, firms have developed their own networks of exchange 
and communication, with their suppliers and distributors, 
customers and other contractors ; and thus, they have developed 
national e c o n o m i e s . I n  a liberal economy, if the state 
usually builds the networks of communication and 
transportation, it is private economic actors who, by using the 
national networks of communication and transportation, have 
built national economies. A "national economy" is always in 
fact a network of micro-economic exchange relationships : it 
consists in the sum of the transactions which occur using the 
networks of roads, railroads, railways, telephone networks, 
computer networks, etc... spreading over the territory ; and 
these transactions are for a great part coordinated by firms.
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As long as states were opposing strong barriers, through 
tariffs or otherwise, to the interfacing of the networks 
(physical or virtual), the sum of transactions occurring using 
the national networks could give the illusion of composing 
units, coherent and quasi self-sustaining "economies", 
inherently associated with the corresponding strips of land. 
With the globalization of markets, products and firms, and the 
interconnection of the transportation and communication 
networks which translates in a rate of growth of international 
economic exchange faster than that of Gross National Products, 
this whole association of "national economies" and national 
territories becomes outdated ; and this challenges the 
state-system of regulation of the economy.
2. Economic Integration Defined
(1) One can consider that a state of absolute economic 
integration ^50  ^ exists over a territory when there are no 
barriers impeding economic exchange among economic actors on 
such territory. Fundamentally, economic integration means that 
there is no discrimination among economic actors on the basis 
of their origin (territorial, racial, social, or other) on the 
economically integrated territory : they all transact on equal 
terms on the whole territory. Since we deal, in this book, with 
international economic integration, the sort of barriers we are 
most concerned with is the territorial kind. Some territorial 
barriers may be the result of natural conditions (oceans,
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mountains, etc ...) ; but institutions may create barriers of 
their own and it is with this type of barriers that we will be 
concerned in this book. It must be realized however that 
political institutions may play a great role in reducing the 
effect of natural barriers against exchange by building or 
subsidizing roads, canals, tunnels, bridges, phone companies,
airplane manufacturers, etc... A meaningful international
feconomic integration may thus require a positive action in the 
form of a reduction of physical barriers to economic exchange, 
in the same manner as this is done today, for example, by the 
institutions of the European Community to facilitate the 
integration of the European economy.
We will start our analysis by accepting in first 
approximation that in an economically integrated polity, there 
are no internal customs, forced trades, or anything equivalent, 
and that the norms applying on the territory being the same for 
all, no barriers exist due to differences in regulation. That 
means that goods and services are traded with their price 
determined by a pure market mechanism, within the set of 
constraints created by the political system. No customs means 
that no goods are loaded with a tariff which would advantage 
the goods (domestic) traded free of tariff. No forced trade 
means that consumers are free to buy from any producer they 
fashion, who are themselves equally free to sell to consumers 
whose trade they want. The fact that norms are the same for all 
means, for example, that no producer is subject to an 
anti-pollution statute having for effect to increase his costs,
- 25 -
while others are not, or that rules concerning the number of 
hours worked per week are the same everywhere, or that the 
amount of minimum wages to be paid is the same everywhere, 
etc... The fact that market forces are left undisturbed means, 
in short, that no one is forced to buy at a price higher than 
that otherwise available, and that no one is forced to sell at 
a price lower than market forces would normally command 
Consequently, no producer nor consumer is subsidized by 
political action.
One must realize that in highly integrated economies, there 
are usually actually some forms of economic discriminations 
among the various parts of their territory : economic activity 
on some part of the territory is subsidized, while it is 
disadvantaged on some others, through taxation or otherwise.
For example, it is usual for states to have policies providing 
economic incentives, fiscal or otherwise, to investments in the 
lesser developed parts of their territory ; or some taxes may 
be higher in some parts of such territory to discourage some 
sort of activity there, etc... such measures work very much 
like a tariff increasing the producers costs out of the polity 
imposing it, and thus increasing the prices domestic producers 
can command for like products, at the expense of local 
consumers. However, such forms of subdidization are usually 
decided for redistribution purposes by political institutions 
having jurisdiction over the whole territory considered.
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Such forms of redistribution may be desirable at the 
international level, particularly if one considers the task of 
providing a sound regime for a proper economic development of 
the third world. But such type of political action, if common 
at the national level, requires a higher degree of political 
union than the one existing at the international level today. 
Our immediate aim is thus only to set the foundations of a 
sound trading system, even though we hope and think that such 
system may eventually lead to higher forms of economic 
integration, and political union, accompanied by international 
redistribution policies (under the form of development 
subsidies, for example).
(2) As a first approximation, the state of international
"economic integration” among different states can then be
understood as a relative absence of artificially and
voluntarily created economic barriers between two or more
c o u n t r i e s . I n  an international context, the effect of the
economic barriers is felt at the political border, which then
becomes an economic frontier. An economic frontier in turn can
be defined as any demarcation over which mobilities of goods,
152)services and factors of production are relatively low.1 7 On
both sides of the "frontier", the determination of prices and 
the quality of goods, services and factors of production is 
only marginally influenced by the flows over the 
"frontier".(53)
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Because of our concentration on barriers to international
exchange erected by states, the political border is of
particular significance as an economic frontier. However, the
reader should be aware that economic frontiers do not
necessarily coincide with political borders, though they
commonly do. For one thing, one must notice that states are not
the only institutions imposing barriers to international
economic exchange. Regions, departments, local communities,
professional organizations, unions, etc... may also impede
international trade in a severe manner which may require that
restrictions to do so be imposed on them. We will not address
this issue - which usually is a domestic constitutional law
issue - here, notwithstanding the fact that it should be
addressed for the establishment of a sound international
economic regime. This is particularly true when the states
i54)integrated m  a new regime are themselves federal states.' '
In addition, the fact that there is a political border 
doesn't imply as such that there is an economic frontier. An 
economic frontier may naturally coincide with the political 
border when the political border between two countries has been 
partly determined through history by the presence of some 
geographical barrier hostile to economic intercourse between 
the two countries : a chain of high mountains, a lake, a 
desert, a swamp, ... Here, in a sense, it may be that the 
political border is a consequence of the economic frontier 
inhibiting the intercourse between two separate communities. It 
is also true that, generally speaking, even though economic 
frontiers can be very distinct from political borders, they 
commonly coincide. However,
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(i) there can also be artificial economic frontiers within 
the borders of a state : for example, long after France had 
become politically unified with a strong central state, 
trade within its borders remained impeded by internal 
tariff b a r r i e r s . F r a n c e  became a free trade area only 
in 1792.
(ii) On the other hand, in "multi-state integrated 
economies", i.e. federal or federal-like systems - such as 
the United States or, increasingly, the European Community 
-f57) internal political borders can be of little 
significance as economic frontiers.
All these refinements aside, it remains true that in most 
instances, the political border is often an economic frontier 
iust because it is a political border, implying the application 
of different rules having restrictive economic effects.
One can consider as a given that when there exists a 
geographical space divided into territories over which various 
institutions have sovereign jurisdiction, the existence of 
those several institutions is likely to create man-made 
barriers to economic exchange on such space. This is certainly 
the case in times of war or during other political conflicts 
accompanied by embargos or like-measures. However, even in 
times of peace among friendly nations there may be unnecessary 
barriers, deriving from the use by states of their sovereign 
right to create rules, institutions and norms independently one 
from another. Adopting norms or creating institutions having
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for purpose or effect to create economic barriers between two 
communities is like erecting a chain of mountains to isolate 
them, or increasing the distance separating them. If, for one 
reason or another, it is desired to facilitate intercourse 
between two communities, some sort of means must be found to 
reduce barriers. One of the purposes of international economic 
institutions is to reduce these barriers to international 
economic intercourse.
3. The International Economic Order
(1) There is an obvious conflict or dilemma between the 
claim of domestic political autonomy, of "sovereignty", and the 
need for international rules to allow for international 
economic stability ; the purpose of the existing institutions 
of the world economic order is to attempt to solve this 
dilemma.
The need for rules at the international level comes from
the absolute need for rules for markets to function. Just as a
stable institutional environment is required for the effective
functioning of the market at the national l e v e l , s o  such
an environment is necessary at the international level.
International transactions, being affected by the policies of
numerous governments, are exposed to a higher degree of
uncertainty than domestic o n e s . I t  is therefore
necessary, for the market forces to work at the international
level in an orderly fashion, that an accepted system of rules,
governing those policies in national economies which have
/ g2 \effects in other national economies, be developed.
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(2) The international economic order can be perceived as 
consisting of two sets of rules : one relates to the "real" 
side - that is trade, investment, factor movements, ... of the 
world-economy ; the other relates to the monetary side of the 
world-economy. The recognized purpose of the corpus of 
monetary and trade rules is to allow the effective functioning 
of an integrated world m a r k e t . P r i c e  changes can then 
convey to all participants information about investment 
opportunities, allowing firms to plan for expansion or 
adjustment.
The monetary rules ought to ensure the stability of 
exchange rates if an integrated world-economy is to be created. 
But, short of that, rules can ensure at least the 
convertibility of national currencies, which is necessary to 
allow the coordination of multilateral trade through the 
market.(66)
On the "real" side, trade rules in GATT are the only
multilateral rules at the global - if not universal - level.
Based on the principle of reciprocity,^67  ^ the
Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) p r i n c i p l e , a n d  the National
Treatment p r i n c i p l e , t h e y  have both the function to
ensure equality, i.e. nondiscrimination. among competitors, and
some minimal stability in trading conditions.^70  ^ Rules
concerning freedom of investment and of factor movements are
i71)increasingly important for micro-economic actors ;' 7 but so
far, they do not fall under the jurisdiction of GATT, and are
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dealt with bilaterally, generally in
Friendship-Commerce-Navigation (FCN) treaties. The content of 
such treaties varies, but their main rules are also based on 
reciprocity, MFN and non-discrimination principles. They 
usually provide for (a) rights of entry for business and 
residence ; (b) protection of individuals and companies ; (c) 
rights and privileges of individuals and companies with respect 
to : (1) practice of profession ; (2) acquisition of property ;
(3) patents ; (4) taxes ; (5) remittance of earnings and 
capital ; (6) competition of state-owned enterprises ; (7) 
expropriation or nationalization ; (8) access to 
courts .,.^72^
The facilitative function of rules^73  ^ is relatively well 
fulfilled at the international level by the existence of a 
network of international bilateral or multilateral 
treaties.^74  ^ It is at the level of the institutions, such as 
GATT, whose jurisdiction imply that they have to deal with the 
fulfillment of interventionist state functions which imply 
interferences with the functioning of the market mechanisms 
that difficulties are mostly felt. It is for the development of 
such institutions that we will try to develop a new type of 
analysis.
He first have to make clear what our purposes - and the 
purpose of economic integration generally speaking - is.
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4. The Purpose of Economic Integration
(1) Many different types of arguments are made from various 
corners to advocate international economic integration. Two 
types of arguments are made by economists and business people, 
which are mostly directed against protectionism, and favor 
economic integration because it increases welfare. Other 
arguments are made by various internationalists, ecologists, 
etc... in favor of economic integration because it favors 
increased political cooperation among states. Finally, it is 
often claimed that economic integration is positive because it 
prevents war.
(i) For economists, the fundamental significance of 
economic integration is that differences in the prices and 
availability of equivalent goods, services and factors of 
production are decreased to the irreducible minima arising 
from spatial differentiation.^75  ^ It is generally held 
that this improves the "welfare" in the integrated 
economies : there are winners and loosers, but the economy 
as a whole is better off. 7^6  ^ In other words, economists 
argue that protectionism should be rejected because it is 
"inefficient".^77^
(ii) The other argument against protectionism is made by 
some business people who argue that, in a world where the 
costs of research and development are large, they must have 
access to a global market in order to justify their
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efforts. 7 Some also invoke the need for large markets 
to fully benefit from economies of scale. Without access to 
large markets, they argue that they cannot make as much 
research, investments, etc... as they could otherwise, and 
that they do not hire as many people as they could if 
markets were openned.
(iii) In addition to these two arguments in favor of
integration (because they reject protectionism) there is an
argument in favor of integration which is more directed at
the benefits derived from political cooperation among
states. Thus, it is often said that, in many different
fields, international agreement on economic policy is
useful, and often necessary, because independent national
actions to promote trade or stability or other economic
policies will usually be frustrated by the actions of other 
(79)states.v 7 For example, it is often said that states
should agree on rules preventing export subsidies because
if let free, states will enter a competitive game in which
they will reciprocally subsidize sectors of their economy
in a costly and ineffective manner leading to wide
inefficiencies in the world economy. Or it is often claimed
that states should agree on common norms to protect workers
from international competition, to prevent pollution, etc
... These are only examples, and there are many other
instances where it is held that international cooperation
is necessary to bring order in the international 
(80)economy.' 7
( 7 8 )
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(iv) Lastly, there is an argument in favor of economic 
integration, mostly made by political scientists, and which 
addresses the issue at another level than the previous 
arguments we have mentioned. It does not refer to benefits 
derived from economic integration in terms of increased 
welfare, be it for the economy as a whole or for dynamic 
exporting companies. Neither does it refer to the benefits 
from economic integration in terms of efficiency of the 
political system of economic regulation. Some simply claim 
that economic integration reduces international tensions, 
and the risk that retaliation against actions felt as being 
offensive may lead to more retaliation, and eventually to 
w a r . I n  particular, the connection between free trade 
and peace was relentlessly made by someone like John 
Maynard Keynes. 8^ 2 ^
(2) Some sort of connection is sometimes made by authors 
between these various arguments in favor of economic 
integration. However, there is no articulate theory explaining 
the relationship there is between these arguments. That there 
is a relationship and that the arguments are not mutually 
contradictory is in fact not obvious. For example, economists 
say that a protectionist state hurts its consumers and its 
economy taken as a whole, which as a whole is made less 
efficient by protectionism than it would otherwise be. But it 
is then a wonder to find why a pro-trade state could go to war 
against a protectionist state if the latest is only hurting
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itself ? If free trade is so good for the economy as a whole, 
and in particular for consumers who buy cheaper products and 
services, how is it possible (i) that protectionism is so 
widespread, and (ii) for what reason would a state be ready to 
go to war to change a policy which we are said only hurts the 
protectionist state's economy ?
One simple explanation is that neither the end nor the 
actual functioning of public institutions making trade policy 
is to maximise consumption as usually assumed by economists. If 
the interests of consumers are somewhat taken into account in 
trade policy - which is one of the reasons why we have a 
relatively open system -^83) trade policy makers also take 
into account other interests in making their decisions. Of 
particular importance are (i) the interests of domestic 
producers^84  ^ and (ii) the interest policy-makers perceive 
there is in protecting the set of regulatory and other 
interventionist economic policies of their state, which we can 
loosely term the "national economic redistribution system".
(i) The interest of domestic producers is neither in free 
trade nor protectionism per se. Depending on their position 
in the business cycle, domestic producers' interests may 
either be to have their potential markets expanded by free 
trade policies or to obtain protection from foreign 
competition by the erection of protectionist barriers. The 
interest of national producers thus depends on the 
competitive conditions in their industry, which vary from 
industry to industry, except when recessions affect all
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sectors of the economy. If a state wants to take into 
account the interests of its domestic producers, it must 
thus have differentiated trade policies, according to the 
position of such producers in international economic 
competition.
(ii) In addition to protecting the interests of the 
domestic economy as a whole, of domestic consumers and of 
domestic producers, states trade policy makers have in mind 
another set of concerns. Since the invention of the welfare 
state, the state can be perceived in part as being a huge 
redistribution machinery influencing the allocation of 
economic resources though regulatory, fiscal or other types 
of measures. Of concern for states is that their 
redistribution policies may be disturbed by foreign 
competition. For example, if they prohibit some type of 
production process because it has for side effect acid 
rains destroying forests, they may be afraid that if their 
neighbours don't do the same and that if borders are kept 
open to the products produced using the poluting production 
process (usually cheaper than the clean one), the end 
result will be the depletion of the local industry for the 
type of products concerned and the depletion of forests, 
since rains tend to be ignorant about political borders. Or 
states may be concerned that if competition in labor 
intensive products from countries with labor costs at a 
fraction of theirs is set free, this may lead to high 
unemployment and deplete their unemployment support
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programs. There are obviously many other types of economic 
policies which states fear would be dramatically challenged 
by free trade, and here again, these are only examples.
The interaction of all those partial interests in and out 
of the institutions in charge with trade policy-making leads to 
actual trade policies. At any given point in time, some 
interests dominate others. For example, in times of economic 
crisis, lousy producers' interests may dominate since keeping a 
free trade policy, and thus letting international competition 
play its role, may lead to massive unemployment which may 
create difficult political problems. The short term interest of 
trade policy-makers (to limit unemployment) is congruent with 
that of troubled firms (to limit foreign competition). It 
is true that limiting competition limits the adaptation of 
domestic producers to competition conditions, and is not in the 
long term interests of society. But only institutions and norms 
can provide the potential means to counterbalance the short 
term interests of both sectional interests and politicians with 
the long term interest of society. Inadequate institutions and 
norms explain why this counterbalancing does not properly occur 
today, and why protectionism is so widespread.
(3) We think our transaction approach has the advantage to 
explain the wonders of trade policy and what can be done about 
it because neither consumption nor production is at its roots 
and comes first in the analysis. It claims neither that the
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interests of consumers nor that those of producers should come 
first in policy decision-making. Because the general interest 
is the end of political institutions, in the context of a 
market society which considers that in principle, the market is 
the best server of the general interest because of the 
socializing consequences transactions have, it is transactions 
per se which should be set free as much as possible. This leads 
us to a second consideration which is that our approach is 
neither of a micro-type (taking into account the interest of 
each consumer who must pay more if protectionist policies are 
adopted, or taking into account the interests of a particular 
firm, depending on its position in the business cycle, ...) nor 
of a macro-type (taking into account the interest of the 
economy as a whole, of peace, ...). It is both micro and macro 
because each transaction has both micro and macro-consequences. 
Someone who likes red-sporty italian cars see his welfare 
increased by purchasing a Ferrari. Simultaneously, he or she 
buys a part of Italian culture and traditions, and improves the 
Italian economy, contributing in reducing unemployment, 
contributing through the taxes paid to the Italian budget, 
etc... Buying a foreign good amounts to buying the culture> 
norms, institutions, etc ... embedded into such good, and thus 
this micro-action has macro-consequences.
What is at the root of our analysis is thus the exchange 
relationship, and what we will consider in this book is the set 
of social consequences this relationship has which are relevant 
for an analysis of the institutional system within which trade 
policy should be decided.
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One of the advantages of our type of transaction approach 
is to give a single explanation to the different arguments in 
favor of economic integration and to be able to show how 
micro-barriers (at the transactional level) can lead to 
macro-effects (at the political level) and how these 
macro-effects are explainable due to unwarranted political 
interferences in micro-transactions.
(4) Here again, one has to start with the basic market 
transaction. There is something magical with market exchange : 
when two individuals mutually and voluntarily give up something 
in exchange for something given up by the other, both 
individuals are better off.^86  ^ No one loses, both parties 
win. For this reason, exchange is fundamentally just, equal and 
fair in an automatic way : by agreeing to exchange, each party 
improves the welfare of the other by improving its own. There 
is normally (but there are exceptions) no need for any external 
political interference to intervene in this exchange 
relationship to tip the scales to ensure justice. On the 
contrary, interfering with market exchange in the absence of a 
proper justification is unjust.^87^
One can then present protectionism in market society as 
being fundamentally uniust. And since part of the process of 
economic integration consists in preventing protectionism, at 
least part of the purpose of economic integration is to ensure 
justice.
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We will see this with a trivial example. Let's assume that 
a state adopts a measure which is unquestionably protectionist, 
with our transaction-institutional approach, protectionism is 
unjust (a) for would-be parties to transactions prevented due 
to the protectionist measure, and (b) for "the economy as a 
whole" (and thus the actors within it), which suffers due to 
the inefficiency created. In terms of injustice, there are thus 
both domestic and foreign effects to a protectionist policy :
(i) Starting with the domestic effects of protectionism, it 
takes away wealth from consumers to give it to protected 
sectional interests at the expense of consumers and of the 
general efficiency of the economy.^88  ^ This is a sort of 
redistribution of income policy, and it is unjust under 
normal circumstances. Why is this type of redistribution 
policy unjust, when there are so many other forms of 
redistribution in modern society which are not complained 
about ? According to what critérium should this form of 
redistribution be nailed ? Protectionism is unjust because 
it is more often the case than not that one cannot find any 
laudable reason to take away money from consumers, who are 
commiting no crime when purchasing goods, to give it to 
lousy producers, who would not get the consumers' trade but 
for the redistribution policy. The whole purpose of having 
a market society is that it gives an incentive to people to 
be better than their competitors. If the market mechanism 
is tainted by redistribution policies which serve no other 
policy than that of subsidizing producers for the mere sake
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that they are national producers, then it can be said that, 
in the context of an international market society, 
protectionism is unjust.
At the domestic level, when unjust redistribution policies 
are imposed within one polity, there is internal political 
resistance when the sectional interests hurted are able 
(i.e. if the institutional system allows it) and willing to 
organize themselves to resist. This does not always happen. 
But with protectionism, this very rarely happens at all 
since those who suffer are (a) the economy as a whole, 
without the possibility to easily weight how much, 
which makes it difficult to organize resistance, and (b) 
consumers, who are notoriously unable to organize 
themselves to act politically.
(ii) But protectionism is also a source of injustice for 
constituents of other polities than the protectionist one, 
since international transactions which would otherwise 
occur do not occur because of the protectionist measure. 
Would be exporters to the protectionist state are then 
deprived of outlets for their products. This is neither 
just not unjust in the absolute as long as foreigners have 
no right to sell their products in the protectionist 
country. However, if it is seriously believed that the 
market is a good socializer at the international level as 
well as at the national one, and that thus barriers to the 
interfacing of national markets into a world market should 
be eliminated, then protectionism is unjust for would-be
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foreign exporters, for the same reason that it is unjust 
for domestic consumers : lousy producers are protected from 
loosing market share to the benefit of presumably more 
efficient foreign producers, whom domestic consumers would 
prefer to trade with.
This explains how retaliatory protectionism, even though it 
is economically absurd, may occur due to the sentiment of 
injustice felt outside the state imposing it. The 
traditional economic analysis of protectionism rightly 
shows that states imposing protectionist measures are 
hurting their own economy voluntarily, that this is 
inefficient, and that thus retaliation is absurd. It cannot 
explain how protectionism and retaliation are widespread 
phenomenon in a world where people are prone to think and 
act rationally. Our analysis can explain this and how, in 
the presence of imperfect institutions, rationality and 
protectionism can co-exist, and why it is imperfect 
institutions which should be blamed for it. Where 
protectionist measures are imposed in a polity, potential 
exporters in the protected country are hurted outside of 
the state imposing protection, and this is where they will 
usually react, their only device being to use the political 
institutions of their own state to try to hurt the 
wrongdoer. This often leads to retaliation, and more 
protectionism, which is certainly absurd but happens 
because our actual institutions imperfectly represent the 
various interests of society.
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There is then a paradox : retaliation is absurd, but it 
occurs because states apparatusses are circumvented for 
sectional interests : in the protectionist state, those of 
the protected sector ; in the retaliating state, those of 
the sector which exports are prevented due to the 
protectionist measure.
In our perspective of preventing protectionism for justice 
purposes, and explaining the prevalence of protectionism due to 
imperfect institutions, the most difficult problem to deal with 
is posed by these measures which appear to some (usually 
suffering from them out of the state imposing it) as being 
protectionist and which appear to others (usually, sectional 
interests in the state imposing the measures and benefitting 
from them) as being taken for perfectly laudable political 
reasons.
The difficulty is that in modern society, justice is a 
little bit more complex than I have said so far. If markets 
were perfect, ensuring justice through trade would be 
relatively easy : opening borders would do the job. However, we 
know that markets are not p e r f e c t , a n d  this is where 
difficulties really begin.
(5) Fundamentally, as we have already seen, there are three 
sorts of imperfections in markets :
- 44 -
(i) Some sort of goods ("public goods") are not, or are 
inadequatly, supplied by the market, and must be provided 
by public institutions, which have the capacity to tax on a 
given territory to finance the creation or maintenance of 
such goods. At the international level, the provision and 
maintenance of such goods often requires cooperation among 
states. The mere fact that there is progressive 
internationalization of society makes that we need more 
international cooperation in this respect. However, this 
first type of market imperfection is not an issue for our 
immediate concern. Providing public goods may be perceived 
as subsidizing one's economy : better schools, roads, 
airports, etc... improve its functioning. But, except in 
unusual circumstances, this type of subsidization should 
not be prohibited by international economic law.
(ii) When economic exchange has effects on more interests 
than on those purely private interests taken into account 
by the economic actors directly involved in the 
transaction, and when such effects are negative (the 
economists' so-called "negative externalities") there is 
need for political intervention, usually under the form of 
regulation. The system of economic regulation, at the 
decentralized and centralized levels (of which there may be 
several : regions, states, international organizations), 
should ensure that such interests are taken into account. 
Most of the developments of this book address this issue, 
since it is often extremely difficult to distinguish
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warranted regulation and protectionist legislation. A 
normative analysis must be made, allowing to find according 
to what rationale some sort of regulations should be 
condemned as protectionist while others should be accepted. 
An institutional analysis must complement this normative 
analysis to show what institutions should be developed to 
ensure justice in regulation. This books aims at addressing 
this issue under both normative and institutional aspects. 
But it is necessary to first examine another source of 
market imperfection raising a justice problem in both 
domestic and international society, which we can put out of 
our way relatively quickly.
(iii) Even assuming a functioning of the market under 
regulatory circumstances ensuring the internalization of 
all market negative externalities, this may not lead to an 
allocation of wealth politically considered as 
" j u s t " . F o r  example, a polity may estimate that it is 
not just that those who are unable to command wages above a 
certain minimum should be left to work for wages below such 
minimum, and thus may impose regulations on minimum wages. 
Or a polity may estimate that children below a certain age 
should not be employed, etc... Within one polity, such type 
of rules limit competition, and thus limit the freedom to 
transact. Some means to get a competitive edge are simply 
prohibited because we find collectively, today, that they 
should not be allowed. Some say that such rules are 
economically inefficient. This may be true or not, and it
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is not our purpose to discuss this issue here. In our 
perspective, as long as these measures are constitutionally 
decided, even if they impose a cost on the economy due to 
the inefficiencies created, they must be accepted as being 
just. If, for example, a majority in the polity does not 
agree that those who are not able to obtain more than a 
certain amount of wage through free transactions should be 
subsidized, then the law should be changed : the political 
system is made for this. But this type of political 
decisions should not be prohibited as such by the 
institutions of the international economic integration. 
However, what some argue is that such policies cannot be 
sustained if free trade with countries with lower standards 
is alowed. This may be true if the country adopting the 
policy has completely lost its comparative advantage in the 
world economy. But adopting protectionist policies to 
protect welfare redistribution policies is still something 
of an absurdity. Wealth can be redistributed only if it is 
created, and in an internationalized economy, that is, in 
an economy where the division of labor extends above states 
borders, imposing protectionism certainly reduces wealth, 
and eventually eliminates the possibility to redistribute 
something which does not exist anymore. One can think about 
the economic fate of Albania, for example, to imagine what 
redistributing wealth may mean in a closed economy. In some 
developed economies, it often happens that business men 
require protection or the lowering of minimum wages to be
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able to compete with their foreign competitors. Lowering
minimum wages is politically difficult, and politicians may
be induced to prefer providing protection. This is absurd :
in those industries where even the payment of minimum wages
only prevents producers to effectively compete with their
foreign counterparts, this simply means that the industry
has lost its comparative advantage. That may be too bad for
local producers (but they have the possibility to
delocalize, or at least, this is a right they should have
and which should be internationally traded against free 
(93)trade)' ' ; but is is quite a positive sign for the
polity loosing its comparative advantage. How is it 
possible to complain when a rich country looses its 
comparative advantage in labor intensive industries in 
favor of pauper labor countries ? It is not an ordeal to be 
rich, and it is certainly not because producers may have to 
change activity as a consequence that borders should be
closed to make the country poor again !
(6) As should already be clear from many of our examples 
and expressed concerns, advocating international economic 
integration is certainly not akin to advocating the "death of 
the state", the disappearance of the state as a meaningful 
policy maker. However, it may in some way conflict with the
concept of sovereignty as traditionally perceived. It is true
that to build new institutions to integrate the global economy 
on the basis of market principles, we fundamentally need to 
share some basic rules :
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(i) First, and it is easier to agree on this today than 
just a few years ago, the market should be perceived as 
being the prime socializer. Other forms of international 
economic integrations than those driven by market forces 
may be possible, for example by coordinating 
planifications, as was the case in the now defunct COMECON. 
But, irrespective of obvious efficiency considerations, 
such a form of international economic integration simply 
could not be plugged into today's international economic 
system, which at its roots is mostly and increasingly 
composed of market economies.
(ii) Second, there should be a common set of fundamental 
rules prohibiting some forms of competition, such as the 
prohibition of slavery, of child labor, etc... There is a 
bare minimum, to be defined in common, below which we 
cannot agree to let the free play of competition work. 
However, since people around the world do not share the 
same values, and have differences of appreciation with 
regards to the meaning of common values, it must also be 
acknowledged that there may be instances where removing 
economic barriers may collide with cultural, religious and 
other v a l u e s . i n  such instances, the constitutional 
documents establishing a multi-state economic integration 
must provide that the preservation of such values may 
warrant economic barriers. This is the case today in 
particular in GATT,^95  ^ and in the European Economic 
Community,^96  ^ whose treaties contain strikingly similar
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provisions in this respect. This point is fundamental and 
should be stressed so that the reader is not mislead by the 
developments in this book : economic integration can only 
go as far as a community of culture and values allows it to 
go.<97>
5. Objective and Plan cf the Book
The objective of this book is to develop a scheme of 
analysis to determine what types of institutional mechanisms 
could be developed to prevent the creation of unnecessary 
barriers to international economic exchange. Its perspective is 
in the continuity of the European conceptual and historical 
experience which has shown how original forms of institutions 
can be progressively developed to integrate economies which 
were previously divided among competing nation-states to create 
an area of peace, economic dynamism and political freedom. Its 
perspective is also comparative in that it will consider the 
American federal experience as relevant in this sense that it 
is also the history of a progressive integration of originally 
divided states with little federal powers into a common single 
market largely federally regulated.
In addition, both the United States and the European 
Community systems allow a certain degree of political and legal 
autonomy of states, and this is their relevance, as systems, to 
the larger system of integration of Western type economies.
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In a first Part, we will consider the institutional needs 
accompanying international economic integration. He will first 
show that economic integration is structurally akin to legal 
integration, prior to look at the GATT-system and its 
historical origins. He will then show how GATT's function in
the world-economy is a constitutional one, which can not
adequately be fulfilled by such a primitive institution.
In a second Part, we will study how non-tariff barriers are 
eliminated in the two largest federal systems in the world :
the United States and the European Community. He will see that
these barriers are eliminated using two very distinct 
institutional mechanisms : (i) the creation of central norms, 
uniformizing competition conditions on the federalized 
territory, and (ii) the prevention of state protectionism by 
judicial interventions, prohibiting states' norms having 
discriminatory intent.
In the third Part, we will try to break a theoretical path 
towards a world economic constitution. He will develop an 
extended economic analysis of federalism to present the type of 
new deal which could be made among states to develop 
institutional mechanisms able to address in a meaningful manner 
the various types of non-tariff barriers existing in the world 
of today. Our analysis of federalism will also show the 
fundamental role played by micro-economic actors to maintain 
the institutional equilibrium of federal systems. It will show 
that a new global system will be developed only if corporate 
forces benefiting from an increased integration of the 
world-economy are harnessed to counterweight the protectionist 
forces resisting institutional change.
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PART I
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND INSTITUTIONAL WEEDS
We will first show how economic integration can be 
meaningfully understood only as legal integration (§1.1)* We 
will then quickly present the functioning of the GATT-System, 
as well as its historical origins (§1.2). Finally, we will show 
how GATT can be perceived as an embryonic federal state and 
review how inadequately it fulfills its constitutional function 
(SI.3).
1.1 ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AS LEGAL INTEGRATION
The problems created by the development of an international
economy all stem from the fact that while markets are unifying,
( 981sovereignty is divided.' ' In this section, we will show how
economic integration can be understood as legal integration, 
and how the various issues raised as a consequence of the 
increased internationalization of the economy are due to an 
absence of legal institutions or mechanisms suited to 
internationalized markets and companies.
We will first see that the traditional, mechanical approach 
to economic integration, mostly developed by economists, is 
ill-adapted to the complexities of today's global economy 
(S 1.1.1).
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A more fruitful approach is to attempt to expand the 
results of the comparative analysis of federalism (S 1.1.2). 
This approach allows to teleologically conceptualize the 
existing system of regulation of the international economy as 
the embryo of a world federal state, and to confront the 
paucity of the existing mechanisms with the richness of the 
approach necessary to respond appropriately to new global 
issues (S 1.1.3).
l.l.l. The Inadequacy of the Traditional Taxonomy of
Economic Integration
(1) The conventional wisdom on economic integration comes
/ go \from Balassa's seminal work.v ' According to the Balassain 
model of economic integration, there are various forms of 
economic integrations, representing varying stages of 
integration. In first approximation, one can distinguish 
between the following :
(i) In a free trade area, tariffs (and quantitative 
restrictions) between the participating countries are 
abolished, but each country retains its own tariffs against 
non-members ;
(ii) the establishment of a customs union involves in 
addition the creation of a common external tariff wall against 
non-member countries ;
(iii) a higher form of economic integration is attained in 
a r:raninrm market, where restrictions on factor movements, i.e. 
raw materials, people, companies and capital, are also 
abolished ;
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(iv) an economic union combines with the elements of a 
common market a certain degree of harmonization of economic, 
fiscal, monetary, social and countercyclical policies ;
(v) finally, total economic integration presupposes the 
unification of economic, fiscal and other policies.(10°)
(2) The major difficulty with the Balassain model of stages 
of economic integration is that it contains a serious flaw, 
ultimately recognized by Balassa himself.^101  ^ The 
definitions given conform to the principles of classical 
economic doctrines but do not apply to present day market 
economies, which are characterized by a considerable degree of 
state intervention.(102) in a world of non-intervention by 
the state in markets, the erasure of classical protectionist 
measures may make national frontiers quasi-irrelevant as 
economic frontiers. However, the augmented scope of government 
intervention makes such frontiers economically relevant, even 
if there were to be complete abolition of traditional 
protectionism under the form of tariffs or quotas.
States entering into any form of economic integration thereby 
want to promote to some degree "free" and "fair” competition 
between the economic actors established on their territories.
In the regulatory environment of modern economic life though, 
eliminating tariffs alone will not be sufficient to fulfill 
this aim.*104  ^ Competition between economic units originating 
from different states is not only distorted by tariff barriers, 
but also by the numberless non-tariff obstacles to trade.(105)
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(3) The additional degree of complexity added to the 
analysis of international economic integration due to the 
economic role of the state is increased by the simultaneous 
need of centralization and decentralization in the provision of 
norms regulating market activity.
To take the example of environment protection, if global 
issues require global norms, not all environmental issues are 
global and, given the usually poor performance of 
bureaucracies, it would be absurd to centralize the process of 
norms creation for all environmental matters. It is typically 
production pollution prevention which in some cases requires 
centralization in the process of norms creation. This is 
necessary to avoid states' competition in providing to 
producers under their jurisdiction a relative comparative 
advantage preventing the decentralized adoption of 
decentralized n o r m s . W i t h  regards to consumption 
pollution, centralization of regulation usually makes no sense :
(i) Production pollution requires centralization in the 
process of norms creation when it involves an over 
exploitation of global commons, such as the oceans, the 
atmosphere or the global climate. For example, the 
depletion of the ozone layer, which protects the Earth's 
surface from the harmful effects of the sun's ultraviolet 
light, urgently requires international cooperation.^107)
No state alone can do anything to dramatically improve 
matters with regards to this i s s u e , a n d  divided 
states may even be prevented from adopting the necessary 
norms by international economic competition.(109)
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(ii) With regards to consumption pollution, the situation 
is wholly different. Consumption pollution is usually local 
and creates local harm. It is logical that local polities 
should be the ones deciding whether there is harm, and what 
to do about it. For example, some may consider that 
consumption pollution under the form of littering of cans 
of beer or soft drinks is obnoxious and should be 
prohibited ; some may consider that it does not matter or 
that the harm does not justify having more cops to check 
what people throw on the streets ; some may think that a 
clever way of solving the problem is to create an economic 
incentive for people to keep their cans instead of throwing 
them away, by giving the cans an artificial economic value, 
for example by statutorily requiring retailers of the 
concerned beverages to pay to consumers a statutory defined 
"refund value" for the cans they return.(110) Some may 
think that a blending of all possible solutions is 
appropriate ; but in any case, there is really no reason 
why there should be an international agreement on what to 
do with empty cans of beer.f111) Public institutions 
should answer to the needs of the people which can not be 
adequately fulfilled by the market, and as a general rule, 
the closest institutions are to them, the better they can 
fulfill these needs.^112  ^ It is only when there is some 
impossibility for the need to be fulfilled at the 
decentralized level that there should be centralization, 
which is often the case for production pollution regulation
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due to states' competition. But this is not usually so for 
consumption pollution regulation, because it usually does 
not entail some form of competition among states to be 
avoided. The costs deriving from the regulation of 
consumption pollution are usually paid by consumers, and 
since consumers are somewhat bound (as consumers) to the 
territory of their state, states are not prevented from 
adopting necessary measures by the existence of competing 
states.
(4) To summarize the institutional issue created by the 
globalization of the economy, if we heuristically treat the 
world-economy as one polity composed of several states, such 
polity can not combine over time a policy of fully open state 
borders and a complete decentralization of all positive state 
functions simultaneously, a complete centralization of
all state functions would be inefficient.
In the traditional wisdom, the dilemma between open borders 
and positive state may lead to three outcomes : 1^14  ^ (i) An 
abandonment of positive policy initiatives combined with a 
confirmation of open borders ; (ii) a continuation of open 
borders combined with a centralization of positive policy ; or 
(iii) a continuation of disintegrated (non-central) positive 
policy combined with a withdrawal from open borders.
The first outcome (the abandonment of the state as a 
policy-maker) and the third outcome (the abandonment of open 
borders policy) are clearly unacceptable for us. The second
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possible outcome is unacceptable because of the shortcomings 
associated with a centralization of positive government 
functions mentioned above. However, a fourth and richer 
approach, which we will propose in this book, allows us to 
contemplate what would be an appropriate blending between 
centralization and decentralization of positive state functions 
in such a manner that open borders can be combined with the 
existence of positive states. This approach, I contend, is an 
enrichment of the existing economic analysis of federalism.
1.1.2. The Economic Analysis of Federalism
(1) In the light of the development of the positive - i.e., 
interventionist - state, a line of inquiry of economic 
integration consists in an analysis of the economics of 
f e d e r a l i s m . T h e  economic theory of federalism is a 
branch of the economics of the positive state.^116  ^ its 
starting point is the classical liberal/individualistic view of 
society which is that as long as private markets efficiently 
allocate goods and services through the price system, the 
various preferences and resource valuation of the different 
individuals will be institutionalized by means of a network of 
consensual transactions.However, it is then assumed 
that when such institutionalization does not spontaneously 
occur, the sovereign will intervene in private markets to 
provide public goods, force the internalization of social 
costs, redistribute wealth and employ macro-economic 
instruments to control economic growth, price stability, 
employment needs and balance of payments.^ ^
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The "law and economics" approach used in the economic
analysis of federalism, developed by Heller, may be best
understood as a type of structural explanation which attempts
to offer a synthetical account of political, economic and legal
i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h i s  assimilation occurs through a
theoretical reduction of each set of institutions to a
concurrent aspect of a single cultural form.(12°) The
argument does not suggest a causal priority for legal,
political or economic factors per se. 1^21) Rather, modern
legal and economic theory are both described as manifestations
11221of a broader cultural expression labelled liberalism.1 '
The essential unity of the disciplines lies in their common
reference to a consistent set of analytical categories which
reflect a particular account of human experience : one that
stresses the voluntaristic activities of individual subjects
and constructs social relations as the aggregate of free
1123)exchanges between these actors.' '
(2) With this approach, there is a direct connection 
between market society and democracy. The autonomy of the 
individual and the structuring of social relationships based on 
free consents to restrictions to such autonomy, either 
contractual or through norms democratically adopted, are the 
roots of the system. The principle is that socialization 
normally occurs through consensual transactions ; however, 
since this does not always suffice, public institutions must 
intervene. Because the end of social institutions is the 
fulfillment of individuals' needs, restrictions on individuals'
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autonomy may only come through means which are least damaging 
to individuals' autonomy, i.e. normative constraints 
democratically adopted through the majoritarian principle.
Heller developed his theory in the context of American 
federalism. The federalist economic analysis has a normative 
goal which is to determine the optimal assignment of these 
different political tasks to more central political 
u n i t s . However, the normative goal of the economic 
analysis of federalism is relevant in an international context 
to determine what scope and structure international economic 
organizations should have. Further, within the context of an 
international economy functioning - or at least, aiming at 
functioning - as a market economy, the liberal view of society 
that it should be primarily institutionalized by consensual 
transactions is also relevant. Only this residual part of 
individuals' value choices and preferences which can not be 
institutionalized by the market should, in this perspective, be 
left to political institutions, domestic or international. 
However, the liberal system requires these institutions to 
exist or the whole construction may - and maybe now does - 
collapse.
The structural nature of the analysis developed by Heller 
allowed him to make a comparative study of the development of 
the institutions of the European Community, which increasingly 
resemble those of a federal state. My intention is to use a 
similar approach to study the global economy, its existing 
institutions being studied for heuristic purposes as the embryo 
of a primitive global federal state.
1 . 1 . 3 .  T h e  U s e fu ln e s s  o f  th e  E co n o m ic A n a ly s is  o f  F e d e ra lis m  
f o r  In t e r n a t io n a l E co n o m ic In s t it u t io n s
(1) The usefulness of the economic analysis of federalism 
for a study of economic integration at the global level is not 
obvious. There is no such thing as a world federal state which 
would directly present the issue of the optimal assignment of 
the different functions of the positive state between the world 
federal government and state (decentralized) ones.(125)
However, economic integration between liberal national 
economies presents exactly the same problem at the global level 
as at the federal one, within such large federal systems as the 
United States or the European Community, for example.
(2) Starting with the institutions in existence at the 
global level, it is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
("GATT") which now serves as a surrogate of a global state, but 
in the limited field of international trade in goods. As we 
know,(126) there is yet no equivalent for services or 
investments, which are mostly dealt with in bilateral treaties. 
Saying that GATT serves as a surrogate of a global state is not 
to say that institutionally, the GATT now looks like anything 
like a state. The GATT is not even an organization : it is 
merely an agreement to prohibit quotas and reduce tariffs, and 
to prevent states from imposing some of the measures having an 
equivalent effect to quotas or tariffs.^127  ^ Further, GATT 
deals only with international trade in goods ; international
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services and investments, for example, are not under its 
jurisdiction. Additionally, the existing system of interfacing 
of the national economies is under tremendous dynamic pressure 
due to the globalization of the economy, and many say that the 
GATT is dead and that it is only a General Agreement to Talk 
and Talk.<128)
(3) The very institutional limits of GATT, which is only an 
agreement with a limited scope, combined with its experienced 
inadequacies, provide good evidence to suggest that it is at 
least partly these constitutional limits which explain these 
inadequacies. The usefulness of the economic analysis of 
federalism is to make clear that if one takes seriously the 
goal assigned to GATT, the development of an organization 
moving closer to resemble a state is a necessity. This does not 
mean that it is necessary to go all the way at the outset. But 
is is necessary to build a system allowing more internal 
institutional evolution than is the case now when evolution 
becomes needed in practice.
To fulfill the ultimate goal of GATT, we will see in the 
last part of this book that (i) its jurisdiction must be 
expanded to include services, investments, etc ... and (ii) it 
must be put at the center of an institutional system fulfilling 
at the international level some of the functions internally 
fulfilled by nation-states. But prior to even start the 
analysis leading to such conclusion, we will first review the 
existing GATT-system and its shortcomings.
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1 . 2 .  T h e  G A TT-SYSTEM  AND IT S  L IM IT S
In a first sub-section, we will present the GATT-system and 
how it is stumbling on the issue of non-tariff 
barriers (§1 *2 .1). This is logical since non-tariff barriers 
derive from states' use of their sovereign power to regulate 
their economies, which is inappropriately regulated by GATT. We 
will show in a second sub-section, by looking at its historical 
origins, that it has always been the role of GATT to limit 
states' capacity to adopt protectionist measures (SI*2.2).
1 . 2 . 1  G ATT an d  th e  N o n -T a r if f  B a r r ie r s  Is s u e
The GATT-system (§1.2.1.1), while founded on principles 
similar to the ones at the origin of the European Economic 
Community, has not been able to respond appropriately to the 
rising issue of the last decades, i.e. the rise of so-called 
non-tariff barriers (SI.2.1.2). These barriers arise, by their 
very nature, from the dispersed power to create law, to 
legislate and to regulate the national economies (§1.2.1.3).
And while the European Community has been able to develop some 
of the means to act as a surrogate for a federal state in order 
to create a single European market, the GATT has not been able 
to follow such a path and has left the world with a very 
inadequate set of broad and inapplicable principles ($1.2.1.4).
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1.2.1.1 The G A T T —SyRtigni
If one follows the Balassain crude taxonomy of forms of
economic integrations, GATT is not even a free trade area.
Tariffs barriers against imports have been dramatically reduced
(129)since the inception of GATT,' ' but tariffs are still here.
The GATT can not even be understood if one reads only the 
articles of the documents signed in 1947. The "GATT-system" - 
the complex set of international treaties and institutions 
centering on the General Agreement - as it now stands, is a 
series of over one hundred agreements, protocols, 
procès-verbaux, etc.(13°)
The GATT contains a number of obligations, some of which 
have been further elaborated through separate treaty 
instruments often called "codes". The central features 
of the General Agreement are (i) the commitment by states to 
limit tariffs that will be applicable to imports of specific 
goods, (ii) the generalization of these commitments to all GATT 
parties through the Most-Favored-Nation clause ("MFN") and,
(iii) provisions directed at preventing non-tariff barriers, 
and in particular, a broad National Treatment obligation.
(i) The "Tariff binding" - that is, schedules of tariff 
commitments, or "concessions", of Article II - is the central 
core of the GATT-system. Each country's "binding" sets a 
maximum tariff rate for each of the products listed on 
impressive lists. The tariff rates for each of the products are 
the result of the aggregate outcome of the several "rounds" of
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multilateral tariff negotiations during which each country 
negotiated^132  ^ detailed commitments to limit tariffs on 
particular items to the amount negotiated and specified in its 
tariff schedule.(133^
(ii) Pursuant to article I of the General Agreement, which 
is the Most-Favored-Nation Clause of GATT, each member of GATT 
is obligated to treat other GATT members at least as well as it 
treats any other country with regards to imports and 
exports.(134) it is essentially a principle of 
nondiscrimination as among the nations party to GATT.^135^
The remaining obligations in the GATT-system are designed 
to reinforce the basic tariff obligations.(136  ^ in effect, 
the key role of the General Agreement is to serve as a 
framework of rules and procedures for the preservation of the 
tariff "deals" made under its auspices.
There are three major premises underlying present
procedures for trade negotiations in GATT : (i) that they will
be "reciprocal and mutually advantageous", (ii) that results
will be generalized through the Most-Favored-Nation principle ;
and (iii) that concessions will be protected from at least some
Î137)non-tariff barriers by the general provisions of GATT.v '
The concessions would prove of little benefit to trade if 
countries were left free to nullify them by the use of 
protective devices other than tariff increases.(138) The 
problem faced in protecting the benefits of the tariff deals is 
that, if custom duties are a kind of subsidies provided to the 
protected industries (under the form of higher prices than
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would otherwise be obtained if foreign competition would not be 
restricted), they are only one of the possible forms of 
subsidization.(139) Accordingly, a tariff concession can have 
value only if alternative trade barriers are held constant, or 
at least are not increased. Hence, the GATT has a number of 
rules concerning non-tariff barriers and the way nations can 
apply their regulations for governing trade which crosses their 
borders.(14°)
(iii) The provisions regarding non-tariff barriers cover 
several specific fields, but some are more general.
Historically, the most significant non-tariff barrier was 
the import quota (quantitative restrictions), which is 
dealt with in Article XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XV of GATT.
Article XI prohibits quotas,^142  ^ unless one of the detailed 
exceptions provided for in the subsequent articles 
applies.(143)
The other various non-tariff barrier provisions of GATT
cover internal taxes, anti-dumping and countervailing duties,
paper work and administrative costs, valuation of goods for
customs purposes, freedom of transit, marks of origin, export
( 1 4 4 )subsidies, government monopolies, etc... ' However, it was
impossible to cover in specific articles all the possible
(145)restrictive measures that the human mind can invent.
GATT, for example, does not specifically govern barriers that 
could result from food and drug requirements, fair packaging 
requirements, taxes which differ as to classes of goods which 
"coincidentally" fall heaviest on imported goods, etc...^146^
However, GATT contains an article III which is the National 
Treatment obligation(147) and provides that imports shall be 
treated no worse than domestically produced goods, under 
internal taxation or regulatory m e a s u r e s . i t  therefore 
calls for the principle of non-discrimination to be applied as 
between goods imported into a GATT member and goods produced 
domestically within that GATT member.^149^
Reciprocity and non-discrimination, be it among nations 
(MFN) or as between goods (National Treatment) are therefore 
key principles in GATT. Reciprocity, however, is a strange and 
difficult concept,^150  ^ making it all the more difficult to 
maintain - which is one of the objectives of the General 
Agreement which contains numerous procedures to that effect - 
especially in the face of rising non-tariff barriers.
1.2.1.2 Maintaining Reciprocity : the Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms
GATT does not have a uniform dispute settlement procedure 
and there is no single, sharply defined dispute settlement 
procedure that can be distinguished from the remainder of GATT 
a c t i v i t y . T h e r e  is, on the one hand, the system of 
conciliation and dispute settlement of the General Agreement 
and, on the other hand, specific dispute settlement procedures 
provided in most of the Tokyo Round A g r e e m e n t s . B u t  even 
in the General Agreement only, there are for instance nineteen 
clauses in the Treaty that obligate parties to consult in
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specific instances ;^153) likewise, there are sprinkled 
throughout the GATT at least seven different provisions for 
compensatory withdrawal or suspension of concessions.
(1) The two Articles central to the GATT dispute settlement 
procedure are article XXII and Article XXIII.^155^
Article XXII, para. 1, provides for consultations with 
respect to "any matter affecting the operation" of the General 
Agreement. If such bilateral consultations are not successful, 
Article XXII, para. 2, provides for the possibility of setting 
up a working party, open to all GATT members, including the 
parties to the dispute.(156) Article XXII is relatively 
simple and has been relied upon only in some ten cases since 
the inception of GATT, essentially during the fifties and 
sixties.(157)
In contrast, approximately one hundred complaints have been 
raised under Article XXIII^158  ^ - which is much more complex. 
Article XXIII, para. 1, provides for bilateral consultations 
whenever (i) any "benefit" accruing to a party, directly or 
indirectly, under the Agreement is "nullified or impaired" or 
when, (ii) there is impediment of any "objective" of the 
Agreement. If no solution is achieved at this stage, Article 
XXIII, para. 2, provides for the matter to be investigated by 
the contracting parties, who can make recommendations or give a 
ruling.
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One of the major goals behind Article XXIII was to provide 
a means for ensuring continued reciprocity and balance of 
concessions in the face of possibly changing 
c i r c u m s t a n c e . A s  one of the draftsmen of the ITO 
(Article 35 of the ITO Charter is the exact equivalent of 
Article XXIII of GATT) puts it,
"We shall achieve, under the Charter (...) a 
careful balance of the interests of the 
contracting States. This balance rests upon 
certain assumptions as to the character of the 
tinder lying situation in the years to come. And it 
involves a mutuality of obligations and benefits. 
If, with the passage of time, the underlying 
situation should change or the benefits accorded 
any Member should be impaired, the balance would 
be destroyed. It is the purpose of Article 35 to 
restore this balance by providing for 
compensatory adjustment in the obligations which 
the Member has assumed. This adjustment will not 
be made unless the Member has asked that it be 
made. And it is then the function of the 
Organization to ensure that compensatory action 
will not be carried to such a level that the 
balance would be tipped the other way. What we 
have really provided, in the last analysis, is 
not that retaliation shall be invited or 
sanctions invoked, but that a balance of 
interests, once established shall be 
maintained".(I60)
There is one very important aspect of the provisions of 
Article XXIII that pervades GATT practice and procedures of 
dispute settlement. When invoking Article XXIII, a GATT Party 
must argue that benefits it expected under GATT are "nullified or 
impaired".
From a survey of the preparatory work as a whole, Prof. 
Jackson concluded that those who drafted GATT Articles XXII and 
XXIII had several goals in mind.f162) First, they wanted the
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two Articles to be the framework of a dispute settlement
procedure.(163) second, they had in mind that Article XXIII
would play an important role in obtaining compliance with the
GATT obligations, and the analogy with the concept of retaliation
was used.^164  ^ Third, these provisions were to provide a means
for ensuring continued reciprocity and balance of concessions An
the face of possibly changing circumstances.*165* Thus, Article
XXIII can be invoked in the absence of anv breach of GATT
obligations.(166) The concept of nullification or impairment is
related to the idea that a complaining party could have
"reasonable expectations" and it is explicitly
recognized in GATT practice that nullification or impairment is
not coexistent with a breach of GATT obligations. A breach of
obligation is neither a sufficient nor a necessary prerequisite
for the invocation of Article X X I I I . I n d e e d ,  the concept
of nullification or impairment relates to the idea that there is
a balance of benefits derived under the Agreement which is to be
preserved. Thus, GATT law generally doesn't rest on conventional
ideas of legal obligations per se. but on a root concept of
reciprocal and mutual "benefits".*169* The scope of the
non-violation nullification or impairment remedy will accordingly
be determined by the exact meaning of the term "benefit...
accruing under the Agreement".*1 7 However, what the benefits
under the Agreement are is very unclear. The truth of the matter
is that the common purpose of the procedures for the settlement
of disputes is not to ensure compliance with law, but to arrive
(171)at settlements acceptable to the parties concerned. It is
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not a matter of sanctioning a breach of a rule, but of restoring 
a balance of a d v a n t a g e s . s u c h  balance is considered to be 
restored when the parties reach an agreement that it is 
so GATT is therefore treated as a flexible instrument
of negotiation in the field of commercial policy and not as a 
system of legally binding rules.^174)
Article XXIII is therefore a provision to keep a certain 
continuity of advantages, of benefits to the contracting parties 
in GATT in a changing environment. However, the value of the 
"benefits" being uncertain, it is no wonder that the GATT dispute 
resolution process is more a matter of bargaining than of 
judicial interpretation
(2) The main problem as identified by prof. Jackson is that :
Beyond the four protectionist devices discussed 
above [the tariffs, the quotas, subsidies and 
state trading monopolies], there is a large 
number of other measures. The discovery of new 
protectionist devices appears to be an endless 
process. As soon as the international system 
establishes restraints or regulation on a 
particular protective device, government 
officials and human ingenuity seem able to turn 
up some other measures to accomplish at least 
part of their protective purposes. Consequently, 
it can be argued that any international 
regulatory system must be designed so as to cope 
with the constant change in protectionist 
techniques."(17 5)
The existing system - to permit duties ; to attempt to 
prevent the most obvious forms of non-tariff barriers ; and to 
provide for a forum of negotiations for the reduction of tariff 
barriers - makes the conduct of multilateral trade negotiations
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manageable. All kind of protection except duties are either 
forbidden by some specific provision, or covered by the 
"non-violation nullification or impairment of a benefit under the 
Agreement" mechanism.
But with the increased globalization of the economy, the 
unfinished work as to non-tariff barriers has become more 
crucial. Attempting to design a system "so as to cope with the 
constant change in protectionist techniques" means developing 
institutional mechanisms much more advanced than the ones 
existing in GATT as it exists today. And so far, GATT has not 
been able to give to itself the appropriate means it requires to 
fulfill its function.
1.2.1.3 Success and its Limits : the Rise in Non-Tariff
Barriers
(1) Tariff barriers have been dramatically reduced over the 
seven Rounds of tariff negotiations there has been so far.(17®^
In the United States, the average tariff declined by nearly 92 
percent over the 33 years spanned by the Geneva Round of 1947 and 
the Tokyo Round.(177  ^ simultaneously however, the growth of 
non-tariff barriers in the 1970s and in the 1980s has been such 
that many observers believe that it offsets the liberalization of 
trade that tariff reductions implied.*178* Many such non-tariff 
barriers are micro barriers found in all kinds of regulations 
dealing with product standards, certification requirements, all 
sorts of norms, etc... However9 other non-tariff barriers are
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macro, very visible, barriers. For example, states have 
increasingly adopted a practice of agreeing to so-called 
Voluntary Restraints Agreements, which have the same effect as
fl79)quotas.1 ' A Voluntary Restraints Agreement consist in a
unilateral action by an exporting country to limit the exports of 
its producers of a given product to a given importing country, in 
order to avoid the imposition of unilateral quotas by the 
importing country. It is barely "voluntary", and usually results 
from negotiations between the importing and exporting countries, 
which allows more flexibility than if a quota would be 
imposed.(*80) Most Voluntary Restraints Agreements are a 
violation of Article XI of GATT, but the enforcement of GATT is 
impossible because no party with access to enforcement procedures 
can be found.(181) The country restraining exports will hardly 
complain against itself ; the importing country, which is the 
most affected, will hardly complain either since it requested the 
"voluntary" restraint ; other countries will find it awkward or 
difficult to complain since they will find it difficult to 
demonstrate that they are harmed, even though this is often the 
case, or since they often use themselves the same type of 
devices.i^82^
(2) It must be kept in mind that non-tariff barriers are felt 
as a major obstacle to economic integration because of the 
increased openess and interdependence of the national economies. 
Despite its limits in the field of non-tariff barriers, GATT 
should be credited for this success.f183) The dire predictions
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made by some today with regards to the future of GATT are 
remnants of something which already happened with regards to the 
European Community in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The 
generally held view at that time was that the European Community 
was dead, that the future of Europe was bleak, that Europeans 
would never manage to overcome their divisions and that people 
with a future should move to the Pacific shores.. . Today, 
the European economy is one of the most dynamic in the world, and 
the institutional crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as 
well as europessimism,(185) appear as signs of a growth 
crisis : the incredible economic expansion in Europe during the 
first three decades after World War II had simply outgrown the 
institutional structure set in place by the Paris and Rome 
Treaties.
(3) The further the process of economic integration proceeds, 
boosted by a reduction of discriminations in the forms of tariff 
barriers, the more noticeable non-tariff barriers seem to become. 
This is so true that in 1974, Victoria Curzon could write that in 
the contexts of both the GATT and the European Community, a great 
deal was being said on the relative unimportance of tariffs and 
the great importance of non-tariff barriers to trade.^186  ^ She 
was also noticing that a widespread view at the time was that, 
given that non-tariff barriers are a tremendously difficult 
problem highly charged with political overtones, nothing much 
could be done in the visible future to liberalize world 
trade.f187) This was partly because machinery and principles
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for dealing with non-tariff barriers still had to be worked out 
for the most part, and it was highly questionable whether or not 
sufficiently strong mechanisms of international control over 
non-tariff barriers could be developed to enforce the 
implementation of agreements to reduce them, nor to exert 
pressure for their gradual reduction.f188) The successes of the 
European experience brings hope for reforms at the global 
level.<189>
1 . 2 . 1 . 4  H o n -T a r lf f  B a r r ie r s  and  th e  Pow er t o  C re a te  Law
What is so perplexing about non-tariff barriers is that they 
are intimately related to the claims of states to a sovereign 
authority to legislate. And while tariff barriers are relatively 
easy to deal with because they are easy to perceive, feel and 
understand, non-tariff barriers are of such a degree of diversity 
that they are difficult to grasp and compare. But their 
significance for economic competitors is clear.
(1) In a unitary state, there are not more non-tariff 
barriers to internal trade than tariff ones : the laws applying 
on the territory (or, if one prefers, the national market) being 
the same e v e r y w h e r e , t h e  only element determining the 
outcome of the competition between the economic actors is 
normally their relative efficiency in the context of the rules of 
the game as settled by state law. As soon as there are different 
sovereigns over a given economic space - over a given "market" 
where economic actors compete - the competition between the
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economic actors is necessarily "distorted". One can take the 
simple example of a producer X in a country A, willing to compete 
against a producer Y in a country B imposing a tariff of 33.33% 
to the import of the type of widget produced by X as well as Y ; 
obviously, X will need to have costs at least 25% lower than 
those of Y to be able to compete in If A and B
negotiate to eliminate B's tariff on widgets (for example, 
because A reduces its own tariff on some other item), X and Y 
should be able to compete on more equal terms. However, this may 
not last if A and B have not covered the possibility that B may 
impose a non-tariff barrier having exactly the same effect for X 
than a tariff barrier. For example, B may impose that widgets be 
sold in B only in packages produced by a producer Z, which 
happens to be located in B and to have the monopoly of that type 
of packages. Imagine that the mandatory package serves no purpose 
(other than the one of increasing X's costs by, say, 1/3), then X 
is in no better position than previously ; A will get mad, and 
may eventually retaliate (which possibly should actually reduce 
B#s tendency to play that kind of tricks).
I have made my non-tariff barrier example obvious, and in my 
story, B appears as the bad guy in an obvious manner. But imagine 
now that A has a genuine concern for its environment : recently, 
producers of beer in B have been using a new type of package 
which is very convenient, light and appeals to consumers : 
aluminium cans. They have only one defect : people throw them 
anywhere, and because they are not biodegradable, they may remain 
there for eternity if no one comes to clean-up. The environment
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is getting disgusting ; B's government may have to raise taxes 
because of the need to clean up ; and therefore B's government is 
scared : it may not be re-elected at the coming elections, either 
because the environment will be disgusting or because it will 
have raised taxes. B has been considering several alternatives, 
and came to the conclusion that the best solution is to create a 
mandatory refund system : producers of beer will be allowed to 
sell their product in aluminium cans only if they undertake to 
repurchase them from retailers or consumers at a statutorily 
defined refund value. People were throwing their cans anywhere 
because of their lack of value ; now they will collect them ... 
The problem for us is not that the new statute will increase X's 
costs : it will also increase Y's, and the cost increase is 
logical since what B is doing consists in internalizing the cost 
of pollution on producers (who can pass it on to consumers, 
depending on demand elasticity). But the statute may very well 
increase X's costs more than Y's : X is an exporter in B, and if 
B's market is small for X, the cost of adapting its products to 
B's market requirements may be substantial, say, for example,
1/3. But should B be blamed for adopting the new statute ? The 
answer to this question will be found in Part II. The lesson we 
can draw at this stage is that even for competitors competing on 
a market undistorted by tariffs, but operating from the 
territories of separate states, their activities being subjected 
to different state jurisdictions, different laws will apply to 
them, and therefore they will not play exactly the same game.
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(2) One must notice that if this is true at the international 
level, it is also true for competitors from different states of a 
federal union, as long as the states of the union keep some 
degree of sovereignty. The fact that there is "double 
sovereignty" over the territory of the union - that is the 
union-wide sovereignty of the federal or federal-like authority, 
and the decentralized sovereignty of each state - combined with a 
possibility for the federal authority to preempt state 
authorities in order to level the playing field eases the problem 
of interfacing of the state-economies ; it does not eliminate the 
fact that competitors do not all play by exactly the same rules, 
as long as the states of the union remain meaningful creators of 
norms. Consequently, non-tariff barriers can not be purely and 
simply prohibited at the international level since they do exist 
even in federal systems. The treatment of non-tariff barriers 
requires a much more elaborated theoretical analysis than the 
elimination of tariffs.
1.2.1.5 Law and Markets
(1) The fact of the matter is that what we call a "market" is 
a set of behaviours and relations that are, in part, constituted 
and constrained by law.^192  ^ The law constructs social 
relationships on the market inasmuch as it controls some 
••natural" behaviour. It is therefore impossible to speak of 
markets except in the context of specific legal institutions 
which make them possible.*193* A plurality of states implies a
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plurality of laws. Even within federalized markets, market 
competition therefore always differs for companies established on 
the territories of different states, even in the most integrated 
multi-state economies.(194) it might at times seem unfair from 
the point of view of economic competitors that they do not all 
play by the same rules, but in many instances, this is an 
unavoidable consequence of the federal model. The persistence of 
distortions in federal states such as the United States or the 
European Community implies that if economic integration is to be 
extended at the global level, a solution to the problem of the 
development of non-tariff barriers has to be found, but knowing 
that conflicting policies and rules can not be entirely 
eliminated. What must be found is some sort of institutional 
mechanisms resolving the conflicts where they exist and in those 
areas where they can be resolved.i195)
(2) The difficulty with non-tariff barriers is political : 
their reduction requests that a system be created which will 
restrict the possible abuse of the sovereign right to legislate. 
The difficulty then turns out on finding the rationale defining 
what is a proper use of sovereignty.
In this respect, the parallel made between the European 
Community and the GATT is less artificial than may have appeared 
so far. With all their differences in structure and nature, the 
GATT and the European Community both have to be understood as two 
functionally different expressions of the same liberal conception 
of sovereignty.^196  ^ This is little surprising once it is
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recalled that it was primarily the GATT which supplied the
conceptual and legal framework within which the negotiations on
the core of the Community, i.e. on the Common Market and, more
specifically, the free movement of goods, took place.(197) if
Community law represents a wholly new legal order, the binding
power of which is much stronger than that of ordinary
international law, which is a major difference with GATT law, the
two systems share the same liberal i n s p i r a t i o n . T h e y  can
both be thought as international extensions of the principle of
( 199)democratic constitutionalism.v '
There are certain fundamental differences between the GATT 
and the European Community :
(i) As we have already said, GATT deals only with trade in 
goods and is not even a free trade area, while the European 
Community provides for total freedom of movement for goods, 
services, people and capital.
(ii) While GATT is not even an organization, and can lead to»
the creation of common norms almost only during rounds of 
negotiations - such as the Tokyo or Uruguay Round - the 
European Community comprises a whole machinery of central 
norms creation to adopt common laws when needed.
(iii) Finally, a key difference is that in the European
Community, private parties themselves have some powers to 
enforce on reluctant governments the commitment they 
made,(20°) while GATT - even though it is in legal form 
similar to the Treaty of Rome - in effect is an 
intergovernmental agreement of the ordinary kind.^  ^ It
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did not create rights for the citizens of its parties. The 
GATT is a foundation of individual rights only to the extent 
that these may be provided by implementing national 
legislation.(202) Even though, in their founding 
principles, the GATT and the European Community are therefore 
strikingly similar, in particular with respect to the 
principle of non-discrimination, which is at their core, 
their practical consequences for individuals and companies, 
as well as their inherent capacity for evolution, are totally 
different.
(3) Our analysis leads us to the conclusion that GATT is and 
ought to be an instrument restricting states' capacity to create 
certain types of laws - which we have yet to 'identify. An 
historical analysis of the origins of the GATT-system will show 
now that from the very beginning, such was the function of 
international free trade treaties.
A pattern of events leading to the creation of a free trade 
regime can be found. Parliaments have a natural tendency to be 
protectionist : their members, because they want to be reelected, 
tend to be very sensitive to highly vocal local interests ; and 
failing firms or industries tend to be highly vocal in requesting 
protection from foreign competitors. Typically, states 
executives, who institutionally tend to represent more the 
interests of the nation than sectorial interests,(203) need to 
find a way to go around protectionist parliaments to prevent them 
from adopting protectionist measures, which may undermine the
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foreign policies they desire to pursue. A solution for states 
executives is to negotiate international treaties, and to have 
them somehow binding upon parliaments. We will see that this 
pattern has taken various forms in history.
1.2.2 The Historical Origins of the GATT-Svstem
The emergence of the GATT as the central international trade
institution is a development that none of the countries
participating in the drafting of the General Agreement had
anticipated.(204) Nevertheless, the GATT can be said to be a
reflection of certain views that dominated the thinking on trade
matters of US diplomats in the 1940's.^205  ^ There was not
necessarily consciousness of the underlying reasons for the
substantive content of the norms of GATT, for GATT was a
codification of the basic ideas of the système des traités of the
nineteenth century.(206) in this sense, GATT is an example of
an evolved rather than a consciously invented order.^2 What
the founders of GATT knew was that the système des traités had
worked for quite a long time ; they associated the disasters of
the great economic crisis of the inter-war period, and maybe even
of World War II, to the abandonment of its central
elements.(208) For this reason, they emphasized and made formal
(209)what they perceived to be the basic elements of the system.
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1.2.2.1 The Sysi-frmf» des Traités
(1) Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the 
international exchange of goods had been hampered by countless 
restrictive practices.(21°) States were trying to achieve 
self-sufficiency by mercantilistic policies modeled on those 
adopted by France in Colbert's d a y . T h e n ,  several treaties 
signed in the 1860s placed the commercial relations of the main 
trading countries of Western Europe on a new basis and 
inaugurated a short but significant era of virtual free 
trade.(212)
Traditional explanations for the birth of the so-called 
système des traités are quite confused. What is puzzling is why 
there was need for treaties at all to achieve such a result : 
tariffs being national statutes, why does a state need a treaty 
to change its own law ? Reciprocity, which is the traditional 
rationale for entering into international commercial treaties, is 
no explanation in itself. The Cobden-Chevalier treaty, between 
England and France, dates back from 1860. However, prior to the 
Treaty, England was already pursuing a unilateral policy of free 
trade. Why did the French decide that they needed a treaty to 
change their own law then ?(213) it is certainly not because 
they were getting "reciprocal1* concessions from England. For one 
thing, reducing tariffs is not a "concession" as is generally 
believed : it is tariffs which are harming the country imposing 
them, and not their reduction because tariffs increase domestic 
prices while their reduction diminishes them. England knew it 
very well at the time, and was pursuing a unilateral policy of 
relatively free trade.^214^
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The normal method of reducing duties in France was to submit
a new tariff for the approval of the legislature.(21®) But
Napoléon III knew that the protectionist majority in the Chambers
would never accept substantial tariff reductions.(2 ®^) so he
approached the problem in another way : the French Constitution
gave the Emperor the right both to sign and to ratify commercial
agreements with foreign governments without submitting them to
the Legislature.^217) a tariff embodied in a trade treaty
( 218 )became law even if the Chambers objected.v ' Thus, in 1859,
tentative approaches were made to the British government
. . . . . . . . (219)concerning the possibility of initiating tariff talks.v ' The
British government was of the opinion that a country should fix
its own tariff without reference to those of other
countries.(22°) However, it appreciated the difficulties facing
(221)Napoléon III, and agreed to the French request.' ‘ The
British "concessions" were included in Gladstone's budget in 
1860,(222) but the token reductions of the British tariff being 
on an unconditional Most—Favored—Nation basis benefited to all 
countries.(223)
(2) The treaty between France and the Zollverein was adopted 
for similar reasons, but this time, to go around German 
protectionism. The French concessions in the anglo-French treaty 
were made to Britain alone, which means that France had then two 
tariffs z moderate duties were levied upon imports from Britain, 
but the old prohibitions and high duties remained in force as far 
as other countries were concerned.(224* German manufacturers 
then wished to compete in the French market on equal terms with
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their British rivals.^225) But in order to secure the 
advantages of the moderate French tariff, the Zollverein had to 
offer the French government concessions similar to those already 
granted by Britain.(226) Just as Napoléon III had been unable 
to reform the French tariff by the simple method of securing the 
passage of a new tariff law, so the Prussian officials 
responsible for commercial affairs were unable to recast the 
German tariff by submitting the necessary changes to the General 
Conference of the Zollverein.^227) Under the constitution of 
the Zollverein, any state represented at the general conference 
could exercise its veto, and in these circumstances, it was 
useless to submit a far-reaching reform to the conference.(228) 
The only way out of the impasse was the one already adopted by 
Napoléon III - namely to embody tariff changes in a commercial 
treaty with a foreign nation.^229) The Zollverein was not a 
permanent institution and its treaties were due to expire in 
1866. If the German tariffs were recast as the result of a 
commercial treaty, the Prussian government could include the 
terms of such an agreement in the treaties which would in due 
course have to be made with other states for the renewal of the 
Zollverein.(23°) Those states in the customs union which 
opposed the lower tariff would then be faced with the choice of 
accepting low import duties which they disliked or of leaving the 
Zollverein.(231) No state opted for the second possibility and 
thus, when the German customs union was renewed in 1886, the new 
tariff came into force.f232)
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Within a short time, Western Europe was covered with a 
network of low tariffs, Most-Favored-Nation treaties.i233) 
However, it is to be noticed that no attempt was made to link the 
agreements by a general multilateral treaty.^234) The system 
however proved extremely fragile : it was vulnerable to the 
depression of the 1870's, and was short-lived.(235) But the 
point is made that international trade treaties were made mostly 
because of constitutional law problems in the adoption of free 
trade policies - namely, because of the clear susceptibilities of 
"representative" assemblies towards the interests of producers.
After the death of the système des traités, several economic 
depressions and two world wars ensued. It is only after World War 
II that the struggle to create a regime bounding protectionist 
parliaments took off again.
1.2.2.2 The Building of a Multilateral System after
World War Two
(1) The United States dominant economic position after World 
War II gave it the power to lead the restructuring of post World 
War trade.(236  ^ The regime set in place was an expression of 
the views held by the US State Department diplomats as to what 
should be the appropriate form for the new international economic 
order.(237) it stemmed from two strands in American economic 
policy.(23®) The first strand was that which focused on United 
States "reciprocal trade agreements", and which began with the 
enactment of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 by which
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Congress granted to the Executive the authority to enter into 
trade agreements.(239) During the period from 1934 to 1945, 32 
such trade agreements had been negotiated and accepted by the 
United States, and almost all the clauses in GATT can be traced 
to one or another of the clauses contained in these trade 
agreements.(24°) The second strand in American policy was the 
development of ideas during World War II that recognized the need 
for international economic institutions to prevent the type of 
Mbeggar-my-neighborN policies that had been so disastrous to 
world trade during the inter-war period and which, in the minds 
of many leaders, were responsible to a great degree for World War
II itself.i241)
(2) On the substantive level, United States negotiators 
sought to achieve the goals of free, nondiscriminatory 
trade.(242) Their position was that a liberalized system of 
international trade, based on non-discrimination and the 
elimination of trade barriers, was essential to world 
peace.(243) The rules governing world trade were to be 
developed and enforced by an International Trade Organization 
which, together with the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, was to compose a complete system of economic 
cooperation through international institutions.^244  ^ with 
regards to trade, the US State Department's position was that, in 
general, non-tariff barriers should be abolished forthwith or 
eventually converted into tariffs, and that all tariffs should be 
progressively reduced through international negotiations.(245)
- 87 -
As to the means to use to achieve these goals, the United States
view was that - in broad line - all non-tariff barriers should be
flatly prohibited within the framework of a comprehensive code 
governing world trade.*246) The code would seriously limit the 
right of individual governments to interfere with the free flow 
of private trade.(247) Transgression of the code would be an 
unlawful act and an institutional body would be created to 
interpret and, if need be, enforce the code.(248)
(2) Prior even to start the negotiations which were to lead
to the creation of this system, the United States trade officials
had to cope with the agent of the American industry - with the US
Congress. The Administration needed to obtain congressional
authorization prior to initiate the negotiations, and the chance
of making a substantial across-the-board reduction in tariffs had
( 249 )to be abandoned in the face of opposition by the Congress.'
In 1945, the Administration managed to secure legislative 
authority for Presidential right to negotiate up to a 50 percent 
reduction in existing tariffs, provided it got reciprocal 
concessions, by a renewal of an authority it had received from 
Congress already in 1934. However, the President was committed to 
use that authority in the context of item-by-item negotiations 
designed to preclude tariff reductions that might injure American 
producers. ( 2 5 ° ) in addition, the Administration was also 
pledged to insert an "escape clause" in all forthcoming trade 
agreements, reserving the right to withdraw particular 
concessions at a later date if they did jp fact injure domestic
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producers.(251) By definition, competition injures inefficient 
producers ; it is obvious that with the constraints imposed by 
the US Congress, US negotiators could not achieve dramatic 
results.
(4) To achieve a rational re-ordering of world trade 
mechanisms, an international conference on trade and employment 
was held at Havana in the winter of 1947-1948. 2^52) The 
conference approved the charter of an International Trade 
Organization ("ITO") which included six agreements : commercial 
policy ; restrictive business practices ; commodity agreements ; 
employment ; economic development and international investment ; 
and a constitution for a new United Nations agency in the field 
of international trade.f253) The ITO charter, however, never 
came into existence, mostly due to the American refusal to ratify 
the Charter.(254) The reasons for this refusal were manifold, 
and included a general "cold war" disenchantment with 
international institutions, the revival of protectionist 
sentiments, and the disaffection of the business community. In 
particular, the attempt to draft detailed agreements attempting 
to reconcile competing demands from the outside and from within 
the United States was partly responsible for the failure of the 
ITO.(255) After all the compromises that had been necessary to 
reach an agreement with the rest of the world, the American 
public opinion had the impression that whereas the United States 
would have to play by the rules, every nationalistic 
trade-control device and every excuse for using it was in the
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document.(256) Whatever the reasons for the fate of the ITO, 
the world was left with the GATT as a very poor substitute to a 
much more complete institution.(257)
(5) An inherent problem in the approach of US negotiators was 
that they failed to appreciate the need for an appropriate 
institutional framework within which states could resolve their 
conflicts streaming from their permanently diverging interests, 
and that they did put faith almost entirely in substantive 
agreement.(258) us negotiators considered that, in the area of 
trade policy, the ITO primary purpose was to apply and enforce 
substantive rules of law.(259) in a very important sense, they 
were the victims of their own "legalism".(26°) what was needed 
was not so much an agency to enforce a detailed catalogue of 
obligations more or less adapted to a changing economic 
environment as an institutional framework within which countries 
might examine the particular circumstances of specific trade 
policies, thereby, if possible, identifying their common interest 
and working out mutually acceptable solutions.^261^
International regimes, particularly when they have to deal with 
issues so much charged with political overtone, derive their 
legitimacy less from their ability to implement substantive legal 
rules than from their capacity to reshape the context within 
which states conceive their self-interest.(2®2) And in this 
respect, GATT - our poor substitute for the ITO - is a failure.
It is very important to distinguish this view that it is 
necessary to have an institutional arrangement allowing to reach 
a consensus on controversial issues from what are sometimes
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called "pragmatist" views of the GATT - that is, from an approach 
to the drafting and administration of international agreements in 
which emphasis is placed on mutual agreement on objectives, and 
in which rules concerning rights and obligations are considered 
as mere formalities to be avoided whenever p o s s i b l e . o n  
the contrary, since the different policies pursued by the 
different countries represent competing values, it was important 
to create strong procedures for clarifying the common interest of 
the various trading countries and for establishing the impact of 
commercial policies.f264) The ITO was not primarily designed to 
fulfill that function, and the GATT as it came into being was of 
course completely illsuited to this desired role.(265^
Ironically, though, the very institutional weakness of GATT 
allowed it through time to rise above the legalistic confines of 
the General Agreement, through the development - still 
insufficient - of many improvised procedures and codes.(266)
(6) In a very real sense, the latent dispute between 
proponents of "legalism" and of "pragmatism" within the framework 
of the GATT was, and still is, a false one.(267) Both
( 268)approaches rest upon a single, naive view of the law.1 ' Both
view law as substance - as substantive rules prescribing rights 
and duties for all parties for all future problems. Whereas
m
legalists view substantive rules as inherently desirable, 
pragmatists are more inclined to see detailed substantive rules 
as obstacles to the achievement of the common long-term 
objectives.^269  ^ This jointly held view of the nature of law
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tends to obscure the importance of procedures. of the legal 
(270)procesg. Law is not solely or even primarily a set of
substantive rules : it is a set of procedures adapted to the 
subject matter and designed to resolve conflicts that can not be 
foreseen at the outset.(27 )^ as procedures and process, 
international economic law is what allows states to identify 
their common interest in complex situations and to formulate 
short-term policies for the achievement of the long-term 
objectives.(272) part of the history of GATT is precisely a 
movement away from the naive view of law and toward an increased 
interest in procedures.(273) Through time,
The legalists found that substantive rules 
requiring the abolition of trade barriers did not 
make that much difference, and the pragmatists 
found that good will and ingenuity could achieve 
little in the way of reducing trade barriers and 
promoting international trade unless those 
qualities were accompanied by procedures for 
identifying underlying economic problems that made 
barriers inevitable, for promoting staged 
multilateral moves toward the liberalization of 
trade barriers where it was difficult for any one 
contracting party to move alone, and for providing 
governments with a mechanism or an excuse to do 
that which they wanted to do but were unable to do 
because of domestic pressures.(274)
An international conflict over trade resulting primarily from
an internal conflict over the distribution of wealth and
power,(275) trading countries need a system of rules to define
the room within which unilateral action is permissible, which
allows them to resist against unwarranted local demands for
protection.^27®^  Such rules and procedures can also ease the
delegation of decisions to the executive by the legislative
branch without the danger that executive discretion would be
(277)effectively untrammelled.
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(7) The existing rules on trade are ill-adapted to today's 
economy. The international economic order set in place in the 
late 1940s had for its first purpose to formally organize the 
economic relations between countries on a rule-oriented 
basis.(278) it has helped to achieve a high level in 
interdependence among national economies.(279) However, the 
development in interdependence has been outpacing the development 
of political thought and institutions to cope with so much 
change.(28°) As an agreement on a number of basic principles or 
norms of behaviour supposed to allow the orderly evolution of an 
international market economy, GATT appears to be moribond.^281  ^
GATT now has become little more than a forum for multilateral (or 
even bilateral) commercial diplomacy and no longer embodies 
living norms.(282) jn particular, the fundamental principle of 
non-discrimination has been seriously weakened.(283)
We will see now how the rules of the international economic 
order, destined to be part of the framework of procedures leading 
to the adoption of norms in response to conflicting internal 
demands and interests, have a function which is of a 
constitutional nature and why it is not fulfilled now.
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1.3. GATT AS AN EMBRYONIC FEDERAL STATE : THE CONSTITUTIONAL
FUNCTION OF GATT
As we know, GATT came to fill the void left after the "death" 
of the I T O . H o w e v e r ,  there is a host of misconceptions as 
to the nature of the void that the ITO itself was trying to fill, 
and which indirectly GATT is supposed to fill as a substitute. 
These misconceptions seriously burden the debate as to what kind 
of improvement is needed in GATT for a better fulfillment of its 
function. As we have seen, common sense or economic logic is no 
guide as to why governments generally prefer to reduce trade 
barriers on the basis of multilaterally agreed principles and 
rules rather than unilaterally on a purely autonomous 
basis.<285>
(1) The purpose of an institution such as GATT is not
obvious. According to liberal economic theory, a country which
reduces its barriers to imports is the first to benefit because
it thereby achieves a more productive allocation of its national
resources. to obtain this benefit, the country does not
(287)need simultaneous liberalization in other countries. The
purpose of GATT negotiations and of its legal framework of rules 
on non-discrimination, reciprocity, etc... is therefore not
directly to ensure a fair distribution of economic sacrifices
• (288) among countries.
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Although the GATT-system is based on liberal economic 
principles, it is important to remember that it does not 
prescribe free trade per se.(289) After all, it is an agreement 
on tariffs, on a stabilization of the levels of protection among 
its signatories, and on rules to prevent unrestrained unilateral 
variations of these levels.(29°)
To understand why it is important to reach an agreement on 
tariffs, one has to realize that the level of protection a state 
provides to its industries is only of partial concern for the 
international community, for the mere reason that the cost of 
protection is mostly borne by the constituents of the protecting 
country itself.^291) it is the unpredictable changes in the 
level and forms of protection which are a concern for other 
countries and foreign competitors. This is so because if it is 
left to the absolute discretion of states to change the "rules of 
the game" at any time, for whatever reason and under whatever 
forms, this creates uncertainty for firms.(292) This 
uncertainty is most costly for foreign firms because under modern 
conditions of production for international markets, firms must 
plan years in advance their production capacities, distribution 
systems, etc. If uncertainty in the international trading system 
is such that it upsets firms plan and dispositions, with 
consequences such as excessive investments to serve the demand on 
disappearing markets, unemployment, etc... then the constituents 
of foreign countries will be made to bear a heavy share of the 
cost of protection, and this is of concern for the international 
community.(293)
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When examined more closely, the principles and rules of the
international economic order can be seen as serving two
constitutional functions, one "internal", the other "external" :
(i) The external "constitutional" function consists for
states in providing to themselves rules having the same role for 
states that contracts, partnerships or companies have for
constituents : they ensure a certain discipline and allow order 
so that governments can act on the basis of what can be the 
expected behavior of other governments in a given situation.
(ii) The internal constitutional function is the most 
interesting for our purposes. In the field of trade, GATT is in 
essence - or is supposed to be - a document helping governments 
to resist against domestic demands for protection against 
competition coming from abroad. By providing to governments an 
excuse for not being responsive to demands for protection, GATT 
reduces the political cost of sticking to free trade, and allows 
politicians to follow the policy which is in the best long term 
interest of their country. In democratic welfare states, this is 
a constitutional function, the document being directed against a 
use of the state apparatus in a manner circumscribing the 
democratic process in favor of sectional interests.
To understand the problem, one has to realize that
protectionist measures amount to a redistribution of income or
(294)wealth, mostly from consumers to the protected producers.
There is nothing inherently bad in redistributing wealth, as long
(295)as such a redistribution is decided by the People. Modern
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states are indeed complex redistributory systems, and it is 
plainly legitimate for elected assemblies to redistribute income. 
However, a major problem with redistribution through protection 
is that it is not visible, and is little understood.^296  ^ Few 
people realize that protecting a domestic industry amounts to 
subsidizing it out of consumers' pockets. The predominance of 
domestic producers' interest in domestic political life - because 
of a higher capacity to organize, say, than consumers -(297) 
therefore creates a constitutional problem. It makes it possible 
to use the state apparatus in the name of the general interest 
but for private ends.
Some mechanism must prevent the use of the state apparatus 
for such group interests, which is one of the essential functions 
of constitutional law. As Hayek puts it :
The interest which is common to all members of a society is 
not the sum of the interests which are common to the members 
of the existing groups of producers, but only the interest in 
the continuous adaptation to changing conditions which some 
particular groups will always find it in their interest to 
prevent. The interest of the organized producers is therefore 
always contrary to the one permanent interest of all the 
individual members of society, namely the interest in the 
continuous adaptation to unpredictable changes, an adaptation 
necessary even if only the existing level of production is to 
be maintained (...). The interest of organized producers is 
always to prevent the influx of others who want to share 
their prosperity or to avoid being driven out from a group by 
the more efficient producers when demand should decline. By 
this, all strictly economic decisions, that is all new 
adjustment to unforeseen changes, will be impeded. The 
viability of a society, however, depends on the smooth and 
continuous execution of such gradual changes and their not 
being blocked by obstacles which can only be broken down when 
sufficient pressure accumulates. (...) . But every changes of 
this kind will hurt some organized interests ; and the 
preservation of the market order will therefore depend on 
those interests not being allowed to prevent what they dislike.(298)
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Constitutions in liberal democratic states are partly 
designed to prevent a circumvention of the public system of 
institutions by organized sectional interests in their favor.
Part of the functional role of notions they embody, such as 
equality, non-discrimination, etc... is to prevent a use of the 
state apparatus contrary to its very end as determined by the 
internal logic of the liberal system.
In this perspective, we will first review the external 
constitutional function of international trade agreements 
(SI*3.1), and then their internal function (Sl*3.2). We will then 
study how this function is not properly fulfilled today by 
examining in some detail the internal regime of trade regulation 
in the United States ($1*3.3).
1.3.1. The External Constitutional Function of International
Trade AtfrftgmeTvtiB
(1) The function of the rules of the international trade 
regime as being restraints on the actions of governments for the 
benefits of governments - consist in the provision of rules which 
serve the same purposes for government as internal rules for 
constituents.(2") By restricting the objectives that can be 
pursued by governments as well as the means which they can employ 
to reach them, the rules of the international economic order 
provide a certain degree of predictability about the prospective 
actions of other states.(300) These rules have the paradoxical
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result that by constraining the actions of governments, they are 
enhancing the capacity of states to adopt policies which will not 
be self-defeating. When policies are adopted through means 
allowed by the rules of the international economic order, there 
is simply no reason why they should lead to unpredicted reactions 
by other states (i.e. protectionism in reply to protectionism ; 
subsidization in reply to subsidization) which could lead to a 
nullification of the effects of the policy adopted in the first 
place.(301) An effective functioning of the system of rules 
allows the pursuit of policies with the knowledge that they are 
not nullifying or conflicting with policies adopted elsewhere, 
and therefore do not carry the risk of counter-measures which in 
turn can nullify the policy pursued.
(2) International competition having potentially dramatic 
social consequences, under the form of massive unemployment for 
example, this function explains why an effective international 
regime must comprise a safeguard clause, allowing governments to 
temporarily lift the application of the normal rules of the free 
trade regime, while it takes measures to ease the process of 
adaptation to new competitive conditions.(302) Without such a 
clause, governments would theoretically be obliged to let 
competition do its job, eventually eliminating a whole branch of 
activity within a given state in a matter of months or years. 
Without such a clause, governments would be left with the sole 
possibility to watch people demonstrating in the street and to 
explain to them that life is tough, that they are too old, too
lousy, or too lazy, ... or worse, that it is their employers who 
have been lousy, and that they are now the ones who have to pay 
for it. That would be tough, particularly in election years, and 
governments would eventually be forced to breach their 
international commitment to free trade, leading to retaliation 
and thus destroying the whole regime.
A safeguard clause must be inserted in any free trade regime 
which does not provide for redistribution policies such as the 
ones found within a state's economy. Governments must be able to 
buy time to take appropriate measures to adapt their economies to 
new competition conditions. But any safeguard clause must be of 
temporary application so as not to allow indefinite protection to 
industries having lost their comparative advantage in the world 
division of labor. And it must be politically costly for 
governments so that they will use it only when necessary, so as 
not to undermine the whole system.
The external constitutional function, which is paradoxically 
to limit governments' capacity to adopt policies, even in the 
face of conflicting local sectorial demands, is therefore 
directly connected to the internal constitutional function.
1.3.2. The internal Constitutional Functions
(1) Maybe partly due to the obscure origin of GATT as the 
major institution for the regulation of international 
trade,*303* there is little understanding that it is part of 
the procedural constraints on domestic law-making. The GATT was
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originally supposed to be only an agreement to be later 
administered by an organization, the International Trade 
Organization.(304) But with the United States Senate refusal to 
adopt the Havana Charter on the ITOr the GATT had then to evolve 
to become the institution it is today.(30®) its functioning is 
so imperfect that some say that GATT is dead.^306  ^ To say the 
least, it does not fulfill the function which should be the one 
of an international agreement on trade. He will see it by 
studying what this internal function should be.
(2) The ultimate constitutional function of international 
trade rules is to protect taxpayers and consumers from their own 
governments. in case they would be tempted to use the state 
apparatus to protect failing industries.(307) in this respect, 
international economic obligations and the threat of lawful 
retaliation in case of breach, can be seen as creating the 
potential of a political cost which will bear on the politician's 
decision whether to adopt protectionist measures or not.(308)
This function is the ultimate goal of a free trade regime, but 
this does not explain why governments enter into the agreement in 
the first place.
Formally, governments enter into free trade regimes because 
they are in charge of defending the national interest, which 
requires to refuse to use public institutions in favor of 
sectional interests. It is the role of free trade regimes to 
protect governments from organized sectional interests which 
could try to influence the government to have it make use of the
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state apparatus in their favor.(309) This issue is just a facet 
of the perennial problem of checking the tendency of group action 
to undermine the liberty of the individual or to rival the 
political power of the state and of the necessity of having an 
effective constitutional system to prevent this from happening. 
However, a framework of constraints on policy options allows not 
only to defend the country's interests, but also the 
governments'.^310  ^ No government can achieve its long term 
policy goals without a framework of constraints ensuring that the 
goal is not sacrificed to short-term problems, or vocal sectional 
interests. It is only within such a framework of constraints that 
a government can effectively resolve in its trade policy the 
perenial conflict between short-term political expediency and 
national welfare, between the interests of producers and the 
interests of consumers, or between society's desire for economic 
growth and its desire to avoid the structural adjustment needed 
for growth.^311  ^ Hence, the purpose of the legal framework now 
provided by GATT is to help governments overcome the internal 
political obstacles against a rationalization of the regime of 
imports arising from the predominance of producers' interests in 
political life.i312)
(3) International obligations allow governments faced with 
demands from sectional interest to resist to these demands by 
pointing to the international obligations undertaken to meet the 
national interest. The structure of decision-making in democracy 
typically leads public officials to opt in favor of short-run
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political gains (they want to be re-elected), and thus in favor 
of protection, even when their values or long-run political 
agenda are best served by an open market.(313) International 
obligations reduce or eliminate the dominance of the strategy of 
defection in domestic decision-making by changing the payoffs to 
public officials for granting and denying protection.(314) it 
allows to a certain degree, especially if reciprocal commitments 
have been made by other countries - and are respected - to make 
politically feasible a sustained policy of liberal trade.^315^
(4) This explains why the principle of reciprocity is 
essential in the establishment of a free trade regime. The 
conclusion of an international agreement to fulfill this 
fundamentally domestic constitutional function is made necessary 
by the bias democratic institutions have toward domestic 
producers in trade policy making.(316) in principle, a 
unilateral liberalization of trade should be beneficial not only 
economically, but also politically : in liberal economic theory, 
a government should win votes by reducing trade barriers either 
because the majority of the population derives benefits from 
trade liberalization or because the government redistributes the 
gains from trade liberalization, for example through adjustment 
assistance programmes, in such a way that the welfare of the 
majority of the voters rises.^317  ^ However, because of a bias 
towards producers in trade policy making, governments need to 
reduce trade barriers on the basis of reciprocally agreed 
principles and rules rather than unilaterally :f318) Given the
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predominance of organized producers' interests in political life,
governments can liberalize trade only if they gain their 
(319)support. ' And while trade liberalization is beneficial for 
the economy as a whole, certain industries and workers are 
inevitably hurt by it and will therefore use their political 
influence to oppose it.(32°) Reciprocal liberalization of trade 
holds the promise of visible export gains for other industries, 
and therefore helps to establish a political counterweight to the 
one of ailing industries. Reciprocity is the safest route to get 
domestic political support from dynamic industries in favor of 
trade liberalization to counteract the resistance of more 
stagnating industries.^321)
(5) An effective institution allowing a liberal interfacing
of national economies would fulfill a constitutional function in
that it would prevent the production of domestic laws to favor
sectional interests in the polity in a hidden manner. GATT does
not fulfill this function today, which barely needs to be proved.
This is logical because the effectiveness of the system of rules
depends on the effectiveness of the mechanism of enforcement.
International trade law, like most international law, is
"horizontal" law : it is made, administered and enforced by the
( 2 2 2 )national governments to which it applies* It consists
primarily of reciprocal undertakings by national governments to 
restrain their own actions and to recognize as legitimate the 
sanctions imposed by other governments if they fail to live up to 
their commitments.i323) This makes the whole system extremely
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fragile. Domestic rules of law are breached all the time, but 
this has little effect on their effectivity as rules of law 
because the state apparatus can always increase the means devoted 
to rule-enforcement. The situation is wholly different in case of 
violation of the rules of international trade. Actions by a 
government in violation of the rules will have two immediate 
consequences (apart from direct retaliation) : first, other 
governments will be less well placed to resist to domestic 
pressures ;(324  ^ second, domestic groups in situations similar 
to that of those given similar special treatment will find that 
it is-only "fair" that they should be given similar special 
treatment.(325) Exceptions will generalize, with an implied 
weakening of the rules, and increased disorder in the 
international economy.^326)
(6) This erosion of the rule of law and the resulting 
increase in disorder will be particularly difficult to resist if 
there is little or no recognition that it is a purely domestic 
interest which is protected through a commitment to the rules of 
the international economic order. If both government and general 
public opinion view internationally agreed rules as obstacles to 
desirable domestic action, rather than as means to resist against 
sectional interests, it is not surprising if they give in to 
political pressure to cheat.(327) Evidently, the damage to the 
international economic order is not overwhelming if a state of 
minor importance breaches the law. The situation is wholly 
different for huge economic powers who have a particular
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responsibility in the creation and maintenance of international 
order. International obligations have to be seen as an 
international public good - a kind of good from which everybody 
benefits even without "paying" for it. In case of a public good 
provided by voluntary action - which is the case for the 
international economic order - a "free rider" problem exists : if 
you benefit from the good whether you contribute to it or not, 
why contribute at all ? The public good will then generally be 
underproduced, unless (i) the deterrent of retaliation is 
effective or (ii) a single country - or a small group of 
countries - is large enough, relative to the rest of the world, 
to take responsibility for the world as a whole, to be prepared 
to ignore "free riders".(328) in other words, if major 
market-oriented economies follow the rules, then order in the 
multilateral trading system is created for the world as a 
whole.(329) But the weight of the open economies in the world 
market economy must be reasonably large for this to 
function.(33°)
A major reason for the erosion of liberal trading lies in the
fact that the United States have partially abdicated their role
(331)of leadership in maintaining a liberal world order. The
three main actors in the world-economy - the United States, the 
European Community and Japan are exploiting the system for their 
own short-sighted ends. Even in the United States, there is a 
diminishing belief in free trade, mostly because of a fundamental 
misunderstanding as to the meaning of its rules. Everywhere the 
belief is held that being a free trader means being generous to
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the outside world ; that having an open economy is a cost and 
that all those who benefit should contribute to the expense. The 
misunderstanding of GATT as a constitutional document to protect 
national constituents is particularly damaging.
To demonstrate this, we will show in some details the process 
by which, in the absence of an effective international regime, 
interest group lobbying in the United States designs trade policy 
at the expense of the American consumer. The United States are 
taken as an example because the cost of protection there is well 
documented, which by no means means that the problem is met in 
the United States only, nor that it is worse there.(332)
1.3.3. The United States Example
(1) We have already mentioned that the United States have 
dramatically liberalized their tariff barriers since World 
War II.(333) on the other hand however, the United States has 
also imposed numerous regimes of "special protection" to insulate 
important manufacturing and agricultural sectors from foreign 
competition.^334  ^ There are also, in the United States as 
anywhere else, protectionist measures hidden in thousands of 
regulations which do not have trade regulation as their main 
purpose but which commonly discriminate against imported goods. 
These are what is sometimes called "technical and administrative 
obstacles" ;(335) they are extremely difficult to grasp, and 
impossible to enumerate and are very troublesome because of the 
difficulty of eliminating them. In addition, as Professor Jackson
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"the temptation of legislators and other government officials 
to shape regulation or tax measures so as to favor domestic -- ------ ----  an<J proposals to do this
These measures pose the same constitutional law problem as 
the one we have identified with regard to measures directed at 
trade control. Because their impact is impossible to measure, we 
will concentrate however on trade regulatory laws which cost has 
been estimated by economists. But it must be stressed that the 
constitutional problem posed by protectionism is the same for all 
types of protectionist measures.
(2) Trade policy-making in the United States is shared by the 
US Congress and the President. The Constitution grants Congress 
the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations" and to levy 
duties as well as other forms of taxes.(337> The President also 
possesses constitutional law powers relating to international 
trade because of his responsibility in conducting foreign
Some of the existing restrictions on imports are imposed by
Congress itself, others are imposed by the Executive under a
delegation of power by Congress, others again are resulting from
a use of the President's inherent powers.
(i) In the first place, if tariffs generally speaking have
been dramatically reduced since the end of World War II, there
are still instances of tariff-based special protection for some
(339)industries where tariffs are 15 percent or higher. It is
relations.(338)
notorious that these remaining high tariffs have been retained by 
industries with sufficient political strength to guard their 
ancestral ramparts against the erosion of the seven GATT Rounds 
of tariff negotiations.(34°) Prior to each Round, these 
industries have been able to persuade a constituent-minded 
Congress that they can not survive without their accustomed 
t a r i f f s . T h i s  biased opinion has then translated in a 
reduction of the capacity to negotiate of a more globally-minded 
President, either under the form of a specific exclusion from the 
President's tariff-cutting authority, or by a special 
investigation that identifies "import-sensitive" industries, or 
simply by informal persuasion.^342^
Even more decisive exercises of congressional powers are the 
instances of statutory quotas.^343  ^ These statutes often set a 
rigid limit on imports, expressed as a percentage of consumption 
or as a residual between domestic consumption and domestic 
production, or they altogether ban foreign supplies from the US 
market.
(ii) There are then instances of delegation of congressional 
authority to the President to enable him to adopt protectionist 
measures, at the conclusion of three administrative procedures. 
The first of these administrative procedures is the US domestic 
escape clause, allowing to give a temporary competitive break to 
a domestic industry when foreign competition "hurts too much".
The other two administrative procedures are less-than-fair-value 
procedures, pursuant to which a domestic firm or industry may get
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a competitive break if it is suffering from some "unfair" foreign 
competition. While the first of these administrative procedures 
is not criticizable in its principle, the economics of the 
functioning of the other two procedures show that they sometimes 
lead to the creation of barriers against "fair" trade.
(a) The more political of the administrative procedures 
created by Congress is the so-called "Escape Clause" of Section 
201 of the Trade Act of 1974.(344) Under this clause, an 
industry may petition the International Trade Commission ("ITC") 
to conduct an investigation of "injury" from imports. The ITC 
investigates whether or not there has been or is likely to be 
serious injury to a domestic industry producing an article like 
or directly competitive with the imported article. Then the ITC 
reports its findings to the President and if injury or threat of 
injury is found, it makes recommendations as to the imports 
restrictions and/or adjustment assistance necessary to prevent or 
remedy the injury. However, the President is not legally 
constrained by the ITC's recommendation.
We have shown why the existence of an escape clause is an 
absolute necessity in the actual international trade 
system.(345) in the absence of international redistributory 
policies, the set of rules and constraints applying on any given 
competitor on a given market vary too much from the ones applying 
to other competitors on the same market to consider as an 
inflexible rule that market competition alone should select 
efficient producers without political intervention.^  ^ In
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some individual situations, the competitive failure of domestic 
firms or industries is not due to an incapacity to compete but to 
circumstances which can not be blamed on the failing competitors. 
Additionally, it is sometimes politically impossible to abandon 
some sectors of activity due to the ensuing consequences 
(unemployment, etc...) even if domestic producers have been 
lousy, did not invest enough, etc... The existence of an escape 
clause mechanism in US domestic law is therefore not to be blamed 
per se. However, it should be, and was meant in US domestic law, 
to provide a major route for temporary protection when foreign 
competition "hurts too much" and makes it necessary to grant 
temporary relief in order to slow the pace of adjustment to 
changed competition conditions. But because of its strict - and 
necessarily strict -i347) conditions of application, and 
because other devices could be subverted in an easier way in 
order to get protection from competition,(348) the escape 
clause has become a "secondary road" to get protection. Escape 
clause relief has two major drawbacks from the point of view of 
petitioning industries : (i) it is difficult to get : an industry 
seeking escape clause relief must first persuade the ITC that it 
is "seriously injured", or "threatened with serious injury" and 
that rising imports are the "most important cause" of the actual 
injury or threat of injury ;(349) then, (ii) once the ITC 
recommends trade relief to the President - who awards escape 
clause relief in a highly discretionary manner - the industry 
still has to persuade the President that trade relief serves the 
national interest more than adjustment assistance or, indeed, no
relief at all and (iii) once it is obtained, the
protection will diminish year-to-year, forcing the industry to 
adapt to the realities of international competition.
All this explains that out of the 53 import relief petitions 
from 1975 to 1984, the ITC recommended trade relief in only 28 
cases, was evenly split in 3 other instances, and that out of 
these 31 cases, the President granted relief only 13 times.*351)
(b) Whereas the escape clause deals only with injury to 
United States producers from import competition, two 
"less-than-fair-value" administrative procedures exist to 
restrict imports which deal, in law, with the "fairness" of 
business practices used in the American market by
/*>eforeigners. ' ’ Countervailing duty law is concerned with the
sale of subsidized exports, while antidumping law deals with
sales at a price below the foreign producer's long-run costs, or
below his home market-price.(353  ^ However, Finger and others
have discovered that escape clause cases and less-than-fair-value
cases in fact deal with the same thing - injury from imports and
the associated gains from trade.(354) For them, the functional
difference between the cases which belong to one track or the
other is the size and perhaps the degree of public awareness of
the interest at stake, not the nature of those interests :
"antidumping and countervailing duties are, functionally, the
„(355)poor (or small) man's escape clause.
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The reasoning of Finger and others is the following. They 
start by noting that when protection is the issue, the opposed 
interests are domestic producers', who want import restricted, 
and domestic consumers' or users' who want access to foreign 
sources of supply.(356) By specifying precisely how the 
interests of one group are to be taken into account, legal or 
technical criteria in less-than-fair-value proceedings spare 
policy level officials from having to decide whose interests will 
be taken into account and from having to explain to those whose 
interests are left out why this is so.^357) The 
less-than-fair-value criteria are much more technically precise 
than the escape clause criteria and furthermore, the criteria are 
assured of a subsequent right of appeal : any interested party 
can appeal a less-than-fair-value determination whereas the right 
of court appeal evidently does not apply to escape clause 
findings.(358) These criteria provide solid reasons for the 
government's decision, and allow the government to point out to 
the losing side that no other decision was legally possible, 
which thus diffuses the political costs of the decision without 
preventing the government from harvesting the gratitude of the 
winners.f359) The end result is some very large transfer of 
income, without (almost) anybody knowing about it : the transfer 
of income from consumers to producers induced by protection is 
typically eight to ten times the net cost of protection i(36°)
The key to the effectiveness of such technical tracks is to 
disenfranchise one "side" with a major interest in the decision 
made.(361) Because the mechanisms are established through
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democratic processes, such a disenfranchisement is possible 
because the "losers'* are unaware of what is going on. (362) This 
in turn is possible because of misdirection and 
obfussafcien.*363) (i) Misdirection has to do with the fact that
whereas in law the mechanism is designed to impose import 
restrictions only in instances of "unfair" foreign pricing, the 
economics of the mechanisms suggests that they will go too far 
and protect domestic producers from "fair" foreign competition as 
well.(364) Less-than-fair-value mechanisms having the power to 
restrict imports, they will attract all those with an interest in 
having imports restricted and not only firms and industries beset 
by unfair competition.(365  ^ Bv design, these mechanisms weight 
domestic producers' interests more heavily than domestic users' : 
they have the capacity to impose trade restriction, but not to 
enhance trade... 3^66  ^ Firms seeking trade relief will attempt 
to make their needs fit the scope of the mechanism and its scope 
fit their needs,^367  ^ and the obscure nature of the proceedings 
assure that this advantage can be exploited without generating 
opposition.(36®) (ii) Such a misdirection in the establishment 
of less-than-fair-value procedures goes on because of 
obfuscation.(369) Technical procedures are incomprehensible 
without lengthy training.*370  ^ They don't attract news media 
attention, tend to obscure, and this allows the government to 
serve the advantaged interest group without being called to task
137i)by the disadvantaged ones.' '
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Interestingly, Finger and others were concluding that if you 
are politically obscure, the lower track provided by 
administrative procedures will work for you, but that if you are 
politically prominent, it won't.(372) Highly visible petitions 
will attract political opposition : because they have no 
technical outlet, buyers will press their interests at the
political level, and hence such cases will escalate into
. . i 3 7 3 )political issues.1 '
This is precisely what happened in the major instances of 
protection in steel, auto, etc... industries, were the use of the 
inherent powers of the President have been used by highly 
politically visible and vocal industries.
(iii) Highly visible industries have therefore been looking 
for other modes of getting protection. The legislative conditions 
(imposed by GATT obligations) to get escape clause relief proving 
difficult to meet, one of the roads taken was to make use of the 
inherent responsibility of the President for the conduct of 
foreign policy in order to get him persuade foreign governments 
both to limits their exports to the United States and to 
administer the necessary restraints.(374) This has become the 
favored means of protecting large troubled industries,(37S) the
President being able to claim credit both for defending the
principle of free trade and for defending the industry. In
addition, the President can usually conceal the (huge) cost of
protection from the public. Further, quantitative restraints have 
the preference of both domestic producers and foreign exporters 
in comparison with high tariffs.
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(a) Domestic producers prefer quantitative restrictions 
because, first, their share of the market is more certain ; 
second, domestic prices are less variable ; and third, it is easy 
to get protection under this form because if the public 
understands the impact of tariffs, it is easily persuaded that 
quantitative restrictions barely affect prices.(376)
(b) Foreign exporters prefer quantitative restrictions for 
reasons varying whether they are traditional suppliers or new 
entrants on the US market.(377) Traditional suppliers like 
quantitative restrictions because, first, this normally does not 
cut back their own exports and limits third countries producers' 
increases in market shares ; and second, the restrictions imposed 
tend to improve price levels in the United States.(378) Even 
aggressive new entrants tend to like quantitative restrictions 
because scarcity rents are artificially created on the American 
market which, because of the way quantitative restrictions are 
customarily implemented in the United States, go to the 
restrained exporters (who can use them to export more effectively 
on third markets...).(379)
Quotas please many in international trade. What, then, is the 
problem with them ? Special protection generally speaking does 
not, for the most part, freeze the status quo in the United 
States.(38°) a substantial amount of adjustment takes place, 
and relief often turns out to be temporary.*381) However, the 
system provides little assistance to firms - or workers - that 
depart the troubled industries.(382) it imposes huge costs on
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consumers : if it is true that jobs are saved in this manner, the 
costs per production job saved are usually in the range of 
$150,000 ! it would be far cheaper to openly compensate - even 
largely - departing workers for moving to new industries or early 
retirement.f383) Finally the system engenders widespread 
opposition to trade liberalization.*384)
In the case of countervailing and antidumping duties, income 
transfers from consumers to producers are also very important.
The problem here comes from the perversion of the law, which 
allows to get protection from the higher comparative advantage of 
competitors.
(3) The point of all this is that the classical vision of the 
GATT as a creator of order and predictability in international 
trade tells only part of the story.(385) National economies are 
the first to suffer when their governments enter into beggar-my- 
neighbour policies. But governments can be forced for internal 
political reasons to undertake such policies. The principal 
function of the GATT legal system is therefore to help resolve 
conflicts of interest within, and not among countries.^386) The 
function of the GATT is to allow states to defend their national 
economic interests not against the national economic interest of 
other countries, but against sectional interest within their own 
AND other countries.(387) a similar point was made by Hudec 
when he wrote that "the pressures of the GATT legal system are 
directed toward the decision-making processes of national 
governments".(388) The GATT-system is part of the framework of
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pressures and constraints in which public choices are 
( 389)made.' Although formally an international agreement among 
countries, GATT has therefore become functionally part of the 
domestic constitutional order of each contracting party.
The rise in protectionism however proves that GATT has not 
managed to fulfill its function. But the improvement to be made 
is not the one of a document like any other ; it is the 
improvement of a constitutional document which is needed. One has 
to realize that to hope for more than what GATT has achieved was 
to ask much too much, given its weak structures. To respond to 
the issues of interdependence, it would have been necessary for 
GATT to develop to a federal or guasi-federal state. which GATT 
obviously is not and towards which it could not evolve given its 
birth defects.
What allows us to reach such a conclusion is that the issues 
raised by the "nationalization" (in the United States context) or 
the "internationalization" (in the European Community context) of 
markets over a structure of decentralized economic regulation by 
states have already been faced by geographically smaller economic 
integrations, that is, by the United States and the European 
Community. Two major developments have followed in both cases :
(i) the rise in federal - central - power ; that is, a 
development of the process of norms creation at a level above the 
one of the states integrated into a "single" economy ; and (ii) 
the development of principles of nondiscrimination which respect 
is imposed on states when they make use of their regulatory
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power. This lesson can be drawn from a study of the case law of 
the American Supreme Court and of the European Court of Justice 
whereby both supreme courts determined, by interpreting the 
constitution or treaty founding the union, what states can not be 
allowed to do if the unity of the integrated economy is to be 
preserved.
In order to draw an appropriate parallel with the existing 
institutions at the global level, one has to stress that the 
creation of central norms does not directly or uniquely fall 
within the functions of GATT. The improvement of the processes of 
central norm creation, which corresponds to a globalization of 
the fulfillment of positive state functions, is a necessary 
development at the global level due to the globalization of 
markets. However, several institutions can and probably must be 
involved in this process. GATT is not necessarily the best suited 
forum for the creation of norms. Among liberal economies, for 
example, the OECD plays an important role in this respect.
Several codes isolated from GATT can be designed ; organizations 
dealing with specific on-going problems can be built, etc...
However, there is one issue area in which GATT is uniquely 
positioned : the prevention of protectionism by an effective 
implementation of the principle of nondiscrimination - in fact, 
what is called in GATT the MFN and National Treatment obligations
- upon states. The fulfillment of this negative state function 
(not to discriminate) directly falls within the function of GATT.
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This first Part has demonstrated that international economic 
integration is comparable in certain respects to international 
legal integration, i.e. that it is hopeless to imagine 
integrating national economies without developing Hproto-federal" 
structures above the states of the economies integrated. The use 
of the term "federal" is rather provocative ; even within the 
European Community it is still considered by many to be 
blasphemous to pretend that the European Community is in any way 
like a federal state. By using the expression "proto-federal 
structures" however, I do not mean that the development of a 
fully fledged federal state is a necessity, but that certain 
elements of federalism have to be developed in the interest of 
constituents within member states.
This perspective allows us to suggest that a comparative 
study of the two most important federations of today - the United 
States and the European Community - will allow us to draw 
parallels and to isolate common mechanisms which both logically 
and politically could then be developed at the global level. This 
will be the purpose of the next two Parts of this book.
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PART II
THE PREVENTION OF NON-TARIFF BARRIERS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS
(1) We have said in the first part of this book that the 
type of approach we propose to use to analyse the institutional 
developments accompanying the progressive integration of the 
international economy is an extension of the economic analysis 
of federalism.^ We have mentioned that the economic 
analysis of federalism is a branch of the economics of the 
positive state which attempts to offer a unified account of 
political, economic and legal institutions through a 
theoretical reduction of each set of institutions to an aspect 
of this single cultural form which can be termed 
"liberalism".^  We have presented the institutions required 
for the existence of an international economic order by looking 
at the problems raised by the existence of several states in a 
normative perspective considering that the primary medium of 
socialization, at the international as well as at the national 
level, should be the market.^ Some of the institutions 
required at the international level to reduce or eliminate the 
non-tariff barriers induced by a decentralized state-system are
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purely facilitative and technical.^ Others are more
controversial in the sense that due to the existence of
political interventions in the economy - some of which may be
warranted in our liberal perspective, while some others are not
- there is need for institutions preserving some stability and
fairness in international micro-economic competition, which
implies some sort of constraint on states' capacity to create 
(5)norms.' '
In highly integrated economic federations, such as the 
United States and the European Community, the constraints on 
states capacity to create non-tariff barriers to economic 
exchange are found in the constitution (in the United States) 
or in a sum of constitutional texts (in the European 
Community).^  This is logical since federalism, being a 
system of divided power, proceeds from the very essence of 
constitutionalism. which is limited government under the rule 
of l a w . ^  In a policy organized with several layers of 
public authority, with possibly conflicting jurisdictions, some 
document (which can be termed a constitution) must define the 
content of the power exercised at each layer and its limits. At 
the global level, there is obviously no world economic 
constitution and the rules existing - in the GATT, with regards 
to trade in goods - are not usually understood as fulfilling a 
constitutional function. However, our thesis is that the 
problems to be solved are constitutional in nature, and that 
the global institutions aiming at preventing the creation of 
non-tariff barriers are a constitutional system en devenir.
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(2) In the first Part, we have shown how the international 
system of economic institutions has developed as a reply to the 
intrinsic disequilibrium in representative democracies in favor 
of sectional organized interests, creating a need for
/  Q \constitutional restraints to preserve the common interest.1 '
We have seen that the existing system seems to have reached its 
limits, and is unable to adequately fulfill this function.^ 
Prior to present in the third Part how to improve the 
existing international economic regime, the present Part will 
indicate how non-tariff barriers are either reduced or 
eliminated in the two most important existing federal systems : 
the United States and the European Community. These two systems 
are central in our perspective for a variety of reasons :
(i) Their combined structural weight in the global-economy 
is overwhelming. This implies that if they can find a way 
to agree on how things should be done at the international 
level, they have a capacity to determine how things will be 
done, even if there is resistance on the part of other 
polities.
(ii) Combined, America and Europe have almost monopolized 
in the past the ideas on which the existing institutions of 
the liberal world-economy have been built ; it is most 
likely in the literature accompanying their own progressive 
integration and explaining it that ideas for the future 
will be found.
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(iii) The scale of the problems they have faced, and still 
face, to progressively integrate is somewhat related to the 
scale of the problems existing at the global level. 
Consequently, it is in these systems that proper experience 
exists from which lessons can be drawn for the world.
(iv) For the reasons mentioned above, no political action 
at the global level is possible if there is no agreement 
between America and Europe. The best way of finding where 
there can be agreement is to try to draw lessons from their 
common experience of progressive economic and political 
integration.
(v) Finally, even though our realist's perspective may 
appear somewhat imperialistic, it may be legitimated by the 
fact that both the American and the European polities have 
evidenced a tradition of preservation of liberties, 
political freedom, human rights, etc ... which, in an 
individualistic perspective such as ours, may justify that 
fundamental rules of behavior be structurally imposed on 
other states. which rights and interests do not have to be 
preserved as such, but only to the extent that they are 
useful for the preservation of the rights and interests of 
individuals wherever they are.
(3) A final word of caution : the internal logic of our 
individualistic liberal approach implies that we start our 
analysis by considering the institutional requirements deriving 
from the transborder activity of micro-economic actors. The
- 124 -
answer of positive public institutions is discursively 
presented as if it were second. In other words, our approach 
leads us to present institutional evolution as if the supply of 
norms by public institutions were occurring as a response to 
private demands. This logical consequence of our 
individualistic point of departure does not mean that in a 
historical sense, public institutions and norms are always 
developed as a reaction to private demands. It must be stressed 
that we don't think it is possible to demonstrate any such 
historical primacy. Rather, the supply and demand for rules 
appear in a mirror image fashion in liberal systems, and the 
evolution of their relationship seems to occur through a 
circular chain of causes and reactions.
Prior to present the manner in which the various issues 
raised by the political structure of federalized common markets 
are addressed in the United States and the European Economic 
Community, we will make a quick presentation of a taxonomy of 
such issues (§2.0.1) and of the various mechanisms created to 
address them ($2.0.2).
2 . 0 . 1 .  A  T a xo n o my o f  Is s u e s  in  F e d e r a liz e d  Common M a rk e ts
We will consider a territorial space of micro-economic 
exchange relationships over which various states with some 
capacity to create norms independently from each other, are 
somehow members of a "federal state". On the territory 
delineated by the external borders of the member states,
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transactions occur in such a manner, and with such 
institutions, that this space and institutions are considered 
as composing a "common market".
By definition, federalized common markets reject both the
"unitary state" and the "classical international law"
approaches to constructing systems of regulation of the
economic a c t i v i t y . T h e  territory of these common markets
is partitioned among several states so that there isn't one
single state to provide the institutions and norms requested by
the evolution of the transactional activity of economic actors.
Simultaneously, a federal state exists with some sort of
jurisdiction extending above the whole territory of the
federalized common market, so that somehow "sovereignty" is
shared, and member states in some instances must abide to the
commands of the federal state. Federalized common markets have
in principle the ability to achieve an effective balance
between uniformity and diversity in the development and
maintenance of institutions and mechanisms.However,
their structure creates special problems for the creation of an
effective legal system, i.e. for the creation of a system
having an effective capacity to create and implement required
norms. In particular, the question is posed of how to allocate
regulatory competences between the center and constituent
units. Decentralized regulation being warranted for a set of
(12)various reasons already mentioned, while uniform
regulation may be necessary in some instances, there is a 
tension between two poles which must be institutionally dealt
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with. The allocation of power among constituent units and
center varies enormously from one federal system to the
( 1 3 ]other.' ' Generally speaking, though :
(i) Constituent units must have substantial legal powers to 
regulate transactions so that decentralized political 
action is possible ; but at the same time, these regulatory 
powers must be limited so that the regulations made by 
constituent units do not unnecessarily impede the operation 
of the common market.
(ii) Simultaneously, in those areas where constituent 
units' powers are curbed because a lack of uniformity would 
put at a competitive disadvantage the micro-economic actors 
established on the various states' territories, or when it 
is necessary to prohibit states from imposing purposive 
barriers to economic exchange, the center must have the 
power and the capacity to act.
There are thus two main problems in a federalized common 
market :
(i) the problem of the efficiency of a regulatory system 
partly decentralized to appropriately address the various 
issues presented. It requires that the allocation of 
jurisdiction over the various issue areas be made according 
to the intrinsic needs of the area. Local lawmaking is 
preferred on grounds of efficiency, participatory 
democracy, and diffusion of p o w e r . I n  many fields, 
their is no need for centralization of regulation :
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education, for example, like transport, housing, or health, 
etc... is a field of regulation which is naturally 
d e c e n t r a l i z e d . O n  the other hand, the management of 
foreign economic relations, for example, is naturally 
centralized to avoid competition among member states which 
could lead to tensions among them. Environment protection 
is an example of a complex field in the sense that it must 
both be decentralized and centralized. In particular, when 
decentralized political action to protect the environment 
is made difficult or impossible due to economic competitive 
pressure by non-intervening states, federal action is 
w a r r a n t e d . T h e r e  is then
(ii) the problem of the non-tariff barriers induced by the 
existence of a decentralized system, which must be treated 
differently according to whether they are purposively 
created by states or not. In a liberal perspective, states 
must fulfill the needs arising in their polities which are 
not appropriately fulfilled by the market. The general 
interest is their end, and if they adopt measures for other 
types of purposes, the norms adopted should be 
challengeable. In our perspective, barriers deriving from 
norms adopted for valid purposes must be accepted, while 
norms having as sole purpose to create barriers must be 
r e j e c t e d . S i n c e  non-protectionist non-tariff barriers 
may be very high and may require elimination, a 
differenciated treatment of non-tariff barriers must be 
made according to the following lines : (a) purposively and
- 128 -
unwarrantly created barriers need to be eliminated, and do 
not require any positive federal action other than 
prohibiting such barriers ; (b) those unpurposively 
created, arising out of the mere diversity in the warranted 
political replies to local demands, and high enough to 
justify giving up of the gains deriving from 
decentralization, require federal action ; (c) other 
unpurposive barriers should be accepted.
2 . 0 . 2 .  M e ch an ism s t o  A d d re s s  th e  Is s u e s
Mechanisms in federal - and federal-like - systems work to 
reconcile the potentially conflicting policies of (i) the free 
flow of trade across state lines and (ii) state interventions 
in markets to correct market failures and market 
imperfections.There are four principal mechanisms 
involved in resolving conflicts between open borders and 
diversity in the regulation of transactions : (i) federal law 
interventions. by the pre-emption of state law ; (ii) parallel 
coordination by the states themselves ; (iii) the establishment 
of voluntary standards ; finally, (iv) judicial intervention 
nullifying the effect of state laws unduly burdening the
( IQ \interstate flow of goods.' '
These different means achieve different results.
The first three means consist in the adoption of central 
norms, through different mechanisms. The first of them is the 
most important one in federal systems ; We will see the use 
made of it in a first section (§2.1).
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The last means is unique in that it merely consists in a 
prohibition of some types of states' actions. A main difference 
between judicial intervention and the three other means is that 
judicial intervention does not necessitate the use of the 
political/administrative system. Private challenges to state 
legislations on constitutional grounds allow the elimination of 
the negative effects of state laws when they are contrary to 
the grounds invoked. However, precisely because the judicial 
and not the legislative system is used here to improve the 
effective functioning of the economic integration, the courts 
can not enter into the political weighting of the different 
interests involved which is necessary for the elimination of 
many non-tariff barriers. We will see in a second section 
(S2.2) that courts have been struggling to find constitutional 
theories legitimizing their rejection of the validity of some 
state statutes on the grounds that they are unduly burdening 
the free flow of goods. Quite independently, the United States 
Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice have developed 
a similar constitutional law principle of non-discrimination.
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2 , 1 .  TH E ADOPTION OF CEN TR A L WORMS
The adoption of central norms solves two types of problems 
in federalized common markets :
(i) First, it resolves the prisoner's dilemma faced by the 
system of decentralized policy decision-making, and which may 
impede decentralized state-regulation.^20  ^ For example, in
the field of consumer protection, Trubek noted that the 
political economy of federal systems can create de facto 
regulatory gaps, if the existence of a common market creates 
political and economic forces which deter constituent units 
from exercising the legal power that the federation recognizes 
as theirs.^21  ^ Because of the fear of losing business to 
other constituent units, states may be reluctant to pass stiff 
laws protecting consumers.^22  ^ This is also true in the field 
of environment protection, health and safety regulation, or 
workers rights, etc...^23  ^ The "federalization" of a field of 
regulation allows to overcome this difficulty.
(ii) Second, central norms allow the removal of all types 
of non-tariff barriers, be they purposively created by member 
states or not. It is important to stress that any type of 
non-tariff barrier can be removed in this way. If purposive 
non-tariff barriers can also be removed by judicial action 
declaring unconstitutional - or against the treaty creating the 
common market - the unwarranted barrier,^24  ^ in the case of
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otherwise valid decentralized measures, having protective 
effect but no protectionist intent, the only possibility of 
removal comes from the adoption of a central norm.
2.1.1. The Adoption of Central Worms in the United States
(1) In the United States, the Constitution's text
establishes an intricate, three level structure for the
allocation of power between the state and federal 
(2 5 )governments.' '
(i) In one category of situations, the states are expressly 
and absolutely prohibited from enacting certain type of 
legislation. For example, the states may not "coin Money ; Emit 
Bills of Credit ; [or] pass any ... Law impairing the 
Obligations of Contracts." 2^6  ^ Provisions like this place 
absolute constitutional prohibitions on states' power to enact 
these measures, and Congress alone can enact such measures.
(ii) In the second category of situations, the state must 
obtain congressional authorization to adopt new 
legislation.^27  ^ Article I, section 10 of the Constitution 
provides that :
"No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay 
any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what 
may be absolutely necessary for executing its Inspection 
Laws ; and the net Produce of all Impost and Duties, 
laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for 
the Use of the Treasury of the United States ; and all 
such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control 
of the Congress.No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay 
any Duty of Tonnage..."
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In this type of situations, states can not act absent 
affirmative authorization by Congress, which is almost impossible 
to obtain given the realities of the federal legislative 
process.
(iii) In the third category of situations, the states are 
free to enact legislation ; however, Congress has authority to 
preempt or overrule such state action pursuant to its own 
enumerated powers. Congress' enumerated powers in article I, 
section 8 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , w h e n  read in conjunction of 
the terms of the Supremacy Clause,^30  ^ make clear that those 
powers neither expressly nor conditionally denied to states may 
be exercised by them, subject to reversal or preemption by 
legislation enacted pursuant to one of Congress' enumerated 
powers.
Today, it is mostly under the authority provided by the
Commerce Clause - the power to "regulate commerce with foreign
( 32 )nations, [and] among the several states" -v ' that the federal 
government regulates "interstate commerce". 3^3  ^ The Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution making federal law supreme over 
conflicting state enactments, this ensures that when Congress 
does act, conflicting state laws are deprived of any effect.
(2) The historical roots of the Commerce Clause are to be 
found in the poor conditions of American commerce and the 
proliferating trade rivalries between the states during the 
Confederation's days.^34  ^ The Commerce Clause, which was a
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major innovation of the new Constitution, was a response to those 
( 35)concerns. It had a two-fold impact : as a restraint on
state action (which we will review below in §2.2.1) and as a 
source of national authority.
(3) As a practical matter, the US federal government of today 
has unlimited authority to enact measures regulating, taxing and 
subsidizing within the United States. The affirmation of the 
federal government's power to regulate virtually every aspect of 
the economic life of the United states is the result of a long 
evolution in the interpretation of the federal constitution which 
is beyond the scope of this b o o k . H o w e v e r ,  it is 
interesting for our purposes to notice that the major reason for 
the expansion of federal power over time was simply the 
transportation and communication revolutions that changed the 
nature of interstate c o m m e r c e . P r i o r  to that, land 
transportation was prohibitively expensive : the cost of shipping 
goods thirty miles inland equated the cost of shipping them to 
Europe, and the nation was therefore divided into a large number 
of small local markets. Most commerce was contained within one of 
these markets, and prices in one market had little or no effect
/ 3 0  \on prices in another.v Consequently, if one would apply the 
Supreme Court's modern law of interstate commerce to the economy 
of 1787; most commerce would still be intrastate. The modern law 
of inter-state commerce would have made no difference without the 
railroads. With the coming of railroads, local markets were 
linked to national markets and lost control of their destiny.
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Local prosperity began to depend of far away and uncontrollable 
developments. When railroads and paved highways ran everywhere, 
the change was universal : no state or locality could manage its 
own economy and the Supreme Court had to decide that no commerce 
was beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause.
(4) Capitalism was given an enormous accelerating thrust by 
the Civil War and there is a great difference between the old 
constitutional environment and the one which followed the 
war.^40  ^ While the dominant interest of the Court in the past 
had been the nation/state relationship, and the dominant judicial 
value was the preservation of the Union,^41  ^ the gravest 
problem facing America after the war was government regulation of 
business, and that problem became gradually the major interest of 
the Supreme Court.^42  ^ From the end of the Civil War to 1937, 
the major interest of the Supreme Court as a molder of government 
policy became the relationship between government and business ;
%
and the major value of the Court was the protection of the 
business community against government.^43  ^ The grant of power 
to the national government made by the Commerce Clause had been 
uniformly interpreted broadly by pre-Civil War courts.^44  ^
Negative formulas had to be designed to reduce the absolutism of 
the national government's power to regulate the national economy, 
and were in effect devised by the Court, for example in the E.C. 
Kniaht case of 1895, which forbade federal control over 
manufacturing on the ground that Congress may regulate only 
interstate commerce itself'and what affects interstate commerce
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"directly". 4^5  ^ The Court held that the Sherman Act, which had
been passed by Congress in 1890 to protect "trade and consumers
against unlawful restraints and monopolies" could not forbid
monopolies in manufacturing, because manufacturing is not part of
interstate commerce, and affects interstate commerce only
"indirectly".^46^
But with the Great Depression, the trend towards increased
federal powers was increased because it overwhelmed the resources
of the state and local governments.^47  ^ Although initially many
of the statutes adopted as part of the New Deal program, which
was aimed at resolving the crisis and easing the pains of the
unemployed, were invalidated as unconstitutional exercises of
power,^48  ^ after the stunning re-election of Roosevelt in
November 1936, the Court progressively admitted the federal
government's power to adopt such types of economic 
(49)legislation.v 7
(5) Today, it is often claimed by scholars that the text of
the United States constitution does not authorize the current
balance of state and federal power, and that the actual
functioning of the US Constitution is far remote from its
Framers' original i n t e n t . i t  is quite clear, however, that
the establishment of a common market was one of the Framers'
intent. In particular, the Framers wanted a stronger national
(51)union to compete more efficiently with the British. The
Framers believed that British trade domination was made possible 
by interstate squabbling and the lack of adequate central
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authority to require states to honor their obligations and 
agreements.Accordingly, they granted power to regulate
/ 5 3  \foreign commerce to the federal government.' ' It is true that
the Commerce Clause limits on protectionism in interstate trade 
are less well supported in the Convention R e p o r t . H o w e v e r ,  
this is a logical consequence of the division of the internal 
market in many isolated local markets at the time. Today's 
interpretation of the Constitution seems consistent with the 
broader Framers' intent to create a viable common market.
2.1.2. T h e Adoption of Central Noras in The European
Economic Community
(1) When the federal legislative powers in the United States 
are compared to those in the European Economic Community, the 
most striking and most important difference is that while the US 
congressional power to regulate interstate commerce is 
practically unlimited, there is no granting of such
far-reaching regulatory power to the European institutions in the 
Rome Treaty. In addition, even in the subject matters of 
regulation entrusted to the European Community, the Member States 
ordinarily keep a concurrent power over such subject matters to 
the extent that the Community has not acted upon them. As a mile, 
the powers granted to the European Community contain only a 
potential for it to exercise them, and in the absence of such 
exercise, the Member States remain competent to act.
Consequently, the procedural rules determining the Community's
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capacity to act are important for an effective Community action.
In this respect, the Council of Ministers powers for the
approximation of national laws are fairly strictly bound by
Article 100, which is the Article which has been mostly used for
the removal of non-tariff barriers resulting from disparities in
(57)national regulations.' ' Article 100 provides that :
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission, issue directives for the approximation of such 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in Member States as directly affect the establishment 
or functioning of the common market."
Article 100 therefore requires that the Council, which 
comprises one representative for each Member State, shall act by 
unanimous vote to approximate national provisions directly 
affecting the establishment or functioning of the common market, 
and the unanimity requirement has made such approximation 
difficult in the past.
When federal laws in the United States are compared with the 
legal instruments available in the European Community, it appears 
that the legislative process in the EC is rather more 
i n h i b i t e d . T h e  principal species of instruments by which 
the Council and Commission may legislate in pursuance of the Rome 
Treaty are set out in Article 1 8 9 . The instrument directly 
comparable with federal law is the "regulation", which is 
directly applicable throughout the European Community. However, 
since its use is required by article 100, the more widely used 
instrument to remove non—tariff barriers has been the directive, 
which provides only an indirect and unsatisfactory means for
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enacting uniform provisions throughout the European Community. A 
directive does not as such create rules of law directly 
applicable in Member States, but only requires Member States to 
adapt their legislation to conform it with the directive.
Because of its legal nature, a directive may create difficulties 
for the incorporation of community rules in the legal orders of 
member states.
(2) Thus, until the Single Act, article 100 was presenting
two limitations for the elimination of non-tariff barriers : the
Council was to act unanimously and, when acting, was only
adopting directives. Article 8A of the Single Act has introduced
a new policy objective into the Rome Treaty, stipulating that the
Community must adopt measures with the aim of progressively
/ £2 \establishing the internal market by December 1992. ' Article
100A, which goes hand-in-hand with Article 8 A , p r o v i d e s  in 
substance that for the adoption of measures "which have as their 
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market", 
majority voting in the council replaces unanimity. Therefore, one 
of the main obstacles to the improvement of the European common 
market has been removed and should allow the adoption of the some 
292 instruments that the Commission proposed in its "White Paper" 
as a means to reduce the non-tariff barriers impeding the 
internal market.
As far as the other limitations of directives as a means of 
achieving an effective quasi-federal system of regulation is 
concerned - their lack of direct applicability - it has been 
partly removed by Article 100A which allows - still for the
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achievement of the internal market - the adoption either of 
directives oe regulations. This extension of the range of 
instruments allowed is a reaction to past experience with 
directives.However, in its declaration on Article 100A, 
the Commission has given assurance that it would give preference 
to the use of directives if harmonization involves the amendment 
of legislative provisions in one or more Member States.
In addition to provide for a system of creation of central 
norms, federal systems provide for another method to reconcile 
the potentially conflicting policies of the free flow of goods 
and of states' interventions in the economy, by allowing judicial 
intervention to nullify the effects of state laws unduly 
burdening the free flow of goods. We will see in the next section 
what theories have been developed by the United States Supreme 
Court and by the European Court of Justice in their case law to 
legitimate their apparent interferences with the people's 
representatives decisions.
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2.2. TH E PREV EN TIO N  OF ST A T E  PROTECTIONISM
We will first review the prevention of state protectionism in 
the United States (§2 .2 .1) and then in the European Economic 
Community (§2.2.2).
2.2.X. The Prevention of S t a t e  Protectionism in the United States
(1) We have already mentioned that the US Congress, as a 
practical matter, has unlimited authority to enact measures 
regulating, taxing or subsidizing within the United States.
In addition to this positive competence, in case Congress does 
not regulate some aspect of commerce, the federal courts have 
exercised authority - generally held to derive from the Commerce 
Clause to invalidate state measures that "unduly" burden
or restrict such commerce.1 ' Thus, since early in the
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has promoted economic union 
on the basis of the "Dormant Commerce Clause" doctrine by 
invalidating state laws that were hostile to a national common 
m a r k e t . T h e  reason for this intervention of federal courts 
in states' regulations of interstate commerce - without a clear 
textual basis - is simply that the most important argument for 
constitutional limitations on state power is a systemic, 
structural o n e . T h e i r  position derives from their belief
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that economic union is a central purpose of the Constitution, and
that the judiciary has broad powers to carry out that 
(71)purpose.' '
(2) The Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has no direct 
support in the text of the Constitution.^72  ^ If specific 
provisions forbid state duties on foreign imports and 
exports^73  ^ and on shipping,^74) and state discriminations 
against citizens of other s t a t e s , t h e  words of the Commerce 
Clause grant regulatory power to Congress and do not explicitly 
limit the states when Congress has not acted.^76  ^ However, the 
Constitution, viewed as a coherent document, embodies a concept 
of economic nationhood, of a "common market" that is inconsistent
(77)with certain forms of parochial legislation.v ' This common 
market is composed of several "sovereign" states, able to 
exercise their authority through the adoption of economic 
regulations. There is, however, no explicit provision in the 
United States Constitution directly limiting the power of states 
to regulate interstate commerce.^7®^  Thus, even though much 
local economic regulation has non-local consequences there is no
(79)general prohibition on economic regulation by the states ; 
however, because there is common market, the Supreme Court has 
ensured that states do not adopt measures that "unduly" burden 
interstate commerce. The importance of such a review has been 
clearly stated by Justice Holmes :
"I do not think the United States would come to 
an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of 
Congress void. I do think the Union would be 
imperiled if we could not make that declaration
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as to the laws of the several states. For one in 
my place sees how often a local policy prevails 
with those who are not trained to national views 
and how often action is taken that embodies what 
the Commerce Clause was meant to end.N(80)
As the final arbiter of the conformity of state legislation 
to the federal Constitution, the Supreme Court has had the 
responsibility for working out the negative implications of the 
Commerce Clause, developing a case law around its "Dormant 
Commerce Clause" doctrine.^81  ^ It has been clear very early 
that the national interest in maintaining a common market can not 
be construed as meaning that there is an absolute prohibition of 
state legislation impinging upon interstate commerce.^82  ^ That 
would really make nonsense of the whole idea of federalism.^83  ^
Indeed, the case law affirming the validity of state legislations 
affecting or regulating interstate commerce, when passed out of a 
legitimate concern for the well being of its people, is 
substantial.^84  ^ The difficulty lies in the delimitation of the 
appropriate test to screen states' measures in order to 
distinguish among those which, even though they affect interstate 
commerce, are valid, and those which are not.
(3) In order to strike an adequate balance between the 
interests of state and nation, the Court had to formulate legal 
theories working out the negative implications of the Commerce 
Clause.^85  ^ Several formulations have been used over the 
years. <86>
Prior to review these various formulations, it must be 
stressed that if burden on commerce alone were sufficient to 
invalidate a measure, few state taxes or regulations would
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survive :v ’ Some state laws, such as those defining basic
property rights of ownership and alienability, promote rather
(88)than burden commerce ;1 ' many other laws are commerce
neutral, except as part of a state's package of laws competing 
against the package of other states ;(89) but most taxes and 
commercial regulations displace or restrict market allocation and 
thus "burden" commerce.
Even though the doctrine applied by the Court is not too 
obvious, and even though there is a lively debate in the United 
states as to what that doctrine actually is, it appears today 
that what the Court is after in its review of states' measures is 
to see whether an allegedly legitimate state interest to impose
restrictions on interstate commerce is really just a pretext for
. . . . (91)some type of discrimination against out-of-state business.' '
We will first review the various theories used over time by the
Supreme Court (§2.2.1.1) and then what are the rationales for the
non-discrimination principle now enforced by the Court (§2 .2 .1 .2 ).
2.2.1.1. Judicial Theories of the Dormant Commerce Clause
The first approach used by federal courts was to focus on
the nature of the powers being exercised. In 1824, Marshall
denied, in Gibbons v. Oaden. t h e  rights of the states to
regulate interstate commerce as such. He acknowledged the right
of states to enact "inspection, quarantine laws, rand! health
laws" despite their "remote and considerable effect on commerce",
but on the basis of the "police powers" of the states under the
Tenth Amendment. However, the line between the commerce and
(93)police powers soon got very murky.
(87 \
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Therefore, in Coolev v. Board of Wardens.i94) a second 
approach was used, shifting the emphasis from the nature of the 
power exercised to the subject regulated. In 1851, Coolev 
established the general rule that states may freely regulate 
those subjects of commerce that are "local" but not those which 
in their nature require national uniform legislation.^95^
However, the Court did not develop an adequate standard to 
determine which subjects are "local" and which are "national". 
Declaration had substituted judicial analysis and the Coolev rule 
suffered from the same defect as the police power doctrine in 
Gibbons.*96*
A third formula was developed after Coolev : the
"direct/indirect" burden test.^97  ^ Regulations burdening
interstate commerce "directly" were held invalid ; those
burdening it "indirectly", "incidentally" were held valid.
Evidently, this led to a rhetoric frequently undistinguishable
from police-power analysis, using "labels to describe a result
(98)rather than anv trustworthy formula bv which it is reached."1
In the modern era, the Court has been shifting its analysis 
to put the emphasis not so much on what is regulated, but on how 
it is regulated.^99  ^ In this fourth approach, the Court 
appears to be balancing interests, which makes some writers 
critical of this doctrine, as it is reminiscent of due process 
a n a l y s i s . P a r t  of the American doctrine in effect claims 
that to determine the constitutional validity of a state 
regulation having effects on interstate commerce, a "balancing 
test" is to be applied. This doctrine realizes that to say that
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the appropriate standard is a balancing test says very little 
about the pattern of results that will be generated by applying 
the s t a n d a r d . w ith  a balancing test, everything turns on 
what factors are placed on the scales, how they are characterized 
for purposes of evaluation, and how they are weighted and ordered 
in the analysis.(102) in fact, several different kinds of 
"balancing tests" have been advocated.^103^
(a) One is the so-called "open-ended private interest 
balancing".(104) under various theories, it is argued that any 
cost imposed by a statute on a private party can be advanced as 
an argument against the constitutionality of the statute. 
According to this test, all costs to a private party should 
deserve some weight in the balance. They all give rise to a need 
for legislative justification, which is said to be up to the 
courts to see is p r e s e n t . H o w e v e r ,  since 1937 and the 
discredit on "substantive due process" doctrines, if it is 
considered that those arguments are fully met for legislative 
consideration, they also are considered as being constitutionally 
irrelevant.(106)
(b) The most serious candidate as a test in movement-of- 
goods cases under the Dormant Commerce Clause is "protectionist 
effect balancing".^107  ^ The basic idea is that if a statute has 
a protectionist effect - improving the competitive position of 
some local economic actors vis-à-vis their foreign competitors - 
the Court must look to see whether it has also good effects 
adequate to justify the negative protectionist effect. This test 
seems to be the Court's currently favored official test. Hence, 
in Pike v. Bruce church. Inc..(108) Stewart wrote :
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"Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, 
and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits."(109)
The Court seems to be balancing interests : if a Legitimate 
Local Public Interest ("T.T.PI") leads to the adoption of a state 
norm having Putative Local Benefits ("PLB"), but also an Effect 
on Interstate Commerce ("EIC") imposing a Burden on Interstate 
Commerce ("BIC"), the state norm will be upheld if BIC<PLB. 
However, Professor Regan's discussion of the Court's practice in 
the modern era demonstrates that despite the Court's talk about 
balancing, the Court has been doing nothing more in this area 
than implementing the anti~discrimination principle.^110^
Protectionist effect balancing is simply a means of 
smoking-out protectionist purpose. It is protectionist purpose 
which is objectionable, and protectionist effect is only 
important as evidence of protectionist purpose.f111) That it is 
protectionist purpose which makes a regulation criticizable in an 
economic integration is demonstrated by Professor Regan, in the 
following manner.
To effectively implement the anti-protectionism principle 
which is at the root of a multi-state common market, we want to 
prohibit the laws other than the classical tariff, embargo and 
quota which fall under the same condemnation.^112  ^ To recognize 
these, we have to identify the features of classical 
protectionist measures. Regan writes :
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HThe classical tariff or embargo or quota joins 
three features : (1) It is explicit ; that is, it 
legislates explicitly in terms of state line. (2) 
It is motivated by protectionist purpose ; its 
object is to improve the competitive position of 
local economic actors, just because the are 
local, vis-à-vis their foreign competitors. (3)
It produces a protectionist effect ; it diverts 
some business from foreign economic actors to 
their local competitors.
Can we identify one of these three features of 
classical protectionist measures as central ?
Yes, we can. If we consider in turn our three 
objections to protectionism - the 
concept-of-union objection, the 
resentment/retaliation objection, and the 
efficiency objection - we [can] see that in 
connection with each of these objections the 
centrally relevant feature is protectionist 
purpose."(113)
Because of the importance of the efficiency objection to 
state protectionism for our purposes, it is the only objection 
with regard to which we will study in more detail the adequacy of 
a motive review to screen protectionism.
Efficiency is a treacherous notion. Hence, a regulation can 
have for result to divert business from low-cost to high-cost 
producers and be efficient — in situations where it internalizes 
some cost not taken into account by the market under the previous 
scheme. The problem of such a regulation in a multi-state economy 
is that the diversion commonly ends up being in the benefit of 
local producers. It is therefore apparently protectionist, 
diverting business from out—of—state competitors to local ones. 
But with our understanding of efficiency, protectionist effect in 
itself does not trigger the efficiency objection.*115*
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Within the US constitutional system, the proper formulation 
of the inefficiency argument is the following : protectionism is 
inefficient because it diverts away business from presumptively 
low-cost producers without any colorable justification in terms 
of a benefit that deserves approval from the point of view of the 
nation as a whole ;(116  ^ without any colorable justification in 
terms of a "federally cognizable interest".(117*
"If a law which diverts business from foreign 
producers to local producers is motivated by 
protectionist purpose, it aims only at 
transferring welfare from foreigners to their 
local counterpart. That is not a federally 
cognizable benefit. On the other hand, if the law 
is not motivated by protectionist purpose, it 
must have some other purpose. That other purpose, 
whatever it is, will provide a colorable 
justification in terms of a federally cognizable 
benefit, since anything else the state aims at by 
way of economic regulation must be counted a 
benefit from the national point of view for 
constitutional law purposes."(118)
Take for example the Oregon bottle l a w . i n  1971,
Oregon enacted a statute designed to protect the environment by 
discouraging the use of non-returnable, non-reusable beverage 
containers. The statute prohibited "pull-top" metal cans, and 
imposed a specified refundable deposit on beverage containers, 
repayable by retailers to consumers and by distributors to 
retailers upon return of the container. The object of the statute 
was to discourage a mode of production - the packaging of 
beverages in non-returnable and non-reusable cans - that created 
costs (in the form of litter) not accounted for by market 
mechanisms. In other words, the object of the law was to improve 
productive efficiency by correcting an inefficiency that resulted 
from an external cost of the existing productive process.(12°)
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Oregon attempted to correct the inefficiency partly by 
requiring internalization (the provisions about mandatory refunds 
for returned cans) and partly by prohibiting outright certain 
specially obnoxious modes of production (packaging in pull-top 
cans). In sum, even though the Oregon bottle law diverted some 
business from foreign producers to local ones, there is no reason 
to condemn the law as inefficient. Hence, if costs are evaluated 
by the scheme implicit in the legal status quo prevailing before 
the bottle law, packaging beer in lightweight non-returnable 
metal cans outside Oregon (for the most part) and shipping it 
into Oregon is the low-cost method of distributing beer in 
Oregon. But that scheme does not take into account the cost of 
litter. The Oregon legislature decided that the cost of litter 
was significant and should be assigned to the modes of production 
that caused it. Then, it might well be that filling glass bottles 
within Oregon (to a greater extent than before) is the low-cost 
method of packaging under the new cost assignment scheme. So, 
just as the Oregon law diverts business from low-cost producers 
under the old scheme, it diverts business from high-cost 
producers to low-cost producers under the new scheme. What 
happened in between is a legitimate political decision that 
litter is a significant cost which should be internalized into 
the production process, legitimate in the sense that it deserves 
approval from the point of view of the nation as a whole, and not «
only from the point of view of Oregon.
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The notion of "federally cognizable benefit" which 
legitimates the diversion of business from presumptively low-cost 
producers is difficult to grasp. Within the United states, it is 
clear that a classical tariff or quota enacted by a state to 
apply on interstate commerce would aim at no federally cognizable 
benefit, no benefit that deserves approval from the point of view 
of the nation as a whole.i121) Simultaneously, the adoption by 
states of policies, implemented in an evenhanded manner, is a 
federally cognizable benefit because the constitution is written 
in such a manner that states have the autonomy to decide what 
laws to adopt. This doesn't mean that there is need of a national 
policy - for example against consumption pollution in the form of 
litter - before it is possible to say that a state regulation 
against such a pollution seeks a federally cognizable 
benefit.(122) The whole point about federalism^123  ^ is to 
have states as independent entities making their own decisions 
about - for example - what sort of an environment they value and 
want to maintain.^124^
Laws like the Oregon bottle law may have a protectionist 
effect by the mere fact that they add to the diversity of the 
regulation of commerce. However, there is no national interest in 
uniformity in commercial regulation, which would prevent states 
from adopting tough environmental laws,(125) and suggesting 
that there is such an interest - especially in view of the 
breadth of "commercial regulation" nowadays - is very nearly to 
make nonsense of the whole idea of federal union. Congress may, 
under the Commerce Clause, limit state power to enact legislation
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that is thought to interfere unduly with an integrated national 
economy, even though it is valid under the anti-protectionism 
principle. But the role of the Court is only to see that in 
adopting legislation, states do not act with a discriminatory 
intent.
2.2.1.2. Rationales for the Anti-Protectionism Principle
(1) There is first a semiotics rationale to the
anti-protectionism principle : the commands of the Constitution
are principally addressed to legislatures, and the business of
courts reviewing the constitutionality of legislation is to see
that legislatures do their d u t y . i t  follows that the
Court's standards for reviewing legislation ought to originate in
prescriptions for legislative behaviour that it is reasonable to
expect legislatures to comply w i t h . A n d  precisely, the
requirement of avoiding protectionist purpose is such a
prescription, whereas judicial balancing of a law's benefits
against its protectionist effect does not reflect a proper
( 128)underlying prescription for legislative behavior.
Legislatures need not balance BICs and PLBs, and the Court should 
not adopt a mode of review that suggests the legislature should 
have balanced.(129) Now, there is no doubt that it is difficult 
for a multi—member body such as a parliament to be always sure 
what its purposes are. It is even more so in the case of a
legislature which is arbitraging the different interests 
represented. But it is still appropriate to instruct a
- 152 -
legislative body to take care for its purposes, and to ensure 
that protectionist purpose does not contribute substantially to 
the adoption of the law or any of its features.(131)
(2) In addition to this first rationale, the Court is
ensuring the efficiency of local lawmaking by enforcing the
anti-protectionism principle, which is a basic justification for
(132)state autonomy in a federal system.' 7 Local lawmaking can be
more exactly tailored to particular problems and can more readily
experiment with different solutions, competition among legal
systems generating efficiencies as jurisdictions compete to
(133)attract and retain people and capital. 7 Local lawmaking 
best serves these ends when people and resources are mobile and 
when local laws do not export significant costs. When government 
imposed costs borne at home become relatively large, a state's 
product are less competitive than products of states imposing 
lower costs ; Local politics then restrains the legislature. When 
the same costs are largely exported, political restraint weakens 
or disappears.i134)
To the extent that the dormant commerce power doctrine 
invalidates only cost exporting legislation, it defers to 
efficient local lawmaking and complements competition among legal 
systems.
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2.2.2. The Prevention of State Protectionism in the
European Economic Community
If the US Supreme Court views the Commerce Clause not just as 
a source of Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce, 
but also as a restraint on states' power to affect such commerce, 
the Treaty of Rome articles on free movement of goods serve as 
the source of a corresponding restraint on Member States actions 
affecting movement of goods within the Community.(135)
It has been suggested that in reviewing the compatibility of 
state action with these "constitutional" restraints, the European 
Court of Justice is less tolerant of state restrictions than the 
Supreme Court.^136) it is recognized that both courts manifest 
a common attitude against legislations that openly discriminate 
against goods from other states by imposing restrictions that are 
not equally applicable to domestic goods. Except in rare 
circumstances, these legislations are held to be invalid.(137)
It is in the cases that deal with pieces of legislation that do 
not on their face reveal a protectionist aim that courts are said 
to differ. When legislation does not openly express a 
protectionist policy, but nevertheless restricts the free 
movement of goods across state boundaries, it is said that the 
Court of Justice has held such legislation generally incompatible 
with the Treaty, while the Supreme Court has held that if the 
legislation resists a "balancing test", it is not proscribed by 
the Constitution.(138^
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However, we have seen in the previous section that the
Supreme Court is interested in screening protectionist purpose.
which is quite different from protectionist effect 
(139 )balancing.' 'It takes account of protectionist effect only 
as evidence of protectionist intent.
We will see now that the European Court of Justice holds 
invalid - if not saved by Article 36 of the Treaty of 
Rome only some of the legislations that restrain the
free movement of goods without being openly protectionist. For 
some years, the Court appeared to be going beyond merely 
suppressing protectionism in its decisions about what economic 
regulations by Member States were forbidden by the Treaty of 
Rome.(141) But it is clearer now that what the Court is after 
is - like the American Supreme Court - protectionist intent.
2 . 2 . 2 . 1 .  A n t i-P r o t e c t io n is m  in  th e  T r e a t y
The validity of the type of structural argument used by 
Professor Regan to delineate what principles are to be used to 
prevent state protectionism in movement-of-goods cases is 
confirmed in the European context by the position of Articles 
30-36 - which are the ones designed to prevent such protectionism
- within the Rome Treaty. In part II of the Treaty - dealing with 
the Foundations of the Community - Title I is the one on free 
movement of goods. It was logical that it should contain two 
chapters, each dealing with closely related provisions designed 
to ensure the free movement of goods within the Common
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Market : Chapter I deals with the Customs Union,
and from the beginning, the Court has taken a firm position
against charges having equivalent effect to customs 
/ 1 4 4 \duties 1 Chapter II (Articles 30-37) deals with the
elimination of quantitative restrictions between Member States. 
Prohibiting tariffs is clearly not enough to create a common 
market if at the same time quantitative restrictions and 
equivalent measures are not restricted.^145) Article 30 
contains a general prohibition in trade between Member States of 
restrictions on imports and of all measures having an "equivalent 
effect". Article 34 prohibits quantitative restrictions on 
exports and equivalent measures. Article 36, however, allows 
certain important derogations from the rules of free movement - 
apparently creating a risk of circumvention of the principles of 
the Treaty - in favor of some important non-economic 
interests.(146)
2.2.2.2. What is "Equivalent"?
So much for the text. Now, if it is clear what a quantitative
restriction is, what is an equivalent measure to a quantitative
restriction ? In the case Procureur du Roi v♦_passgnvilie, the
Court wrote obiter dictum :
"All trading rules enacted by Member States which 
are capable of burdening, directly or indirectly, 
actually or potentially, intra-Community trade 
are to be considered as measures having an effect 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions. " ( 1 4 7 )
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In short, virtually every kind of measure can have the effect 
of hindering intra-Community trade and therefore can be 
considered as a measure having an equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions. Does that imply that they are 
prohibited by the Rome Treaty, as seems then logical ?(148) n o . 
The Court gave a wide interpretation of what are "measures having 
an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions** in order to 
keep the ambit of Article 30 as wide as possible. This was 
necessary because the Court wanted to be in a position to check 
protectionist motives in all the pieces of legislation 
susceptible of hiding such discrimination, i.e. in 
everything.
Discrimination - as we are well aware now - can come under 
two forms. It may be embodied in national rules that expressly 
distinguish between intra-community trade and domestic trade, and 
which put the former at a disadvantage. These measures have 
usually been held inadmissible measures of equivalent effect - 
when not saved by Article 36.(15°) Discrimination may also 
occur when national rules by their terms apply equally to all 
goods originating in the Community or in free circulation, but 
the effect of those rules in practice is to put goods imported 
from, or exported to, other Member States in a less favorable 
position than similar goods produced at home. Now, the fact that 
there is negative effect on intra-Community trade is important : 
it is what is pursued by the protectionist state and it is 
strong, even though non-conclusive, evidence of protectionist 
intent. But effect is important as evidence of intent, and that's 
all.
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What the Court is really after in its review is 
discrimination.^151) However, neither Article 30 nor Article 34 
mentions discrimination, in contrast to Article 36, which makes 
the absence of arbitrary discrimination an essential condition to 
be satisfied before there can be any defense under this Article. 
This might lead to the conclusion that discrimination is not an 
essential part of the offense, but that its absence is a required 
element of each of the special defenses in Article 36.(152)
A distinction has to be made in the analysis between 
discrimination and Article 34 of the Rome Treaty, where there is 
general agreement that the Court applies a discrimination test, 
and discrimination and Article 30 of that same Treaty, where 
there is some discussion as to what the Court is doing.
2 . 2 . 2 . 3 .  D is c r im in a t io n  and A r t ic le  34 o f th e  Rome T r e a ty
It is clear that what the Court is after in Article 34 cases 
is discrimination. It is settled law that in Article 34 cases, 
the Court - in accordance to what it does in Article 30 cases as 
we will show below -(153) has adopted a criterion of 
discrimination when considering measures applicable without 
distinction as to the destination of the product concerned.
(154)This was made clear by the Groenveld case. It involved
a Dutch regulation prohibiting the use of horsemeat in the 
manufacture of sausage. The measure, indistinctly applicable, had 
nevertheless been taken in order to facilitate the export of 
sausages to anglo-saxon countries, psychologically hostile to the 
idea of eating horsemeat.
- 158 -
The Court clearly made discrimination the criterion for its 
judgment and decided that the Dutch measure, applied objectively 
without drawing a distinction depending on whether the goods are 
intended for the national market or for e x p o r t d i d  not 
provide a "particular advantage" for national production "at the 
expense" of other Member States.
The Court expressly specified that its appreciation was
"... not affected by the circumstances that the 
regulation in question [had] as its objective. 
inter alia the safeguarding of the reputation of 
the national production of meat products in 
certain export markets in the Community and in 
non-member countries where there are obstacles of 
a psychological or legislative nature to the 
consumption of horsemeat."(157)
The intent of the Dutch legislator was not to hinder the free 
movement of goods : it was to encourage it. There was no 
protectionist intent behind the legislation ; on the contrary, it 
was motivated by a desire to avoid a potential restriction on 
trade due to the impossibility for the consumer to determine 
whether horsemeat is present in sausages or not.
2.2.2.4. Discrimination and Article 30 of the Rone T r e a t y
The Court of Justice also applies a discrimination test in 
Article 30 cases, even though part of the doctrine claims the 
contrary.^159  ^ This doctrine - which acknowledges the use of 
the discrimination principle in Article 34 cases - then regrets 
that the Court does not have a single concept of what constitutes
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measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative 
restrictions.(16°) The Court indeed has a single concept of 
measures of equivalent effect : these are the measures
adopted with a protectionist intent.*162^
The doctrine pretending that the Court cares about effect on 
trade in Article 30 cases takes the Dassonville*163) case as 
expressing the test when it says : "all trading rules... which 
are capable of burdening... intra-Community trade are to be 
considered as measures having an equivalent effect.w(164* But 
by this sentence, the Court is not expressing its test : it is 
keeping open the possibility to check bad motive in all kinds of 
texts. The Court does not prohibit all these measures "having an 
equivalent effect". The European integration is not intended to 
create total integration : the Court recognizes that if interests 
or values deserving protection are not protected by Community 
law, then it is up to states to protect them.(165) However, 
then, the measures taken are necessarily within the ambit of 
Article 30, necessarily having "effects" outside the state 
adopting them, and the Court must have the possibility to check 
whether the measure was adopted for valid purposes or not.
The role of discrimination is better seen in the case 
rnmmigg-ion v. Ireland. <167) m  that case, certain souvenir 
jewellery had to be marked "foreign" when imported into Ireland. 
The Irish government said this was justified in the interest of 
consumer protection and the fairness of commercial transactions. 
The Court held however that the Irish measures could not be
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regarded as outside the scope of Article 30. This was because 
they were discriminatory. and discrimination prevents any 
reliance on these grounds.
Bad motive, protectionist intent, discrimination is therefore 
as much the test in Article 30 as it is in Article 34.f169)
2.2.2.5. Discrimination and Article 36 of the Rome Treaty and the
■Cassis de Diion" Doctrine
(1) The non-discrimination principle applies also when states 
attèmpt to defend restrictive measures taken under the authority 
of Article 36, allowing certain "exceptions'* to the rules on free 
movement. Additionally, the principle equally applies for 
measures benefiting from the "Cassis de Dijon" jurisprudence. Due 
to the very wide definition of measures of equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions which the Court gave in Dassonville. it 
is not surprising that the Court should sooner or later accept 
the need to restrict the effect of that definition in some 
w a y . T h e  method chosen in "Cassis de Dijon" was to declare 
that there were certain "exceptions" to the rule in Article 30, 
in addition to those created by Article 36.
In fact, these so-called "exceptions" are exceptions to the 
rule in Article 30 only if one considers Article 30 to aim at 
preventing measures having a negative effect on trade. With this 
perspective, the role of Article 36 is to recognize exceptions in 
favor of some non-economic interests. ‘The problem with this 
approach is that because the favored non-economic interests are 
limitatively enumerated, one wonders then how the Court could 
create additional "exceptions" to the ones provided by Article 36.
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In fact, neither Article 36 nor the "Cassis de Dijon" 
jurisprudence are "exceptions" to the rules on free movement, 
understood as rules designed to prevent negative effects on 
intra-community trade. There are no such rules and Article 36 and 
the "Cassis de Dijon" jurisprudence are a sub-part of the 
non-discrimination principle which is the only rule pursuant to 
which measures equivalent to a quantitative restriction are 
prohibited in European Community law.
Article 36 and the "Cassis de Dijon" jurisprudence form a 
coherent whole : the Treaty provides only for limited instances 
(in Article 36) in which state-regulation can have a negative 
effect on intra-Community trade without being presumptively 
protectionist ? Very well ; the Court, because it is after 
protectionism only, can - like the Treaty did in Article 36 - 
identify for itself those fields in which state regulation is not 
protectionist - whatever its effects - if it passes a 
"proportionality test" between its avowed goal and the means 
used. If the Treaty cared about effect, nothing would excuse the 
extension of the list of non-economic interests protected by 
Article 36 which has been made by the Court by "Cassis de Dijon" 
and subsequent case law ; but the Treaty in fact cares only about 
state protectionism. and the Court did just what it was supposed 
to do, i.e. check that when states do regulate when they should, 
they do it in a non-discriminatory manner.
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(2) Before reviewing the exception mechanism to Article 30 
created by the Court, let us first review the exception mechanism 
existing in the Treaty in Article 36. This Article reads :
"The provisions of Article 30 to 34 shall not 
preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, 
exports or goods in transit justified on grounds 
of public morality, public policy or public 
security ; the protection of health and life of 
humans, animals or plants ; the protection of 
national treasures possessing artistic, historic 
and archaeological value ; or the protection of 
industrial and commercial property. Such 
prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or 
a disguised restriction on trade between Member 
States."
One could think of reading the two sentences in Article 36 
independently.
The first sentence then in essence would say that 
"prohibitions or restrictions" are not prohibited if they are 
justified on certain grounds. These grounds are important 
non-economic interests that arguably the authors of the Treaty 
didn't want to see destroyed by unrestrained market mechanisms.
So far so good.
But then, what does it mean for "prohibitions or 
restrictions" to be "justified" ? Does that mean that for 
"prohibitions and restrictions" to be admissible, a state only 
has to say that they are adopted to protect one or more of the 
mentioned possible grounds, and that this automatically 
"justifies" them ? Could that suffice for "prohibitions and 
restrictions" to be "justified" ? Obviously no : it would then be 
much too easy to go around the prohibition of adopting measures 
having an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions.
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The second possible interpretation of what "justified" means 
would be that the Court will review the state policy to verify 
its adequacy to its avowed goals. But then, what theory is it 
going to use ? The specter of what is called "substantive due 
process" in the United States is not far away.
However, the theory the Court is to apply is written in 
Article 36 itself. The second sentence of the Article doesn't 
mean that "in case there would be discrimination, it shall not be 
arbitrary." The sentence has to be read together with the first 
one. It makes sense, then, while giving its exact meaning to the 
first sentence.
What the article says is that in order to protect important 
non-economic interests, we admit discriminations. That's what 
"prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in 
transit" are : discriminations. We do not preclude them for the 
reason that they can happen to be necessary for the protection of 
the interests m e n t i o n e d . W h a t  is it that says that what we 
want to allow is only necessary "prohibitions or restrictions" ? 
Article 36, second sentence : "such prohibitions or restrictions 
shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination.. . A necessary "prohibition or restriction " is 
by definition net arbitrary ; by prohibiting arbitrary 
"prohibition or restrictions", we keep only the ones we accept : 
the necessary ones.
Thus, if genuinely based on one of the grounds mentioned in 
Article 36, a national measure may discriminate against imports, 
or exports, or goods in transit, but may not do so in an
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arbitrary way. The distinction between good discrimination and 
bad - arbitrary - discrimination is best seen in the case Rewe- 
Zentralfinanz v. Landwirtschaftskammer.(172) It was decided 
that although domestic products and imported ones were treated 
differently in this inspection law, there was no arbitrary 
discrimination because effective domestic measures were taken to 
prevent the distribution of contaminated domestic products, and 
that experience had shown that there was a risk of spread of the 
disease if imported products were not inspected.
Another expression of the non-arbitrary discrimination 
principle is that measures falling within the exceptions of 
Article 36 also have to meet a "proportionality test". Measures 
will not be justified under Article 36 if the objective could be 
obtained by other measures which could be less restrictive of 
intra-Community trade and which a member state could reasonably 
be expected to take. But this is no "balancing test" : the 
rationale for the proportionality test is that a discrepancy 
between goal and means is evidence of a discriminatory 
intent.<173>
Article 36 is therefore an exceptional device in two 
respects : First, States can use it only if there is no Community 
action ; Second, it allows discriminations only in a limited 
number of enumerated fields. This second aspect has brought the 
Court to interpret strictly the grounds mentioned in the Article 
which means that states cannot invoke Article 36 to protect other 
interests than the ones mentioned in the Article.
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(3) However, with the wide definition of measures equivalent 
to quantitative restrictions which the Court gave in Dassonville. 
in order to allow the widest possible judicial review combined 
with its strict reading of the "exceptions" contained in Article 
36, the Court had to restrict the effect of Dassonville in some 
way, recognizing that effect on trade is not what it was after. 
Announcing that it could review all measures of states because 
they all can be the locus of hidden protectionism was necessary 
in order to protect the spirit of the Common Market. However, the 
Court had to find a way to allow protectionist effects - even in 
the cases not accounted for in Article 36 - in the cases where a 
protectionist effect was a necessary consequence of an acceptable 
state policy.
The method chosen was to declare that there are certain 
"exceptions"^175  ^ to the rule in Article 30, in addition to 
those created by Article 36. Obviously, they can be found in no 
specific Article of the Treaty since the draftsmen of the Rome 
Treaty concentrated all the exceptions to Article 30 they thought 
about at the time of drafting in Article 36. But these additional 
"exceptions" logically derive from the structure of this text, 
for the same reason that many state economic regulations are 
constitutionally valid in the United States even though they 
impede on interstate commerce.
In the "Cassis de Diion" case, a French liqueur was prevented 
from being marketed in Germany because its wine spirit content 
was too low. The plaintiff attacked this under Article 30 of the
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Rome treaty, and the Germans sought to justify their law because 
it was needed on three grounds - for the protection of public 
health, the protection of the consumer against fraud, and the 
suppression of unfair competition. Advocate General Capotorti 
regarded the facts as falling prima facie within the scope of 
Article 30, and thought that the only possible escape way through 
Article 36 did not apply in view of the particular facts.
The Court did not analyse the situation in the same way, and 
nowhere in its judgment did it mention Article 36... It 
recognized that in the absence of common rules on the production 
and marketing of alcohol, it would be for the Member States to 
regulate those matters on their own territories.^176) Thus, if 
the Community does not act in a field, states can - and this is 
so because there are, in the words of the Court, "mandatory 
requirements" relating in particular to the effectiveness of 
fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness 
of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer.
States satisfy the requirements mentioned or they don't. However, 
if they do, they will do it independently, autonomously, and most 
likely differently one from another. Then, surely, the 
"disparities between the national laws" will create "pfrfftflCles 
movement within the Community". Article 30 should then apply - 
one could think and some would say - except if these obstacles 
are saved by Article 36. But no : these obstacles "must be 
accepted".(177) And why must they be accepted ? Well, precisely 
for the reason that states can act if the Community doesn't : 
states are sovereign, and if they are not bound to inaction by 
some valid international norm, they can adopt whatever measure 
pleases them to satisfy so-called "mandatory requirements".(178*
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However, the Court kept for itself the possibility to verify 
that two kinds of requirements are met : First, as to what 
"mandatory requirementsw are. The Court gave only examples ("in 
particular"), keeping the possibility to extend the list,^179  ^
but also to refuse such expansion to a particular "requirement" 
which could come to be invoked by a state to defend its 
legislation.
But second, states can act and in effect create barriers 
only as long as they live up to their obligations under the 
Treaty, that is, as long as they do not discriminate. The 
"obstacles... must be accepted... insofar as those provisions mav 
be recognized as being necessary". We arrive back at the already 
mentioned problem of the determination of what is necessary, and 
at the conclusion that the so-called "proportionality test" is in
fact only a test to determine and screen protectionist
(180) purpose.' '
(3) Article 36 and the "exceptions" to Article 30 constitute 
a coherent body of law allowing to check states intent.
There remains a difference between the two escape possibilities : 
under Article 36, it is possible to discriminate openly, and it 
seems not to be the case with the exceptions to Article 30.
Thus, in commission v. Ireland,(182) the Court recalled its 
previous position in several cases^  ^ that
"... it is only where national rules, which apply 
without discrimination to both domestic and 
imported products, may be justified as being 
necessary in order to satisfy imperative requirements (...) that they may constitute an 
exception to the requirements arising under 
Article 30."(184)
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The Court - not asking for the absence of arbitrary 
discrimination - seems to require a text non-discriminatory on 
its face to be susceptible to benefit from the "exceptions" to 
Article 30 acknowledged by the Court (under the form of 
"imperative requirements"). And the Court goes on writing that 
the orders under scrutiny are not
"measures which are applicable to domestic 
products and to imported products without 
distinction but rather a set of rules which apply 
only to imported products and are therefore 
discriminatory in nature, with the result that 
the measures in issue are not covered by the 
decisions [on the exceptions to Article 30] which 
relate exclusively to provisions that regulate in 
a uniform manner the marketing of domestic 
products and imported products".(185)
However, the Court notes the Irish argument that
"this difference of treatment awarded to 
home-product articles and to imported articles 
does not constitute discrimination on the ground 
that the articles referred to in the contested 
orders consist mainly of souvenirs."(*86)
And it then decides that :
"It is therefore necessary to consider whether 
the contested measures are indeed discriminatory 
or whether they constitute discrimination in 
appearance onlv."(187)
If the Court felt necessary to check if there was 
"effectively" discrimination and not only an apparent one, that 
implies that an apparent discrimination could have been not truly 
discriminatory.^188)
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It is therefore likely that there is no difference between 
Article 36 exceptions and the ones of Article 30, except that the 
Court keeps the possibility to decide what is a "mandatory 
requirement" while it interprets strictly the exceptions 
mentioned in Article 36. Doing this, the Court is then in 
position to control the "Community cognizable interests" to which 
states can legitimately sacrifice the interest of uniformity of 
legislation in a similar manner to the one with which the 
American Supreme Court accepts states' burden on inter-state 
commerce only if they derive from the protection of a federally 
cognizable interest.
2.2.2.6. A Check : Bottle Cases
(1) When writing on the principles applied by the US Supreme 
Court and the European Court of Justice in free movement of goods 
cases, Sandalow and Stein were noting that
"An interesting test of the attitudes of the two 
Courts is presented by recent legislation, 
enacted in Denmark and several American states, 
prohibiting the marketing of beverages in 
non-returnable bottles. The effect of such 
legislation, apparently, is to substantially 
increase the transport costs of bottlers, thereby 
disadvantaging those who are at a distance from 
the market served. Moreover, the capital costs of 
complying with the legislation may impede entry 
into the market by bottlers whose primary 
business is conducted in a state that does not 
impose the restriction. The legislation has nst» 
however, been enacted in pursuance—o£ nrntectionist policy. but as a means of reducing 
litter. The question is nicely posed, therefore, 
whether, or under what circumstances, legislation 
may be enacted that fragments the "common market" 
in pursuance of legitimate state 
objectives."(189)
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Both Courts applying a motive review to test the validity of 
legislation having protectionist effects, they arrived at the 
same basic result that despite their protectionist effects, the 
statutes were valid.
(2) We have already seen the solution reached in the United 
States.<190>
In the European Community, the problem arised with the Danish 
legislation on the re-utilization of paper and beverage 
containers enacted by Law No. 297 of 8 June 1978 and Order No.
397 of 2 July 1981. The Order lays down rules for containers for 
beer and soft drinks. Article 2(1) of the Order provides that 
such drinks may be marketed only in returnable containers, for 
which there is a system of collection and refilling under which a 
large proportion of containers used will be refilled. Article 
2(2) subjects the use of returned containers to a formal approval 
which has to be given by the National Agency for the Protection 
of the Environment in each-individual case and which may be 
refused if the Agency considers that the planned collection 
system does not ensure that a sufficient proportion of the 
containers in question will actually be re-used or if a container 
of equal capacity which is both available and suitable for the 
same use has already been approved.
An Order 95 of 16 March 1984 was adopted in order to take 
account of the Commission's objections to the System established 
by Order No. 397. It introduced a derogation from the 
aforementioned rules so as to allow the use of non-approved 
containers except for any form of metal container, either within
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well defined limits (3.000 hi per producer and per annum) or in
order to test the market, provided that a deposit-and-return
system is established.
When reviewing the validity of the Danish bottle law,^191)
the European Court of Justice recalled its "established body of 
(192)case law" that in the absence of common regulation of the
commercialization of products,
"... obstacles to free movement within the 
community resulting from disparities between the 
national laws must be accepted in so far as such 
rules, applicable to domestic and imported 
products without distinction, may be recognized 
as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory 
requirements recognized bv Community law."(193)
When the Danish government argued that the system organized 
was justified by a mandatory requirement of protection of the 
environment, the Court agreed :
The Court has already held (...)(194) that the 
protection of the environment is "one of the 
Community's essential objectives", which may as 
such justify certain limitations on the principle 
of the free movement of goods. That view is 
moreover confirmed by the Single European Act.
In view of the foregoing, it must therefore be 
stated that the protection of the environment is 
a mandatory requirement which may limit the 
application of Article 30 of the Treaty."(195)
«
What the commission was then contesting was not that the 
Danish scheme was discriminatory on its face but that
"... while formally applying to both domestic and 
imported products, [the collection system in 
force in Denmark] nevertheless puts imported 
products at a disadvantage in relation to 
domestic products."(196)
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Thus, the commission observed that
"... compliance with the conditions imposed by 
the collection system, as devised and applied at 
present, requires the necessary infrastructure to 
be set up for the collection, sorting, storing 
and transport of containers and the completion of 
long and complicated administrative 
formalities..."(197)
All this would have a "dissuasive effect" on foreign 
producers and this "discriminatory effect" (this strange shift of 
formula is the one of the Commission) would mean that
"... it is not possible to justify the collection 
system as a mandatory requirement relating to the 
protection of the environment."(198)
The European Court of Justice recalled that in Association de 
défense des brûleurs d'huiles usagées"(199) it had said that
"... measures adopted to protect the environment 
must not "go beyond the inevitable restrictions 
which are justified by the pursuit of the 
objective of environmental protection".(200)
Then, for the Court,
"It is therefore necessary to examine whether all 
the restrictions which the contested rules impose 
on the free movement of goods are 
necessary..."(201)
First, the deposit system. Yes, it is
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”... an indispensable element of a system 
intended to ensure the re-use of containers and 
therefore appears necessary to achieve the aims pursued by the contested rules.«(202)
Therefore, the deposit system can not be considered as a 
disproportionate limitation on the free movement of goods.
Second, the obligation to use only containers approved by the 
national agency. Yes, it guaranties a
”... maximum rate of re—use and therefore a very 
considerable degree of protection of the 
environment..." 12 03)
But for the Court,
"... it must nevertheless be observed that under 
the system at present in force in Denmark the 
Danish authorities may refuse approval to a 
foreign producer even if he is prepared to ensure 
that returned containers are re-used.
In those circumstances, a foreign producer who 
still wished to sell his products in Denmark 
would be obliged to manufacture or purchase 
containers of a type already approved, which 
would involve substantial additional costs for 
that producer and therefore make the importation 
of his products into Denmark very 
difficult. "(■204 )
The Court has never been a great enthusiast of approval 
procedures handled by national administrative bodies.^2®^  ^ What 
explains best the rest of the decision may be its efforts to 
avoid such a system of approval by a national agency.
The Court noticed that under the pressure of the Commission, 
the Danish government modified its regulation to authorize a 
producer to commercialize up to 3*000 hi of beer or soft drinks 
in non-approved containers - provided a deposit system is 
created* The Court estimated that
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"... the system for returning non approved 
containers is capable of protecting the 
environment and, as far as imports are concerned, 
affects only limited quantities of beverages 
compared with the quantity of beverages consumed 
in Denmark owing to the restrictive effect which 
the, requirement that containers should be returnable has on imports."(206)
Note that the Court was really plainly conscious of the 
restrictive effects of the Danish scheme. So much that it even 
used this restrictive effect as an argument against the 
limitations in quantity - to 3.000 hi - per producer and per year 
to imports of beverages in non-approved containers...! "Because 
the deposit obligation has a restrictive effect on imports, why 
do you limit the quantity which can be imported under the benefit 
of the derogation introduced in 1984", the Court said to 
Denmark ? "Well, Denmark could honestly answer : precisely 
because our deposit scheme doesn't have that much of a 
protectionist effect..." And maybe Denmark would have been right. 
But it was not really asked the question, maybe partly because 
the Court was after the approval procedure, which raised a risk 
of discrimination in the regulation as applied. The Court 
concluded :
"In those circumstances, a restriction of the 
quantity of products which may be marketed by 
importers is disproportionate to the objective 
pursued."(207)
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Hence, the global scheme was upheld, but by limiting to
3.000 hi per year the quantity of beverages that any producer can 
commercialize in Denmark in non-approved containers, Denmark was 
held to have "failed (...) to fulfill its obligations under 
Article 30 of the Rome Treaty."
(3) As in the case of the Oregon Court of Appeals, the
European Court of Justice was not after protectionist effect, but 
protectionist intent.
It might have gone further than that, actually ; but this is 
probably because of the "approval procedure", which is something 
which always makes the Court of Justice a bit nervous. However, 
the principle remains.
Why isn't the Court saying what it does - then - if it really
cares about intent and not effect as it seems to say ? Well,
Article 30 and 34 speak about effect, which is a good reason for 
the Court to appear as being doing what these Articles seem to 
tell it to do.
However, one could answer, isn't it a basic mistake to try to 
analyse the Court's decisions in terms of intent when the Treaty 
itself speaks of effect ? Even if the Court is really after 
intent in the cases, isn't the Court wrong and shouldn't the 
Court follow what the Treaty tells it to do and go after the bad 
effects on the common market ? Surely, the Court should do what 
the Treaty tells it to do. But the Treaty does mean intent when 
it says effect. And this is so because states are still sovereign 
in non-delegated fields and can act in the absence of Community 
action.<208>
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(4) The Court might also be at times rather militant. But our 
basic point has been made : An integrated multi-state economy 
must have judicial procedures preventing the adoption of state 
measures motivated by protectionist intent, not the ones having 
protectionist effects. In both systems, the provision of 
protection by a states to its constituents is not a value which 
is accepted as deserving protection by both supreme courts, while 
the measures having protectionist effect only must be prevented 
by centrally-created norms, in the fields where states agree or 
have agreed in the past for such a creation. In truly federal 
states, legislative or quasi-legislative bodies exist to get 
round the barriers erected by measures having bad effects on 
inter-state commerce without bad intent. That is the case in the 
United States with the Interstate Commerce Power or the Spending 
Power of the US Congress ; in the European Economic Community, 
directives and regulations allow a reduction of the costs of 
diversity through uniformization. But the institutional 
mechanisms for the creation of central norms are of a wholly 
different nature than the ones preventing state protectionism. 
While only the prevention of protectionism under the form of 
discrimination can be made by a Court because it does not imply a 
political weighting of interests, the creation of central norms 
requires either a federal legislative body or coordination 
agreements or the establishment of voluntary standards.
With this teaching in mind, we will now study the necessary 
and possible improvements of the integrative institutions of the 
global-economy.
- 177 -
4006R
PART III
TOWARDS A WORTJ) FrpNOMIC CONSTITUTION
(1) We have shown in the first Part of this book how the 
geographic extension of the networks of micro-economic exchange 
relationships at the international level requires a development 
of international institutions. This is true whether there is 
spontaneous expansion of international economic exchange, 
requiring international agreement on the normative framework 
within which exchange should occur, or whether it is by 
political will that states want to increase the stream of 
micro-economic exchange among themselves.
The spontaneous expansion of economic exchange may raise 
issues requiring some sort of normative activity. The 
protection of consumers, of the environment, for example, may 
require that norms be adopted to prevent the importation or 
exportation of certain types of products having potentially 
harmful effects on consumers or the environment. Another 
possibility is that the sheer increase in imports in a given 
sector of activity may endanger the existence of the national
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industry in such sector, which may appear as warranting some 
sort of protection to prevent the loss of jobs, the diminution 
in the value of the industrial assets in this sectors, etc... 
Whatever the value endangered by international economic 
exchange (consumer's health, the environment, jobs in a given 
sector of economic activity) the risk of leaving total 
independance on states to decide what norms to adopt is that 
they may do too much, go too far, and thus adopt norms not 
merely to protect the value at risk, but to prevent 
international economic exchange as such. Doing this, they may 
in turn endanger a great value, which is the openess of the 
international economy, with all the consequences this has in 
terms of justice and thus peace.
Even if states decide at some point in time that they 
should create an institutional framework adequate for a smooth 
functioning of the international economic system, because they 
think, for example that this is good as such to maintain 
ongoing peaceful relations, they may be reluctant to go as far 
as a full implementation of their earnest will would request, 
because they fear this would endanger their sovereignty too 
much.
(2) The second Part of this book has presented a taxonomy 
of the issues arising in economic integrations composed of 
several states, and the way they are addressed in the two major 
existing multi-state economic integrations : the United States 
and the European Community. We have seen that the various
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issues presented in federalized common markets are the same in 
any multi-state economic integration based on market 
principles, be it so integrated that it appears to outsiders as 
a unity (such as the United States), or in the process of 
becoming a single polity (the European Community), or be it so 
divided that it does not appear as a commonwealth at all 
(GATT). We have shown that the existence of a certain degree of 
inter-state economic integration requires an appropriate 
institutional framework allowing the coexistence of (i) one (or 
several) authority(ies) with the capacity to create norms at 
the central level and (ii) states with an appropriate level of 
authority to create those norms which do not need to be created 
at the central level. This is so because in any multi-state 
economic integration, some norms have to be provided at a 
central level ("central norms") ; some others are better 
provided at the decentralized - state - level ("decentralized 
norms") ; finally, this dual capacity of norm creation (at the 
central and decentralized levels) implies the need for some 
type of procedure or institution (in federal systems, a court) 
to prevent the development of rampant protectionism. We have 
seen how the supreme courts in the two economic integrations we 
have studied have developed theories which basically are 
expressions of the same non-discrimination principle.
(3) Many of the institutions required today to integrate 
national economies are technical and of a facilitative 
n a t u r e , a n d  are properly developed through the classical
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process of international law creation through treaties.
However, some of the international arrangements required for a 
proper functioning of the system composed by the integrated 
national economies are of a less mechanical nature for two 
reasons : (a) preventing all forms of protectionism requires 
the creation of a court system to check states' motives and (b) 
some issues in the international society cannot be addressed by 
norms adopted once and for all by treaty, but require a 
constant attention to the evolution of the situation in an area 
and a constant adaptation of norms to such situation. This may 
require the creation of functional international organizations 
with a specified functional jurisdiction, which may entail 
partial transfers of sovereignty.
(a) The institutional framework required for the 
functioning of the integrated international economy must 
comprise an anti-protectionism regime which function consists 
in permanently limiting the capacity of states to create norms 
and institutions having a protectionist purpose.^ He have 
seen in part II that this requires the creation of institutions 
able to screen the purposes of state authorities having 
normative power.^ The creation of such institutions at the 
global level would be a dramatic development in international 
economic law, and is absolutely irrealistic in today's world. 
But there is a trend towards such a development, and we must 
understand it to follow it and eventually improve the existing 
system so that its evolution will go in the right direction.
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The theoretical analysis we have made of the rationale for
the development of an anti-protectionism regime, combined with
a sensible historical account of the development of the système
des traités, and then of GATT, has shown how the function of
the existing international anti-protectionism arrangements is
to limit the capacity of legislatures to adopt protectionist 
14 )measures. In short, m  the same manner that national 
constitutions partly aim at organizing the functioning of the 
national system of creation of norms in a democratic manner 
whilst preventing a violation of the rights of the powerless 
and voiceless, international arrangements allowing governments 
to resist local demands for protection which satisfaction would 
be at the expense of others within the country and out of it 
without any justification acceptable in a market society pursue 
the same e n d . ^  With regard to the political dynamic leading 
to the creation of international anti-protectionist regimes, in 
each of the historical instances of creation of free trade 
regimes we have recalled, we have seen that it is the national 
executive powers which, being more structurally inclined than 
national legislatures to defend the national interest — as 
opposed to sectional ones represented by members of the 
legislatures — have attempted to limit the ability of 
legislatures, both at home and abroad, to adopt protectionist 
measures. ^  This was, in particular, one of the objectives 
behind the negotiations held to create an International Trade 
Organization after World War II, and which its poor substitute
- the GATT - is trying to reach. ^  We have also seen that
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due to its birth defects and its very inadequate structure,
GATT has only partially reached that objective, and has 
essentially failed to stop the rise of non-tariff barriers 
during recent decades.^
(b) Many issues in international society can be effectively 
addressed and solved only by common norms among states.v ' In 
the absence of an effective system of central norms creation, 
any anti-protectionism regime created may very well fail simply 
because states may decide to act alone, and eventually to 
retaliate against states refusing to adopt norms perceived as 
being required, whatever the consequences on international 
economic exchange, and whatever the efficiency of their action. 
In this respect, both the scope and the nature of GATT are 
totally unsatisfactory to address this problem.
With regard to its scope, GATT deals only with trade in 
goods, and aims at reducing protectionism in this particular 
field. This does not suffice since the globalization of the 
economy raises issues in many more fields than the one of 
trade. Rules on foreign direct investment, on the international 
provision of services, on the movement of people to deliver the 
services, make the investment, sale the goods, etc... do not 
fall within the jurisdiction of GATT. A sensible 
anti-protectionist regime should address all these 
interconnected issues. The expansion of the scope of GATT has 
in effect been a central gold of the Uruguay Rounf of 
negotiations.
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But even an extended anti-protectionism regime does not 
suffice and eventually may very well become meaningless if not 
accompanied by a development of the capacity to adopt 
international economic norms where common action is desirable. 
In the fields where such a need can be identified, functional 
organizations should be created with a capacity to adopt common 
mandatory norms.
(4) The issue to be addressed now in this third and last 
Part is the one of the improvement of the existing 
international institutional system of economic integration. We 
will develop our analysis from our normative point of departure 
that the institutionalization of a market liberal system is the 
way to create a framework allowing the auto-regulation of 
society both at the national and at the international levels.
We will try both (i) to identify the institutions which need to 
be developed for the liberal system to effectively function in 
a world of open borders, and (ii) to develop a proper approach 
and discourse to harness the forces necessary to create the 
international institutions of the liberal system and then to
maintain them.
In both respects, there are major problems with the 
approach and arguments used by traditional advocates of a free 
trade regime. First, they seem to be willing to impose an 
unrealistic model of perfect competition and institutions on 
society. Second, they rely on states to create and — something 
which may be even more difficult - to maintain a free trade
- 184 -
regime in the long run, while states are complex political 
machines subject to opposing political pressures, which 
equilibrium varies permanently, which has for effect to 
permanently modify their short term interests and eventually 
their willingness to live up to their promise to maintain their 
economy open.
With regards to the institutional improvements needed, the 
mistake generally made by political scientists or politicians 
in using classical free trade theory to advocate a free trade 
regime is to use an approach presenting the problem of 
international economic integration in a mechanistic and 
unrealistic manner, which does not stress that the problem to 
be solved is the one due to the legal ordering of the world 
society - that is, the existence of a decentralized 
state-system as the original system of creation of norms both 
at the national and at the international levels.
A perfect liberal system does not exist in any domestic 
economy, and it is only a model which does not have to be 
dogmatically imposed on society. As we have seen, a function of 
the international institutional system is in effect to allow to 
reduce the disfunctionments of the liberal system, at the 
international as well as at the internal level. It is clearly 
not the economists' free trade theory which can provide a 
scheme of analysis allowing to reduce such disfunctionments, 
precisely because this analysis generally assumes a perfect 
world without politics and with perfect institutions. It thus 
proposes as a remedy to the problems created by the
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decentralized state-system precisely something which is 
impossible to achieve : a non-interference by states in 
economic exchange. States should lift tariffs, they should 
eliminate quotas, they should not subsidize, etc... say the 
economists. This approach leads nowhere because the fundamental 
problem of international integration is not that states 
"interfere" with economic transactions by overtly protecting or 
otherwise subsidizing domestic firms or industries. They do 
overtly protect and subsidize, and this disfunctionment in the 
international liberal system is an issue which we will review 
later but which, conceptually, is relatively easy to solve, if 
it is politically difficult. The fundamental problem is that 
liberal states do structure economic exchange, and are actors 
in the transactional field, by their normative activity, and 
this is what theory has to find how to regulate prior to even 
think about the way to establish a regime preventing 
unwarranted state behavior. If there is no agreement on what is 
the proper role of government in a liberal economy, there is 
simply no way one can distinguish between appropriate 
regulation and disruptive subsidization. This does not mean 
that governments should do the same thing everywhere : 
decentralized collectivities may have different needs, 
different means, different traditions, etc... Governments are 
an instrument for common purposes and it is the people who 
should decide what governments do, because governments are here 
to serve their purposes.(11) Hence, governments should not be 
regulated in a quantitative way, but in a qualitative
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one.' ' As we have seen, it is not how much there is of any
local government which is a concern for the international
(13)community ;1 ' the concern is m  the type of means which can
be used by governments to implement their policies. What our
analysis of federalism shows is that these means should be such
that they should not put the burden of policies on actors out
of the states adopting them in situations where this is not a
(14)necessary consequence of the policies.1 '
With regards to the cornerstones on which an effective 
anti-protectionism regime must be built, we know from the 
previous Parts of this book that the non-discrimination 
principle is key : anti-protectionism regimes, be they found in 
constitutions or in treaties, are supposed to help governments 
to resist against demands for protection when they are 
illegitimate ; that's what the non-discrimination principle is 
useful for : it allows governments to refuse to give socially 
damaging favors in the name of superior principles to which 
they can claim to be bound.
To strike a new deal among states to eventually supersede 
GATT, states must therefore agree, on a reciprocal basis, on 
limiting subsidization, and in particular must agree to be 
bound by a non-discrimination principle. We have seen that the 
non-discrimination principle is already prevalent throughout 
the GATT, since the Most-Favored-Nation Clause and the National 
Treatment Obligation are central to its structure. However, the 
existence of these principles has not prevented the development 
of micro-protectionism, under the form of discrimination in
(12)
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thousands of pieces of legislation or decision, and of 
macro-protectionism, under the form of Voluntary Export 
Restraints, or Orderly Marketing Agreements or the like.*15^
In order for the system to be such that the free trade 
principle will not tend to be undermined by a progressive 
creation of "exceptional" derogatory regimes (as has been the 
case with GATT), which politicians must accept in case of 
economic difficulties affecting a given sector of economic 
activity, the system must comprise effective procedures to 
prevent discrimination.
The institutional system to set in place must certainly be 
goal oriented in the sense that protectionism can take so many 
different forms that it is impossible to specifically deal with 
all of them in a document specifically prohibiting each of 
them : a commitment to non-protectionism, and therefore to 
non-discrimination, must thus be at the core of the 
international regime of economic integration. But the 
international anti-protectionism arrangement must then be 
process oriented around two main tracks :
(a) an effective anti-protectionism arrangement must be 
developed and be of such a nature so as to effectively impact 
on the process of domestic norms creation, so that norms are 
adopted without protectionist intent, or else may have their
effect being nullified ;
(b) an effective escape clause must complement the system 
to allow for temporary relief under strict and mutually agreed 
conditions. When demands for protection are felt as being
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legitimate or when political pressure is too strong for 
governments to resist, the most the institutions of the global 
economic integration can do is to (i) reduce the types of 
measures available to governments, so that they can use only 
specific means in specific circumstances accepted by all, 
reducing the risks of retaliation, and (ii) increase the 
visibility of their use, reducing the risk of increased use of 
protectionism in situations where it would be possible to avoid 
it if its victims were aware of what is going on.
Procedures are useful if there are actors to effectively 
use them. Even if theory can show us what type of procedural 
reform would be needed to improve GATT, the difficulty is to 
identify the political forces which can be used (i) to create a 
new anti-protectionism regime and (ii) to structure this regime 
in such a manner that it will improve over time, and not tend 
to become irrelevant to an international society in constant 
evolution.
We therefore have to deal with two issues, which are (i) 
the forces which can be used to build a new anti-protectionism 
regime and (ii) its structuring in a manner that it will 
evidence auto-constitution building properties through time. 
These are two separate but very closely connected issues. The 
answer to both of them requires an improved economic theory of 
federalism which will take into account the functional role of 
micro-economic actors both within the juridical system and in 
the political arena in the definition and evolution of the 
division of regulatory power in federal systems ($3.1). Taking
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into account this functional role, we will see what type of 
forces could be used to strike a new deal among states, and how 
to institutionalize it so that it will lead to a progressive 
integration of the global-economy (S3.2).
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3 .1  AN EXTEN DED ECONOM IC A N A LY S IS  OF FED ER A LISM  : 
T E R R IT O R IA L  AND FU N CTIO N A L FED ER A LISM
In classical liberal theory, the "market" is treated in an 
impersonal manner, as if there were no actors acting in and on 
it, apart from regulators setting the rules and economic agents 
too powerless to influence them. This may be a useful 
simplification for economists, but it is a mistake to neglect 
the existence of powerful economic actors in the market when 
the market is envisioned in an institutional perspective. As we 
have seen, the problem posed by protectionism is precisely due 
to the impact of economic actors on the political system 
creating the rules : firms, unions, industries, etc ... use 
their power to have the political system provide them with 
protection or other forms of subsidies. Protectionism - 
discriminatory state laws - is the produce of the interaction 
between the democratic process of law creation in advanced 
societies and corporate strategies to subvert this process in 
order to get protection from competition.^16  ^ Protectionism 
is a negative side effect of the type of interactions there are 
in our democratic societies between private corporate powers 
and public institutions. The increasing globalization of the 
economy now gives an incentive to enterprises and industries 
unable to face competition to have their state provide them 
protection and other forms of subsidies, and this is why 
institutional evolution is needed. The development of 
protectionism is possible, and the creation of institutions to 
limit it is difficult, precisely because the corporate 
structure of society is not recognized.
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We will first elaborate on the consequences of the 
structural changes in the international corporate society which 
we have already identified in the first Part of this book, and 
in particular on the fact that the internationalization of 
competition among firms translates in a modification of the 
forms taken by the competition among states, which requires new 
international rules (§3.1.1).
The problem is that the mere functioning of a 
market-society requires the existence of an effective 
government limited by the rule of law : market society is 
inseparable from some sort of constitutionalism. For this very 
reason, the markets being now global, the effective provision 
by the public system of institutions of the appropriate rules 
needed in the global-economy requires the development above 
states of proto-federal structures. Simultaneously, apart from 
the issue of the allocation of power to the institutions having 
territorial jurisdiction in the global-economy, proper 
procedures need to be developed so that the division of 
regulatory labor among them functions. In order to restrict the 
use of sovereignty to what is proper in a market society, 
procedures must be developed so that the commitments undertaken 
by states — in a treaty/constitution for example — can be 
imposed on them through time. To develop the appropriate 
procedures, it must be recalled that in market society, firms 
share in the exercise of power due to their control over 
property rights and their capacity to create organizations
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having power, but also that they often participate in the 
institutional schemes of creation and screening of norms due to 
the recognition of their judicial standing. They may be made 
actors in the positive creation of norms, through their 
involvement in procedures leading to the adoption of such 
norms. But they are also, in all existing federal systems, 
actors who can request the nullification of the effects of a 
norm adopted in contradiction with the provisions of the 
founding constitution or treaty : firms thus play a functional 
role in federal systems which is essential to the preservation 
and development of such systems ($3.1.2).
Since the extension of the global-economy requires the 
creation of proto-federal institutions at the global level, 
procedural mechanisms must be designed in such a manner that a 
use of firms, similar to the one made in the United States or 
in the European Community to deeply integrate these economies, 
will be made. We will see, in effect, that firms played an 
important role, due to their access to justice, in the 
institutional integration of the American and of the European 
Economies ($3.1.3).
In a last subsection, we will summarize the theoretical 
setting needed to develop proper institutions for the 
global-economy ($3.1.4).
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3»lilt— Competition in the Transnational Economic Space and
the Market for States
(1) A first step in the institutional analysis of the
international economy is to recognize the existence of a space
of economic transactions - international, transnational, global
- within which diverse economic actors o p e r a t e . T h e
existence of this space modifies the positive legal ordering
within which these economic relations take place, because it
creates conflicts between states due to two separate phenomenon.
(a) On the one hand, the existence of this space may either
increase the capacity of states to adopt legislations having
(18)effects out of their territory,' 7 or reduce the capacity of
(19) . .states to legislate on their territory.v 7 The origin of 
this reduction or extension of states7 capacity to legislate 
with respect to actors acting on the economic space to which 
their territory belongs can be found in the differentiated 
control of states over structural power. It is evidenced by the 
extra-territorial application by some states of their norms, 
which in turn is possible due to the structural power they 
derive from their control over economic actors having extended 
international networks of transactional relationships.
The phenomenon of extraterritoriality has to be dealt with in 
international economic law, but is out of the scope of this 
study.
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(b) On the other hand, the existence of a global economic 
space also entails conflicts between states resulting from the 
mere fact that the globalization of the economy reduces the 
effective capacity of states to legislate - to influence the 
outcome of market forces - because they are themselves subject 
to a kind of "market for s t a t e s " . T h e  existence of a 
global economic structure ("the market") limits their 
individual capacity to influence on prices - that is, to 
legislate. That there is a "market for states" is highly 
visible when a multinational enterprise negotiates with several 
countries before deciding where to establish new production 
facilities, in order to get tax exemptions, subsidies, etc... 
But by "market for states", we mean more than that. The
(2 2 )consumers m  the market for states - mostly companies '
don't even need to make the market play by negotiating 
preferential treatment with state authorities. The mere fact 
that there is globalization of production and relative freedom 
of movement of goods, services and investments makes that there 
is a correlative reduction in states' capacity to legislate 
independently one from another. When consumers decide to buy 
foreign imported products, they also import the social, 
economic and environmental standards embedded in those 
p r o d u c t s , w h i c h  limits states' capacity to loose track 
with what their competitors are doing in those fields. Not 
being responsive to the global tendencies would mean losses of 
comparative advantages for the domestic production, be it by 
local firms or multinational ones having local production
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facilities. This is why "sovereignty" in economic matters is 
more and more akin to the autonomy of an actor on a market, who 
can differenciate himself from competitors, but who is not 
independent from the constraints imposed by the market.
States sovereignty, like economic actors' property rights, 
allows to adopt strategies of differenciation from 
competitors ; but it is the market, and not the actor (firm or 
state), which at the end will decide whether the strategy was 
correct or not.^25^
(2) What is challenged by the globalization of the economy
is thus nothing less but states' sovereignty as classically'
understood. However, the meaning of the concept of sovereignty
and its evolution is dependent on the evolution of the system
within which it exists : in this sense, states' "sovereignty" 
still exists in the world of today in the economic field, but 
it is more akin to the idea of autonomy than to the one of 
independence. States can not adopt completely go-it-alone 
economic policies because this would have for direct immediate 
result to force them to isolate their economy from the rest of 
the global-economy.^26  ^ States have only a marginal freedom 
to make political decisions in today's global economy : they 
still have a sphere of autonomy in the use of their capacity to 
act in the global system ; however, their actions in the 
economic field are not independent from the actions of other 
states in that same field, and their marginal capacity to act 
is dependent on the constraints imposed by the system they 
compose with other states and other public and private 
organizations.
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In short, the global-economy can therefore be seen as a 
system of transaction among economic actors, with the various 
states having jurisdiction over either the transactions or the 
actors or both and trying to impact on (regulate) them, and in 
which private economic actors have a capacity to impact on 
states, by making the market for states play in order to get 
boons or protection.
(3) The economic/legal conflicts between states have their 
origin in the existence of a formally decentralized 
state-system : if there were only one global state, one would 
not be faced with the issue of competition among states... A 
direct consequence of the globalization of markets and of 
competition among firms in the economic space above the 
state-system is that it directly entails a qualitative change 
in the competition among states themselves ; 2^7  ^
simultaneously, the existing system of international economic 
organizations and norms, which function is to reduce the
dilemma there is between states' autonomy and the need for
( 28 )order in the international economy,v ' is challenged by the 
spreading of the economy over states' borders, since it appears 
to be unable to raise to its task.^29^
It is important to notice that the change in the 
competition among states is only qualitative. Competition among 
states is as old as states themselves, in fact older than them, 
because it is competition among the masters of the land in 
Europe from the eleventh century onwards which has conducted to
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the development of these specific organizations that states
are. But whereas the most visible manifestation of competition
among states used to be war. whereby states tried to achieve
control over economic resources through an extension by force
of their jurisdiction over a larger t e r r i t o r y , t h e
struggle among states having a developed economy on their
territory for the control over economic resources does not need
to take the form of war anymore.Territory, in a global
economy - with the direct produce of land (raw materials,
agriculture, etc...) representing a shrinking portion of
economic wealth - loses in importance for economically
( 32)developed countries.1 ' And consequently, competition among
economically developed states does not take the form of war any 
m o r e . H o w e v e r ,  this does not mean that there is less 
competition among developed states than among others and among 
developed and less-developed states. Competition simply 
expresses itself through other media than war.
(4) The tensions created at the institutional level by the 
globalization of the economy are then due to the fact that it 
implies new forms of competition among the organizations 
composing it (states and firms), to which the international 
normative system has yet to adapt. It is logical that 
international law, which initially developed to set the rules 
within which war could take place, would now tend to develop in 
such a manner as to regulate states' economic competition at 
the global level. And while territory, as the source of
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economic and political power, and as the object of the struggle 
among states, was and still is a primary notion of 
international law,^34  ^ it is logical that the other modes of 
gaining power in an international economy increasingly detached 
from territories would tend to fall in the realm of 
international law.^35  ^ The object of international law is 
still to define the actors of the international competitive 
game, and its rules. But wealth and power are now associated 
with the control of more objects than territory only, and 
international law therefore evolves to take this development 
into account.^36^
We will now see the origin of the need for rules in a 
society socialized by competition, and how this need is felt at 
all levels of the regulation of society.
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3*1*2 MarKet Society and Limited Government under the
Rule of Law
Since individuals are considered, in the liberal system, as 
being the primary holders of power, the nature of the division 
of regulatory labor in liberal societies implies that public 
actors provide rules only when necessary for the socially 
efficient functioning of the market economy, but also that they 
must modify them when they are or become inappropriate. ^ 3 7 ^
The globalization of the liberal system requires a development 
of international public institutions so that rules appropriate 
for the functioning of a global economy are properly provided 
at all levels where they are needed.
(1) In liberal society, the private exercise of power
- i.e. the making of economic decisions by economic actors on
the basis of a taking into account of their sole interest - is
usually beneficial for all because rules (which can be modified
in particular if the public opinion so requests through its
representatives in national assemblies) exist which create a
game in which economic actors, due to the mere existence of
such rules, automatically take into account the interests of
others in the pursuit of their private i n t e r e s t . F o r
(39)example, if the reader recalls the Oregon bottle law, 
prior to the law, producers of beer were packaging it in such a 
manner as to attract as much trade as they could from 
consumers, without necessarily taking into account the interest 
one may estimate there is in protecting the environment from
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littering. After the law, by selling beer in refundable cans, 
producers were necessarily taking into account such interest, 
which the Oregon legislature had estimated strong enough to 
justify imposing rules concerning packaging on producers.
(2) Today, a proper functioning of the liberal 
global-economy requests a better system of provision of the 
rules of the game to be created in order to allow (i) a 
protection of the interests which are not comprised within the 
boundaries of one state (the global commons, i.e. the ozone 
layer, the Earth's climate, the oceans, etc...) and 
simultaneously (ii) a better protection of local interests 
which may, because of their inferior capacity to act 
collectively, be sacrificed to those of organized interests 
circumventing public institutions for their private ends.
With regards to both ends, the proper functioning of the 
international liberal global-economy implies the development of 
a regime limiting states' normative capacities.
(3) There is then one single fundamental problem in the 
global-economy : organizing competition among the various
i41)groups (public and private) and individuals composing it. ' 
Competition among private economic actors is at the root of any 
liberal economy, but it needs r u l e s . L e f t  unorganized, 
private competition at the international level translates in 
competition among states ; and while such competition is 
positive in some instances, and has to be preserved (for 
example, it keeps taxes down and forces states to be relatively 
efficient as organizations and as regulators in most of the
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fields where there is no systemic need for
/ 43 \centralization), in other instances (for example in the
field of production pollution regulation) such competition
itself has to be prevented.^44^
By advocating a limitation of states' ability to compete,
one necessarily heads into the concept of sovereignty as
understood in classical international law. But it is necessary
to realize that there are in fact two concepts of sovereignty
in a market society regulated by a state-system. There is (i)
the liberal constitutional meaning of sovereignty, which
domestically defines the proper role of government in an
individualistic liberal society ; there is then (ii) the
international law concept of sovereignty, which is this concept
pursuant to which the international society is an anarchy :
states are solely subject to the rules they collectively give 
/ 4 5)to themselves.' '
(i) Sovereignty, in its liberal constitutional meaning, 
fulfills a function, which we will call "internal", and 
which is provided for in national constitutions of liberal 
states. It is directly connected to the mere fact that the 
economy is liberal : because the economy is primarily 
regulated by private transactions among economic actors, 
and because such regulation can lead to results considered 
as politically inappropriate, there is need for a 
"sovereign" with jurisdiction over the considered economy 
and with a capacity to adopt those norms which will allow 
for a functioning of the economic game without these
undesired effects.
- 202 -
(ii) Sovereignty in international law fulfill a function 
which is not particular to liberal society, but derives 
from the division of supreme public power in the 
international society among states. We will call it 
"external" for this reason. It is this norm of autonomy in 
the international public society according to which a state 
can do whatever it wants which is not contrary to 
international law.
The concept of sovereignty in international law is 
fundamentally different from the one in domestic 
constitutional law. No norm of international law requires a 
state to adopt a liberal system to regulate its 
e c o n o m y . H o w e v e r ,  once a state wants to adopt a 
liberal economic system, there is need for the development 
of institutions allowing for a limited government under the 
rule of law, defined by a constitution : an efficient and 
just functioning of a market economy requires the existence 
of an Etat de droit. The reasons for this are that 
efficiency and justice both require (i) that rules be set 
for the future only and be enforced in a equal and 
predictable manner, so that private planning is possible ; 
and (ii) that rules be changed when they are democratically 
determined to be socially inappropriate.^47^
(4) The consequences of the need of an Etat de droit for a 
proper functioning of market society must be drawn at the level 
of the global economy.
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(i) In our perspective, the analysis must start with the
concept of jjiterpaj. sovereignty because the libera] svst-.Pin
of socialization requires that there is always a sovereign
able to adopt the appropriate norms when needed. In the
liberal system, the regulation of society is primarily done
through the autonomous functioning of market 
(48)competition. ' The sovereign is external to this 
"game", and normally only provides appropriate norms when 
needed, but must have the capacity to do s o . A n  
important consequence of this fact is that with the 
globalization of markets and firms, there is a tendency 
towards the globalization of the liberal system, and 
therefore for a need in some instances of a "global11 
sovereign. I do not mean that there is necessarily need for 
the development of one global state. However, in some issue 
areas, there is need of global institutions, acting as 
functional surrogates of a global state, with an effective 
capacity to adopt norms mandatory for all, and therefore 
also for states. This may go against a preservation of 
sovereignty for external purposes in some instances, but it 
is a necessary consequence of maintaining sovereignty for 
what we have called "internal" purposes, but at the global 
level.
(ii) In parallel with this need to develop institutions 
having "internal" sovereignty at the global level, a proper 
functioning of national and international institutions also 
requests a recognition of the functional role that private
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actors fulfill in the maintenance of the internal 
institutional equilibrium of federal and federal like 
systems, and which reduces the absolutism of a concept such 
as the one of sovereignty.
An understanding of the division of power among private and 
public organizations in liberal society as a sort of functional 
federalism (S3.1.2.1) allows to understand the fundamental role 
played by a concept such as standing in the inner development 
of federal systems proper (S3.1.2.2).
3 . 1 . 2 . 1  In t e r n a l S o v e r e ig n t y  and  F u n c t io n a l F e d e ra lis m
(1) As we have recalled hereabove, the internal economic 
function of sovereignty, which is to allow the provision of 
rules when the autonomous functioning of the market is such 
that it needs corrections, is the consequence of the type of 
division of labor existing among public and private actors with 
regards to the regulation of the economy in liberal 
s o c i e t i e s . A s  a consequence of the primacy of the 
individual in such society, it is possible to interpret the 
functioning of liberal society as a system of exercise of 
power. decentralized through property rights, and canalized 
with rules.
This is a useful perspective for us because by using the 
transaction between economic actors as our unit of analysis of 
the liberal system, we can extend the economic analysis of
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federalism by extending the analysis made of territorial 
federalism - that is, classical federalism - to develop a 
broader vision of the division of labor in the liberal system, 
which we can call "functional federalism". The traditional 
economic analysis of federalism analyses the various functions 
to be performed by public institutions of the liberal system 
and searches where the power to fulfill these functions is more 
appropriately located - i.e. in the states or in the 
institutions of the union. ' "Functional federalism" would 
extend that type of analysis to include the role of private 
actors in the institutional division of labor among the various 
institutions regulating the economy in the liberal system. Our 
point is that private micro-economic actors - and particularly 
firms - participate in the regulation of the economy. Even in a 
unitary - non-federal - state, there is a division of labor 
among the public/political system of institutions and private 
economic actors to regulate the national economy, considered as 
a system of transactions ; even in unitary states, there is a 
sort of "functional federalism" in the sense that the power to 
make economic decisions is in principle left to firms which 
make an autonomous use of their power within the rules set by 
public institutions within the state—system. In liberal 
societies, individuals and firms have the freedom to do what 
they want with what they have without having to obey the 
commands of a hierarchy.(53) It is only when the result of 
the autonomous game of micro-economic actors is politically 
considered as inadequate that the liberal state intervenes to
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modify the rules of the game. A consequence of this mode of 
structuring of liberal society is that when the competitive 
game leads to consequences considered to be negative, there is 
need for the existence of some authority having the capacity to 
i n t e r v e n e . I t  is in order to fulfill this function that 
the concept of sovereignty is essential for internal purposes : 
this authority which has the capacity and means to intervene 
when required is what is called the sovereign.
(2) The basic framework of fundamental rights and 
principles necessary for the functioning of a market economy is 
usually defined in liberal societies in their states' 
constitutions : the constitution usually defines fundamental 
economic rights such as the right to property, and fundamental 
freedoms such as the freedom of movement, of employment, of 
contract, of enterprise, etc... It also often provides, 
particularly in federal systems, for a recognition of the 
functional role of micro-economic actors in ensuring the proper 
functioning of institutions. To protect the liberal 
organization of society, ideally the sovereign must not be 
allowed to adopt norms in contradiction with the liberal 
principles of market society. Several means can be created to 
prevent this from happening. One of them is to give standing to 
private economic actors to challenge the constitutional 
validity of norms adopted by states' institutions when they are 
considered as unconstitutional by the actor.
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3.1.2.2 Functional Federalism and Positive Federal 
Constitutions - The Role of Standing
(1) One of the roles of constitutions is to organize the
proper use of sovereignty. The three main functions typical of
any legal system (law-making, law enforcement, and law
determination) are entrusted to central organs acting on behalf
of the whole national community.v '
The creation and modification of law is vested in an
Assembly, a Parliament, ... generally speaking a legislative
body. This legislative body is usually under a constitutional
obligation to define rules for the common interest. However, we
have seen how - in the field of trade - the process of norm
creation can be c i r c u m s c r i b e d . A s  it is only one of the
examples where this happens, it is therefore necessary to have
some system of courts to check that the legislative body does
what it is supposed to do (defend the common interest) and 
Î57)nothing else.' '
The legislative body is not the only organ of a state 
having a capacity to create norms which may be improper in a 
liberal society. Modern executive powers, in particular, also 
have this capacity and need to be checked. Obviously, the 
institutions and procedures through which such check is made 
vary enormously from one national system of public institutions 
to another one. What states' institutions may do and how they 
are checked defies generalization. However, the existence of 
some form of control of normative activity on the basis of
- 208 -
constitutional documents or principles is increasingly 
p r e s e n t . O n e  additional element which is constant in 
modern democratic states, at least in federal systems, and 
which is essential for the preservation of the division of 
regulatory work is the standing of individuals or corporate 
persons, who have the capacity to challenge norms adopted in 
contradiction with the founding p r i n c i p l e s . T h e  existence 
of individuals' standing has fundamental consequences for the 
preservation of fundamental r i g h t s . I n  the limited sphere 
of economic regulation, the standing of micro-economic actors 
plays a fundamental role for the determination and evolution of 
the allocation of regulatory capacity.
(2) The institutional consequences of the understanding of 
micro-economic actors as holders of power - which we will 
partly attempt to draw now - has much larger implications than 
the ones we will show h e r e . O u r  purpose in this study of 
the international economic system is to present enterprises, 
and in particular multinational enterprises, as sub-parts of 
the institutional framework which we consider composes now, and 
will compose in the foreseeable future, the world order and to 
show how their inherent supra-national nature can be used for 
international industrial policy purposes at the world level.
The recognition of the liberal advanced market society as a 
corporate society is in this sense a strategic move aimed at 
potentially improving the functioning of the liberal system by 
a recognition of the possible use of corporate actors, of 
spontaneous institutions. There is nothing dramatically new in
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the idea of using spontaneous social institutions to improve 
the functioning of the positive system of exercise of power, 
liberal regulation of the economy being self-regulation. 
However, the reform made necessary by the globalization of the 
economy requires the understanding of the nature of the 
interactions between the positive legal system and corporate 
economic actors.
The idea of this book is to use the fact that many 
enterprises tend to have their own interest structurally bound 
to that of the international economy and that they are 
relatively independent from any state authority to use them to 
integrate markets at the global level, in the same manner that 
the autonomy of national enterprises has been key to integrate 
national markets, in the United States and in the European 
Community. This did not require any positive legal recognition 
of enterprises ; nor will the integration of markets at the 
global level require a legal recognition of enterprises as 
positive legal actors in the global society. But in a 
sociological sense, in any federal economy partly integrated by 
the activities of enterprises established in the several 
states, the enterprise is a "private government" and a unit of 
functional federalism, as Miller wrote in the United States 
c o n t e x t . W h a t  Miller calls the "supercorporations" are 
the institutions which have produced a national economy in the 
United States, which is superimposed upon a decentralized 
formal political order.*64* It is clear that corporations 
have no direct, express delegation of power from the
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s t a t e s . B u t  enterprises may still be seen as private 
governments because "the sociological corporate community may 
meaningfully be seen as a political system as well as an 
economic entity."^66) Given the role played in the 
development of the institutions of the United States by firms 
which had extended their range of activity over the whole 
national territory, one can conclude for the World (because the 
same applies ceteris paribus with their globalization at the 
world level) as Lerner did for America, that Na new 
constitutional structure in industry and government is 
emerging, with a new separation of powers that is more relevant 
to contemporary America [to today's world] than the classical 
separation of governmental powers."^67  ^ In particular, the 
understanding of firms as being autonomous organizations above 
states' jurisdictions suggests that they are potential 
litigants who may require equality of treatment with local 
micro-economic actors, counterbalancing parochial protectionist 
forces. This is what happens in the United States and in the 
European Community when national enterprises could appeal to 
"federal" principles of non-discrimination when they are 
discriminated against. At the global level, the integrated 
corporate actors needed are already in place. What we have to 
do is introduce the principle of non-discrimination in such a 
manner that enterprises (through their positive corporate 
structure) can appeal to it, for the defense of their own 
interests, but with the beneficial social interests we have 
identified.
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(3) Similar institutional challenges as the ones we know 
today at the international level have already occurred in the 
late nineteenth and in the twentieth century, first in the 
United States with the nationalization of markets following the 
extension of railroads, and then in Europe, where a mix of 
economic needs and political action has led to the creation of 
the largest multi-state integrated economy in the World. 
Institutional adaptation to the evolution of economic exchange 
requested a new interpretation of the American Constitution in 
the United States to allow the required rise in federal 
legislation and a concomitant diminution of states' capacity to 
adopt protectionist measures. In the European Community, the 
expansion of economic exchange requested some transfers of 
formal sovereignty to international institutions, which are 
still under way. In both the United States and Europe, the 
extension of the market above states' borders has led to 
constitutional changes in which firms played an important role 
as litigants. The European experience shows that international 
political action is possible, and what use of multinational 
enterprises can be made of to develop integrative institutions.
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3 . 1 . 3  K a rte lls  ion of B c o n m ie  R vc-hange a n d  C r e a t io n  o f  th e
Existing Federal Systems
We have seen that in the context of the United States, the 
modifications in the constitutional allocation of regulatory 
powers needed due to the "nationalization" of the economy and 
of the issues to be addressed through the political system of 
regulation occurred through a modification in the 
interpretation of the meaning of some of the provisions of the 
constitution.^68  ^ The other side to this story - i.e. the 
importance of national enterprises in the creation and 
functioning of the new scheme of allocation of political power
- should not be neglected (S3.1.3.1).
A parallel can be made here with the recent institutional 
developments which occurred in Europe, where the role of 
companies has been critical, both for the evolution of the 
internal functioning of European Community institutions as well 
as for their amendment (S3.1.3.2).
3.1.3.1 Enterprises and the Unification of the Federal Market
in the United States
(1) The issue of non-tariff barriers which is puzzling 
international scholars nowadays has already been met within the 
United States domestic economy in the 1930s and 1940s. The 
creation of trade barriers between the states of the federal
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union at this moment in history, mostly because of the economic
depression, was the object of heated debates.Newspapers
were writing intensively about it ; conferences were called on
the subject. Analogies with the balkanization which was
occurring in Europe at the time were drawn, and the evil days
of the confederation were recalled, when trade wars between the
states of the Confederation were sometimes transformed into
real wars.^70  ^ One of the goals of the Framers of the Federal
Constitution had been to create a system preventing such
( 71 )self-reenforcing animosities to develop :' ' how was it
possible that new trade barriers could arise when the Framers 
had sought to eliminate bothersome burdens on trade between 
states ?(72)
The most compelling reason for the creation of non-tariff
barriers at the end of the 1930s was without doubt the Great
Economic Depression.^73  ^ On the world scene, the depression
resulted in tariff and quota wars between nations, which
ultimately led to World War II and, as a reaction, to the
creation of the GATT-system.*74  ^ Within the United States,
(75)this road was blocked by the federal constitution.v ' But 
individual states still desperately tried to protect their 
local constituents against the effects of the economic crisis, 
sometimes at the expense of the interests of constituents of 
other states within the United States. In many states, pressure 
groups were formed to lobby for protectionist legislation. In 
addition, the rapid growth of nation-wide enterprises - 
especially at that time in distribution - was completely 
challenging and disrupting the traditional patterns of business
organization.
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In this world of changes, the remissness of Congress in 
passing federal regulations meant that the individual states of 
the Union were seldom restrained from action by federal 
l a w s . A n d  whereas the Supreme Court often upheld state 
laws despite their negative effects upon interstate 
commerce,^77  ^ when Congress started creating legislation 
under the New Deal program, it found the Supreme Court in its 
way.^78  ^ At the very moment that federal uniform legislation 
was needed to prevent the rapidly increasing enactment of state 
trade barriers, the Supreme Court invalidated several 
Congressional Acts.^79^
The situation changed when the Supreme Court finally agreed 
in 1937 to interpret the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution to mean that the US Congress had an unlimited 
power to regulate "inter-state" commerce.^80  ^ This meant - as 
later developments will show - that it could regulate almost 
everything.^81  ^ Thus, all sorts of non-tariff barriers 
between the different states could be eliminated, so long as 
Congress had the will to do so.^82  ^ Simultaneously, the power 
of states to regulate was upheld, with the sole limitation of 
the non-discrimination principle which effectively prevented 
them only to adopt protectionist legislation.^83^
(2) The crucial role played by national enterprises in the 
increase in power of the federal government can not be 
underestimated. The corporate nature of American society is a 
well-known fact.^84  ^ It is a club of "X-hundred", in the
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expression of Daniel Bell, a conglomerate of many agencies and 
institutions which interact and in which the state is one - but 
only one - of the participants in the struggle for 
influence.^85  ^ The consequence of the development of this 
"pluralistic economy" is that a new form of social order has 
been created, with profound institutional consequences.
One of them is that enterprises, as "private" governments, can 
usefully be viewed as units of federalism, of functional 
federalism.^87  ^ They have no territory, but the surimposition 
of their networks of organized economic exchange, of their 
spaces of exchange relationships, over the decentralized formal 
political order of the federation has produced a national 
economy. National enterprises have unified the national 
market^88  ^ because of their activities as producers, 
transactors, etc... but also because of their legal role within 
the federal structure of the US government.
In particular, the building of the non-democratic economic
structures of firms upon the framework of democratic political
theory has led to the development of the judicial power in the
American polity.^89  ^ In no small measure, the history of
American constitutional law is the history of the impact of
(90)American corporate enterprise on the American scene.
There are many reasons for judicial review to be associated 
with federalism,^91  ^ but one of them is that by easing the 
extension of enterprises above state borders, federal or 
quasi-federal systems create potential challengers to 
decentralized legislations blocking interstate economic 
exchange.
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Multi-state business was naturally concerned with federal 
law and the federal constitution, resisting the idea that every 
state in which it operated could regulate it.^92  ^ In many 
ways, constitutional law developed favorably to large corporate
/ 9 3  \enterprises.v 7 Progressively, however, theories - in 
particular the non-discrimination principle - have developed 
which preserve the regulatory capacity of states without 
allowing them to use it for protectionist motives.
Enterprises played a key role in this process of constitutional 
law evolution : they were litigants in a larger and larger 
share of reported cases, they hired lawyers, created whole law 
firms to defend their interests. In doing so, they played a 
truly fundamental role in ensuring that some power exists 
outside the state to vindicate minimal standards of fair and 
equal treatment to citizens, and residents and strangers.^95^
As noted by Collins, when merchants sue to enforce the Supreme 
Court's doctrine against discrimination, they certainly do it 
to defend their interest but as surrogates of their own state, 
as private attorney generals.i96) Spread over the national 
territory well before the rise of federal regulation, national 
enterprises were the force which allowed - with the correlative 
change in constitutional doctrine - to reduce state barriers to 
inter-state trade within the United States.
Enterprises have also played a large role in the internal 
evolution of the European Community. But here, they also have 
actively participated in the creation of the institutional 
framework itself.
3,1,3,2 Enterprises and the Unification of the Federal Market
in the European Community
(1) The European Community has progressively acquired 
features which give it a quasi-federal n a t u r e . T h e  
European system is recognized, as much as the American one, as 
forming a complex and interacting whole between official (state 
and intergovernmental) and unofficial (nongovernmental 
organizations and multinational enterprises) actors contending 
for power and i n f l u e n c e . I n  a system where the evolution 
of normative supranationalism is disconnected from the more 
shaky one of decisional supranationalism. i n t e g r a t e d  
business organizations are key actors to vindicate and obtain 
equality of treatment, and thus to force the effective 
implementation of normative supranationalism. The existence of 
the European Court of Justice in which they have standing to 
challenge the validity of the norms adopted by the European 
Community Institutions, has been crucial for the progressive 
integration of the European e c o n o m y . T h e  system of 
allocation of power among the European Community institutions 
and the states must be respected by the Community institutions 
and by all the states.^101  ^ The Court is the institution 
which has assured the respect of this allocation of power 
through its interpretation and application of the founding 
treaties.*102* And while other institutions of the European 
Community, as well as the various Member States, have standing
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to challenge the validity of legislation adopted in 
contradiction with the European constitution, individuals and 
companies also have this capacity, which gave them a great role 
to play in the effective development of European Community 
law. <103>
(2) In the United States, the rise of federal power 
followed the nationalization of the markets.^104  ^ Federal 
power has progressively taken over fields of regulation as the 
need was increasingly felt for uniformity and the prevention of 
state competition in some areas. Federal powers could expand by 
using powers the Constitution was granting to it, but that it 
did not exercise before as a result of self-restraint.
In the European Community, a similar need for central norms 
as the one felt in the United states in the 1930s has been 
increasingly felt in the 1970s. But in this case, an 
institutional change was needed to improve the process of 
central norm creation. In 1981, Professor J. Weiler could 
write :
In the Community (...) we can trace on the one hand a 
more or less continuous process of approfondissement of 
normative supranationalism whereby the relationship between 
the (legal) order of the Community and that of the Member 
States has come to resemble increasingly a fully fledged 
(USA type) federal system. On the other hand, and 
contemporaneously, we can detect a more or less continuous 
process of diminution of decisional supranationalism, 
stopping, in some respect, only just short of traditional 
intergovernmentalism. (1Q5)
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What has happened since in the Community is a progressive 
rise of consciousness that many of the benefits of the "common 
market" were slowly eroded by persistent non-tariff barriers to 
intra-European Community trade, and that numerous new ones were 
indeed frequently introduced to protect vested interests and 
impede trade. The Commission therefore identified these 
non-tariff barriers in the so-called "White Paper" it presented 
to the European Council in June 1985. With a view to creating a 
"Single Market" by the end of 1992, the Commission set out in 
the White Paper a detailed programme of some 282 directives 
needed to create a "frontier free internal market" at that 
time. The White Paper list had the political advantage of 
setting forth concrete steps and deadlines, obscuring difficult 
political questions by focusing on the mission and reducing the 
issues to a series of apparently technical steps.^106^
Advocates of market unification could thus emphasize highly 
specific, concrete, seemingly innocuous steps and long overdue 
o b j e c t i v e s . T o  implement the White Paper, a separate 
initiative was undertaken to limit national vetoes over 
Community d e c i s i o n s . A t  its core, the Community had been 
a mechanism for governments to bargain since its 
creation.^109  ^ Decisions taken by the Council had to be 
unanimous, providing each government a v e t o . T h e  "Single 
European Act" — which replaced the unanimity requirement with 
qualified majority with respect to the instruments that have 
the completion of the internal market as their objective - is 
the institutional change which was decided to allow the 
implementation of the 1992 programme.^ ^
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(3) The recent progress consisting in the creation of the 
"Single market", which is still under way, has made - and still 
makes - use of private forces in combination with public 
action.(112) However, 1992 is not a story of mass movements, 
of pressure groups or legislators.f113) it is the story of 
the political entrepreneurship of an elite drawn from the 
business community, national governments and the European 
Community institutions. a key factor in the 1992 
enterprise has been the leadership of the European 
multinational corporations.Industrialists have been 
well ahead of politicians in the creation of the dynamic 
leading to the 1992 p r o j e c t . i n  the early 1980s - well 
before the White Paper - a booklet published by Philips 
proposed urgent action on the internal European market :
"There is really no choice, and the option left for the 
Community is to achieve the goals led down in the treaty of 
Rome. Only in this way can industry compete globally, by 
exploiting economies of scale, for what will then be the 
biggest home market in the world today : THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY HOME MARKET."(117)
In 1983, business began to organize. The Roundtable of 
European Industrialists was formed that y e a r . A n  
association of some of Europe's largest and most influential 
multinationals, including Philips, Siemens, Olivetti, GEC, 
Daimler-Benz, Volvo, FIAT, BOSCH, ASEA and Ciba-Geigy, it was 
chaired by Pehr Gyllenhammer, chairman of V o l v o . T h e  
Roundtable published several reports, including one that
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depicted the economies of scale that would benef j>t European 
business in a truly unified market.f120) in parallel with 
their support to the political initiatives behind the 1992 
movement and an intensive lobbying activity vis-à-vis the 
national governments, the business community also acted on the 
market place.(121) a series of business deals, ventures and 
mergers took place, which is a critical part of the whole 1992 
process.^122^
Backed by this transnational industry coalition, the
Commission could then play the role of policy 
1123 )entrepreneur.' It undertook the preparation of the
Cecchini Report on the "cost of the non-Europe" - a 16 volumes 
report measuring the advantages which would be derived from the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers to intra-European Community 
trade, which took some time to be completed.f124) Together 
with European business, the Commission by-passed national 
governments processes and shaped an agenda which compelled 
attention and action.^125  ^ Everything has occurred as if the 
Commission had in mind to use what is known now in social 
sciences as a "self-fulfilling prophecy".^ 26  ^ By subsidizing 
the information on the costs of the "non-Europe" (the Cecchini 
Report), and advertising extensively the possibility that such 
costs could be reduced by a reform of the European Community 
institutions, the Commission has created a dynamic where 
private economic forces started to anticipate the institutional 
evolution, lobbied their governments in favor of the reform, 
and actually launched the movement in practical terms.
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Public action, in combination with private reaction, has 
thus created - and is expected to create - macroeconomic 
results.(127) on the side of public action, the sequence of 
events was the elaboration by the Commission of the strategic 
concept (the White Paper), followed by a commitment made by the 
Member States (the Single European Act) ; credibility was then 
given to the reform by national legislative a c t i o n s . o n  
the side of the private reaction, business planners anticipated 
the institutional move to get "first mover advantages" 
(initiating a movement of cross border mergers, joint-ventures, 
etc ...) over competitors within and outside the Community, 
giving followers incentives to adopts strategies similar to 
theirs. They thus gave its practical meaning to the whole 1992 
enterprise, by increasing the density of the networks of 
intra-European economic transactions, thus building a sensible 
European Economy.(129)
The American and European examples of the role played by 
firms in the federalization of the economy, and their common 
features, show how a conception of the production of law and 
institutions by something larger than the state apparatus and 
including the demands and actions of economic actors, local and 
global, and their capacity to resist against unwarranted norms 
must be adopted if one wants to think about the dynamic of the 
evolution towards a world economic constitution.
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In both American and European cases, the standing of firms 
in federal courts has given them the capacity to challenge 
legislation impeding their activity, sometimes leading to the 
elimination of unwarranted norms, sometimes arising attention 
to issues requiring the creation of central norms.(13°) in 
both cases, this role has been key for the delimitation of the 
role of states in regulating economic activity, and in the 
development of federal powers (in the United States) and of 
normative supranationalism (in the European Community). In 
addition recent developments in the European Community also 
show how firms can act to provoke an improvement of decisional 
supranationalism, of public institutions able to provide the 
unifying norms their transnational activity requires.
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3.1.4 The Globalization of the Liberal World-Economv and its 
Institutionalization : the Theoretical Setting
The globalization of the liberal world-economy raises 
issues and challenges the capacity of the existing public 
system of institutions to develop the appropriate norms to 
answer to them in a manner similar to the one met earlier in 
America and in Europe. This challenge heads on into the concept 
of*states' sovereignty, for two separate reasons :
(i) the liberal mode of regulating society requires the 
existence of a constitutional authority (which is usually, 
and was initially, a state) to adopt rules when market 
exchange is imperfect or leads to negative 
externalities.(131) when states themselves become subject 
to the market because of the extension of micro-economic 
exchange above their frontiers,(132) this founding 
principle of market society requests that the "market for 
states" be curbed in some instances by the adoption of 
central norms, and in some other instances by the creation 
of central institutions ;^133)
(ii) the concept of sovereignty in international law 
allowing states to do whatever they want which is not 
prohibited by international law,^134) a proper 
functioning of the liberal economy requires (a) that 
subsidization, in particular under the form of protection 
be limited by an international treaty, and (b) that part of
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these state functions which cannot be adequately fulfilled 
at the decentralized level of states be progressively 
transfered to functional international organizations.
The challenge created for the normative system by the 
extension of markets and companies was less of a problem in the 
United States in the late 1930s because of the pre-existence of 
the Constitution (even though the allocation of power between 
the national government and the states was, and still is, a 
lively issue). in Europe, this challenge led to what
was, and still is, a political adventure ; but the European 
experience shows that it is possible to cope with most of the 
p r o b l e m s . T h e  European experience shows in addition that 
it is necessary to harness private corporate forces to create a 
new deal among states and to implement and maintain it.^137^
The taxonomy of issues in connection with the process of 
norm creation at the global level is the same as the one
/i 3g\existing in federal systems, ' i.e. there is need for (i) 
an effective system of central norm creation (§3.1.4.1), and
(ii) a regime of prevention of state protectionism (S3.1.4.2). 
Since states are subject to conflicting interests, which 
prevents them from fulfilling functions which must then be 
fulfilled by larger institutions and which may even prevent 
them from agreeing to necessary reforms at the international 
level, we will then see what types of forces need to be 
harnessed in order to be able to reach and implement a new deal 
among states (S3.1.4.3).
3 . 1 . 4 . 1  Im p ro v in g  th e  S y ste m  o f  C en t r a l  Worms C r e a t io n
(1) The need for an improved system of central norm 
creation is obvious. Faced with an increasing number of global 
issues, we need global rules and functional organizations to 
deal with them. However, it is unlikely that anything like a 
world federal state would or should be created. For one thing, 
the creation of an all-encompassing organization to deal with 
all trade, investment and related matters is a very unlikely 
s t e p . T h e  granting of the authority to enact central 
legislation even to what would be only a multisectorial 
condominium 1^ 4 similar to the European Community is 
impossible in the world of today and any way probably 
unnecessary.(141  ^ in addition, there is no need for one big 
bureaucracy to take care of all the issues presented : a 
cluster of institutions can very well assure the extension of 
positive state functions at the international level in the 
different areas where such an extension is needed - and only 
there -, and when such an extension is needed - and only then. 
However, if the structure of the new international regime set 
in place may take the form of a cluster of institutions, the 
divergent nature of states' interests may require that issues 
be batched, in order to allow for more quids pro auos.^142^
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(2) Even if one considers only the narrower perspective of 
setting up a free trade regime without taking into account the 
other functional organizations which creation nay be needed at 
the international level in the various fields where 
decentralized state action is ineffective, there is need for an 
improved institutional system providing international norms for 
the following reason : the setting-up of an anti-protectionism 
regime, even if it works properly, does not eliminate 
non-tariff barriers ; it eliminates only purposive ones.(143  ^
Non-purposive non-tariff barriers must be eliminated by central
f 144)norms. One can notice, however, that an efficient system
to eliminate purposive non-tariff barriers will isolate 
non-purposive (legitimate) ones, and allow to concentrate 
diplomatic efforts on their reduction, which can be done by 
creation of common norms and institutions.
(3) What is needed at the global level to improve the 
process of central norms creation is an improvement of 
harmonization, coordination and cooperation procedures in the 
different issue areas, which does not necessarily require the 
building of an all-encompassing far-reaching institution.
International arrangements are usually difficult to reach 
when they create costs for states because of the problems 
stemming from the fact that some states may render 
international agreements ineffective, by refusing to 
participate (hold—outs), or from the fact that some states may 
enjoy the benefits of international regulation, while refusing
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to share its costs (free riders).(145  ^ Both problems may 
prevent willing states to reach an agreement. The hold-out 
problem may even exacerbate the underlying problem.^146^
There is one approach to the creation of international 
arrangements which may solve some of these problems : the 
so-called convention-protocol approach.(147) Unlike 
comprehensive agreements, the convention-protocol approach does 
not attempt to resolve all substantive issues in a single set 
of negotiations.(148) Rather, it segregates the negotiation 
o f separate issues into separate agreements : states first 
adopt a framework convention that calls for cooperation in 
achieving broadly-stated goals ;^149) then the parties to the 
convention negotiate separate protocols providing the specific 
measures designed to achieve these goals.(15°)
This type of approach to the creation of international 
regimes may be used to create either harmonizing, coordinative 
or cooperative agreements. There are important differences 
between harmonization, coordination and cooperation as far as 
the impact on the national regulatory system is concerned, and 
the need for either of these three solutions varies according 
to the underlying problem to be solved. The decreasing 
constraints they create diminishes the difficulty of their 
adoption.
(i) Harmonization policies attempt to equalize conditions 
of competition and production throughout the area 
concerned, regardless of whether or not regional 
disparities might warrant differentiated policies.
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For example, the two principal methods of avoiding state 
competition in production pollution regulation - which 
competition entails over-exploitation of global commons 
(such as the atmosphere, the oceans, etc ...) - are 
harmonizations of environmental standards and of the 
principles which govern who shall bear the cost of 
environmental measures, and how these costs should be 
m e t . H o w e v e r ,  such harmonizations are usually 
possible only between states at similar stages of economic 
development. Otherwise - except in case of a subsidization 
of the developing states by the developed ones accompanying 
the harmonization^153  ^ - the harmonization entails an 
elimination of comparative advantage to which developing
(154)countries have difficulties to subscribe.' 7
(ii) Coordination. on the other hand, seeks to adapt
centrally determined measures to the various needs of
. . (155)different regions, according to their capacities.
However ideal this solution might look, it goes far beyond 
what states are usually ready to accept in terms of 
restraints on the use of sovereignty.
(iii) Therefore, the solution which is most acceptable - 
politically, socially and economically - in an economic 
integration which wishes to combine efficient free trade 
with the maximum retention of sovereignty is <?p<?peratiPD«
It leaves to participating governments relative freedom to 
determine their own economic policies, but provides for a 
means of adopting them by mutual agreement when it is
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discovered that they clash.^156) The main difference 
between this approach and the coordination approach is the 
way the decisions are taken.(157  ^ in the coordination 
approach, policy decisions remain decentralized and it is 
only when conflicts arise that they are resolved through 
negotiation within pre-established procedures.
(4) With regards to the creation of international 
organizations, advocating partial transfers of sovereignty for 
external purposes to functional organizations is less offensive 
to states' jealously guarded independence than seems to be the 
case at first sight, and this for two main reasons :
(a) In practical terms, the globalization of the economy 
without a correlative extension of international public 
institutions implies a very large loss of sovereignty for 
internal p u r p o s e s . T h e  mere fact that the economy of a 
country is liberal and open to the international economy means 
that the state of this country can not adopt whatever 
discretionary and arbitrary measures it wishes to : the liberal 
system is imposing its r u l e . N o r m s ,  regulations, etc... 
have to be adopted while taking into account the set of 
constraints imposed by the world economic system. And 
therefore, without effective international public institutions, 
states may very well keep intact their sovereignty for external 
purposes, but have lost it for internal purposes. In such a 
situation, they are better of negotiating the procedures 
according to which they are going to express their voice in the
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international arenas to which they will transmit part of their 
sovereignty for external purposes in order to recover - 
collectively - sovereignty for internal purposes.(161) This 
is what is in the interest of the People, and modern states, 
after all, are supposed to be run in the interest of the People.
(b) In addition, with regards to the political feasibility 
of the extension of international economic law, one must 
distinguish two very different aspects of the international 
order - the political-military and the economic one - a wholly 
different kind of policy being directed at each of them,^162  ^
which makes that limits on a state's independence in economic 
matters do not necessarily have to coincide with limits in the 
political-military field. Traditionally, strategic foreign 
policy has operated under looser legal constraints than foreign 
economic policy.(163  ^ in contrast, foreign economic policy is 
addressed through a system (more or less effective) of 
internationally agreed rules or commitments.i1®4) as we know, 
the basic objective, in the field of economic policy, is 
stability of the policy framework itself, which ensures that 
plans and activities of firms, as players on the market, will 
not be disrupted, that competition will be maintained up to its 
ultimate implications and that the international price system 
will continue to function.*165* Thus, by nature, economic 
foreign policy is much more legal in its mode of operation than 
strategic foreign policy. As we know, a major
explanation for why it has to be so is that in today's * 
corporate economy, the democratic process of norms creation
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makes economic foreign policy much more vulnerable to pressures 
of private economic interests than strategic foreign 
p o l i c y . A n d  while the art of strategic foreign policy 
for governments is to discern changes and react promptly to 
them, the art of economic foreign policy is to know how to 
persevere in the face of change to achieve long term 
objectives.
The approach to the ways to achieve international economic 
order should then be based on wholly different principles than 
the ones used for the attainment of military order. There can 
be increased institutionalization of international economic 
intercourse, while the international military strategy matters 
are left uninstitutionalized. An increased isolation of the two 
spheres greatly simplifies the political difficulties there may 
be at the decentralized political level to agree to enter into 
some form of institutional international integration. 
Simultaneously, economic integration may very well 
progressively allow a reduction of the importance of military 
questions between the national societies integrated in economic 
commonwealthes, potentially without the question of military 
alliance being ever raised. It is one of the ends of creating 
economic i n t e g r a t i o n s . i t  was, in particular, at the 
origin of the creation of the European Community and its 
successes in leading to a European Union where war is a virtual 
impossibility provides encouragements to create institutions 
achieving a similar result at a larger scale.
- 233 -
3.1.4.2 The Anti-Protectionism Regime
(1) As we have seen, the elimination of all types of 
non-tariff barriers can be realized in federal states by the 
creation of central n o r m s . N o n - p u r p o s i v e  non-tariff 
barriers, mostly due to diversity in legislations, can be 
eliminated in this manner. It is obviously also the case for 
purposive ones. At the same time, we have seen how even in 
federal systems many non-tariff barriers remain, precisely 
because such systems are not unitary states : member states are 
sovereign in some respect and they can always somehow regulate 
the economic activity under their jurisdictions.
If one wants to keep several states, which is obviously the 
case when one aims at improving international economic 
integration, non-tariff barriers can not be rejected per se. 
However, there is one type of non-tariff barriers states can 
not be allowed to create : the non-tarrif barriers created as 
such, simply because they are barriers. The difficulty is to 
define rules and procedures to eliminate them. Like all other 
legal barriers, non-tariff barriers can be eliminated by 
central norms. More importantly for us, they can also be 
eliminated by judicial decision.
(2) A clear difference is to be made between the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers and the prevention of 
protectionism.*171* We draw this conclusion from a study of 
the United States and the European Community, but because the 
analysis leading us to such conclusion is structural, we think
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such distinction must be made in all federal or federal-like 
systems. On the international scene, there is one additional 
reason why the prevention of protectionism should not be left 
to the sole adoption of central norms through the international 
procedures of harmonization, coordination and cooperation to 
produce norms. If it is true that all types of non-tariff 
barriers could be eliminated by an increased creation of common 
norms at the international level, the process of international 
norms creation is generally so complex and so slow that it is 
impossible to use it to address all the instances of non-tariff 
barriers. In many cases, this would amount to a waste of 
international diplomatic resources. Most of the instances of 
non-tariff barriers taken individually are of so little 
importance for states that they can not waste their time 
persuading other states to remove them. In the aggregate, the 
effect of these micro-barriers is probably huge, if impossible 
to measure ; but they are just not the kind of issues 
diplomatic services wish to, and can, spend their time on. A 
system of elimination of purposive non-tariff barriers will 
thus have to be developed at the international level which will 
not make use of diplomatic resources.
The issue now is to find the forces on which states could 
rely to help them agreeing and enforcing a new deal among 
themselves to create a new trading system.
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3.1.4.3 Forces to Harness in order to Develop and
implement a New Deal
(1) In order to progressively develop the constitutional 
structure of the global-economy, an agenda has to be though 
about carefully to create an institutional dynamic. Given the 
history of the recent progresses in European integration, the 
idea is to make the minimum amount of change so that the 
reaction of private forces will progressively create 
institutional gaps which will have to be filled in by 
institutional reforms which will create new private reactions, 
etc... The goal is therefore to set up an institutional system 
which due to its original structure will be easy to adapt to an 
increased integration of the global-economy. To be flexible, 
such a system would have to be based on solid foundations 
coherent with the internal logic of the liberal system. The 
idea is to initiate a dynamic by making an initial appropriate 
institutional change so that private economic forces, by their 
strategic adaptations to the new institutional setting, will 
increase the need for more international institutionalization, 
which will then occur by way of adaptations to the institutions 
originally created. The issue is to find where to start with in 
order to create the appropriate dynamic.
(2) We know that to create a new regime, states' executives 
need the backing of domestic economic actors who will benefit 
from the regime.*172* If society as a whole will benefit from 
an improved open trade regime, there will be winners and
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loosers among economic actors, and the later will have a
tendency to resist any change. It is among states' executives
that a "new deal" has to be made ; however, they have to be
backed by strong pro-trade forces to counterbalance the
protectionist forces expressing themselves through their
representatives in national assemblies (mostly at the
/ 1 7 3  \ratification level),x 'or otherwise. Not all industries 
and enterprises in a given state are backwards, protectionist 
and rent-seeking, and these which are not have an interest in 
expanding the potential size of their space of micro-economic 
relationships by having their state act to reduce the existing 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to international economic 
exchange. These forces are essential for the establishment of a 
legal regime suited to the needs of an open economy, either 
because they can initially request new negotiations, or because 
they can support such negotiations in the face of protectionist 
demands.
(3) States' executives will be able to agree on an 
implementable new deal only if they have the backing of the 
dynamic economic forces in their countries. A key word in past 
and present international economic negotiations has thus been 
"reciprocity", which is necessary to "sell'* an international 
agreement domestically. States' executives thus have to 
negotiate on the basis of a reciprocity principle, which allows 
to counterbalance protectionist by expansionist forces. But on 
what must they try to obtain reciprocity ? One can trace a 
historical evolution of the meaning of the concept of
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reciprocity, in a sense which indicates a possible rise of law, 
as opposed to negotiation, as a medium of solving many 
international economic disputes, which could be perceived as a 
dramatic improvement of reciprocity by dynamic economic actors.
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3.2 STRUCTURE OF DEAL AMD IMPLEMENTATION
(1) Reciprocity is a key concept in international law and 
for the GATT in particular. However, its definition is 
troublesome, and no absolute, general criteria has been 
developed to ascertain "reciprocity".*174* In the field of 
trade, the idea generally rests on the pragmatic but fallacious 
mercantilist fiction that it is possible to calculate the 
"balance of trade". There is also somewhere the zero-sum notion 
that the amount of world commerce is fixed so that one country 
can expand its trade only at the expense of its rivals, and 
that consequently, if expansion in one field of trade is 
allowed, for example by a reduction in tariff, it should be 
reciprocally compensated by a reduction of tariff protection in 
another field.
It is almost impossible during a round of tariffs 
negotiations in GATT to measure the value of a concession so 
that another concession can be accurately compared to 
it.*175* in practice, a rough measure of a concession's value 
is used.*176* one takes as a starting point the present 
quantity of goods that enter the country. This is then 
multiplied by the money saved on each item by the tariff 
reduction proposed.*177* But the fallacies of the method are 
obvious : in one sense, the value of the concession is the 
additional goods that will be imported due to the tariff 
concession, and this may be quite different from the 
computation described above, and would usually depend on 
elasticities of demand.*178*
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(2) Even though the idea of reciprocity is a somewhat
artificial one, with no good criteria existing to determine the
meaning of "reciprocity" or "mutually advantageous", once the
bargaining process within GATT is achieved - for example after
a round of negotiations - a country is bound to its
commitments. In a sense, the value of a concept such as the one
of reciprocity is that it allows to reach international
agreements which then can be breached only at a cost. As we
have s e e n , t h e  function of international economic law is
to be part of the framework of procedures and constraints
according to which public choices are made.*180* states could
theoretically attempt to follow a free trade policy
unilaterally - and some are actually advocating unilateral free
trade as providing the same benefits as reciprocal free
trade.*181) This may be true on sunny days, but not when hard
times come : constraints simply work better when they are
(182)imposed pursuant to reciprocal agreements , the
existence of reciprocity allows much more to resist to demands 
for protection in case of difficulties than if the government 
must count on its own political strength to resist to the
/183)sirens' song. 1
(3) Many of the obligations in GATT are thus destined to 
maintain the aquilibrium of the deal reached which, by 
definition, is reciprocally beneficial when agreed to but may 
not remain so through time. Provisions regarding non-tariff 
barriers are central to maintain on-going reciprocity.
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In particular, in a regulatory environment in perpetual 
change, the National Treatment obligation, i.e. the obligation 
not to discriminate as between nationals and foreigners, is a 
key principle for the maintaining of reciprocity.*184* As 
Jackson puts it in the context of GATT,
"The national treatment obligation is one of the most 
important and also one of the most contentious of the GATT 
trading system. It has the potential of affecting a large 
number of internal regulations and government measures in any 
country, thus treading on national sovereignty and 
sensitivities, ranging from the way a country governs its 
' environment protection, consumer protection, food and drug 
measures, safety measures, to tax laws, etc."(185)
We have seen that in other mutli-state economic integrations, 
such as the United states or the European Community, the 
non-discrimination principle is really at the core of the 
integrationist regime.*186* This has led us to the conclusion 
that while the substantive content of trade law, centered around 
the principle of non-discrimination (i) as among imported and 
domestically produced goods (the national treatment clause) and
(ii) based on the national origin of the imported goods (the 
most-favored-nation clause), is relatively fitted to its 
function, the institutional mechanisms existing to allow these 
norms to impact effectively on rule makers are deficient. Matters 
are even worse in other fields of international activity 
(services, investments) which are much less institutionalized 
than trade, and where discrimination is even more common. We will 
see how international negotiations could lead to a new 
understanding of reciprocity in international economic law, with
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regards to the reduction of tariff barriers (S3.2.1), as well as 
with regards to non-tariff barriers, which may permit to develop 
procedures increasing the effectivity of non-discrimination 
(S3 .2.2). Finally, we will develop a sketchy presentation of the 
quid pro auos possible in a global economic negotiation to show 
how, if an effective harnessing of pro-trade forces is made, a 
reform of the institutions of the international economy is 
possible (S3.2.3).
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3 . 2 . 1  T a r i f f  B a r r ie r s  : T h e  C r e a t io n  o f  a  M u lt ila t e r a l
Free Trade Area
(1) The move toward freer trade and a correlative change in 
the notion of reciprocity started with the adoption of the 
"linear technique" for negotiating tariff reductions during the 
Kennedy Round.
The procedure adopted for the tariff negotiations during the 
first five Rounds*187* can be summarized in four steps.*188*
The first step was for each country to submit a "request list" on 
which it detailed for every other participant the concessions 
(specified product-by-product) which it desired the other country 
to make. Second. each country would analyze the requests 
submitted to it and make an "offer list", which would indicate 
what tariff concessions it was willing to make in exchange for 
obtaining favorable treatment on its "requests". A third step was 
a series of bilateral conferences between negotiating countries 
to begin to develop the "bargain" between them. The objective was 
to obtain concessions roughly equivalent in "value" to those 
which a country gave up. In general, offers would be extended for 
particular products to the country which was the "principal 
supplier" of that product for the offering country. Finally, at 
some point near the deadline, all countries would finalize their 
"offer list". At this point, each country would have to evaluate 
the total concessions of all the other participants in the 
conference, to see whether it felt that as a whole they were
- 243 -
equivalent to the concessions which it was giving. If it felt 
that it was not the case, it would then notify the other 
participants that it was withdrawing from some of its offers to 
remove the imbalance.
At the Dillon Round, the item-by-item approach to tariff 
negotiations already proved too cumbersome. For one thing, the 
European Community was theoretically negotiating as one entity,
but had to establish a common position among its members before
(189)it could negotiate on an item in GATT in Geneva.' ’ This made 
progress during the negotiations almost impossible. But further, 
tariffs on many items were already so low that it was becoming 
increasingly difficult to obtain meaningful offers of further 
tariff concessions on a selective product-by-product 
basis.*190) it was thus concluded that it would be necessary 
for future tariff-trade negotiating rounds to utilize a "linear 
technique" for negotiating the reductions.(191  ^ At the Kennedy 
Round (1964-67), the so-called "initial offer" called for a fifty 
percent linear cut as a "working hypotheses". Agricultural 
products were generally excluded from the linear rule. On the 
basis of the fifty percent linear cut, countries were then 
entitled to table "exceptions lists", which were to be held to a 
"bare minimum" and subject to "confrontation and 
justification".*192*
(2) The further one goes toward the elimination of tariff 
barriers, the more difficult it is to get tariff concessions in 
item-by-item negotiations. Adopting another solution - as was
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done during the Kennedy Round - in order to go further in the 
reduction of tariff protectionism implies a qualitative change in 
the conception of reciprocity.
Item-by-item negotiations corresponded to the idea of the 
GATT's framers as providing a balance between the concessions 
granted and the ones received, and protected by GATT law. In 
financial terms, measuring the value of concessions is extremely 
difficult, if not wholly impossible. In any case, the move toward 
a "linear reduction" evidences a change in the perception of what 
reciprocal concessions are. It is not the equilibrium resulting 
from a sum of micro-concessions for each of the items involved, 
but a global "disarmament" where reciprocity is achieved by the 
application of a common formula to each Party's tariffs.
The introduction of the "linear technique" was in a sense a 
departure from reciprocity as traditionally u n d e r s t o o d . i t  
was also the introduction of a new criterion for measuring 
reciprocity.
(3) The new criterion for measuring reciprocity is absolute 
when one arrives at a free trade regime. In a sense, when one 
encompasses the whole process of the progressive establishment of 
a free trade area, it might be possible to say that the states 
involved made reciprocal moves. But when one looks at the final 
steps of the negotiation - when the decision to go toward a free 
trade area in the course of a fixed period of time is not made at 
the outset, as is the case for GATT - then it is almost 
impossible for the last tariff concessions to be "balanced", even 
in theory. A possible solution is to decide - at some point - to
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get rid of tariffs entirely, and to create a Free Trade Area. The 
creation of a Free Trade Area among all those members of GATT 
which would wish to participate is a solution which can be 
contemplated today, given the generally low levels of tariff 
averages. A similar proposal has already been made by 
o t h e r s . o n e  of the advantages of such a solution is that 
it would represent a very visible political move, which would 
appeal to pro-trade forces much more than intricate, complex, and 
often seemingly meaningless negotiations. By mobilizing pro-trade 
forces, this solution would make it easier to defend the 
agreement against protectionist forces, using dynamic forces, by 
making reference to a new principle of reciprocity. This would be 
particularly true if in addition with an elimination of tariffs, 
institutional mechanisms would be created to allow a proper 
treatment of non-tariff barriers issues. Reciprocity then would 
not based on a "balance" of tariff concessions, but on an 
equality of access to the national markets of the member states 
of the Free Trade Area to their respective nationals.
However, the drawback of this solution is that it may request 
a partial abandonment of the principle of the
Most-Favored-Nation, since only those who accept to join the Free 
Trade Area should enjoy free access to the markets of its members.
(4) We have seen the role of the MFN clause in ensuring 
reciprocity in the GATT-system and as one of the major premises 
underlying the present GATT—system. However, MFN can have a 
strong inhibiting effect, especially in the final steps of the
- 246 -
institution of a free trade r e g i m e . i f  a nation refuses to 
offer adequate concessions in the negotiations, because of MFN
and the idea of reciprocity, other nations will be reluctant to
(198 }grant any concession that would benefit the hold-out. 1 ' If
the hold-out is a major trader, it is hard for other states to 
make meaningful concessions that won't benefit it, and thus the 
negotiations will proceed at the pace of the slowest.
One possible way to avoid this problem is a limited departure 
from MFN, allowing nations that so desire to proceed further and 
faster in their reciprocal concessions without granting the 
benefits to the holdouts.*199* A "Free Trade Club", for 
instance, can be created for all those who want to enter a 
process to do away with tariffs entirely. Such a club can be 
allowed in GATT either by a waiver or by a complete fulfillment 
of the conditions set in Article XXIV of the General Agreement.
One way to harness pro-trade forces in favor of a new 
integrationist regime is therefore to go all the way towards a 
free trade area. But it is in the field of non-tariff barriers 
that trouble with the concept of reciprocity has been 
particularly felt, and where progress is mostly needed to create 
a regime which would have enough appeal to free traders that they 
would have an incentive to mobilize against protectionists. We 
will now see along what lines reform could be contemplated.
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3.2.2 Non-Tariff Barriers
(1) Non-tariff barriers have arisen as an issue in 
international trade because of the relatively low level of 
average tariff rates.(20°) The interconnection of national 
economies it entails makes much more sensitive the erection of 
non-tariff barriers. These are felt as nullifying the positive 
effect of the reduction of tariff barriers and as challenging the 
reciprocity of advantages derived under GATT. However, recourse 
to the dispute resolution mechanism existing in GATT is largely 
inefficient in eliminating non-tariff barriers. The whole problem 
of the "balance of benefits" which the dispute resolution 
mechanism in GATT is designed to ensure*201* is that as long as 
there still remain tariff barriers, the benefits under the 
Agreement are necessarily relative ones, weighted ones, even if 
imperfectly so. The preservation of the benefits reciprocally 
granted during the negotiations requires a kind of weighting - 
itself diplomatically realized - if within the legal framework 
provided by GATT. This necessarily leads to a political process 
of dispute resolution, with solutions generally unsatisfactory 
for the economic actors hurt by non-tariff barriers.
(2) As a consequence of the progressive reduction of tariff 
barriers, the benefits which are important for states' 
governments and constituents to obtain are less and less the ones 
of tariff concessions. The single most important benefit to 
obtain under GATT is the elimination of discriminatory treatment 
in a more general manner. Such elimination has been the goal of 
GATT from the outset, and was proclaimed in GATT's Preamble, 
where the Contracting Parties announced their intention that :
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"... their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour shall be conducted with a view to raising 
standards of living ... by entering into reciprocal and 
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the 
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to 
trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade.(2 0 2)
The concern over non-tariff barriers started in the 
sixties,*203) but it was only during the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiation (NMTNN) of the Tokyo Round that the issue was 
seriously addressed and that somewhat elaborated rules were 
formulated.*204* The MTN produced an extensive series of 
complex and technical Agreements, and the scope of the 
GATT-system has been greatly broadened.*205* The negotiators 
elaborated on the weak constitutional structure of the GATT to 
develop its function in the global-economy. For example, the 
negotiations included a major effort to provide a framework of 
principles for managing problems arising from product standards 
that affect trade. An Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade*206* has been adopted. It concerns all types of product 
standards, including technical, health, safety and consumer 
protection standards in addition to environmental ones. Under 
the Code, the Signatories announce their desire to
"... further the objectives of the General 
Agreement",(207) "to ensure that technical regulations 
and standards (...) do not create unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade",(208) [while] "recognizing that no 
country should be prevented from taking measures necessary 
to ensure the quality of its plant life or health, of the 
environment or for the prevention of deceptive practices, 
subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
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unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on 
international trade*;(209) [and evidently] "recognizing 
that no country should be prevented from taking measures 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests".(210)
To implement these goals, the Code provides that
Parties shall ensure that technical regulations and 
standards are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view 
to creating obstacles to international trade. (...) They 
shall likewise ensure that neither technical regulations 
nor standards themselves nor their application have the 
effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.(211)
It clearly appears from the highlighted portions of the 
citations of the Code that what the parties to the Code were 
after was not the effect on trade of states measures but the 
presence of purposive protectionism. When they speak about 
effect on trade, it is in connection with unnecessary obstacles 
to international trade. The coherence with the lessons which 
can be drawn from the comparison between the American and 
European case law on the prevention of states' protectionism is 
obvious.*212*
It is only when one arrives at the consultation and dispute 
resolution mechanism that the unfortunate terminology of 
Article XXIII of GATT is used. Thus,
If any party considers that any benefit accruing to it, 
directly or indirectly, under this Agreement is being 
nullified or impaired (.••) and that its trade interests 
are significantly affected, the party may make written 
representations and proposals to the other party 
(...)•<213>
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Thus, the trade interests of a country have to be 
"significantly affected" before it can use the dispute 
resolution mechanism. And then, such country can make "written 
representations and proposals".... It is by writing such 
clauses that one leads people to believe that GATT means 
General Agreement to Talk and Talk. It is clearly recognized in 
the codes elaborated during the Tokyo Round that 
nondiscrimination is the key principle in the elimination of
non-tariff barriers. But the existing dispute resolution
process is ineffective here. A new system needs to be built, 
based on a different - additional - conception of reciprocity : 
a qualitative one, entailing effective enforcement procedures.
(3) It is certainly a necessity to have a dispute 
resolution process working partly as a negotiation procedure 
for GATT as a whole. But the existing dispute resolution
process is ill-adapted to effectively address the problem of
many purposive non-tariff barriers. In particular, the existing 
diplomatic dispute resolution mechanism is not well adapted to 
deal with the thousands of instances of micro-discriminations.
But to see the core function of the GATT-system fulfilled, 
which is to allow to resist against internal demands for 
protection against foreign competitors, realism requests that 
non-tariff protectionist measures be put in two categories, a 
different type of treatment being warranted for each of them. 
There are, on the one hand, forms of macro-protectionism, such 
as the effective prohibition of the importation of Japanese
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cars above a certain level, or the effective prevention of the 
importation of some agricultural products. Such high-track 
protectionist measures are so politically charged that the most 
one can hope for in the coming reform is to improve the 
safeguard clause, so that it is effectively and exclusively 
used, which should have for effect to reduce
macro-protectionism overall (S3.2.2.1). There are also, on the 
other hand, thousands of instances of micro-protectionism, for 
example under the form of discriminatory regulations in 
standard requirements, product certification procedures, etc... 
To address this form of low-track protectionism, which is not 
politically sensitive, a juridical system of elimination of 
protectionist measures must be set in place (S3.2.2.2).
3.2.2.1 Hight Track Protectionism
(1) To determine the content of the rules to be created at 
the international level to allow resistance against 
protectionist demands, it is necessary to distinguish between 
low-track non-tariff barriers and high-track non-tariff 
barriers. In making this distinction, we mean that there are 
some barriers which removal is highly politically sensitive and 
difficult while the removal of others is less so. It is obvious 
that in some sectors of activity, a dramatic and sudden 
increase in international economic competition can only lead to 
disruption, massive unemployment, social unrest and all the 
accompanying political problems one can expect. If the purpose
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of the international trading regime is to allow to resist 
against protectionist forces, there is a level above which no 
piece of paper will allow any government to resist against the 
shouting demands of hundreds of thousands of demonstrators on 
the streets. For example, if the European Community would open 
the European car market to Japanese competition from one day to 
the next in these early 1990s, there would be riots, and there 
is no way any European government with a national car industry 
could resist against them in the name of free trade, 
reciprocity, economic order, the fundamental principles of 
market society, etc... Damaging effect resulting from 
competition has to be dealt with under today's political 
conditions and, since we have not reached a level of political 
integration such that redistribution policies can be decided at 
the international level by an international institution, it can 
be so only in a decentralized manner. Decisions to give 
assistance to declining domestic industries have to be accepted 
as legitimate, even when they create major problems at the 
level of the international economy. The only improvement we can 
hope to make at this level and at this point in time is in 
finding agreement in the forms that assistance can take, their 
duration and the means which can be used to increase the 
visibility of their use. If it is clear that modern democratic 
political regimes can not resist highly vocal - "high track" - 
internal demands for assistance, the international trading 
system can still fulfill its function which is to allow to 
resist against demands for protection.
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We will see with an example the consequences of an 
ineffective and inapplicable escape clause, such as the one 
existing today, in this respect.
A recent and paradigmatic example of an unsatisfactory 
regime of high track protectionism is the one of the agreement 
between the European Community and Japan on cars (hereinafter 
the "Agreement" or the "Car Agreement").(214  ^ The origin of 
the Car Agreement is to be found in the European Single Act, 
which is to create a frontier free internal market by 
January 1, 1 9 9 3 . On that date, there are supposed to be 
no more customs posts between European Community Member States. 
However, until the European Single Act was signed, there still 
existed in some Member States national import quotas 
restricting the importation of Japanese cars in some national 
markets.*216* The existence of such national quotas was at 
odd with the existence of a Common European Commercial Policy, 
which is a component of a common market,*217  ^ but it was 
explainable for historical reasons : European Community Member 
States were allowed to keep the GATT-acceptable import
(218)restrictions they had before they joined the Community.
With the 1993 single market and the elimination of border 
controls, the administration of national quotas would have been 
impossible. The countries with quotas did not want to allow 
free Japanese competition on January 1, 1993, while countries 
without restrictions were reluctant to agree on a European wide 
Japanese car quota. During 18 months, the European Commission, 
the governments of the 12 Member States and the Japanese
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government negotiated to settle there differences. The 
Agreement which has been reached has not been published, which 
is a problem in itself since consumers' and taxpayers' money 
has been, and will be, taken away from them by people who can 
not be made politically accountable for it since it is 
difficult for European citizens to evaluate the cost of their 
policy. However, elements of the Car Agreement have transpired 
in the press,*219) and are the following :
(a) The European Commission estimates a European car market 
of 15.1 million in 1991. On this assumption, an agreed 
"forecast" of demand for Japanese imports to the European 
Community in 1999 of 1.23 million vehicles*220* has been 
based. This last figure, however (i) is not a formal limit 
and (ii) excludes vehicles from Japanese car plants within 
the European Community, the so-called "transplants".
(b) The Agreement covers a seven-year transition period, 
which is supposed to clear the way for a completely open 
vehicle market on January 1, 2000. It includes elaborate 
monitoring procedures and targets for individual national 
markets :
(i) The European Commission and Japanese officials will 
meet twice a year for consultations to monitor the 
Agreement.
- Each autumn, they will examine the export trend for 
that year, the forecast of exports for the following 
year and the preliminary outlook for the level of 
exports for the year after that.
- 255 -
- Each spring, they will examine the actual export 
outturn for the previous year, the forecast level for 
the current year and adjustments to targets if 
necessary. It is provided that the so-called "agreed 
forecast of demand for Japanese imports" will be 
adjusted "in an equitable manner", the Agreement 
noting that "Japan bears in mind the EC's concern that 
the necessary adjustments of the EC manufacturers 
towards adequate levels of international 
competitiveness would be affected if EC manufacturers 
can not enjoy the adequate benefit of market growth or 
if they face improper decrease in the production level 
in a contracting market".
(ii) Exports to countries where restrictions still apply 
will continue to be monitored until the end of the 
Agreement, when they are supposed to be abolished. The 
monitoring will be in accordance with forecast 1999 
Japanese exports to these markets of 199,000 units to 
the United Kingdom, representing 7.03 per cent of a 
forecast UK market of 2.7 million vehicles ; 150,000 
to France (5.26% of a 2.85 million units market) ;
138.000 to Italy (5.3% of a 2.6 million market) ;
79.000 to Spain (5.3% of a 1.475 million market) ; and
(221)23.000 to Portugal (8.36% of a 275,000 market).'
- 256 -
Aside from the formal Agreement, there is an unwritten 
"understanding" that the Japanese won't drastically increase 
car production at their plants in the European Community beyond 
their current plans to produce 1.2 million cars by the end of 
the century.*222* The overall Japanese market share should 
thus increase from a current 11% to about 16%.*223*
French and Italian producers have been most active to 
request protection, while the Northern European Community 
countries pressed for freer trade. The heart of the negotiation 
centered on Japanese producers' market share, and on whether 
transplant production would be included within the Agreement or 
not. Formally including transplant production within the quota 
would have been contrary to the principles of the Single«
Market ; it has therefore been excluded from the Agreement. 
However, there is this "understanding" on the 1.2 million car 
ceiling of production within the European Community which, 
coupled with the monitoring procedure and a broad "equity" 
principle, is bound to lead to a political clash between 
Britain, Italy and France. According to British government 
estimates, Japanese car manufacturers in effect will be 
producing 2 million vehicles a year within the European 
Community by the end of the decade, and 1 million in the UK 
alone.*224* That would give Japanese producers a 21.2% market 
share, which is far more than French and Italian producers are 
ready to accept. The discrepancy between the official EC 
"understanding" and the actual figure is explainable by the 
fact that the increase in transplant production is less of a
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problem for national governments than for national producers : 
transplant production creates jobs and reduces the political 
tension streaming from the economic difficulties faced by 
national producers. Their main concern should then be with 
regards to the localization of transplant activity, which they 
should try to attract (as Britain already did).*225  ^ Leaving 
the Agreement somewhat hazy on the transplant issue allows to 
give short term satisfaction to national producers (the 
"understanding" on the 1.2 million ceiling) while keeping open 
the possibility to increase transplant production, as long as 
it is somewhat evenly located.
Overall, this Agreement is unreal, and shows how managed 
trade can, without a proper framework of principles and 
procedures, lead to unacceptable results in the context of a 
liberal market society :
(i) The first reason why such an agreement is unacceptable is 
that it simply, won't lead to free trade in cars in 2000. We 
are said that it takes 7 years of "transitory period" for 
the Japanese market share to go from an 11 to a 16%, when 
free trade is supposed to occur. But it has been estimated 
that a sensible transition period of seven years to free 
trade would move the permitted Japanese market share by 3% 
or so a year.(226) Pretending that the Car Agreement will 
allow breathing room for European producers so that they 
get ready for free competition in year 2000 is nothing but
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a lie : European producers have been fighting during 18 
months for an Agreement which allows one-fourth of the 
increase of market share which would be necessary to allow 
them to get used to free competition ; those who say that 
on January 1, 2000 they will let the Japanese market share 
increase by an additional 15% almost overnight are nothing 
but lying. As The Economist's writes : "a political 
showdown in 1999 has been built in from the start, and the 
protectionists will again be able to say that they need 
more time."*227* This is true for the overall quota, but 
this is even more so for the remaining national ones. The 
Car Agreement allows the Japanese market share to go from a 
3.5% in 1991 in France to a 5.26% in the course of seven 
years... or from a 2% in Italy to a 5.3%! Who can believe 
that Europeans, and French and Italians in particular, 
would be stupid enough to believe that in 2000 Jacques 
Calvet, the now president of Peugeot who has been virulent 
on Japanese bashing, or his successor and peers, will 
accept that French or Italian people should be free to buy 
the car they want i But the negotiations were secret, the 
Agreement is unpublished, and the whole scheme has been 
presented as a great victory against the invasion of the 
yellow man ...
(ii) The Agreement will be-costly to consumers, but no one 
knows the amount of the bill.(228) in addition, the 
Agreement will also be costly to taxpayers : getting 
protection is not enough for European car makers ; now,
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they want subsidies and are lobbying the European
(22 9 \Commission for help. ' The Commission has said that it
was not ready to provide the kind of bailout it did for the
steel industry in the 1980s, but that it was working on
help to finance research and development and worker
training programs.(23°)
(iii) All this waste has been decided secretly by people who
have been defending the interest of the only sector of
activity directly involved : the car industry. While the
French and Italian car industry is responsible for its own
inefficiency,f231) consumers, taxpayers and the economy
as a whole will pay for the protection from competition
provided by the Agreement. But their voice could not be
( 232 )heard because of secrecy.' ' Secrecy has prevented
consumer resistance, but also the linking of this 
protectionist issue in Europe to other protectionist issues 
in Japan. While the opening of the European car market to 
Japanese competition could have been negotiated against the 
opening of the Japanese market for some European 
industries, the only elements in the negotiation were the 
amount of protection provided to European producers, and 
the quantity of "transplants" allowed.
(3) A refurbished escape clause within which such type of
high track protectionism could be dealt with would prevent such
absurdities. Its main principles would be the same as the ones
(233)of the existing escape clause of GATT (Article XIX) : In
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case a domestic industry would be seriously injured by foreign 
competition, a Contracting Party would be authorized to suspend 
compliance with its GATT obligations. The existing escape 
clause requires the Contracting Party to previously inform GATT 
and, absent critical circumstances, to consult with it. If 
agreement on the action is not reached, affected Contracting 
Parties can suspend equivalent concessions, subject to 
disapprovement by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. A new escape clause 
would also provide for domestic adjustment to assure that the 
safeguard mechanisms will be temporary.(234  ^ Ideally, there 
should be prior GATT agreement to the use of protection ; but 
even if there is only prior information, this should be made in 
such a manner that the use of the procedure would be public, 
allowing resistance by the affected Contracting Parties, but, 
more importantly, by the affected domestic interests of the 
state contemplating to provide protection, which would increase 
domestic resistance to the project. The regime to limit 
high-track protectionism would have to be structured in such a 
manner that it would cost something to the government to adopt 
such a policy so that it will have an incentive to resist 
demands against which resistance would be less costly 
politically than providing protection. For example, if it would 
be necessary to request authorization to provide temporary 
protection, or at least to inform on the intent to use 
protection prior to its use, allowing for a possibility for 
harmed states to react and request that a case be made to 
demonstrate the need for protection, this would imply several
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costs for the country requesting protection : there would be a 
cost in prestige ; more importantly, if the regime would 
provide for the possibility of some form of retaliation, to be 
announced during the phase of international negotiation on the 
use of the escape clause, this would allow domestic resistance 
from the part of the domestic industry retaliated against. 
International negotiations on temporary assistance would allow 
the country whose industry would be the target of protection to 
link the issue to some difficulty felt by some other of its own 
industries. It could threaten to provide them protection. This 
would eventually raise political activism from the part of the 
corresponding industry in the first country, which exports 
could be threatened in retaliation to the originally 
contemplated protection. This should have for effect to reduce 
protection overall. In this manner, which high-track demands 
for protection deserve protection would be determined more by 
the resistance capacity of the decentralized political system 
of the state contemplating to give protection than by 
international negotiations, where agreement would be difficult. 
It is only for those demands against which the national 
political system can not resist that their would be managed 
protection.
In cases of high track protectionist demands, the only 
improvement possible therefore is the one of the ruj,gg 
according to which states may legitimately grant protection.
But even in such cases where the demand for protection is too 
vocal and an escape clause has to be used, international rules
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can be improved so that the protection granted is temporary and 
designed to facilitate the adaptation to competition. Such an 
escape clause system would allow a combination of (i) the 
interests of society in forcing economic actors to adapt to 
competition and (ii) the legitimacy there is in decentralized 
political systems to reduce the pain of the adaptation.
An important improvement in the procedures of 
cooperat ion *2 3 5 * in trade matters is therefore the one 
»
dealing with the Escape Clause mechanism, creating an effective 
international procedure to control the use made of it. Having a 
set of norms and procedures to deal with high track demands for 
protectionism can allow to fulfill the final aim of the trading 
regime in the long run, since the end of such norms and 
procedures is only to provide time for adaptation. Without such 
a system, high track protectionism exists any way, but without 
the assurance that the final aim of the free trade regime, 
which is to allow competition to play its positive function at 
the international level, will be fulfilled, even if it is only 
in the long run.
(4) Practically, assuming that an equilibrium in the 
concessions made in the fields of trade, services, investment, 
etc... by states is possible, i.e. that a "deal" can be reached 
(which we will see below is the case), it would be possible to 
deal with existing high track protectionism during 
international negotiations leading to an international economic 
regime in the following manner. Most of the actual instances of
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special protection should be converted into an escape clause
procedure, the purpose of which would be to provide temporary
"breathing room" for orderly adjustment, and not to provide a
facade for indefinite protection.*236) centralizing relief
under a refurbished escape clause with custom tailored
adjustment plans would allow for the negotiation of an
international "deal" on the basis of a reciprocal phasing-out
of the existing instances of special protection. The only
element in the negotiation would then be the time horizon for
the elimination of each instance of special protection. The
menu of regressive remedies used to ease the transition would
( 2 3 7 )be much the same as for new escape clause cases.' ' In
particular, existing quantitative restrictions could be
(2 38)converted into tariffs or auctioned quotas,v ' which would
be phased out according to a time-horizon depending on the
( 2 3 9 )existing level of tariff-equivalent protection.
(5) International agreement on the use of the escape clause 
mechanism would ease its use by globally minded executive 
powers and therefore would decrease the need for the use of 
unfair trade laws.(24°) These could then be used to address 
the issues they are supposed to deal with : unfair business 
behaviour.^241^
- 264 -
3 . 2 . 2 . 2  L o w -T ra c k  P r o t e c t io n is m  : th e  N o n -D is c r im in a t io n
Principle
(1) Another interesting aspect of the solution of creating 
a free trade club is that it allows to find a solution to the 
problem of low-track non-tariff barriers. If the decision to 
build a free trade area is understood as a modification in the 
significance of the reciprocity principle, the new principle 
can be perceived as a commitment toward free trade and 
non-discrimination. We have seen what the anti-protectionism 
principle means in other more integrationist multi-state 
integrated economies : it is nothing more than the prevention 
of purposely protectionist measures. The change in the 
reciprocity principle at the global level means then nothing 
less than the possibility of the institutionalization of the 
rule of law in some types of trade disputes. Reciprocity in the 
old system could be "measured" only diplomatically. If 
reciprocity becomes a reciprocity of commitment toward 
nondiscrimination between nationals and foreigners, then it is 
possible for law to determine when the principle is breached or 
not.
Another way of eliminating many of the purposive non-tariff 
barriers than adopting central norms is to develop a procedural 
mechanism akin to the one existing in federal states to prevent 
state protectionism. The idea here is to save on the use of 
international diplomatic resources, and to make a greater use 
of national judicial resources and of private international
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resources. We already know the principle to apply to prevent 
protectionist legislation : the principle of 
non-discrimination. Increasing its effectivity in 
international law through procedural developments would help 
economic integration. The principle of non-discrimination, 
which is diffused in the entire existing international 
integrationist regime, is now enforced by states : to improve 
its effectivity, there is need for another mode of enforcement.
(2) As we have seen, in the United States and the European 
Community,*243) economic actors can make use of judicial 
resources to have unwarranted barriers removed by demonstrating 
that such barriers derive from discriminatory measures. They 
can go to courts which can declare such laws either 
"unconstitutional", in the United states, or in violation of 
the Founding Treaties of the European Community. They thus can 
maintain the integrationist regime open even when the evolution 
of society requests the adoption of new norms, which they can 
challenge when they do not fit within the set of supreme norms 
at the root of the integrationist regime. The issue is to find 
the type of procedural development needed for such an action of 
private economic actors to be possible at the global level.
(3 ) To maintain a free trade regime after its creation, use 
must be made of forces having an interest in such 
maintaining.(244) Household consumers are obvious loosers 
from trade protection.(245) However, their failure to act to
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defend their interest is a staple of political analysis : they 
face a severe collective action problem and, a good deal of 
them being also producers of goods, when they think about trade 
politics, they tend to worry more about their job than about 
the monopoly rents they pay to lousy producers.(246) But 
there are other forces having an interest in free trade which 
can be made use of.(247  ^ For example, a recent study in the 
United states has shown that several primary groups contributed 
to a sharp increase in political resistance to product-specific 
trade protection between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. They 
were four types of special interests benefiting particularly 
from the trade threatened with protection : industrial users of 
imports, retailers of traded consumer goods, American exporters 
selling to the countries whose products were targeted, and the 
companies and government of those countries.(248)
The difficulty with these forces is to pull them 
together :(249) since they tend to defend special interests 
opposed to the special interests requesting protection, they 
lack a central political organization to speak for them, and 
their interest is not in "free trade" as much as in the 
specific product flow to which they are party.(2^°) However, 
in an existing regime, their presence is certainly useful to 
maintain the regime open.
But in addition to local consumers and special interests in 
favor of free trade, a very strong counterbalancing force to 
hidden protectionism in an existing system can also be found 
outside the nation/state whose protection is requested by a
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firm or industry, in the competitors of the firm or industry 
requesting p r o t e c t i o n . T h e  constitutional change needed 
to counterweight protectionist demands must therefore give a 
voice to outside forces. This is why it can be said that there 
must be a constitutional change at the internationa1 level : an 
international agreement is needed to get the support of dynamic 
industries because they are outside the nation-state whose 
protection is sought by failing industries or companies ; but 
the agreement has to be based on a principle influencing on the 
whole domestic decision-making process, and this is why it can 
be said of a constitutional nature.
(4) Everybody agrees that the machinery for dispute 
settlement in GATT does not operate properly with regard to 
very important areas of trade relations, and that limited 
achievements in the settlement of disputes could not cover up 
such inadequacies. *252 * However, most of the proposals made 
to improve matters relate to small changes, small improvements 
in the existing diplomatic/bureaucratic way disputes are 
handled.(253) proposing small achievements is probably 
warranted for the dispute resolution process applying to GATT 
as a whole. For most of the GATT activity, the purpose of the 
general machinery of dispute resolution is RQi to ensure 
compliance with law, but to ensure a continuous "balance of 
advantages".*254* The role of law here is mostly to put 
boundaries to the arguments available to the parties in order 
to circumscribe their dispute. The acceptance of the
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"diplomat's technique as a medium of legal discourse" ( 2 5 5 ) 
was necessary for an institution with potentially so wide a 
jurisdiction as that of GATT. This same argument justifies the 
warning by authors that there can not be any improvement in the 
procedures of dispute settlement without prior agreement on the 
rules to be applied :
"It is agreement on these rules which conditions agreement 
on the procedures for settlement and not the opposite. A 
stronger consensus on precise substantive rules make it 
possible to strengthen the machinery for supervision of 
their interpretation and application. But if there is no 
such consensus, a strengthening of the dispute-settlement 
procedures will provide no remedy. On the contrary, because 
the supervision procedures are applied to contested rules, 
the stricter they are, the more firmly they will be 
rejected. (...) Any reform of the procedure therefore 
presupposes prior agreement on the rules themselves."(256)
As far as low-track non-tariff barriers are concerned, the 
rule to apply - if Contracting Parties really want to face the 
issue - is simple : it consists in the direct applicability in 
national law of the non-discrimination principle. Bhagwati has 
very properly remarked that :
The need for institutional change that will give more play 
to the forces favoring free trade and will permit the costs 
of protection to weight more adequately in the 
deliberations than they now do is evident.(257)
The reader should recall that from the outset, the 
structural bias in favor of protectionism in the global-economy 
is a constitutional problem : international trade policy 
conflicts arise from domestic redistribution policies.*258* 
International negotiations on the creation of a regime
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preventing the recurrence of conflicts should try to articulate 
rules that will have a chance of reforming not iust the conduct 
of trade policy, but also the domestic policies that determine 
that conduct.(259) And because trade policy is not the only 
area where protectionist forces can make themselves felt, the 
rules or mechanisms designed should indeed influence the whole 
process of domestic norms creation. We have seen the 
constitutional role of states in answering the demands of their 
constituents, and in internalizing costs within the structure 
of decision-making of enterprises.(26°) This raises 
non-tariff barriers, some of them being unwarranted per se in 
an integrated but politically decentralized economy, because 
purposefully created. Enterprises affected can - in the United 
States and in the European Community - challenge these measures 
in courts, fulfilling a "functional constitutional role" - in 
the pursuit of their own "private" interest - in favor of the 
unification of the market, with all the implied benefits for 
the nation as a whole. For the same constitutional role to be 
played by multinational enterprises at the global level, "locus 
standi" has to be granted to them. The most efficient manner to 
achieve that objective would be to have the Free Trade Club 
Agreement directly applicable in state law, allowing everybody 
to invoke the Agreement in state courts.^
(5) To effectively implement the non-discrimination 
principle at the global level, the reform needed is twice : (i) 
the respect for the principle of non-discrimination must be 
imposed on the whole national process of norm creation ; and
(ii) the principle must be directly applicable in national law.
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The fulfillment of the ideal of legality implies that the 
capacity to generate and sustain reasoned criticism of the 
rules and of official discretion must be built into the 
machinery of lawmaking and administration.*262* We have shown 
that the nondiscrimination requirement is a cornerstone 
principle in GATT, two of its most important obligations - 
Most-Favored-Nation and National Treatment - deriving from 
it.*263* However, as a rule of international public law with 
no direct effect on individual rights,*264* it has not been 
' able to prevent the world-wide rise in protectionism we have 
experienced over the last decades.*265* Given the political 
dynamics of protectionism, it can not be stopped if the 
nondiscrimination principle in international law is not 
translated into a right to nondiscrimination under national 
law ; that is, a principle to which economic actors can make 
appeal directly in courts.
An effective implementation of the non-discrimination 
principle requires that private actors can invoke it against 
other states than their state of origin when they feel that 
they are discriminated against. This implementation requires 
that the principle of non-discrimination be made directly 
applicable in national law. With the reform we advocate, the 
Most-Favored-Nation principle and the National-Treatment 
Obligation - which are the two aspects of the nondiscrimination 
principle in GATT law - would merge in a unique principle of 
nondiscrimination to which private parties could appeal in 
courts.
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While the nondiscrimination principle is a keystone to
GATT, the existing structure of the GATT legal system is built
to address issues of negative effect on trade of state measures
which have as a result to "nullify or impair11 the benefits of
Contracting Parties in GATT.(266) it is a sum of procedures
nggptiatjpn between states, the dispute resolution mechanism
itself being barely distinguishable from the rest of the
negotiation activity going on in GATT. It therefore does not
function as a legally enforced principle, and those actors
which are more directly interested in requesting its respect
(private ones) can not invoke it in court.*267) It is true
that both the United States (with the Section 301 of the 1974
Trade Act)(268) and the European Community (with the
so-called "new commercial policy instrument")*269) have
adopted legislation allowing their constituents to launch
procedures eventually leading to an enforcement of their
state's international economic rights. These developments are
interesting in the sense that they may be perceived as
representing a trend toward the creation of procedures
available to economic actors in connection with the application
and enforcement of international economic rules.* *
However, so far, they only allow an indirect mode of redressing
discriminatory practices of other states, since their only role
is to allow constituents to make their own state act against
(271)alleged violations of international economic law.
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(6 ) For a good many years, there have been discussions on 
the creation of a "GATT-Plus", "GATT of the like-minded", or a 
"Super-GATT", searching for an additional joint pledge by which 
a group of core countries would make the GATT rules more 
strictly binding on themselves.Í272) in that way, their 
governments would be more effectively shielded from domestic 
demands for protection.(273  ^ The difficult problem has been 
to find what form the additional pledge should take.^274  ^ The 
proposal has been made to have GATT law enacted into domestic 
law to have it enforceable by private parties on 
governments.t275) This solution is generally considered as 
impracticable and maybe inappropriate due to the inadequacy of 
GATT rules generally speaking. But this is not so for the 
non-discrimination principle. We thus propose at the core of a 
reform of the trading regime to have the principle of 
non-discrimination directly applicable in national law. This 
would permit economic actors to invoke it in national courts to 
request nullification of the effects of protectionist measures. 
This solution would be simple and flexible. With an appropriate 
transitory period to allow for the creation of the free trade 
area and the progressive removal of existing discriminatory 
measures, together with appropriate escape clauses, a treaty 
could be concluded between like-minded countries which, once 
ratified, would be national law with regards to the 
non-discrimination principle provided for and would, either 
directly or through implementation, constitute a private right 
invokable in court. This direct applicability is the
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cornerstone of the reform : as we have seen, nondiscrimination 
is already an obligation for governments in GATT law.*276^
They do not respect it because the treaty has been ineffective 
in forcing them to do so, the reason for its ineffectiveness 
being that the treaty failed to provide a private recourse 
against non-compliance.i277) «phe practical effect of this 
change would be to make of multinational enterprises - as the 
first actors interested, concerned and capable of mobilizing 
the juridical resources necessary - agents of the prevention of 
state protectionism without having to go through the complex 
and unreliable process of international negotiation among 
states. Among the many ways of using multinationals for 
industrial policy purposes at the global level, one is 
therefore to use them as actors against parochialism and the 
production of protectionism. Many types of utilization of 
multinational enterprises for industrial policy purposes would 
require difficult international agreement on substantive rules 
and principles. But here, the legal principle to apply is not a 
novelty for the two most important public players in the 
international economy. The United States and the European 
Community have a federal structure which juridical apparatus is 
accustomed to the interpretation of the principle of 
non-discrimination.
(7) At the international level, the ultimate objective of 
the rules is stability of the policy framework, which ensures 
that plans and activities of enterprises will not be disrupted,
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that competition will be maintained, and that the international 
price system functions smoothly.*278* The reform we advocate 
would reach that objective. Additionally, entrenching the 
principle of nondiscrimination would be an important step, at 
the national level, in domestic constitutional 
reconstruction.Successful rent seeking consisting in 
securing differentially favorable treatment by the state, 
protectionism is a form of internal discrimination. There is 
therefore not just a parallel between nondiscrimination 
internationally and equality before the law in the 
international context, but a functional relationship between 
the two : nondiscrimination in international trade is a 
safeguard for the equality of individuals before their own 
national law.(28°)
(8 ) One must recall that the end of the reform proposed is 
to protect the functioning of liberal society, and in 
particular the principle that wealth will not be appropriated 
by the public system for the purpose of being redistributed to 
others without the agreement of representative assemblies and 
for legitimate p u r p o s e s . T h e  purpose of the reform, 
thus, is not to give privileges to companies. But to protect 
the rights of individuals, a use of the corporate system is a 
necessity : when an enterprise or industry gets protection from 
competition, the competing enterprise(s) or industry(ies) 
has(have) an interest in having competition re-established. In 
order to allow them to fulfill the socially beneficial function
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of having competition protected, they must have access to 
procedures reestablishing competition, allowing them to enforce 
the principle of non-discrimination.
(9) With regards to the procedural reform needed to allow 
micro-economic actors to screen discriminatory measures, 
develop arguments against them and have them removed by court 
decisions, it is obvious that the simpler the reform, the 
better. For the sake of discussion, one could imagine creating 
a central international court to deal with issues of 
discrimination. But the court would soon be overburdened, and 
become unable to reach to its task. A system of courts would 
thus be needed. However, the complexity of the organization of 
such a system would probably destroy any goodwill there may be 
in the world in favor of the reform. Additionally, creating 
international courts is very offensive to national sovereignty, 
and is a very difficult and unlikely step.
There is one simpler first move which can be made, which 
does not solve all issues but allows to launch a dynamic. We 
have seen the similarities there are in the case law of the 
American Supreme Court and of the European Court of Justice in 
cases dealing with these particular types of measures we aim at 
seing suppressed. One simple way of providing for procedures 
for the effective implementation of the non-discrimination 
principle is to provide for its direct applicability in 
national law... and do nothing else. In the European Community, 
the additional commitment not to discriminate would be made by
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the European Community, and would be directly applicable in the 
Member States. The European Court of Justice would be the 
supreme court in charge with the uniformization of the 
interpretation of the principle of non-discrimination over the 
territory of the European Community. In the United States, the 
commitment would be above other federal and state law, and 
would be interpreted by federal courts under the unifying 
interpretative role of the Supreme Court. Since there is a 
great similarity in the case law of the European Court of 
Justice and of the Supreme Court, there is little risk that 
their future case law on similar issues would greatly diverge. 
The international treaty could provide that both supreme 
courts, and the ones of other polities participating in the 
regime, should use the American and European case laws as a 
source of inspiration for their own decisions, if not as a 
mandatory source of law.(282) in case divergent 
interpretations would develop, there would be at least two 
solutions : (i) create a court of appeals above the two supreme 
courts to resolve the differences, or (ii) adopt an 
interpretative treaty.
We now come to the end of our story. The Uruguay Round is 
almost dead and everyone is afraid of tomorrow, of trade wars, 
of a divided trade world. And fear there should be since we now 
know how much exchange - trade - and peace are connected. We 
will quickly explain what happened, in the hope that our theory 
may help to launch a new negotiation on different tracks, to 
escape the many specters of yesterday.
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3*2*3 Tire  la u n c h in g  o f  a S e l f - F u l f i l l i n g  P ro p h e c y
(1) The world trading system enters a period of crisis, 
with a great danger to fall apart, and few are the ones who 
believe it can recover soon. Here again, the history of the 
European Community is an important source of
inspiration.f283) The parallel which can be drawn between the
European Community integration and the institutional evolution
of the GATT System is that a use of micro-economic forces was
needed for progress in the European Community and this is what
is needed to improve the global system. The evident difficulty
at the global level is that there is no Commission to advertise
on the global cost of protectionism, which has been an
important element in the dynamic of the European integration.
However, one could imagine that an "institution" such as the
Group of the Seven More Industrialized Countries, or "G7",
could play a similar role. A dynamic such as the one which led
to the adoption of the Single Act*284* could be developed if
— after careful elaboration of the strategic concepts — a
commitment would be made to create a new regime during one of
the summits.*285* An ad |*oc comity with a role similar to the
one played by the Commission with regards to the development
and diffusion of the information regarding the costs of the
non-Europe could be created to develop and publicize the costs
of a divided world economic system, the possibility to save
some of these costs by appropriate institutional reforms, the
need for corporate political activism to counterbalance
(286)protectionist forces, etc...
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(2) As far as the feasibility of the reform is concerned, 
and with regards to the reason why the G7 may be the proper 
arena where to launch the creation of a new regime,(287) our 
discussion on the creation of international public goods is to 
be recalled here.(288) There is no need for an agreement 
between all trading countries for such a good to be created ; 
an agreement between the most important trading countries is 
sufficient. In 1985, twelve countries accounted for 
three-fourth of the world imports ;(289) the European 
Economic Community, the United States, Japan and Canada (all 
the G7 countries) alone accounted for more than half.(29°) jf 
transactions among this group of countries could come to be 
conducted according to settled rules, and other countries could 
trade with them on a Most-Favored-Nation basis, a sturdy 
international trade regime could be said to exist.(291)
(3) The main obstacle to a successful completion of the 
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (so far) has been the 
impossibility for the United States and the European Community 
to agree on rules regarding agricultural products. The United 
States, who may have gone too far in their uncompromising 
attitude,(292) have declared that they will not go along with 
the other reforms discussed during the talks if a solution is 
not found in the agricultural field. While the United States, 
or American consumers, spend about 75 billion US dollars a year 
on agricultural subsidization,(293) and after decades of
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agreement on the fact that agriculture should not be subject to 
the general GATT rules, the United States proposed in 1987 a 
complete elimination (over 10 years) of exports subsidies and 
of 75% reduction of internal subsidies. The European Community 
has not responded favorably and has proposed a reduction of 30% 
of the subsidies on all the main agricultural products, to be 
achieved over the next five years to 1995/1996. As far as the 
United States is concerned, the reduction in support proposed 
amounts in effect to an overall reduction of 10% in current 
support measures by 1996 and is unacceptable. Its latest 
position is that there should be a 70-75% reduction on internal 
support ; possibly a 90% cut in export subsidies ; a 
tariffication plan converting all non-tariff barriers in the 
agricultural sector into tariffs, incorporating tariff rate 
quotas to be progressively reduced and a 3% minimum access on 
imports currently prohibited.
(4) At first sight, the difference of attitude between the 
United States and the European Community is surprising : they 
both heavily subsidize their agriculture now ; for both, the 
amounts spent have reached unbearable levels requiring reform. 
How is it possible to explain why the United States absolutely 
want to reform their programs supporting agriculture while the 
European Community absolutely refuses to do so ? A fundamental 
explaination of this difference in attitude is that while the 
United States system is structured in such a manner that the 
price of the subsidization provided is paid by the taxpayer, so 
that there is internal political pressure to reform the system.
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the European Community system is structured in such a manner 
that the price of support is mostly paid by consumers (who do 
not know what its amount is), and not by taxpayers. For this 
very reason, the European Community has not been able to 
dramatically reform the Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP") so 
far, because in the face of a strong resistance from farmers, 
it is not forced by the pressure of taxpayers to move ahead 
with a necessary reform. Only when the cost of the stocking of 
the surplusses reached such amounts that it started to be felt 
by taxpayers has the Community started reforming the system, in
1984. While it is necessary to come back to this simple but 
fundamental idea that farmers should, like anyone else, bear 
the consequences of their acts, as determined by the price 
s y s t e m , a n d  that any subsidization paid to them should 
come out of either national or Community b u d g e t s , t h e  
pressure to reform the CAP has to come from abroad since its 
very structure makes that it is paid by consumers who barely 
know how much they pay for it and therefore don't pressure 
politicians to reform it. If this would work, GATT would, as is 
logical in the light of the analysis we have made of its 
functions, allow to create a new regime of support to farmers 
more defendable within the framework of a liberal society. The 
issue, in effect, is not to let go any support to farmers. It 
is to structure such support in a manner that (i) this will be 
least harmful for the price system and that (ii) support will 
come from the public budgets, which would put political limits 
on the support provided. Redistribution policies, to be decided
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in a politically sensible manner, must be priced, and only if 
support comes from taxes can Europeans decide how much they 
value traditional modes of organizatin of the country.
(5) Initially the goals of the CAP were clear : while the 
Community wanted to protect the family farm, it aimed at 
providing self-sufficiency in agricultural production to 
Europe. To this end, agriculture was isolated from the normal 
price effects of variations in supply and demand. Prices much 
higher than world prices were and are still today decided in 
Brussels and paid by consumers, while importers of farm 
products in the European Community have to pay variable levies 
having for effect to bring their prices to Community levels. 
Exporters of European Community farm products (who have to sell 
at world prices) receive from Brussels the difference between 
such prices and Community's prices. This system led to its 
desired effects : it generally increased productivity and 
production.*296* However, since the Community must purchase 
on the "market" the farmers' production which can not find a 
buyer at Brussels' determined prices, stocks of farm products 
have reached absurd levels, at great expense for the European 
taxpayer who must pay for their keeping or export, at 
subsidized prices.(297) Since 1984, the European Community 
has started to reform the CAP, in particular by imposing quotas 
on milk production and by reducing support prices. However, if 
the level of support has been globally reduced, there has been 
no structural reform. The problem the existing system creates 
at the international level, and which led to America's stance
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in GATT, is that in order to get rid of surplusses, the 
European Community must subsidize their sale on third markets 
at heavily subsidized prices. This disrupts the export markets 
of third countries such as the United States, which then need 
to subsidize their own exports to remain competitive, while 
developing countries do not receive the appropriate market 
signals to develop their local agriculture, which development 
should be one of their priorities.f298)
The United States also subsidize its farmers,(2") but in 
a manner which is generally less disruptive of third 
markets.*300* Each year, a "target price" is fixed for farm 
products in the United States. Farmers request loans for the 
estimated value of their crop, which is determined using a 
floor price, the so-called "loan rate". If the market price 
obtained is higher than the "loan rate", the farmer reimburses 
the loan ; otherwise, the loan is kept, and ownership of the 
crop is transfered to the Commodity Credit Association which 
granted the loan. If the market price is lower than the "target 
price", the farmer gets the difference as a so-called 
"deficiency payment". With this system, prices on the American 
market are close to world prices, while farmers get in fact 
higher prices ("target prices"). The main differences with the 
PAC are that while the cost of the PAC is mostly paid by 
consumers, the cost of the American system is paid by 
taxpayers ; and that while deficiency payments are made for the 
whole of the farm production, the Community's policy is such 
that subsidies are paid in large part for the export of farm 
products only.*301*
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(6) The opposition between the United States and the
European Community therefore derives more from a problem of
structure than from a fundamental opposition between a Free
Trader and a Market disrupter. The CAP is structurally
disturbing the international markets in agricultural products
in a severe manner. Only if it is profoundly reformed can the
problem be solved in the long run. But the PAC is amazingly
difficult to reform for political reasons : farmers, in many
f302)European countries, such as France or Germany,' ' have a
political weight which is disproportionate to their relative 
importance.(303)
One possibility of reform, as we have already mentioned, 
lies at the international level.*304) Even though linkage 
between the need to make progress at the GATT negotiations and 
the reform of the PAC contemplated by the so-called MacSharry 
plan*305) has been denied,*306  ^ it has been made 
progressively,(307) which is logical in our perspective. To 
reform an economic absurdity, when it is difficult to do at the 
internal level when one has to rely on one's own political 
strength to resist to the voice of entrenched interests,(308) 
a solution is to use the external constitutional order. That's 
one of the functions of GATT.(309* French and other European 
farmers are rightly perceived as blocking progress on GATT's 
negotiations.i310) The key is to use GATT to show to other 
domestic interests what they have to gain from a reform which 
is blocked by the sectional interest of farmers, to have them 
act at the political level to force entrenched interests to
accept the deal.*311^
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(7) The reform of the CAP is not the only issue holding the 
negotiations. Developing countries won't accept an extension of 
the scope of GATT to services and investment and reforms in 
fields such as the protection of intellectual property rights 
if, in addition to a reform in the agricultural sector,*312) 
the Multi-Fiber Agreement is not dismantled.*313* The MFA has 
been a scandal for years, since it is preventing development in 
the precise field where labor rich countries can start with 
limited capital and knowledge to produce exportable products, 
which allows them to progressively upgrade quality, invest in 
side sectors, etc...*314* The MFA has not only been a 
scandal, but another great absurdity : it is by developing 
capital poor countries that markets will be created for the 
products requiring more information and capital such as the 
ones produced by developed countries. The manufacture of these 
types of products commanding higher wages than that of low 
information/low capital products, this would allow to maintain 
the relatively high level of wages in developed countries. 
Finally, the MFA has costed consummers and the economy in 
general a bundle, since prices for clothing products have been 
artificially maintained at exceedinglly high prices given what 
their cost would be if produced in the countries having a 
comparative advantage for such production.*315* Here also, we 
therefore find a combination of internal and of external 
constitutional problems, where more justice at the internal 
level of states can be achieved only by international reform.
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(8) In the same manner that the industry has been mobilized 
to reform the European Community structures when they proved to 
be unable to raise to their task, what must be made, and which 
has barely been made so far, is to mobilize the multinational 
industry and service forces having an interest in the reform.
By batching issues, a new global deal is possible where enough 
advantages would be derived in each of the United States, the 
European Community and Japan that dynamic forces would be able 
to counterbalance protectionist forces.*316* our point is 
that there is a basis to harness the forces needed to develop a 
new deal.
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CONCLUSION
(1) We have developed an approach explaining the 
development of international economic integration as a process 
of legal integration. Our thesis is that the symbiotic 
relationship between the development of micro-economic networks 
of exchange relationships and public institutions creates a 
dynamic which demands centralization in the provision of some 
norms or public functions, while other norms or public services 
can remain decentralized. The needed decentralization of 
sovereignty creates pressure for the institutionalization of a 
cooperative legal system preventing the competitive game among 
state sovereigns to turn sour by making sure that any national 
legislation is adopted in a non-discriminatory manner.
Federalism has provided us with a very powerful model which 
allowed us to go in some depth in the analysis of a system of 
exercise of power composed of several territorial layers and in 
which functional organizations, private or public, play an 
instrumental role in the equilibrium of the system.
At the territorial level, it is thus possible to imagine 
the world of tomorrow composed of four layers : regions within 
states ; states ; regional organizations of states ; global 
organizations. While states are the only organizations having
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potentially the power to regulate all aspects of social life, 
all other organizations have functional jurisdictions. Private 
organizations, in this perspective, can even be included in the 
analysis of federalism. They share in the division of power, 
and can have a dramatic impact on the equilibrium of power 
among territorial organizations holding public power.
(2) Some concluding remarks must be made with regards to 
the potential existing for a new deal which we have mentioned 
in the last part of our book.
(a) The validity of our analysis depends on a prerequisite 
which is that People in the world want to live in a liberal 
system. It is a bold prerequisite since one has to acknowledge 
that most of the world of today does not function as a liberal 
system. This is true both within countries and at the 
international level.
With regards to countries which used to have centrally 
planned economies, they have started a historical process of 
internal reforms which allows one to imagine that an 
interfacing in international liberal institutions may be 
possible in a not too distant future. The same conclusion, 
however, may not be made for many of the countries in the 
so-called third world.
(b) At the international level, one encouraging development 
for the development of the rule of law is the fact that the 
United Nations' system of collective use of force has finally 
began to be used in the Gulf conflict. The objective of this
288 -
system - i.e. the enforcement of international law to maintain 
peace and order - corresponds to one of the rationales for the 
creation of world organizations : the creation of physical 
order. It has been possible because of the recent internal 
changes which occurred in Eastern countries, and especially in 
the Soviet Union, where a dramatic ideological shift has 
allowed more unity of action among the Northern states.
There are two other rationales for the creation of 
institutions necessary for order to appear in the international 
economy, and their presence is overwhelming in today's 
global-economy : (i) many public goods have to be 
internationally provided; and (ii) the prevention of many 
negative externalities created by the existence of world-wide 
markets requires international action.
One example is particularly suited to our case because it 
shows how all the issues of economic order, market 
externalities, public goods, economic development, economic 
regulation, comparative advantage, market for states, etc... 
are systemically linked : the prevention of certain types of 
pollution. In many of its consequences (global heating, ocean 
pollution, etc...), pollution is obviously a world issue. The 
need for international action is already clear today ; but it 
will become even more so if third world countries attempt to 
develop their economies by using the cheapest energetic 
resources available (as they logically must and will do). 
Simultaneously, it is more than unlikely that third world 
countries would agree to give up such a cost advantage - which
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they could use for their economic development - if they are not
subsidized to do so. Such subsidization - which would be in
effect an international political decision for the benefit of 
all to preserve a global common - would require united 
institutional action by developed countries, and therefore the 
need for one or several international organization(s) to 
develop international norms to fight pollution and to subsidize 
by voluntary contributions and/or taxation those bearing a 
share of the cost of the adoption of such norms which is too 
heavy for them.
The ecologically sound development of most of the Southern 
hemisphere can therefore be seen as the next frontier. The 
existence of international economic institutions would 
facilitate the task of helping the economic development of 
these countries. And this task has become urgent, for 
humanitarian reasons, but also due to the demographic imbalance 
between North and South : it will be impossible to keep
impoverished human masses knocking at the doors of our
mountains of wealth for very long. But where can we find the 
impetus to create the dramatically new institutions needed ?
(c) The Northern world would have to take the lead in the 
creation of the required international organizations if 
anything is to be done. However, even among the Northern 
countries, there are wide ideological differences making it 
difficult to agree on common principles, as has been shown in 
agriculture during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.
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Simultaneously though, the results achieved in other fields 
have shown that differences can progressively be resolved, 
especially if a sensible use of private corporate forces is 
made.
Three major problems remain to create and keep the 
leadership of divided Northern countries : (i) the ideological 
differences among the United States and the EEC; (ii) the 
incredible complexity and unpredictable nature of the political 
decision-making process in the United States, but also in the 
European Community; and (iii) the fact that Japan's system 
barely functions according to the liberal model.
These difficulties make that it is possible to imagine one 
scenario for the world of tomorrow. It would consist in the 
consolidation of three zones, each with its clientele of 
developing countries. This system would be unstable and would 
make it very difficult to adopt global policies.
Another possibility is a world composed of two zones, two 
of the three previous zones combining against the third.
The best of such combinations for a progressive development of 
global world order would be, on a transitional basis, US/EEC v. 
Japan, because it is difficult to imagine that Japan, due to 
its reliance on international markets, could stay outside an 
organization with so much structural power to influence world 
markets for very long. This fact explains why we have 
concentrated our comparative analysis on the United States and 
Europe : it is primarily among them that a deal has to be made.
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We think our scheme of analysis is a way to understand and 
explain the development of an international liberal economy. 
However, the history of worldly events remains unpredictable.
In other words, if we are convinced that the principles we 
exposed will apply in case international liberal organizations 
are institutionalized, there is no certainty that this will 
actually happen. In final analysis, if it is true that unity is 
rarely created in favor of something, but more commonly out of 
the fear of something else, the challenge posed by the 
developing world may be the engine for global 
institutionalization, since it provides issues for globally 
minded politicians and opportunities of growth for 
multinational companies.
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ENDNOTES
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PART I
1. Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein are key to the
understanding of the meaning with which I use the concept of world-economy. For Braudel,
"L'économie monde ne met en cause qu'un fragment de 
l'univers, un morceau de la planète économiquement 
autonome, capable pour l'essentiel de se suffire à 
lui-même et auquel ses liaisons et ses échanges 
intérieurs confèrent une certaine unité organique, (at 
12) (...) Pas d'économie-monde sans un espace propre 
et signifiant à plusieurs titres : il a des limites, 
et la ligne qui le cerne lui donne un sens comme les 
rivages expliquent la mer ; il implique un centre au 
bénéfice d'une ville et d'un capitalisme dominant 
déjà, quelle que soit sa forme. La multiplication des 
centres représente soit une forme de jeunesse, soit 
une forme de degenerescence ou de mutation. 
Hiérarchisé, cet espace est une somme d'économies 
particulières, pauvres les unes, modestes les autres, 
une seule étant relativement riche en son centre. Il 
en résulte des inégalités, des différences de voltage 
par quoi s'assure le fonctionnement de l'ensemble.
(...) Les limites d'une économie-monde se situent là 
où commence une autre économie du même type, au long 
d'une ligne, ou mieux d'une zone que, d'un côté comme 
de l'autre, il n'y a avantage, économiquement parlant, 
à franchir que dans des cas exeptionnels. (at 16)
(...) Toute économie-monde est un emboîtement, une 
juxtaposition de zones liées ensemble, mais à des 
niveaux différents. Sur le terrain, trois "aires", trois catégories au moins, se dessinent : un centre 
étroit, des régions secondes assez développées, pour 
finir d'énormes marges extérieures. Et obligatoirement 
les qualités et caractéristiques de la société, de 
l'économie, de la technique, de la culture, de l'ordre 
politique changent selon qu'on se déplace d'une zone à 
l'autre. Nous tenons là une explication à très large 
portée, celle sur laquelle Immanuel Wallerstein a 
construit tout son ouvrage, The Modem World System" 
(1974)." see in Civilisation matérielle, économie et 
capitalisme. XVème-XVIIIème siècles, tome 3, "Le temps 
du monde", A. Colin (1979), at 12, 16 & 28.
Today, for the first time in history, there is one global 
world-economy, since the world-economy which used to be 
centered on the Soviet Union is almost completely 
disintegrated. Its elements are slowly integrated in the 
Western world-economy. The change occurred mostly due to 
the incapacity of the Eastern world-economy to innovate, 
and to its increasing need for technologies and products 
produced in the Western world-economy. The new global 
world-economy is still institutionally very unstable, but 
the hierarchy typical of the structuring of any 
world-economy is visible. Notably, if the core and the 
center of the world-economy are witnessing a 
uniformization of the products and services offered in 
them, and an internationalization of firms which need to 
compete on each local market to remain competitive, many 
national economies are still left at the periphery of the 
world-economy. Their economies are not as intertwinned 
with those of other countries as is the case for the 
economies of developed countries at the center and core 
of the world-economy ; and their firms and competitive 
conditions remain largely local.
See generally. Note, Developments in the Law - 
International Environmental Law. 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1484 
(1991) [hereinafter the "Note"].
Keohane notes that "[world politics] is anarchic in the 
sense that it lacks an authoritative government that can 
enact and enforce rules of behaviour", in After Heaemonv. 
Princeton, Princeton University Press (1984), at 7. 
However, as noticed by Keohane himself, the creation of 
an authoritative government above states is not the only 
solution to eliminate the state of anarchia of the 
international society ; institutions created by 
cooperation among states may very well change states 
behavior for the reason that the commitments made to 
support such institutions can only be broken at a cost to 
reputation, and that international regime therefore 
change the calculations of advantage that governments 
make ; see e.g.. id. at 26.
According to Susan Strange, "the concept of structural 
power (...) consists in the ability of A to determine the 
way in which basic social needs are provided." She 
distinguishes structural power from relativ al PPWer, which consists in the ability of A to get B by coercion 
or persuasion to do what B would not otherwise do. In 
comparison, while relational power is a lever, structural 
power is a framework : "The target of relational power, 
if it should decide not to do what is required of it by 
A, has to suffer the consequences determined by the 
other. For the target or object of structural power, the 
price of resistance is determined more by the system than 
by any other political authority" ; in Toward a Theory of
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Transnational Empire, at 165. Structural power can be 
defined as wthe power to shape and determine the 
structures of the global political economy within which 
other states, their political institutions, their 
economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and 
other professional people have to operate." in States and 
Markets. Pinter Publishers, London, 1988, at 24-25. Susan 
Strange's main thesis in her 1989 article, with which I 
concur, is that structural power is more important to an 
understanding of the international system than relational 
power (see at 164), and that
"although there is disorder in the world economy and 
some disintegration of "regimes" so-called, the reason 
for this is not to be found in the decline of U.S. 
power. Rather, the explanation lies in the misuse of 
American hegemonic power in a unilateralist manner and 
in pursuit of national interests far too narrowly and 
shortsightedly conceived. Asymmetric structural power 
has allowed the United States to break the rules with 
impunity and to pass the consequent risks and pains of . 
adjustment onto others. This has damaged the stability 
and prosperity of the whole world economy and has not 
been in the long-term best interests of the United 
States itself" ; see at 165.
The incapacity of the United States to appropriately use 
its structural power, probably due to its internal 
political system makes it a necessity to bind it within 
the framework of an international cooperative regime, to 
which it will agree only if enough structural power is 
concentrated in competing institutions with which 
agreement will then be necessary. I contend that one of 
the main point in concentrating structural power in the 
European Community is to create such an institution, with 
which the United States will need to cooperate to keep 
open the markets for its multinationals ; see infra. Part 
III, S3.2 .3. On the problem posed by Japan, see id.
5. According to the theory of hegemonic stability, order in 
world politics is typically created by a single dominant 
power, and the maintenance of order requires continued 
hegemony ; e.g. Keohane, supra. note 3, at 31 ; thus, for 
Gilpin, it is " the Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, 
like the Pax Romana [which] ensured an international 
system of relative peace and security. Great Britain and 
the United States created and enforced the rules of a 
liberal international economic order" ; see in War and 
Change in World Politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press (1981), at 144.
6 . £.3 . The Economist's. December 22, 1990 ; The Economist's 
reminds that France's president Mitterrand discovered 
this in 1981-1983, when the market forced him to reverse
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the socialist economic policies that his government had 
been elected to carry out ; Keohane notes in this
context that international openess makes it difficult to 
undertake changes in policy that are at odds with the 
policies of the major states in the world political 
economy ; at 119 ; he cites an 1983 OECD report [...]
according to which "international linkages, real and 
financial, work powerfully to limit the degree of 
divergence that is possible for individual countries." 
id. It is only after this episode that Prance became so 
pro-european, and led the way for an increased 
integration of the European Economy, the European 
institutions being the only level where France can have a 
significant impact on the evolution of the economy.
Hence, it is recognized that the first two years of the 
French socialist government proved crucial in turning 
France away from the quest for economic autonomy : after 
1983, Mitterrand embraced a more market oriented approach 
and became a vigorous advocate of increased european 
integration ; £.g. Sandholtz & Zysman, Recasting the 
European Bargain, draft, at 23. If the existence of 
international linkages reduces the degree of divergence 
that is possible for a given country, the need to 
increase international linkages (to participate in the 
world division of labor and reap its benefits) makes it 
difficult to choose autonomy vs. economic well-being ; 
see infra. Part III, S3.1.1.
7. The Gulf war has been the occasion of an increased 
cooperation among states, which has given rise to 
increased expectations of seing the international society 
functioning pursuant to the rule of law. According to Mr. 
Paul Trân Van-Thinh, who is the European Community's 
permanent representative to GATT in Geneva, "Sur le plan 
de la géo-politique, la guerre du Golfe laisse présager 
le développement de la construction d'un monde, non 
seulement interdépendant, mais également solidaire, et 
surtout fondé sur le droit." in 12 European Clothing 
Newsletter 1 (1991), at 2.
8 . Ehrlich defines society as "the sum total of human 
associations that have mutual relations with one 
another" ; in Fundamental Principles of the Sociology, of 
Law. Arno Press, New York (1975, 1st edition 1913), at 26.
9. For DeAnne Julius, the surge of foreign direct 
investments is contributing to fundamental changes in the 
structure of the world economy. See Global companies and 
public policy : the growing challenge of foreign direct investment. Royal Institute of International 
Affairs/Pinter publishers (1991).
10. For Hayek, competition is a corner stone of a free 
society because of the dispersion of knowledge and the 
role of competition as a discovery procedure :
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'•Competition is ... first and foremost a discovery 
procedure. (...) [The] issue is how we can best assist 
the optimum utilization of the knowledge, skills and 
opportunities to acquire knowledge, that are dispersed 
among hundreds of thousand of people, but given to 
nobody in their entirety. Competition must be seen as 
a process in which people acquire and communicate 
knowledge. (...)
Competition is not merely the only method which we 
know for utilizing the knowledge and skills that other 
people may possess, but it is also the method by which 
we all have been led to acquire much of the knowledge 
and skills we do possess. (...) ... rational behaviour 
is not a premise of economic theory, though it is 
often presented as such. The basic contention of 
theory is rather that competition will make it 
necessary for people to act rationally in order to 
maintain themselves. ... it will in general be through 
competition that a few relatively more rational 
individuals will make it necessary for the rest to 
emulate them in order to prevail. In a society in 
which rational behaviour confers an advantage on the 
individual, rational method will progressively be 
developed and be spread by imitation. It is no use 
being more rational than the rest if one is not 
allowed to derive benefits from being so. (...) No 
society which has not first developed a commercial 
group within which the improvement of the tools of 
thought has brought advantage to the individual has 
ever gained the capacity of systematic rational 
thinking." In F.A. Hayek, Law. Legislation and 
Liberty. Vol. 3, "The Political Order of a Free 
People", London, Routledge & Kegan Paul (1979) at 6 8, 
75-76.
11. For a description of the now extinct United States-Japan 
voluntary restraint agreement on cars, see infra, note 
379 ; for a description of the recent European Community 
Japan voluntary restraint agreement on cars, see infra. 
Part III, S3.2.2.1 (2).
1 2. P. Salin defines protectionism as :
"... 1 'ensemble des mesures d'origine étatique qui 
consistent à limiter, à interdire, à contrôler ou à 
influencer les échanges internationaux. Le 
protectionisme est donc le résultat d'un pouvoir de 
contrainte publique qui vient interférer dans le 
processus d'échange fondé sur la libre volonté de ceux 
qui sont directement concernés par ces échanges." in 
Libre échange et protectionisme. P.U.F, Paris (1991), 
at 3.
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13. .As we will see in more details later, in a liberal
perspective, protection from competition should be
provided either (i) to protect a legitimate interest of 
the liberal society, protection from competition not 
being one of such types of interests, see generally Part
II, $2 .2 , or (ii) to provide temporary breathing room to 
facilitate structural adjustment to international 
competition, see infra. Part III, S3.2.2.1 (3).
14. Even though the rise of "green products" shows that
competitive advantage can be obtained by non-polluting
producers over polluting ones if they appropriately 
advertise the origin of their higher costs, allowing 
consumers to buy a cleaner environment when buying a 
product.
15. The report drafted by the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank, the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, entitled The Economy of 
the USSR - Summary and Recommandations. The World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. (1990) [hereinafter the "Report"], 
prepared at the request of the G7 meeting in Houston of 
July, 1990, remarks that "... there is no example of a 
successful modern centrally planned economy", at 1 .
16. The Report, id., remarks that :
"Environmental concerns cut across all sectors. Many 
of the industrial and agricultural regions of the USSR 
are on the verge of ecological breakdown, posing an 
imminent threat to the health of present and future 
generations. Environmental and health risks in some 
regions are up 10 to 100 times greater than those 
accepted in most OECD countries. Severe ecological 
conditions affect 16 percent of the total land area." 
see at 37.
17. According to President Gorgachev's presidential
guidelines "for the Stabilization of the Economy and 
Transition to a Market Economy" of October 19, 1990 :
"The position of the economy continues to deteriorate. 
The volume of production is declining. Economic links 
are being broken. Separatism is on the increase. The 
consumer markets is in dire straits. The budget 
deficit and the solvency of the government are now at 
critical levels. Antisocial behavior and crime are 
increasing. People are finding life more and more 
difficult and are loosing their interest in work and 
their belief in the future. The economy is in very 
great danger. The old administrative system of 
management has been destroyed, but the impetus to work 
under a market system is lacking. Energetic measures 
must be taken, with the consent of the public, to 
stabilize the situation and to accelerate progress 
towards a market economy." See id. at 11.
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18. The Economist's. April 2 0, 1991.
19. According to The Economist's, world economic integration
has been speeded up by growth in trade in goods and 
services, which amounted to some $4 trillion in 1990 (up
13 fold in real terms since 1950), financial flows and
the migration of people and companies ; The Economist's. December 22, 1990, at 4.
2 0 . R. Kuttner recently remarked that the American contempt 
for government is harming American free enterprise ; e.g. 
Bus. Week. June 3, 1991, at 1 1. He denounced, for 
example, the incapacity of America, "trusting the market, 
fearing government," to be able, like "other advanced 
industrial nations [to] make up for the failure of the 
private market to adequately invest in human capital" ; 
iâ. He concluded that "this cheap libertarian streak in 
the national character weakens our ability to use 
government as an instrument for common purpose" ; id.
21. In general, the term "externality" is used to refer to a 
cost (negative externality) or a benefit (positive 
externality) involving "secondary" effects felt by third 
parties to which producers would not attend except under 
regulatory incentives or controls - effects such as 
pollution, noise, job experience, or safer neighborhoods. 
See, for example, R.R. Nelson. & S.G. Winter, An 
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. (1982), at 
367.
22. See generally M. Beaud, Le système national mondial 
hiérarchisé. Paris, AGALMA, La découverte (1987).
23. Iâ. at 9.
24. I£.
25. X£. at 9-10.
26. Id* See Madeuf, Du paradoxe à l'auto-organisation: pour 
une nouvelle approche de l'économie mondiale. 9 The 
Review 573 (1986).
27. According to Beaud,
"... la réalité économique a été profondément 
bouleversée depuis trois décennies : intensification 
des relations économiques et financières 
internationales ; multinationalisation des grandes 
firmes productrices, mais aussi des banques et 
organismes financiers ; apparition et rapide 
développement de nouvelles marchandises immatérielles
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ayant à voir avec l'information, l'informatique, les 
télécommunications et la décision ; nouvelle logique 
de conception et de production de marchandises, 
conçues en même temps dans leur globalité, pour 
l'ensemble du monde, et dans leurs spécificités, pour 
chaque partie et chaque pays ; et plus récemment, 
brusque gonflement des flux internationaux (crédits, 
placements, financements, spéculations, ...). In 
Beaud, supra. note 22, at 34-35.
28. Strange, The Global Political Economy. 1959-1984. 34 
Int'l J. 267 (1984), at 273 ; see also Miller, The Global 
Corporation and American Constitutionalism : Some 
Political Consequences of Economic Power. J. Int'l L. & 
Econ. 235 (1972), at 237, who was first in understanding 
that the internationalization of production has dramatic 
constitutional law consequences. See infra. Part III,
S3.1.2.2.
29. The existence of multinational firms has been variously 
interpreted as an instrument of colonial exploitation and 
as an efficient vehicle for the economic development of 
the Third World ; see £.g. Teece, The Multinational 
Enterprise î Market Failure and Market Power 
Considerations. 22 Sloan Mngt Rev. 3 (1981), at 3. The 
debate, which used to be highly charged with political 
overtones, has cooled off a little bit. Transaction cost 
economists may have a point when they say that a 
distinctive attribute of the firm is that it is an 
organization which possesses knowledge and skills, and 
that perhaps the most efficiency property of the 
multinational firm is that it is an organizational mode 
capable of transferring this knowledge and skills abroad 
in a relatively efficient fashion ; see, fi.g., Ad., at 7.
30. R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International 
Relations. Princeton, Princeton U. Press (1987) at 254.
In the last three years of the 1980s, the flow of direct 
foreign investment measured in 1980 dollars was more than 
$ 100 billion a year, ten times as much as it had been in 
the first three years of the 1970s (again in 1980 
dollars) ; The Economist's. December 22, 1990, at 74. 
Between 1983 and 1988, foreign direct investments 
worldwide rose by more than 20% annually, four times 
faster than world trade ; see DeAnne Julius, supra. note 
9. Once installed, foreign direct investments 
dramatically change the way economic calculations are 
usually made, assuming that national economies correspond 
to national territories ; hence, by the book, the 
American trade deficit was $ 144 billion in 1986. But if 
one takes into account the activities of American-owned 
firms abroad and foreign owned firms in America, this 
huge deficit becomes a surplus of $ 57 billion ; at
81. The Economist's rightly concludes that an "ownership"
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31.
32.
33.
measure of American trade raises basic questions about 
how international transactions should be thought of :. id. 
DeAnne Julius' conclusion is that "economic growth and 
integration will be enhanced by demoting the role of the 
exchange rate and the current account balance in 
international policy discussions and promoting the 
importance of agreed rules for trade, investment and 
competition in one another's market." at 13.
Id. This form of trade accounts for approximately sixty 
percent of all American imports ; id. On the export side, 
approximately half of the American exports involve 
multinational enterprises, with a quarter consisting of 
intra-corporate transactions ; see, for example,
Mcculloch & Owen, "Linking negotiations on Trade and 
Foreign Direct Investment", in The Multinational 
Corporation in the 1980s. M.I.T. Press (C.P. Kindleberger 
1 D.B. Audretsch, eds. 1983), at 343. A problem to be 
mentioned here as far as such measurements are concerned 
is the one of the definition of what are the boundaries 
of the "firm".
According to Beaud, the 200 largest firms in the world 
represent 30% of the Gross World Product, and 50% of 
world commerce ; see supra. note 2 2, at 1 2 1.
In Keohane, supra. note 3, Keohane advocates a systemic 
analysis of international politics focusing the analysis 
of international cooperation and regimes principally on 
states ; see at 26. He rightly remarked that wealth and 
power are sought by a variety of actors in world 
politics, including nonstate organizations such as 
multinational business corporations ; however, he 
concluded that "states are crucial actors, not only 
seeking wealth and power directly, but striving to 
construct frameworks of rules and practices that will 
enable them to secure these objectives, among others, in 
the future ; id. There is some irony in a lawyer 
insisting that multinational business corporations should 
not be left out of the analysis of the international 
economic regime, but as the developments of this book 
will demonstrate, I think it is a great mistake to leave 
them out of the picture. A major reason for this is that 
it tends to increase the reification of states : states 
appear as objectified autonomous actors, while their 
internal institutions are in fact subject to the 
pressures and influence of corporate actors, national or 
multinational. As remarked in the Note, supra. note 2, 
"States, like corporations are legal fictions, composed 
only of organized group of individuals. International law 
traditionally has treated states as "black boxes" and has 
been unconcerned with their internal structures." at 
1575. Even though states and firms should be treated 
differently due to their distinctive characteristics (in
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particular, states are the only organizations in charge 
with managing a territory and the whole population 
located on it), states and firms should be included in a 
single systemic analysis, simply because the type of 
problems faced in today's progressively integrated 
society make that one can not rest on the surface of the 
"black boxes". Keohane is right in advocating a systemic 
analysis ; but the very reason he gives in favor of such 
analysis requires to develop the analysis at a deeper 
level than the one of states. Concentrating on states, 
keohane notices, with Waltz, that state behavior can be 
studied from the "inside-out" or from the "outside-in" ; 
id. at 25 "Inside-out", or unit-level, explanations 
locate the sources of behavior within the actor - for 
instance in a country's political or economic system, the 
attributes of its leaders, or its domestic political 
culture. "Outside-in", or systemic, explanations account 
for state behavior on the basis of attributes of the 
system as a whole. The distinctive characteristics of 
actors as well as of the system itself must be taken into 
account, but a systemic theory regards these internal 
attributes as constraints rather than as variables. The 
variables of a systemic theory are situational : they 
refer to the location of each actor relative to others ; 
id. It is an error to theorize at the unit level without 
first reflecting on the effects of the international 
system as a whole, for two principal reasons ; id. First, 
causal analysis is difficult at the unit level because of 
the apparent importance of idiosyncratic factors, ranging 
from the personality of a leader to the peculiarities of 
a given country's institutions ; id. Second, analyzing 
states behavior from "inside-out" alone leads observers 
to ignore the context of actions : the pressures exerted 
on all states by the competition among them ; id* Without 
prior systemic theory, unit level analysis of world 
politics floats in an empirical and conceptual vacuum ; 
id. at 26. The study of international economic regimes 
can not disregard the role played by firms in states' 
competitive game, precisely for the reason that if 
competition among states must be somewhat canalyzed by 
the rules of an effective regime fsee supra. note 3), it 
is because of the internationalization of competition 
among firms. The very mechanisms and functioning of such 
competition at the micro-economic level must be 
understood to develop appropriate rules at the state 
level.
Attempting to define the notion of espace-marchand. P. 
Dockès distinguishes "l'espace abstrait comme champ de 
forces de l'espace matérialisé" ; L'espace marchand et 
les économistes des XVIIème et XVIIIème siècles. E.U.I. 
colloquium Papers, DOC. IUE 330/88 (Coll. 79)(1988), at 
3. S'agissant de l'espace abstrait, "toute localisation 
produit un certain champ de forces dont l'inscription
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spatiale n'est pas immédiatement matérielle", constitué 
de signaux-prix et de signaux quantités ; id. Mais "il 
est clair que ces signaux se font ou se déplacent à 
travers des réseaux qui, d'une façon ou d'une autre, 
s'incarnent matériellement ou sont distordus par les 
réseaux matériels (routes, voies d'eau, divers cablages, 
émetteurs-récepteurs d'ondes, ...). D'autres part, ces 
champs de forces ont des conséquences spatiales 
matérielles : localisation des entreprises, des 
productions, déplacement des hommes, des choses, des 
capitaux. L'espace abstrait, en utilisant des réseaux 
diversement matérialisés, structure les espaces 
matérialisés et ceux-ci transforment les champs de forces 
ou espaces abstraits. L'espace marchand est donc 
analysable soit comme espace abstrait (l'espace des prix 
ou des signaux quantités), soit comme un espace 
matérialisé (localisation des entreprises, des marchés, 
déplacement des marchands, des biens, des capitaux dans 
des réseaux matérialisés)" ; id. at 4.
35. Dockès notes that "Les moyens de communication se 
développent en grande partie grace aux relations 
commerciales. Mais ces dernières ne sont possibles que 
lorsqu'il existe des routes, des voies navigables et que 
la mer ne se présente pas comme un obstacle, mais comme 
un lien." in P. Dockès, L'espace dans la pensée 
économique du XVIème au XVIIIème siècle. Flammarion,
Paris (1969), at 23.
36. In The Visible Hand. The Managerial Revolution in 
American Business. Cambridge, Mass. (1977), A.D.
Chandler, Jr. concludes that the spread of the factory 
system depended on the "reliability and spread of the new 
communication and transportation. Without a steady, 
all-weather flow of goods into and out of their 
establishments, manufacturers would have had difficulty 
in maintaining a permanent working-force, and in keeping 
their expensive machinery and equipment operating 
profitably." see at 245. Similarly, Williamson notes that 
"the incentive to integrate forward from manufacturing 
into distribution would have been much less without the 
low-cost, reliable, all weather transportation afforded 
by the railroad" ; in The Modern Corporation : Origins. 
Evolutions. Attributes. XIC J. Eco. Lit. 1537 (1981), at 
1551. Additionally, Williamson notices that "forward 
integration by manufacturers into distribution was one of 
the significant consequences of the appearance of the 
railroads. Low cost transportation combined with the 
telegraph and telephone communication permitted 
manufacturers efficiently to service a larger market and, 
as a consequence, realize greater economies of scale in 
production ;" i£. at 1553. On the general influence of 
the expansion of physical networks of communication and 
transportation on the expansion of the espace-marchand. 
as espace structuré par la marchandise, see generally 
Dockès, supra. note 34.
According to Chandler, id., the rise of the modern 
business enterprise between 1840 and World War I was "the 
organizational response to fundamental changes in 
processes of production and distribution made possible by 
the availability of new sources of energy and by the 
increasing application of scientific knowledge to 
industrial technology" ; see at 376. He insists that "far 
more economies result from the central coordination of 
flows through the process of production than from 
increasing the size of producing or distributing units" ; 
id. at 490.
According to Williamson, the most significant 
organizational innovation of the XXth century was the 
development in the 1920s of the multidivisional (or 
M-form) structure of management ; supra. note 36 at 1555. 
The M-form structure involved the creation of 
semi-autonomous operating divisions (mainly 
profit-centers) organized along product, brand or 
geographic lines. The operating affairs of each were 
managed separately, a general office, consisting of a 
number of powerful general executives and large advisory 
and financial staffs, monitoring divisional performance, 
allocating resources among divisions, and engaging in 
strategic planning ; id. at 1556. The domestic M-form 
strategy for decomposing complex business structures into 
semi-autonomous operating units was subsequently applied 
to the management of foreign subsidiaries ; id- at 1561. 
According to Williamson, "the adoption of a "global" 
strategy or "worldwide perspective" - whereby strategic 
planning and major policy decisions" are made in the 
central office of the enterprise - could only be 
accomplished within a multidivisional framework ; id.
To give an idea of the pace of the expansion of 
multinationals, while world trade volume grew at a 
compound annual rate of 5% between 1983 and 1988, global 
foreign direct investment increased by over 20% per annum 
in real terms over that period. £.g. DeAnne Julius, 
supra. note 9, at 14.
To realize the importance of common norms for traders, 
one can remember, for example, the obstacles to trade 
which existed in the old France. P. Dockès remarks that, 
in the XVIth and XVIIth centuries :
"Divisé par la langue, le royaume de France l'était 
également par des règles juridiques diverses. Au nord 
de la Loire étaient les pays de coutume, au sud les 
pays de droit romain. En outre, chaque province du 
nord et du centre avait sa propre coutume et à 
l'intérieur de ces provinces subsistait une multitude 
de coutumes locales. ...
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Obstacle plus sérieux au commerce et qui durera 
malgré de nombreuses tentatives de réforme jusqu'à la 
Révolution, la variété des poids et mesures. Chaque 
seigneurerie, chaque ville avait son propre système et 
à chaque type de marchandises correspondaient des 
unités particulières. En outre, une même mesure 
portait souvent des noms différents selon les régions 
et une même appellation recouvrait diverses réalités." in Dockès, supra. note 35, at 42.
41. Society implies rules and vice versa ; but why do we need 
society in the first place? Looking for an explanation of 
"Why collective action ? why the need for having society, 
or at least for having it play significant economic 
roles ?", Kenneth J. Arrow gives the following answer :
"... it is clear that interpersonal relationships are 
needed as part of our collective organization, for our 
mutual improvement, (...) for at least two reasons 
(...). One is simply that the basic resources of the 
society, its natural resources, its technological 
resources, are limited in supply, and the realization 
of alternative values or the attempts to find 
alternative activities for meeting those values imply 
a competition for these scarce resources. If we do 
things one way, we cannot do them another way. So we 
need to have a system which will mediate this 
competition, whether it be a market or an 
authoritative allocation system, as in the military or 
in the socialist state. We need, in any case, a social 
system of some complexity and of some considerable 
degree of organization in order to regulate the 
competition for resources, to allocate them along the 
different possible uses.
Further, interpersonal organization is needed to 
secure the gains that can accrue from cooperation. The 
essential considerations are two : (1) individuals are 
different and in particular have different talents,
(2 ) individuals' efficiency in the performance of 
social tasks usually improves with specialization. We 
need cooperation to achieve specialization of 
function. This involves all the elements of trade and 
the division of labor. The blacksmith in the primitive 
village is not expected to eat horseshoes ; he 
specializes in making horseshoes, the farmer supplies 
him with grain in exchange, and both (this is the 
critical point) can be made better off." (see The 
T.imits of organization. New York, WW Norton & Co. 
(1974), at 16 & 18-19, emphasis added)
42. Pirenne notes that with the rise of commerce in Europe from the Xlth century onwards,
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"[Merchants] needed a simpler legal system, more 
expeditious and more equitable. At the fairs and 
markets they elaborated among themselves a commercial 
code (jus mercatorum) of which oldest traces may be 
noted by the beginning of the eleventh century. (...) 
... it was a collection of usages born of business 
experience and which spread from place to place 
commensurately with the spread of trade itself. The 
great fairs (...) had a special tribunal charged with 
the rendering of speedy justice, must have seen from 
the very first the elaboration of a sort of commercial 
jurisprudence, the same everywhere despite the 
differences in country, language and national laws." 
in H. Pirenne, Medieval Cities : Their Origins and the 
Revival of Trade. Princeton, Princeton U. Press 
(1925), at 128-129.
Today, a new lex mercatoria is developed by the 
international business community which, having activities 
spreading over numerous jurisdictions, needs a simpler 
system of resolving contractual, procedural and other 
issues than that which can be afforded by a decentralized 
state-system unable to fulfill part of its facilitative 
function in an efficient manner. According to Goldman,
"[Les relations commerciales internationales] 
paraissent échapper à l'emprise d'un droit étatique, 
voire d'un droit uniforme intégré dans la législation 
des Etats qui y ont adhéré, pour être aménagées et 
gouvernées selon des normes d'origine 
professionnelles, ou des règles coutumières et des 
principes que des sentences arbitrales révèlent, à 
moins qu'elles ne les élaborent." in B. Goldman, 
Frontières du droit et lex mercatoria. 1964 Archives 
de philosophie du droit 177, at 177.
43. On this issue also, we can read Dockès :
"Aux XVI* et XVII® siècles, le royaume de France était 
encore divisé en un certain nombre de territoires 
parlant des langues différentes. Une coupure 
particulièrement nette séparait les pays de langue 
d'oïl de ceux de langue d'oc. Il ne s'agissait pas de 
patois, mais de véritables langues locales. Cette 
variété de "parlers maternels" ne facilitait pas le 
commerce interrégional, ni les déplacements des 
hommes. Assez tôt, la royauté semble avoir été 
défavorable à cette diversité linguistique. L'édit de 
Villers-Cotteréts, pris sous François I* ordonne que 
la rédaction des actes officiels ne se fasse plus 
qu'en français. Il était surtout destiné & lutter 
contre le latin. Cependant un premier pas vers la 
généralisation de la langue française était franchi, 
qui contribua à l'élaboration de l'aire économique 
nationale." in Dockès, supra. note 35, at 41-42.
- 307 -
44. P.'Dockès notes that if "le marché local ou de simple
voisinage [et] le marché au long cours sont des
catégories de marchés très anciennes, (...) le marché 
intérieur sera une invention des Temps Modernes, une 
production de l'Etat et des mercantilistes, et ce ne sera
nullement par une évolution des marchés locaux ou par une
fusion avec le grand commerce que naîtra ce marché 
"national" capitaliste et concurrentiel." e.g. supra. 
note 34, at 5-6. See also Beaud, supra. note 22, at 42.
P. Dockès insists that "la lecture d'un auteur 
mercantiliste comme Bodin montre bien la naissance de 
l'espace économique national d'abord contre l'extérieur, 
par des frontières qui doivent séparer d'avec le reste du 
monde. (...) Dans la dialectique du dehors et du dedans 
qui préside à la construction de l'aire économique 
nationale, le dehors parait précéder." see supra. note 
34, at 10. See also Beaud, supra. note 22, at 8 . P.
Dockès also describes the birth of the French customs, 
which origin is quite remarkable :
"C'est Philippe le Bel qui a doté la France de 
véritables frontières douanières. L'occasion en fut la 
crise économique de début du XIV° siècle, qui toucha 
particulièrement l'industrie drapière. Les producteurs 
de draps languedociens atteints durement par la 
concurrence étrangère demandèrent au roi d'interdire 
l'exportation des laines, des matières tinctoriales, 
des draps écrus. (...) les frapiers ne réclamaient pas 
la prohibition des importations, mais seulement celle 
des produits utiles à leur industrie. (...) Les 
producteurs de draps offrirent (...) de payer douze 
deniers sur chaque pièce de drap qu'ils vendaient en 
gros, sept sur celles vendues au détail si le roi 
interdisait l'exportation des matières premières 
utiles à l'industrie drapière. Par un mandement du 1° 
février 1305, le roi accepta l'offre des drapiers.
(...) Un "maitre des ports et passages" fut institué 
et deux surintendants nommés. Rapidement un service se 
créa dont descend notre douane moderne." in Dockès, 
supra. note 35, at 44.
In the XVIIth century, customs were used as an instrument 
of industrial policy by Colbert. For Colbert, "Tout le 
commerce consiste à décharger les entrées des 
marchandises qui servent aux manufactures du dedans, 
charger celles qui entrent manufacturées, décharger 
entièrement les marchandises du dehors qui, ayant payé 
l'entrée, sortent pour le dehors, et soulager les droits 
de sortie des marchandises manufacturées au dedans du 
royaume." as cited in Dockès, ¿d. at 47
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45. Kenneth J. Arrow remarks that :
"... (although) efficiency can be achieved though a 
particular kind of social system, the price system 
(...) there are profound difficulties with the price 
system, even, so to speak, within its own logic, and 
these strengthen the view that, valuable though it is 
in certain realms, it cannot be made the complete 
arbiter of social life. One point (...) is that the 
price system does not in any way prescribe a just 
distribution of income. (...) ... in a strictly 
technical and objective sense, the price system does 
not always work. You simply cannot price certain 
things. A classical example (...) is the pollution of 
water or air. (...) A similar difficulty (...) is 
found in the case of road use. (...)
... from the point of view of efficiency as well as 
from the point of view of distributive justice, 
something more than the market is called for. Other 
modes of governing the allocation of resources occur. 
Most conspicuous among these is the government at all 
its levels. Government influences the allocation of 
resources by means that operate within the price 
system, but also otherwise. The government buys goods 
and services ; that is still working through the price 
system. The government collect taxes, and taxes are 
not prices. They are not a voluntary exchange. The 
government of course also has its host of laws and 
regulations, coercive and certainly nonmarket methods 
of controlling and directing the economy and indeed 
society in general." see supra. note 40, at 20-23.
A major difficulty with the internationalization of 
society is that it translates in a competition among 
states : the regulatory system of any given state - in a 
specific field (for example, a particular type of 
pollution regulation) or in its generality - is "priced" 
by international economic competition (localization of 
production activities on a given territory is partly 
decided by comparing the advantages of the localization 
to its costs), which may end up (in a global perspective) 
in an inadequate allocation of resources, for that very 
reason, explained by Arrow, that the price system does 
not always work ; see infra. $1.1.1 (2). Leaving aside 
the problem of a just distribution of income, which, at 
the international level, is the problem of 
under-development - which is certainly very severe and 
actual, but which is out of our scope of study, since it 
deals with a problem of redistribution of economic 
resources (see infra. Introduction, $2.(1)) - the whole 
purpose of creating international economic institutions 
is precisely to prevent the pricing of some states norms 
by the international markets ; see infra at $3 .1 . The 
whole conceptual difficulty there is in creating such
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international economic institutions is that, for states 
as for any other organization, pricing is fundamentally 
efficient (for example, if there would be no competition 
with regards to taxation of the economic activity, such 
taxation would probably rise to unacceptable levels) ; 
the problem then is to find where organization should 
replace the price system (or, if one prefers, the market) 
and how to structure it in such a manner that it will not 
do more than necessary, i.e. how much of international 
organization do we need and to do what ; see infra. Part
III, S3.1 .2 .
46. The nation-state, which in any version that would be 
recognizable to twentieth-century man is no older than 
the American constitution and the French revolution, born 
in 1787 and 1789, and national consciousness are the 
result of a deliberate effort to mobilize economic and 
social resources in the pursuit of large political aims ; 
e.g.The Economist's. December 22, 1990 at 73. The leaders 
who built the nation-states all wanted to use national 
economic activity to put muscle behind their political 
ambitions ; e.g. id., at 74.
47. Taxes constituting the basic resources of the states, 
states had an interest in developing an exchange economy 
because 11 tax collection and assessment are indissolubly 
linked to an exchange economy. The flow of goods and 
money are necessary for the understanding and especially 
for the evaluation of taxable materials. It is not enough 
to be aware of the volume of production because the 
economic structure sets a much lower limit. Agrarian 
societies of the past furnished the states with only 
minimal tax potential" ; see in Ardant, "Financial Policy 
and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and 
Nations", in The Formation of National States in Europe. 
Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton U. Press (C. Tilly ed. 
1975), at 166. See generally Ardant, G., Histoire de
1'impôt. tomes 1 & 2, Paris, Fayard (1971 & 1972). 
Apparently, Vauban was the first in understanding the 
connection between exchange economy and development of 
the state ï "il compare le "corps politique" au corps 
humain, soutient que le commerce d'un pays sert "à 
faciliter la circulation et le mouvement de l'argent non 
moins nécessaire au corps politique que celle du sang au 
corps humain"" ; see Dockès, supra. note 35, at 159.
48. See Beaud, supra. note 22, at 60.
49. I£. at 60-62.
50. Deutsch et al., have used the term "integration" to mean
the "attainment, within a territory, of a sense of 
community and of institutions and practices strong enough 
and widespread enough to assure, for a long time,
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dependable expectations of peaceful change among its 
population" ; see in K. Deutsch et al., Political 
Community and the Worth Atlantic Area : International 
Organization in_the Light of Historical Experience. 
Princeton, N.J., Princeton U. Press (1957), at 2 ; see 
also Haas, The Challenge of Regionalism. XII Int'l Org. 
440 (1958), at 442. Haas himself defined integration as 
"the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, 
expectations and political activities toward a new 
center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction 
over the pre-existing national states." in E. B. Haas,
The Uniting of Europe : Political. Social and Economic 
Forces. 1950-1957. Stanford, Stanford U. Press (1958), at
16. One of the main problems that integration theory has 
faced however, is the relation of a sense of community to 
behavioral interdependence ; see in Nye, Comparative 
Regional Integration : Concept and Measurement. XXII 
Int'l Org. 855 (1968), at 858. As noted by Nye, this 
relation becomes harder to investigate when both the 
sense of community and behavioral interdependence are 
built into the same concept ; id. Nye thus proposed to 
break down the concept of integration down into economic 
integration (formation of a transnational economy), 
social integration (formation of a transnational 
society), and political integration (formation of 
transnational political interdependence) ; Id. His 
analysis of economic integration remained rudimentary. We 
will concentrate our efforts on the analysis of this type 
of integration, but the type of approach we will use will 
lead us to make conclusions for the other types of 
integrations as well.
51. Pelkmans, in T. Heller & J. Pelkmans, "The Federal 
Economy: Law and Economic Integration and the Positive 
State - The USA and Europe Compared in Economic 
Perspective", in Integration through Law - Europe and the 
American Federal Experience. Vol.l, Methods* Tools. ..and Institutions. Book l, A Political. Legal and Economic 
Overview 245, Berlin, De Gruyter (M. Cappelletti, M. 
Secombe & J. Weiler eds. 1986) at 318. See also B. 
Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration. London,
Allen & Unwin (1962), at 1.
52. Pelkmans, id.
53. Id.
54. In its 1991 annual "Report on United States Trade 
Barriers and Unfair Practices", the European Community 
Commission expressed alarm at a growing trend toward 
protectionism or discriminatory legislation at the state 
level. It noticed a growing problem of fragmentation of 
the US market and regulatory system and that a seemingly 
growing number of barriers are being encountered at the 
state rather than at the federal level.
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55. Originally, tariff duties only played a tax role. This 
explains how a country such as France could have many 
tariff frontiers within its own political borders, until the end of the XVIIIth century :
"Jusqu'à la fin du XIIIe siècle, les taxes perçues aux 
frontières ne semblaient pas plus élevées. Aucune 
disparité n'apparaissait dans les frais de transport 
aux limites de la France. (...) Il exista (...) 
jusqu'aux réformes de Colbert une union douanière 
entre l'Ile-de-France, l'Orléanais, le Berry, le 
Poitou, la Normandie, la Picardie et la Bourgogne. Les 
produits pouvaient circuler librement entre ces 
provinces, mais ils ne pouvaient en sortir sans 
acquitter les droits de Rêve, de Haut-Passage et 
d'Imposition foraine. (...)
Les autres provinces qui formaient la seconde division 
de la France comprenaient, à l'époque du tarif de 
1664, le Limousin, l'Auvergne, le Lyonnais, le 
Languedoc, l'Armagnac, le Bordelais, le Saintonge, la 
Bretagne et la Franche-Comté. Leur organisation 
douanière était extraordinairement complexe. (...)
Les provinces acquises au XVII° siècle formèrent une 
troisième catégorie, sous le nom de provinces à 
l'instar de l'étranger effectif. Elles jouissaient 
d'une parfaite franchise vis-à-vis de l'étranger, les 
marchandises qui en provenaient ne payaient de droits 
qu'en entrant dans les provinces "réputées étrangères" 
ou dans celles de l'union douanière." in Dockès, 
supra. note 35, at 44-46.
The situation was wholly different in England :
"Si le commerce extérieur de l'Angleterre était 
contrôlé par un système de douanes et de prohibitions, 
le commerce intérieur y était favorisé par rapport à 
celui de la France grâce à l'absence de frontières 
intérieures." id. at 52.
This major difference between France and England may have 
played a significant role in the early development of the 
English economy, which economic actors benefited from a 
larger internal market very early, while French ones were 
restricted by internal tariff barriers
56. SS& W.O. Henderson, The Genesis of the Common Market. 
London, Frank Cass & Co. ltd (1962).
57. The European Community is composed of three separate 
communities, established by distinct treaties : the 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, signed in Paris on April 18, 1951 ; the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community signed in
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Rome on March 25, 1957 ; and the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community, signed in Rome on March
25, 1957. It is however warranted to speak about the 
"European Community" : in a resolution adopted on 
February 16, 1978, the European Parliament considers that 
the expression "the European Community" is appropriate to 
designate the institutions created pursuant to the 
treaties establishing the three European Communities as 
well as the group composed by the Member States ; see 
J.V. Louis, L'ordre juridique communautaire. Office des 
Publications Officielles des Communautés Européennes, (5° 
éd., 1990), at 8 . It is also warranted to speak about the 
constitution of the European Community ; see id. at 71.
In addition to the three original treaties creating the 
European Community, the constitution of the European 
Community comprises the Brussels treaty of April 8 , 1965, 
the so-called "Merger Treaty", establishing a Single 
Council and a Single Commission of the European 
Communities (O.J.E.C. 1967, No. 152), the Luxembourg 
treaty (Treaty amending Certain budgetary Provisions) of 
April 22, 1970 (O.J.E.C. 1971, No. L.2) ; the Brussels 
treaty (Treaty amending Certain Financial provisions) of 
July 2 2 , 1975 (O.J.E.C. 1977 No. L 359) ; the Act 
concerning the election of the representatives of the 
European Parliament by direct universal suffrage 
(O.J.E.C. 1976, No. L 278), and the Single European Act 
signed in Luxembourg and in the Hague on February 17 and
28, 1986 (O.J.E.C. 1987, No. L 169). In addition there 
are three Acts of Accession, adjusting the original 
Treaties, the Act of January 22, 1972 on the accession of 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (O.J.E.C. 1972, 
No. L 73), the Act of May 24, 1979 on the accession of 
Greece (O.J.E.C. 1979, No. L 291) and the Act of June 12, 
1985 on the accession of Portugal and Spain (O.J.E.C
1985, No. 302).
58. It is the recognized function of the public law of 
international trade to restrain governments from 
interfering in private economic transaction involving the 
exchange of goods ; ê *3* Abbott, The Trading Nation's 
Dilemma ; the Functions of the Law of International 
Trade. 26 Harv. Int'l L. J. 501 (1985), at 501.
59. See infra. Part III.
60. A. Viravan, et al.. Trade Routes to Sustained Economic
Growth - Report of a Study Group of the Trade Policy
Center. London, MacMillan press, for the U.N. (1987),
at 2 0 .
61. Iâ. at 30.
62. lâ. at 25-26.
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63 ; see Tumlir, "GATT Rules and Community Law - A
Comparison of Economic and Legal Functions" in The 
European Economic Community and the GATT 1, Kluver, 
Deventer, the Netherlands (M. Hilfs, F.G. Jacobs & E.-U. Petersmann eds. 1986), at 3 .
64. Viravan, supra. note 60, at 27.
65. 13.
6 6. Progress on the international monetary rules is 
necessary, but the study of the shortcomings of the 
international monetary order is beyond the scope of this 
book. One can hope, with Norman Macrae (The Economist's 
former deputy editor) that in the second quarter of the 
next century, the world will be run with a single 
currency under the control of a centrobank, a global 
central bank answerable to no politicians ; The 
Economist's. December 22, 1990 at 75. The creation of the 
European Single Currency is a first step towards that 
aim. Bergsten, who has made several proposals for the 
creation of a new international economic order, remarked 
that "Money and trade would be the most essential 
components of such a package. The Big Three [the United 
States, the European Community and Japan] should start 
the process by launching the construction of a new 
international monetary regime to replace the 
Bretton-Woods system that collapsed in 1971-1973. No 
system worthy of the name has existed since that time, 
with enormous cost for the world-economy. But stable and 
effective monetary arrangements are as crucial to the 
world economy as national monetary stability is key to 
each individual country." see Bergsten, The World Economy 
after the Cold War. Foreign Aff. 96 (1990). Within 
Europe, 10 of the 12 Member States agreed at the 
Maastricht summit held on December 9 & 10, 1991 to 
introduce a single currency at least by the start of 
1999. The Economist's has, as usual, clearly and shortly 
described the reasons for "the heart of its preference 
for a single currency" :
"... each EC government, deprived for ever of the 
delusion that it could devalue its own currency in 
order to make its industry competitive, would have to 
tackle the true causes of uncompetitiveness : 
demoralizing high taxation, red tape, restrictive 
labour practices, poor education and training, etc.
The list is long, but at least it is a true one." in 
issue of September 14, 1991, p. 16.
67. The term "reciprocity" is usually used to denote the
relation existing between two states when each of them
gives the subjects of the other certain privileges, on 
condition that its own subjects shall enjoy similar 
privileges at the hands of the latter state ; see £*3 *
Law Dictionary.
314 -
6 8 . The introduction of the Most-Favored-Nation ("MFN") 
clause in a treaty means that if any of the states party 
to the treaty would grant higher advantages to a third 
state by treaty, the other state would benefit from the 
treatment given to the most-favored nation. The role of 
the MFN provision is to link commercial treaties through 
time between states. The unconditional form of MFN, which 
consists in guaranteeing equal treatment without 
requiring directly reciprocal concessions, was used 
exclusively until the end of the XVIIIth century, when 
the United States inaugurated a practice of agreeing to 
conditional MFN only, i.e. to provide equal treatment 
conditional upon adequate compensation. The position of 
the United States as a newcomer to world commerce largely 
accounts for its novel interpretation of the MFN clause. 
It is only in 1923 that it adhered to unconditional MFN. 
See generally J.H. Jackson & W.J. Davey, Legal Problems 
of International Economic Relations. St. Paul, Minn.,
West Pub. (2nd ed. 1986), at 430-432.
69. The National Treatment clause attempts to impose the 
principle of non-discrimination as between goods which 
are domestically produced, and goods which are imported, 
e.g. ¿d. at 483.
70. Viravan, supra. note 60, at 26.
71. V. Curzon, The Essentials of Economic Integration - 
Lessons of EFTA Experience. London, MacMillan (1974), at 
95.
72. Youngquist, "United States Commercial Treaties : their 
Role in Foreign Economic Policy", in Law and Economic 
Development. Vol. II, Study no. 1 , at 72,73-74.
73. See infra. Part III, ft. — .
74. But there remain difficult problems at the level of the 
protection of property rights, especially intellectual 
ones, which have been negotiated during the Uruguay Round 
of GATT negotiations.
75. Pelkmans, supra. note 51, at 329. Hence, as a consequence 
of the nationalization of the US market, while there were 
large discrepancies in personal income from one region to 
another within the United States in 1929, these 
discrepancies were practically eliminated over the next 
seven decades ; The Economist's. December 22, 1990, at
76. In 1929, the average personal income per head as a 
percentage of US average was 137 in the Midwest while it 
was 50 for the South-east ; in 1990, these two regions 
were still the extremes, but the figures were 
respectively 107 and 93 ; id.
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76. Pelkmans, jjJ. at 319. According to The Economist's, id.. 
it is not too fanciful to believe that the technologies 
of production, information and communication have now 
entered a phase that would allow the same sort of 
convergence as the one which occurred in the United 
States since the Great Crisis of the inter-war period to 
happen worldwide by the year 2100 ; ¿d. This will come to 
pass only is the fewest possible restraints are placed on 
the movement of people, companies, money, goods, services 
and ideas ; id. Letting these things find their right 
rates of return is what both raises and equalizes 
incomes ; id.
77. However, the difference between efficient and inefficient 
regulation (because protectionist) is complex, and saying 
that protectionism should be rejected because it is 
inefficient begs the question of what efficient and 
inefficient regulation is. On this issue, see infra.
SI.2.1.4.
78. The Wall Street Journal Europe. December 17, 1990, citing 
Bergsten.
79. J.H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT. New York,
Bobbs-Merrill Co. (1969), at 10.
80. See infra. Part III, at S3.1.4.1.
81. Id* See also John H. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT
System. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
Pinter Publishers, London, 1990, at 2. More than simply 
reducing risks of war, trade may also be a fundamental 
factor in the keeping of an open, free society. According 
to Karl Popper,
"[Notre civilisation] ne s'est pas encore remise du 
choc de sa naissance, du passage de la société tribale 
ou close, soumise à des forces magiques, à la société 
ouverte. qui libère les capacités critiques de 
l'homme, et (...) c'est (...) le choc de cette 
transition qui favorise les mouvements réactionnaires 
orientés vers un retour au tribalisme" ; in La société 
ouverte et ses ennemis, tome 1, "L'ascendant de 
Platon", Paris, Editions du seuil (1979, 1st ed.
1962), at 9. And for Popper, "La cause principale de 
la chûte de la société close doit être recherchée dans 
le développement du commerce et des communications 
maritimes. Rien n'est plus apte à ébranler la 
confiance dans le caractère intangible des 
institutions tribales que le contact avec d'autres 
populations. Or, le commerce est sans doute une des 
rares activités où, même dans une société encore 
tribale, l'initiative personnelle peut se manifester.
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Aussi la navigation et le commerce ont-ils été la 
principale affirmation de l'impérialisme athénien au 
cours du Ve siècle avant J.-C. ; et il est de fait que 
les oligarches et les membres des classes qui étaient 
ou avaient été privilégiés les dénoncèrent comme des 
activités particulièrement dangereuses. Pour eux, il 
ne faisait aucun doute qu'à Athènes le commerce, les 
transactions monétaires, la politique navale et les 
tendances démocratiques étaient un tout inséparable." 
Id. at 145.
82. As reminded by Clark, he was one of the few who saw, 
after World War I, that the diplomats were laying the 
ground work for World War II ; The Wall Street Journal 
Europe. issue of November 11, 1991, Peace and Free Trade 
Should Go Together. Writing in 1919, Keynes proposed, as 
part of a plan to head off disaster, a free trade union 
to be established under the auspices of the brand new 
League of Nations ; id. Keynes' free trade union never 
materialized, and the nations moved to World War II : id. 
After World War II, Keynes led the discussions at Bretton 
Woods that produced the International Trade 
Organization ; id- The ITO never came to life because of 
US dislike, and the world has been left since with only 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ; see infra.
Si.2.2.2. Free trade still needs work, and the aim is 
still peace.
83. But more importantly, this is so because it is in the 
interest of dynamic exporting local producers.
84. gee generally P. Salins, Libre-échange et protectionisme. 
PUF, Paris, 1991, at 92-102.
85. Salins, supra. note 84, at 105-106.
8 6 . See id. at 5-14. K. Arrow puts it in a colorful way :
"The blacksmith in the primitive village is not 
expected to eat horseshoes ; he specializes in making 
horseshoes, the farmer supplies him with grain in 
exchange, and both (this is the critical point) can be 
made better off." supra. note 40, at 19.
87. Speaking in terms of justice in exchange is important 
because it allows us to bring into the picture the role 
of law and courts. One of the universally recognized 
purposes of private law is to ensure justice precisely by 
implementing the principle of suum cuique tribuere. (see 
in Encyclopédie Dalloz. Jestaz, "Droit", n°6 ) i.e. this 
principle pursuant to which courts should only make shure 
to render to everyone his own (g.g. Black's Law 
Dictionnary). Ensuring justice is certainly one of the 
ends of law generally speaking and thus should also be
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one of the purposes of international law in general, and 
of international economic law in particular. Allowing a 
proper functioning of international markets is, because 
it is a partial implementation of the suum cuicrue 
tnbuere. a fulfillment, albeit partial, of this purpose.
8 8. Salins, supra. note 84, at 38.
89. Id. at 38-39.
90. But see role of dynamic local producers in Part III.
91. See supra. Introduction, SO.(3).
92. For Arrow,
"... there are profound difficulties with the price 
system, even, so to speak, within its own logic, and 
these strengthen the view that, valuable though it is 
in certain realms, it cannot be made the complete 
arbiter of social life. One point, and a difficult one 
indeed, (...) is that the price system does not in any 
way prescribe a just redistribution of income." supra. 
note 40, at 22.
93. Such a "deal" was attempted during the Uruguay Round ;
see generally infra. Part II, S3.2.3.
94. See generally R. Gilpin, supra. note 30, at 31-34 for 
the nationalist argument against free trade partly 
deriving from such considerations. With regards to 
foreign direct investments, although a policy of 
non-discrimination would stimulate growth through more 
efficient production and bring prices down through 
greater competition, in some exceptional cases, other 
valid policy considerations may warrant discriminations 
(for example to protect the domestic defense related 
industry and the media) ; see DeAnne Julius, supra, note
9, at 97-105.
95. Article XX of the GATT provides that :
"Subject to the requirement that such measures are not 
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing 
in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures :(a) necessary to protect public morals ;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life 
or health ;(c) relating to the importation or exportation of 
gold or silver ;
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(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement, including (...) the 
protection of patents, trade marks and 
copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive 
practices ;
(e) relating to the product of prison labour ;
(f) Imposed for the protection of national treasures 
of artistic, historic or archaeological value ;
96. Article 36 of the Rome Treaty provides that :
"The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 [relating to the 
elimination of quantitative restrictions and measures 
having equivalent effect between the Member States] 
shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on 
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on 
grounds of public morality, public policy or public 
security ; the protection of health and life of 
humans, animals or plants ; the protection of national 
treasures possessing artistic, historic or 
archaeological value ; or the protection of industrial 
or commercial property. Such prohibitions or 
restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of 
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
trade between Member States.*
97. G. Scelles was writing in his Manuel élémentaire de droit 
international public. Paris (1943) :
”... au sein de la société internationale universelle 
ou oecuménique, il se forme des groupements de peuples 
ou d'Etats rapprochés par des phénomènes de solidarité 
plus étroits tenant à la communauté d'origine ou de 
race, & la continuité géographique, et surtout à 
l'intensité des échanges, au volume du commerce 
international." At 20, emphasis added.
G. Scelles was thus insisting on the importance of 
international economic intercourse for the creation of 
communities. The creation of such communities within the 
international society seems to require the sharing of 
some fundamental values. On the role of cultures as a 
structuring factor in the international society, F. 
Braudel remarks :
"Les cultures (ou les civilisations : les deux mots, 
quoi qu'on en dise, peuvent s'employer l'un pour 
l'autre dans la plupart des cas) sont aussi un ordre 
organisateur de l'espace, au même titre que les 
économies. Si elles coïncident avec celles-ci (en 
particulier parce que l'ensemble d'une économie-monde, 
dans toute son étendue, tend à partager une même
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culture, au moins certains éléments d'une même 
culture, en opposition avec les économies-mondes 
voisines), elles s'en distinguent aussi." ( supra. note 1, at 51).
A community of culture doesn't necessarily imply the 
inclusion within a common world-economy. However, within 
any given world-economy, some elements of a common 
culture must be shared. It goes beyond the scope of our 
study to elaborate at length on this question of a 
fundamental practical importance. One can notice, 
however, that in the context of the changes in what used 
to be the Eastern world-economy, the progressive 
integration of the countries which used to be part of 
such world-economy in the Western world-economy (see 
supra. note 1) is accompanied by a necessary modification 
in the values and ideologies underlying their internal 
institutions. On the fact that no full integration within 
the GATT-system was possible without an economy 
functioning pursuant to market mechanisms, see, for 
example, Patterson, Improving GATT Rules for Nonmarket 
Economies. 20 J.World Trade L. 185 (1986) ; see also 
Kennedy, The Accession of the Soviet Union to GATT. J. 
World Trade L. 23.
On another, but related, topic, the role of Japan in 
today's world, together with its weird culture and values 
in an occidental perspective, will make the development 
of the institutions of an improved international economic 
integration difficult. Simultaneously, there are also 
serious differences between Europe and the United States, 
which become more obvious now that the cold war is over ; 
the Wall Street Journal Europe notes in this respect that 
"Without the unifying glue of the Soviet threat, tensions 
among various Western countries have burgeoned in a way 
that few leaders seem prepared for." see Post-Cold War 
World Seems a Bit Less Warm As GATT Talks Fail, issue of 
December 10, 1990.
At stake is the meaning of such founding (but loose) 
principles of liberal-market-democratic society as the 
principle of equality (and how, for example, it should 
prevent governments from subsidizing failing producers), 
and generally of those mushy values such as freedom, 
non-discrimination, democracy, etc... without which no 
market-society can meaningfully function as a just 
society, allowing to effectively resist the demands of 
loosers. R. Schuman, one of the Founding Fathers of the 
European Community, perceived Europe as "un des noyaux 
solides d'une future structure politique du monde" ; see 
in Pour 1'Europe. Genève, NAGEL (1990, 1st ed. 1963), at 
183. But he was also warning that :
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"La question qui se pose est de savoir si une 
communauté mondiale est réalisable et dans quelle 
mesure. Nous avons vu jusqu'ici des initiatives 
partielles. Peut-on, avec une efficacité suffisante 
songer à avoir une organisation universelle comprenant 
pratiquement tous les pays du monde ? Ici, il faut 
voir les choses très franchement, en réalistes, non 
seulement à la lumière des idées qu'on peut avoir, 
mais des expériences que nous avons faites, soit au 
sein de la Société des Nations, soit au sein de 
l'Organisation des Nations Unies.
• • •
Pour s'entendre et pour construire une union étroite, 
il n'est pas interdit de se distinguer dans une 
certaine mesure, mais il faut aussi être sûr qu'il 
existe suffisamment de liens et d'idées communes." id. 
at 193 & 196.
98. See infra. Introduction, §0.
99. As noted by Nye, "Many integration theorists have used 
the definition and categorization of economic integration 
elaborated by Bela Balassa. Balassa defines economic 
integration as the abolition of discrimination between 
economic units belonging to different national states." 
see supra. note 50, at 860. Balassa's insight that 
economic integration amounts to abolition of 
discrimination is right, but his approach was not 
developed in sufficient details to allow to deal with the 
issue of rising non-tariff barriers.
100. Balassa, supra. note 51, at 2.
101. See Pelkmans, supra. note 51, at 324.
102. Balassa, as cited by Pelkmans, id.
103. See infra. Part III, 53.1.
104. Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law. 198 
R.C.A.D.I. 9 (1986), at 128.
105. Hindley gave the following example : when, in order to 
promote a policy, a state distorts the market, and this 
has consequences at the level of the market on which the 
[exporting] American firm operates, then this distorts 
the market for the American firm too, and the industrial 
policy decision made abroad also changes the signals 
received by the American firm. The foreign industrial 
policy will then have extra-territorial effects ; see in 
Hindley, "Subsidies, Politics and Economics", in 
Interface Three. 29, at 30.
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106. DeAnne Julius makes a similar point when explaining that 
foreign direct investments may create systemic problems 
for the regulation of financial markets, or where issues 
of public safety or the environment are involved, which 
may require policy coordination among states. She insists 
that policy coordination should be limited, focused and 
attempted only where the problem to be avoided is clearly 
a systemic one. See supra. note 9, at 93-95.
107. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, opened for signature Sept. 16, 1986, 26 
I.L.M. 1541, entered into force on January 1 , 1989, 
and23stablished specific obligations to limit and reduce 
the use of clorofluorocarbons that deplete the ozone 
layer.
108. See, for example, The Economist's, issue of June 23, 1990.
109. States refusing to cooperate (hold-outs) and states who 
enjoy the benefits of international regulation while 
refusing to share the costs of regulation (free riders) 
may render international agreements ineffective ; e.g. 
Note, supra. note 2, especially at 1534. Hold-out states 
can not only prevent other states from reaching effective 
agreements, but also exacerbate the underlying 
environmental threat, id* See also Kiss, Le droit 
international de 1'environnement. Paris, PSdone (1989), 
at 7. On the role of Article 100 of the Rome treaty to 
avoid this problem, see id. and infra. Part II, §2.1.2.
110. For examples of statutes of this kind, see the Oregon 
Bottle Law, infra. Part II, §2.2.1.1, and the Danish 
Bottle Law, infra. Part II, §2.2.2.6 .
111. Except to reduce the implied non-tariff barriers ; see 
infra. Part II, §2.0.1. In Europe, the principle of 
subsidiarity which is at the root of the institutions 
means that each decision should be taken at the lowest 
possible level ; e.g. Brittan, "A Better UK Road to 
Maastricht”, in The Financial Times, issue of October 31, 
1991. On the way down to finding the lowest level of 
decision making, we find the individual, who, in liberal 
society, is the prime decision-maker ; only this which 
can not appropriately be decided at the individual level 
should be decided by institutions ; and only this which 
can not be appropriately decided at the decentralized 
political level should be decided at a more centralized 
level ; etc. The principle of subsidiarity is thus 
congruent with a liberal individualistic society. For 
Brittan, the interpretation of the principle of 
subsidiarity
- 322 -
"... is perhaps clearest in relation to the 
environment. Matters affecting global warming or the 
ozone layer or atmospheric pollution clearly have 
spillover effects, and need to be regulated at a 
European, if not still higher, level. The condition of 
beaches, or most matters relating to rail and road 
construction, have their main impacts on the 
inhabitants of an area or those who choose to go 
there. At the very most, central control should be 
limited to the provision of information so that the 
visitors know the risks they run." id.
112. A clean environment is a type of public good which can be 
purchased only by collective action and through coercion 
of those who would not otherwise want to participate in 
such acquisition. Coercion is a problem, but can be 
legitimated in the following manner - which in turn 
explains why there is need for decentralized political 
institutions :
"[It is clearly] in the interest of the different 
individuals to agree that the compulsory levying of 
means be used also for purposes for which they do not
care so long as others are similarly made to
contribute to ends which they desire, but the others 
do not. (...) all we can aim at will be that each 
should feel that in the aggregate, all the collective 
goods which are supplied to him are worth at least as 
much as the contributions he is required to make.
[Thus] A satisfactory arrangement for the provision of 
collective goods seems to require that the task be to 
a great extent delegated to local and regional 
authorities. (...) the delegation of all powers that 
can be exercised locally to agencies whose powers are 
confined to the locality is probably the best way of 
securing that the burdens of and the benefits from 
government action will be approximately proportional." 
See in Hayek, supra. note 11, at 45-46.
113. Heller, in Heller & Pelkmans, supra. note 7, at 248.
114. See id. ; see also Balassa, Towards a Theory of Economic
Integration. 14 KYKLOS 1 (1961), especially at 8-11 ; and 
Balassa, supra. note 51, at 7-9, for the "liberalist" and 
"dirigist" ideals of economic integration. For a rather 
extreme liberalist view, see generally Röpke, Economic 
order and International Law, 86 R.C.A.D.I. 202 (1954).
115. See Heller, in Heller & Pelkmans, supra. note 7, at 247.
116. Id. at 260.
117. Id.
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118. Id. at 247.
119. e.g. id. at 251.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id-
124. Id-
125. See A. Cassese, International Law in a Divided World. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford (1986), at 13-14. The Three main 
legal functions typical of any legal system (law-making, 
law-determination and law-enforcement) are 
decentralized. As a consequence, organizational rules, 
"secondary rules" are at a very embryonic stage.
126. See supra. Introduction, S3..
127. Saying what GATT is in a few words is a desperate task.
Prior to try to understand some of the elements of 
functioning of this monster, the reader should be aware
of some of the reactions of disarray from serious 
students who have been confronted to GATT's incredible 
complexity : Senator Millikin declared that "anyone who 
reads GATT is likely to have his sanity impaired" (1951
Senate Hearings, Senate Finance Committee, p. 92) ; one
of the draftsmen of GATT, Winthrop Brown, declared at the 
same hearings : "I think your difficulty ... is the 
inherent difficulty of the subject ... I must admit I am 
thoroughly confused" (1951 Senate Hearings, Senate 
Finance Committee, p. 1061, 1076) ; even after the lapse 
of some time after the drafting of GATT, Gardner noted 
that "only ten people in the world understand it, and 
they are not telling anybody" (in In Pursuit of World 
Order. New York (1966), at 148-149).
128. See in Bhagwati, Multilateralism at Risk - The GATT is
Dead. Iona Live the GATT. 1990 World Econ. 149.
129. For example, tariff barriers against imports in the EEC
are of a trade-weighted average of 5.1% ; see Financial 
Times. April 17, 1991.
130. Jackson, supra, note 79, at 297. Professor Jackson
describes the GATT as
"... the least handsome of all major international 
institutions of our time. It began as only one wheel 
of a larger machine, the ill-fated International Trade
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Organization, and, when that larger machine fell apart 
before leaving the assembly line, this wheel became a 
unicycle on which burdens of the larger machine were
heaped. The unicycle, for reasons not quite fully
understood, has continued to roll through two decades
since it was put together. To be sure, it takes 
careful balance to keep it rolling and ad hoc repairs 
and tinkering have brought it to a point where the 
bailing wire and scrap metal that hold it together 
form an almost incomprehensible maze of machinery."
Id. at 3.
131. Jackson, National Treatment Obligations and Non-Tariff 
Barriers. 10 Mich. J. Int'l L. 207 (1989) ; at 207.
132. On the procedures used, see infra. Part III, S3.2.1.
133. Jackson & Davey, supra. note 6 8, at 295.
134. Jackson, supra. note 131, at 208.
135. Id.
136. Jackson & Davey, supra. note 6 8, at 297.
137. Van Bael, The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure. 22 J. 
World Trade L. 67 (1988), at 67.
138. Id.
139. Se£ Plaisant, L'organisation Internationale du Commerce. 
1950 R.G.D.I.P. 161, at 162. A definition of "subsidy" 
given by Malmgren embodies "any government action which 
causes a firm's, or a particular industry's total net 
private cost of production to be below the level of costs 
that would have been incurred in the course of producing 
the same level of output in the absence of government 
action". This presumably includes the subsidizing effect 
of tariff protection. See. e.g. Horlick, Quick, Vermulst, 
Government Actions against Domestic Subsidies : an 
Analysis of the International Rules and an Introduction 
to the American Practice. 1 Legal Issues of Eur. 
Integration 1 (1985), at 2.
140. Jackson, supra. note 131, at 208.
141. £.g. Jackson, The Puzzle of GATT. 1 J. World Trade L. 131 
(1967). In contradistinction to non-prohibitive tariffs 
and tariff-like measures, quantitative restrictions 
completely break any link between domestic and world 
prices ; see Jackson & Davey, supra. note 6 8, at 421.
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142. Article XI, 1st paragraph provides that
"No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, 
taxes or other charges, whether made effective through 
quotas, import or export licences or other measures, 
shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting 
party on the importation of any product of the 
territory of any other contracting party or on the 
exportation or sale for export of any product destined 
for the territory of any other contracting party."
Article XI, 2nd paragraph provides for a whole series of exceptions.
143. Article XII provides a contracting party with an 
exception "in order to safeguard its external financial 
position and its balance of payments" ; Article XIII 
provides for a principle of non-discrimination in the 
administration of quantitative restrictions ; Article XIV 
provides exceptions to such principle ; finally, Article 
XV provides for rules concerning quantitatives 
restrictions in connection with exchange issues.
Even though they are theoretically prohibited by GATT, 
quotas are widespread in today's world. Most quotas 
applied by developed countries are designed to afford 
protection to farmers, clothing and textile makers and 
steel producers. For the pattern of quotas applied by the
United States, see Jackson & Davey, supra. note 68, at
423. In addition to quotas, one must also take into 
account the Voluntary Restraints Agreements of exporters 
in numerous industries ; see infra. §1.2.1.3(1).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id*
147. See supra. note 69.
148. Jackson & Davey, supra. note 68, at 297.
149. Jackson, supra. note 131, at 208.
150. Sê s supra, note 67.
151. See generally. Jackson, supra « note 79, at 163.
152. Van Bael, supra, note 137, at 67.
153. Jackson, supra. note 79, at 164-165.
154. Id. at 164.
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155. Id. at 166.
156. Van Bael, supra. note 137, at 68.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Jackson, supra. note 79, at 170-171.
160. U.N. Doc. EPCT/A/PV.6, at 5 (1947).
161. Jackson & Davey, supra. note 68, at 334.
162. Jackson, supra. note 79, at 169.
163. Id-
164. Id* ; A United States delegate was proudly describing 
what has been done in the following terns : "What (...) 
have we done in Article 35 (of the ITO - but Article 
XXIII of GATT is almost equivalent to it) ? We have 
introduced a new principle of international economic 
relations. We have asked the nations of the world to 
confer upon an international economic organization the 
right to limit their power to retaliate. We have sought 
to tame retaliation, to discipline it, to keep it within 
bounds." See R.E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World 
Trade Diplomacy. New York, Praeger Pub. (1975), at 36.
165. Jackson, supra. note 79.
166. Id.
167. Jackson & Davey, supra. note 68, at 334.
168. Id.. However, a breach of obligations does raise a prima 
facie nullification or impairment ; Id* at 181-182.
169. See Hudec, "Regulation of Domestic Subsidies under the 
MTN Subsidies Code", in Interface Three ; Legal Treatment 
of Domestic Subsidies. 1 (Wallace, Loftus 6 Krikorian 
eds. 1984), at 2.
1 7 0. id. at 4 ; Davey, pjgpyte and Settlement in GATT/ 11 Fordham Int'l L. J. 51 (1987), at 51.
171. Lacharridre, Case for a Tribunal to Assist in Settling 
Trade Disputes. 8 World Econ. 339 (1985), at 340.
172. Id. See also Finger, Picturing America's Future :
Kodack's Solution on American Trade Exposure. 12 The 
World Economy 377 (1991), at 379.
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173. Lacharri6re, Id.
174. Pescatore, "Introduction” to The European Economic 
Community and the GATT. Kluver, Deventer, The Netherlands (M. Hilfs, F.G. Jacobs & E.-U. Petersmann eds. 1986), at xvi.
175. Jackson & Davey, supra. note 68, p. 367.
176. (1) Geneva, Switzerland, 1947 ; (2) Annecy, France,
1948 ; (3) Torquay, England, 1950 ; (4) Geneva, 1956 ; 
"Dillon Round", Geneva, 1960-61 ; (6) "Kennedy Round", 
Geneva, 1964-67 ; (7) "Tokyo Round", Geneva, 1973-79. A 
new Round, the "Uruguay Round", has been launched in September 1986.
177. J. Bhagwati, Protectionism. Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T.
. Press (1988), at 3 ; By the early 1980s, the average
tariff level had gone to 4.9 percent in the United 
States ; 6.0 percent in the European Economic Community, and 5.4 percent in Japan.
178. Id.
179. See supra. note 141.
180. See generally Jackson & Davey, supra. note 68, §9.4.
181. See infra, note 379.
182. See Jackson & Davey, supra. note 68, et 614. For an 
explanation on how a third country can be harmed, see 
infra, note 379.
183. Bhagwati is virulent to "dismiss an influential but 
nonetheless frivolous critique directed at the GATT and 
[its main principles]. It is that the GATT is in truth 
the General Agreement to Talk and Talk : it has delivered 
nothing. This is nonsense. Under GATT auspices, tariff 
barriers of the developed countries were reduced to 
almost negligible levels ; the Tokyo Round negotiations 
then began the assault on non-tariff barriers in a 
process that is now being pursued further, along with the 
task of extending GATT discipline in new sectors, in the 
Uruguay Round negotiations." See in Bhagwati, supra. note
128, at 150-151.
184. £££ in Sandholtz & Zysman, 1992 : Recasting the European 
Bargain. Draft (1989), at 20.
185. Id.
186. Curzon, supra. note 71, at 5.
328 -
187. Id.
188. Id. at 5-6.
189. Schildhaus concludes that "the model of the "1992 
European Experience" has now laid the foundations for 
future plurilateral and multilateral treatment of 
international trade, within or without the GATT". 
Schildhaus, 1992 and the Single European Act. 23 The 
International Lawyer 549 (1989), at 555.
190. Except in the case of regional policies, where internal 
discriminations are decided by the policy in favor of 
some region judged "disfavored". The discrimination here 
is of a communitarian character, decided by the 
encompassing policy, and has nothing to do with the type 
of discrimination we deal with, decided at the 
decentralized level for protectionist motives, and not 
because of some other defendable type of policy.
191. If Y sells at 100, X will need to hove costs below 75 to 
be able to compete : (75 + (75 X 1/3)) = 100.
192. See generally Trubek, "Consumer Law, Common Markets and 
Federalism : Introduction and General Concepts", in 
"Consumer Law, Common Markets and Federalism in Europe 
and the United States" 1 (T. Bourgoignie & D. Trubek 
eds.), vol. 3 of Integration Through Law - Europe and the 
American Federal Experience. Berlin, de Gruyter, (M. 
Cappelletti, M. Secombe & J. Weiler general eds. 1987), 
at 6-7.
193. Id.
194. See. for example, P.J. Slot, Technical and Administrative 
Obstacles to Trade in the EEC. Leyden, A-W sijthoff
(1975), at 149 ; see also DeAnne Julius, supra. note 9, 
at 94.
195. See Trubek, supra. note 192, at 4.
196. Tumlir, supra. note 63, at 1.
197. Pescatore, supra. note 174, at xv.
198. Id. at 10.
199. Id. at 14.
200. From a strictly normative viewpoint, it has made little
difference that the Community was established by a
network of treaties rather than by a formal constitution, 
due to the impact of the Court of Justice. From its
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inception, the Court has construed the Treaty of Rome in 
a constitutional mode rather than employing the 
international law methodology of treaty interpretation.
It held that the Treaty created Ma new legal order", 
conferring rights and imposing obligations not only on 
the member states, but also directly on the nationals of 
the member states which national courts must enforce.
See, e.g.. Stein, Treaty Based Federalism. 127 U, Pa. L. Rev 897 (1979), at 901. See also. Hartley, Federalism. 
Courts and Legal Systems : the Emerging Constitution of
the European Community. 34 Am. J. Comp. L. 229 (1986).
201. Tumlir, supra. note 63, at 10.
202. Id« For an analysis of EEC law in relation to this
question, see generally Ehlermann, "Application of GATT 
Rules in the European Community", in The European 
Economic Community and the Gatt. 127, supra. note 63 ; 
for the situation in the United States, see Hudec, "The 
Legal Status of GATT in the Domestic Law of the United 
States" in The European Economic Community and Gatt 187, 
id-
203. Following a collapse of GATT talks during the Uruguay 
Round, Carla Hills, the United States Trade 
Representative during the later phase of the Round, 
declared that "as long as we don't have an effective 
multilateral system, it's very hard to tell our elected 
representatives that they can't protect national 
interests." See in The Wall Street Journal Europe. 
December 10, 1990.
204. K.W. Dam, The GATT - Law and International Economic 
Organization. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
(1970), at 10.
205. Id. ; the influence on US thinking of Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull can not be overstated ; he was writing in 
1937: "I have never faltered and will never falter, in my 
belief that enduring peace and the welfare of nations are 
indissolubly connected with friendliness, fairness, 
equality and the maximum practicable degree of freedom in 
international trade." id* at 12.
206. Id.
207. ££. id-
208. See Baldwin, "The Changing Nature of US Trade Policy 
Since World War Two", in The Structure and Evolution of 
Recent U.S. Trade Policy 5, Chicago U. Press, Chicago (R. 
Baldwin & a. Kreuger eds. 1984), who recalls that before 
the end of World War II, the leaders of the democratic 
party had become certain that the lack of an open 
world-economy had let to the war, which explains why they 
proposed the creation of an international trade 
organization.
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209. Id-
210. Henderson, supra. note 56, at 56.
211. Id. On Colbert and the use which should be made of tariff
according to him, see supra. note 43.
212. Id.
213. There had been a previous - and short-lived -
Anglo-French commercial treaty in 1786, and the reasons
for its adoption are quite significant. Because of
prohibitions and high excise duties, smuggling was rife 
between the two countries, while legitimate trade 
languished ; Id. at 45. Economists were providing a 
favorable climate of opinion to support a relaxation of 
restrictions impeding trade, but what really influenced 
governments in their liberalization efforts were 
considerations of the utmost practical character : both 
urgently needed to increase their revenues ; Id. France 
especially was on the verge of bankruptcy, with a 
national debt of 3,500 millions livres, and urgently 
needed a reform of its finances. An obvious method of 
increasing revenues would be to augment the income 
derived from import duties : if prohibitions were 
abolished and import duties reduced, then legitimate 
trade would expand ; Id. at 46. The French tariff was a 
French statute : it could therefore be reformed without 
reference to the commercial policies of other countries ; 
Id. at 45. But if French import duties were reduced as 
the result of a commercial treaty with Britain, a twofold 
advantage might be secured : more revenues from import 
duties, and greater opportunities to sell in Britain ;
Id. at 45 ; political motives also influenced the 
negotiations : Britain and France were traditional 
enemies, and a liberal commercial treaty could well be 
the first step toward reconciliation ; Id* at 46. The 
rationale for the 1786 Anglo-French treaty is therefore 
obvious, but it does not apply to the Cobden-Chevalier 
treaty.
214. According to The Economist's, protectionism and
preferential trade is a major reason for Britain's 
economic decline.
"Chamberlain marked the beginning of the end of half a 
century in which British citizens had bought goods 
from across the world on the same terms as those made 
at home. A slow slide led down through the 
protectionism of the 1930s to a warped normality where 
British industry enjoyed just the protected access to 
imperial, later Commonwealth, markets that Chamberlain 
had envisaged. It would be a dishonest British
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industrialist today who denied that such preference, 
which still coddled half the country's exports in the 
1950s, played a part in Britain's post-war decline. It 
bred a complacency that allowed markets after market 
to slip away to more energetic suppliers." See issue of May 4, 1991, at 19.
215. Henderson, supra. note 56, at 59.
216. Id-
217. Id.
218. Id-
219. Id.
220. Id. Cobden wrote to Chevalier : "It would of course be 
agreeable to me to see your Minister of State. But I 
attach very little importance to such interviews ; for 
there is always a latent suspicion that I, as an 
Englishman, in recommending other governments to adopt 
free trade principles, am merely pursuing a selfish 
British policy. Thus my advice is deprived of all weight 
and even my facts are doubted... But on totally different 
grounds I would be glad to see a removal of the 
impediments our foolish legislations interpose on the 
intercourse between the two countries" ; see Bhagwati & 
Irwin, The Return of the Reciprotarians - US Trade Policy 
Today. 10 World Econ. 109 (1987), at 121.
221. Id* The treaty will give rise to many strong reactions 
from French industrialists. To give an idea of the 
protectionist climate in the Corps Législatifs, here are 
some of the remarks made by the députés : "Ils ont livré 
à l'Angleterre l'avenir et la fortune industrielle de la 
France" (Pouyer-Querties) ; "Il est une date néfaste pour 
un certain nombre de nos industries ; je doute qu'il s'en 
soit rencontré une plus funeste pour la France depuis la 
révocation de l'Edit de Nantes ; c'est celle du 23 
janvier 1860... celle du traité Franco-Anglais couvrant 
de ruines toute une partie de notre pays" (Lesperut). In 
the same vein, the Comité des Forges, a very powerful 
lobby group of steel makers, will be created in 1864 to 
defend the French iron and steel metallurgy against 
competition brought by free trade ; see generally M.
Tacel, Restaurations. Révolutions. Nationalités .^
1815-1870. Paris, Masson (3ème ed. 1981), at 210. For a 
description of this "coup d'Etat commercial", see G.
Duby, Histoire de la France. Flammarion, 1970, p. 454-455.
222. Britain never had a policy of complete free trade because 
tariffs represented a sizeable fraction of her revenues - 
as much as two fifth in the 1850s ; see Bhagwati & irwin, 
supra. note 220, ft 59.
- 332 -
223. Henderson, supra. note 56, at 59. The tariff concessions 
were therefore were not the kind of reciprocal 
concessions which the earlier treaty of 1786 had tried to get from the agreement.
224. Id-
225. Id-
226. Id.
227. Id- at 60.
228. Id-
229. Id.
230. Id-
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 61.
234. Id.
235. Britain did not induce major continental powers, after 
the 1870s, to retain liberal trade policies. See in 
Keohane, supra. note 3, at 36. One reason for its 
"relative ineffectiveness in maintaining a free trade 
regime is that it had never made extensive use of the 
principle of reciprocity in trade. It thus had sacrificed 
potential leverage over other countries that preferred to 
retain their own restrictions while Britain practiced 
free trade, the policies of these states might well have 
been altered had they been confronted with a choice 
between a closed British market for their exports on the 
one hand and mutual lowering of barriers on the other." 
Id. at 37.
236. Friedman W, O.J. Lissitzyn & R.C. Pugh, International 
Law. St Paul, Minn. West Publishing Co. (1969), at 1075
237. Dam, supra. note 204, at 12. Keohane writes that "... 
international regimes (...) are rarely if ever instituted 
by disinterested idealists for the sake of the common 
good. Instead, they are constructed principally by 
governments whose officials seek to further the interests 
of their states (as they interpret them) and of 
themselves. They seek wealth and power, and perhaps other 
values as well, no matter how much they may indulge in 
rhetoric about global welfare or a world "safe for 
interdependence"." In Keohane, supra. note 3, at 22.
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238. See Jackson, supra. note 79, at 36-37
239. Ifl. at 36.
240. Id.
241. Id* On the connection between protectionism and war, see 
supra. Introduction, §4.
242. Id.
243. Friedman, supra. note 236, at 1075
244. Id.
245. Id. 12 ; these objectives were the same as the ones 
outlined in the code of conduct elaborated by American 
and British trade experts who met in 1943 in a joint 
seminar for the purpose of drawing what should be the 
trade rules after the war. The experts also agreed that 
these objectives should be cast in detailed legal 
obligations that would allow no evasion ; see R.E. Hudec, 
The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy. New 
York, Praeger Pub. (1975), at 13.
246. Dam, supra. note 204, at 12.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 12-13.
249. Hudec, supra. note 245, at 13.
250. Id-
251. Id-
252. Friedman, supra, note 236, at 1075
253. Id.
254. Id-
255. Dam, supra, note 204, at 14 ; Baldwin, supra, note 208, 
at 10-11.
256. Id-
257. The GATT was drafted at the Geneva conference, simultaneously with the tariff negotiations and the work 
on the ITO charter. However, it was intended to be a 
subsidiary agreement under the ITO charter and to depend 
upon the ITO charter and the ITO secretariat for
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servicing and enforcement. Most of the clauses of the 
GATT were drawn from comparable clauses drafted for the 
ITO, and it was understood that most of these GATT 
clauses would be changed to conform to the corresponding 
version of the ITO charter that emerged from the later 
Havana conference. The United States tariff Agreement 
Authority would expire in the middle of 1948 and it was 
obvious that an ITO charter would not be in effect by 
then. Partly for these reasons, the United States and 
other countries desired to have GATT accepted and 
implemented as soon as possible. Because some countries 
would require parliamentary action in order to accept 
many of the clauses of GATT, the GATT itself was not 
applied. Indeed, a "Protocol of Provisional Application" 
was signed in late 1946, by the 22 original members of 
GATT, and this protocol became effective on January 1, 
1948. It is only through this protocol that the GATT is 
applied. See generally Jackson, supra. note 79, ch. 2.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 16.
260. Dam defines "legalism" as an approach to international 
agreements under which draftsmen attempt to foresee all 
the problems that may arise in a particular area and to 
write down highly detailed rules in order to eliminate to 
the greatest extent any possible disputes, or even any 
doubt, about the rights and obligations of each agreeing 
party under all future circumstances ; see supra. note
204, at 4.
261. Id. at 16.
262. For a similar point in connection with regimes regarding 
the environment protection, see generally Note, supra 
note 2, at 1521.
263. Dam, supra. note 204, at 4.
264. Id. at 16.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 4.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id-
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271.
272.
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274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280. 
281. 
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
Id. "Les règles de droit sont des limites 
transactionnelles imposées aux prétentions des pouvoirs 
individuels et à celles des pouvoirs des institutions ; 
ce sont des règlements anticipés de conflits." Hauriou,
La théorie de l'institution et de la fondation (Essai de 
vitalisme social!. 4 Cahiers de la Nouvelle Journée 89, 
Paris, Bloud & Gay (1925), at 94.
Dam, supra, note 204, at 4-5.
Id- at 5.
Id.
This is so because, as noted by Keohane, "Protection is a 
way of forcing the costs of adjustment onto others 
(inside one's country or outside), at least temporarily, 
and is sought as a shelter from the impact of rapid 
change with which it is difficult for people to cope."
See in Keohane, supra. note 3, at 212.
Viravan, et al., Trade Routes to Sustained Economic 
Growth - Report of a Study Group of the Trade Policy 
Center. Macmillan Press, for the U.N., London '(1987), at
50.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id.
See supra. note 257.
Roessler, The Scope. Limits and Function of the GATT 
Legal Svstem. 8 World Econ. 287 (1985), at 296.
Id. at 295.
Id.
Id.. The Ecpnomist's presents the issue bluntly in the 
following way :
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"It ought to be simple : domestic producers should 
campaign for protection, while exporters and consumers 
should press for free trade. Politicians would be 
lobbied by all three, but their unerring instinct for 
the welfare of their country should lead them towards 
free trade. As life does not follow such art, the GATT 
exist." See the issue of April 6, 1991, at 14.
289. Viravan, supra. note 276, at 24 ; Tumlir, supra. note 63, 
at 7.
290. Viravan, id»
291. Id-
292. See id.
293. See Tumlir, supra. note 63, at 6-7.
294. See id.. at 3. Protection only redistributes income and 
wealth within the economy while reducing it on the whole. 
While such a cost is difficult to measure, it is a very 
costly form of redistribution. This difficulty is due to 
the fact that there are two different kinds of costs: one 
is borne by the consumers or users ; the other can not be 
allocated to any particular group, and is borne by 
practically everybody in the form of reduced productivity 
in the protected country at large ; id. For a practical 
example of such a redistribution, and how inefficient it 
is, see infra. note 379, in the context of the Japanese 
restraint on the export of automobiles to the United 
States.
295. See supra note 112.
296. See supra. Introduction, $0.(3)(ii).
297. See generally. A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy. 
New York, Harper & Row (1957).
298. Hayek, supra. note 11, at 93-94.
299. Viravan, supra. note 276, at 31.
300. Id-
301. They are, in a sense, rules of the road, which certainly 
are at times annoying to follow, but which after all 
allow us to drive through green lights with relative 
confidence.
302. This is true at the global level where differences in 
levels of development are such that it prevent a complete 
harmonization of competition conditions ; see infra. Part
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III, §3.1.4.1(3)(i). Among economies at closer levels of 
economic development, a qualitatively different solution 
to the problem of differing competition conditions for 
economic actors is possible, consisting in such an 
harmonization of competition conditions ; this is what 
Robert Schuman meant in the context of the European 
Integration :
"... la compétitivité d'une production dans un pays 
plus ou moins favorisé par ses richesses naturelles, 
par sa situation géographique ou démographique, par la 
qualité de ses institutions politiques, reste (...) 
capable de variations considérables. C'est pour cela 
qu'il faut des clauses de sauvegarde pour limiter les 
risques, losqu'on s'engage dans l'épreuve d'une 
concurrence nouvelle. Il faut égaliser, harmoniser les 
conditions de le production, les législations, la 
masse des salaires et des charges, afin que chaques 
pays participant soit à même de soutenir le libre 
confrontation avec les autres. Toute communauté viable 
exige que soient d'abord atténuées, et si possible 
éliminées, ces différences de situation, afin qu'une 
industrie ou une production qui n'est plus à l'abri de 
l'ancien protectionisme ne risque pas d'être écrasée." 
see supra. note 97, at 105-106.
303. See supra. note 257.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See Thurow, as cited by Bhagwati in Multilateralism at 
Risk - The GATT is Dead. Iona Live the GATT. 1990 World 
Econ. 149.
307. See Viravan, supra. note 276, at 30.
308. See Abbott, The Trading Nations Dilemma ; the Functions 
of the Law of International Trade. 26 Harv. Int'l L. J. 
501 (1985), at 522.
309. Whereas traditionally the welfare gains and losses that 
occur to particular groups in society as a result of 
moves toward free trade or protection are summed to 
produce a net national result, a public choice approach 
such as the one used here - seing the government as mediating between self-interested social groups - focuses 
not on net national welfare but on redistribution of 
income. See Abbott, id* at 504.
310. Roessler, supra, note 285, at 297.
311. Sgfi Jackson & Davey, supra, note 68, at 367
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312. Id- at 296 ; £gg aIs9 o. Long, Law and Its Limitations in 
the GATT Multilateral Trade System. Dordrecht, Nijhoff 
(1985), at 10.
313. Abbott, supra. note 308, at 521. In the absence of 
effective rules, governments are not so much 
protectionist as helpless ; £.g. Tumlir, Heed for an Open 
Multilateral Trade System. 6 World Econ. 393 (1983) at 
403.
314. See id. at 522-525. See also A. Oxley, The Challenge of 
Free Trade. Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, at 5.
315. Viravan, supra. note 276, at 30.
316. Roessler, supra. note 285, at 296.
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319. Id.
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320. Id.
321. Roessler, The Rationale for Reciprocity in Trade 
Negotiatons Under Floating Currencies 31 KYKLOS 258 
(1978), at 264-265.
322. Abbott, supra. note 308, at 502 ; Cassese, supra. note
125, at 13.
323. Id.
324. Viravan, supra. note 276, at 32.
325. Id*
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. See generally Id*
329. Id. at 27.
330. Id.
331. See Strange, supra. note 4, especially at 165.
332. The GATT's review of the European Community's trade 
policies, released on April 16, 1991, finds that the 
Community has been pursuing highly discriminatory
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policies. It complains that the European Community has 
put in place a set of preferential trading arrangements 
and built up a network of bilateral agreements with other 
countries, which introduces "strong elements of 
discrimination" into the multilateral trading system.
GATT points to the lack of a statutory independent body 
at the Community level to act as a watchdog in trade 
matters. Therefore, when policies are formulated, the 
system under which the Commission proposes and the 
Council disposes favors sector-specific views against 
overall economic or trade considerations. Coal, steel, 
cars and semi-conductors are cited as examples of the 
Communities penchant for pursuing individual industries' 
interests separately. EC textile and clothing 
manufacturers are shielded by 19 bilateral agreements 
under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement and by "self-restraint" 
deals with exporters in Mediterranean countries. The GATT 
considers that the value of the Community's tariff 
bindings (at a trade weighted average of 5.1 per cent) 
has been eroded by the propensity to strike bilateral 
agreements targeted against the most competitive foreign 
suppliers among its trading partners. The accords tend to 
become entrenched and delay more than they promote 
structural adjustment in the industries concerned ; e.g. 
The Financial Times, issue of April 17, 1991. 
Additionally, the European Community rarely uses the 
safeguard action allowed by GATT under the Escape clause 
of Article XIX ; see infra. Part III, §3.2.2.1(3). The 
European Community's tendency to bring dozens of 
antidumping actions against foreign exporters whose main 
crime seems to be selling goods at prices which European 
producers can not match has also been criticized ; see, 
for example, The Wall Street Journal Europe. May 15,
1991, GATT Chief Scolds. Pleads In Bid to End Trade 
Impasse.
333. Sss. supra at §1-2.1.3. In J.W. Hampton. Jr. & Co. v.United States. 276 U.S. 394, 72 L. Ed 624, 48 S Ct 348, 
the Supreme Court determined that the powers conferred 
upon Congress to lay and collect taxes, duties and 
imports, and to regulate commerce with foreign nations 
jggy ])q used for the protection of American industries.
The Supreme Court pointed out that one of the chief 
purposes behind the imposition of customs duties on 
articles of imported merchandise is the equalization of 
the difference between the cost of producing in a foreign 
country the articles in question and laying them down for 
sale in the United States and the cost of producing and 
selling like or similar articles in the United States, so 
that the duties not only secure revenue but at the same 
time enable domestic producers to compete in the American 
market on terms of equality with foreign producers. As 
long as the motive of Congress and the effect of its 
legislative action are to secure revenue for the benefit
340
of the general government, the existence of other motives 
in the selection of the subject of taxes cannot 
invalidate congressional action.
334. See generally G.C. Hufbauer, D.T. Berliner 6 A/E/ 
Kimberly, Trade Protection in the United States - 31 Case 
Studies. Wash., D.C., Institute for International 
Economics (1985), at 1.
335. See Slot, supra. note 194.
336. Jackson, supra. note 79, at 209-210.
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338. U.S. Const., Art. 2, Section 2. However, the Supreme 
Court has generally held the authority of Congress to be 
preeminent whenever presidential actions have conflicted 
with acts of Congress.
339. Hufbauer, Berliner & Kimberly, supra. note 334, at 6. The 
industries involved are Benzenoid Chemicals, Rubber 
Footwear, Ceramic Articles and Tiles, Glassware, Canned 
Tuna, Textiles and Apparels and Orange Juice.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 9.
344. See generally Jackson & Oavey, supra. note 68, at 
538-609 ; see Finger, Keithall & Nelson, The Political 
Economy of Administered Protection. 72 Am. Eco. Rev. 452 
(1982), at 452.
345. supra. SI.3.1.
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347. Jackson, supra. note 79, at 240-241.
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Id. at 465.
Id. Hudec remarks that :
•^In any market economy, the private owners of firms 
injured by foreign competition will normally seek 
governmental protection when the competition becomes 
damaging. International economic competition has 
intensified in the 1970s. Domestic producers have 
responded with mounting demands for protection. The 
numerous complaints with foreign dumping and subsidies 
illustrate this protectionist trend. (...) The 
"unfairness" rationale appears to offer advantages at 
several levels. At the simple business level, the 
firm's managers do not have to admit competitive 
failure. (...) At the political level, the managers 
can obtain relatively greater attention from 
legislators... Third, at the legal level, once a 
particular practice has been defined as "unfair", 
trade laws typically grant relief at a much lower 
threshold of injury to domestic industry. Moreover, 
the relief is mandatory and remains in effect so long 
as the unfair practice continues. Fourth, on the 
international level, compensation is not due, nor is 
the international reaction as severe, when the trade 
being restricted can be shown to be dumped or 
subsidized." See in Hudec, R.E., "Interface 
Revisited : "Unfair Trade" Policy after the Tokyo 
Round", in Interface Two : Conference Proceedings on 
the Legal Framework of East-West Trade (Wallace & 
Flores eds. 1982), at 20-21.
Finger et al., supra. note 344, at 454.
Id.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 454.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 454.
Id. 
Id. 
Id.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 453.
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Id. at 455.
Id.
Id. at 454.
Id. 
Id.
Id. at 465.
Id.
Hufbauer, Berliner & Kimberly, supra. note 334, at 8.
Recent examples being the "Voluntary Restraint Agreement" 
to limit steel shipments from Brazil, Korea, Spain,
Japan, etc ... and the auto restraints concerning 
Japanese car exports. See infra note 379.
Hufbauer, Berliner & Kimberly, supra. note 334, at 10.
Id. 
Id-
Id. at 10. A very instructive case in this respect is the 
one concerning the birth, life and consequences of the 
Japanese restraints on exports of automobiles in the 
United States from 1981 to 1985. The American automobile 
industry faced difficult economic times in the late 
1970s. It first attempted to obtain protection from 
import competition by petitioning the International Trade 
Commission which, in 1980, made a negative determination 
(Certain Motor Vehicles, Inv. No. TA-201-44, Pub. No. 
1110, 2 ITRD 5241 (ITC 1980)). The American automobile 
industry then used the political track : legislation was 
introduced in Congress to authorise a Voluntary Restraint 
Agreement in the car sector and to impose quotas on 
automobile imports. This would have been a violation of 
GATT. However, no legislative action was taken ultimately 
because an "exchange of views" between the US and 
Japanese governments (US officials denied that there was 
"negotiation") led to a proper understanding of their 
interests by the Japanese. In a letter dated May 7, 1981 
to US Attorney General Smith, Japanese ambassador Okawara 
wrote : "I have the honor to inform you that the 
Government of Japan, through explanations by the United 
States Government fully understands the difficult 
situation of the U.S. auto industry. Based upon the above 
understanding, the Government of Japan will unilaterally
Id- at 454.
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restrain the volume of cars to be exported from Japan to 
the U.S (...) The above-mentioned measures (...) will be 
put into practice through written directives setting the 
maximum number of exportable units of passenger cars to 
the U.S. for each Japanese automobile company, to be 
given by MITI (...) The Government of Japan considers 
that the implementation of such an export restraint by 
the Government of Japan (...) would not give rise to 
violations of American antitrust laws. However, the 
Government of Japan requests that the Department of 
Justice (...) supports the view of the Government of 
Japan". On that same May 7, 1981, Attorney General Smith 
replied : "... we believe that the Japanese automobile 
companies' compliance with export limitations directed by 
MITI would properly be viewed as having been compelled by 
the Japanese government, acting within its sovereign 
power. [This] would not give rise to violations of United 
States antitrust laws." There may not have been a 
technical violation of US antitrust laws, but obviously 
the restraint on competition resulting from the 
"understanding" led to the exact same consequences for 
American consumers. A study of the staff of the Federal 
Trade Commission concluded in 1984 that the restraints 
were costing consumers at least $1.1 billion (in 1983 
dollars) annually in higher prices and the economy as a 
whole some $994 million annually in efficiency and other 
losses. The study estimated that the Japanese auto 
producers obtained benefits in an amount of $824 million 
while American producers' gains were estimated at $115 
million. When the restraints expired on March 31, 1985, 
the United States did not request their renewal. What is 
more appalling is that the restraints have only delayed 
the inevitable : the American auto industry is still 
loosing ground to the Japanese one. The irony of the 
restraints is that the benefits to the Japanese industry 
were more than 7 times those of the US industry... With 
the monopoly rents reaped, the Japanese industry has been 
able to invest and can now give a hell of a hard time to 
the American industry. On this issue, see generally 
Jackson & Davey, supra. note 68, at 619-622 ; see also 
Oxley, supra. note 314, at 47. The difficulties faced 
today by the European car industry due to Japanese 
competition are leading to the exact same attempts by the 
European industry to get protection. An agreement 
restraining Japanese car exports in Europe was signed in 
August 1991 ; it will have the exact same consequences as 
the 1981-1985 restraints in the United States : consumers 
will pay a huge bill ; the efficiency of the economy will 
be greatly reduced ; Japanese will get monopoly rents ; 
European producers of cars will not get incentives to 
produce better cars ; ultimately, the problems faced by 
the industry will be worse than at the outset, and the 
cost of adaptation will be even more expensive than if it 
vefe faced today. See infra, Part III, S3*2.2.1(2).
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Federalism. 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 205 (1990), at 205.
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eds.) vol. 3 of Integration through Law - Europe and the 
American federal Experience. Berlin, de Gruyter, (M. 
Cappelletti, M. Secombe & J. Weiler general eds. 1987), 
at 13, who speaks in the context of legal regimes of 
consumer protection.
Id. at 15.
See generally supra. Part I, §1.1.1 ; see also infra, 
note lla and accompanying text.
See Lenaerts, supra. note 7, at 206.
See Hayek, Part I, ft. 112. In the United States context, 
see. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value.
63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 43 (1988) at 63.
See The Economist's. June 23, 1990, at 11.
See supra. Part I, §1.1.3.
17. This is the essence of constitutionalism : the government
is limited under the rule of law. It is limited by the 
fulfillment of its function, which is the preservation of 
the common good ; it is limited by the rule of law
because it is effective procedures which ensure that the
government effectively does nothing else but preserving 
the common good. ,
18. See Trubek, supra. note 10, at 19.
19. Id-
20. See supra. Introduction, SO.
21. Id* 14.
22. Id.
23. DeAnne Julius, for example, notes that "there is a 
theoretical possibility that pressures in favor of policy 
convergence will drive the level of regulation so low 
that the foundations of the market itself are 
undermined." in Global Companies and Public Policy - The 
Groinq Challenge of Foreign Direct Investment. The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Pinter Publishers, 
1990, at 94.
24. Sgg infra. S2.2.
25. Redish & Nugent, The Dormant Commerce clause and the 
Constitutional Balance of Federalism. 1987 Duke L. J.
569, at 591.
26. U.S. Const, art.I, S10, cl. 1.
27. Redish fc Nugent, supra. note 25, at 591. The United
States, even though created by sovereign states, 
therefore contains some components of devolutionary 
federalism, i.e. of a constitutional order that 
redistributes the power of a previously unitary State 
among its components units ; see Lenaerts, supra. note 7, 
at 206.
28. See id.. at 591-593.
29. Article I, section 8 of the US Constitution reads as
follows :
[1] The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts 
and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare 
of the United States ; but all Duties, Imports and 
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States ;
[2] To borrow money on the credit of the United 
States ;
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[3] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ;
[4] To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and Uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States ;
[5] To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of 
foreign Coin, and fix the standard of Weights and Measures ;
[6] To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting 
the Securities and current Coin of the United States ;
[7] To Establish Post Offices and Post Roads ;
[8] To Promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries ;
[9] To constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme 
Court ;
[10] To define and punish Piracies and Felonies 
committed on the High Seas, and Offenses against the 
Law of Nations ;
[11] To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land 
and Water ;
[12] To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation 
of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than 
two Years ;
[13] To provide and maintain a Navy ;
[14] To make Rules for the Government and Regulation 
of the land and naval Forces ;
[15] To provide for calling forth the Militia to 
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections 
and repel Invasions ;
[16] To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part 
of them as may be employed in the Service of the 
United States, reserving to the States respectively, 
the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of 
training the Militia according to the Discipline 
prescribed by Congress ;[17] To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases 
whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten 
Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, 
and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the 
Government of the United States, and to exercise like 
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of 
the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall 
be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, 
dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings ; And
[18] To make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, 
or in any Department or Officer thereof.
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U.S. Const, art VI, cl. 2, reads as follows :
"[2] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
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all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme 
Law of the Land ; and the Judges in every States shall 
be Bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws 
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding ;M
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56. See Lenaerts, supra. note 7, at 224. The European
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in diversity among previously independent or confederally 
related component entities ; see id. at 206.
57. Id. However, any measure designed to achieve one of the 
objectives of the common agricultural policy must be 
based on Art. 43 ; the same is true in the field of 
transportation, with Art. 75. Article 100 is more 
relevant for our purposes, which are to present the 
procedures and instruments used for the removal of 
non-tariff barriers. Article 235 also provides a general 
basis for the adoption of Community acts, but - as 
Article 100 - it requires unanimity. Article 235 reads :
"If action by the Community should prove necessary to 
attain, in the course of the operation of the common 
market, one of the objectives of the Community and 
this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the 
Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from 
the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take 
the appropriate measures.”
58. Slot, supra. note 45, at 153.
59. Article 189 of the Rome Treaty provides that :
"In order to carry out their task the Council and the 
Commission shall, in accordance with the provisions of 
this Treaty, make regulations, issue directives, take 
decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions.
A regulation shall have general application. It 
shall be binding and directly applicable in all Member 
States.A directive shall be binding, as to the result to 
be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is 
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities 
the choice of form and method.
- 350 -
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon 
those to whom it is addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding 
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60. See Lenaerts, supra. note 7, at 211 ; however, in some 
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direct effect to provisions of a directive ; £.g. case 
No. 41-74, December 4, 1974, Van Duvn. Rec. 1974, 1348, 
at 1350.
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Cappelletti, M. Secombe & J. Weiler, general eds. 1985), 
at 44.
67. But American Courts have never really settled on a 
rationale for their frequently exercised power to held 
state regulation of commerce unconstitutional ; see 
Blasi, "Constitutional Limitations on the Power of States 
to Regulate the Movement of Goods in Interstate 
Commerce", in 1 Courts and Free Markets - Perspectives 
from the United States and Europe. 174, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press (T ; Sandalow & E. Stein eds. 1982), at 175-176 ; 
See Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism__i 
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 84 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1091 (1986) for an argument that the Commerce Clause 
is the best textual basis for a power deriving mostly 
from the structure of the Constitution.
68. Rhebinder, supra. note 66, at 44.
69. Collins, supra. note 14, at 43.
70. Regan, supra. note 67, at 1111.
71. Collins, succa, note 14, at 44.
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72. Id. at 51.
73. U.S. Const, art I, §10, cl.2.
74. Id. cl.3.
75. Id. art. IV, §2, cl.i.
76. Collins, supra. note 14, at 51.
77. Blasi, supra. note 67, at 175.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers. 295-296, New York 
(Harcourt, Brace & Howe, 1920), as cited by Kommers & 
Waelbroeck, "Legal Integration and the Free Movement of 
Goods : the American and European Experience", in 
Integration through Law - Europe and the American Federal 
Experience, vol. 1, Book 3, 165, de Gruyter, Berlin (M. 
Cappelletti, M. Secombe & J. Weiler, general eds. 1986), at 171.
81. Id.
82. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
83. Id. As Professor Regan writes it, this decentralized
structure of government is welcomed because many of the 
same considerations that argue for a centralization of 
power - the complexity and pervasiveness of modern 
economic activity - argue strongly against treating the 
central authority as exclusive ; Regan, supra. note 67, 
at 1112.
84. Kommers & Waelbroeck, supra. note 80, at 171-172, who
indicatively cite six areas : (1) Advertising ; (2) Sale
of goods on consignment which move in interstate commerce 
but are sold exclusively intra-state ; (3) Food 
inspection ; (4) Quarantine laws ; (5) State game 
protection ; (6) Where the state acts as a buyer of goods 
in commerce ; see id. for the references to the cases.
85. See id. at 172.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Collins, supra, note 14, at 61
89. Id.
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90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100. 
101. 
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110. 
111.
Id-
Trubek, supra. note 10, at 19.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Kommers & Waelbroeck, supra. note 80, at 172.
53 U.S. (12 HOW.) 299 (1851).
Konuners & Waelbroeck, supra. note 80, at 173.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 173-174, citing the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Stone in DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 
(1927).
Id. at 174.
Id.
Blasi, supra. note 67, at 185.
Id.
See generally. Regan, supra. note 67, at 1101-1108.
Id- at 1102-1103.
Id. at 1102.
Or. App., 517 P. 2d 691 (1973).
Id- at 1105-1108.
397 U.S. 137 (1970).
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Regan, Supra. note 67, at 1108.
See id. at 1136-1137. However, if for one reason or 
another, the court's ability to ascertain legislative
purpose is distrusted, or if it is thought that inquiry
into purpose is improper for some reason, then 
protectionist effect balancing might be recommended as a 
rule of decision that would approximate the results of 
successful inquiry into purpose while avoiding some of 
the attendant problems ; Id* at 1106.
112. Id. at 1125-1126.
113. Id. at 1126.
114. For more details, see gsneyaHy Regan, supra, note 67.
115. Regan, supra. note 67, at 1127.
116. Id. at 1118 ; emphasis added.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1130.
119. The statute was upheld in American Can Co. v. Oregon
Liquor .CQfltrpl Cpppi., 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691
I / 3 j •
120. feiCL*., Regan, supra. note 67, at 1116-1117.
121. Id. at 1118.
122. Id.
123. And, generally speaking, any form of multi-state economic integration.
124. Regan, supra. note 67, at 1118.
125. Id. at 1177.
126. Id. at 1146-1147.
127. Id. at 1147.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1148.
132. See generally. Collins, supra. note 14, at 68.
133. See supra. part I, 5— .
134. Cost exporting legislation is damaging to a decentralized 
structure of government because it is not bound by local 
political restraint. See Collins, supra. note 14, at 
66-67. In South Carolina State Highway Department v. 
Barnwell Bros.. 303 U.S. 177 (1938), Justice Stone's 
opinion for the United States Supreme Court said that the 
Commerce clause prohibits state legislation that "by its
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necessary operation is a means of gaining a local benefit 
by throwing the attendant burdens on those without the 
state.” Id. at 186 "[W]hen the regulation is of such a 
character that its burden falls principally upon those 
without the state, legislative action is not likely to be 
subjected to those political restraints which are 
normally exerted on legislation where it affects 
adversely some interests within the state." Id* at 185.
135. T. Sandalow & E. Stein, supra. note 67, at 24.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 24-25.
138. However, Sandalow & Stein warned that the cases were
plainly too few in number to permit a judgment about the
depth of the European Court of Justice's commitment to 
the principle of integration. They noted further that on 
the cases cited in support of the claim that the Court 
applies an "integration" principle, those involving 
import and export licences may be explained by the risk 
there was that the licence requirements might come to be 
administered in a way that would serve to protect the 
market. As to the industrial property cases, the Court's 
concern may have been the distortion of competition as
much as the free movement of goods ; Id* at 26.
139. The only real contender as a test of constitutionality of 
texts restricting inter-state trade opposed to the motive 
review test ; see supra. notes 107 to 109 and 
accompanying text.
140. See Part I, ft. 96.
141. Regan, supra. note 67, at 1179.
142. See Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law 198 
R.C.A.D.I.9 (1986), at 14.
143. All customs duties on imports or exports between member
states are prohibited ; the same applies to "charges
having equivalent effect" (Article 9).
144. e.g. Schermers, "The Role of the European Court of
Justice in Free Movement of Goods", in 1 Courts and Free 
Markets - Perspectives form the United States and Europe. 
222 (T. Sandalow & E. Stein eds. 1982), at 225. In the 
Administrative fees in Germany case, the Court decided
that "any pecuniary charge however small and whatever its
designation and modes of application, which is imposed 
unilaterally on domestic or foreign goods by reason of 
the fact that they cross a frontier, and which is not a 
customs duty in the strict sense, constitutes a charge
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having equivalent effect within the meaning of Article 9,12, 13 and 16 of the Treaty, even if it is not imposed 
for the benefit of the State, is not discriminatory or 
protective in effect, and if the product on which the 
charge is imposed is not in competition with any domestic 
product" ; joined cases 52 & 55/65 (1966) ECR 159, 169.
145. L.M. Gormley, prohibiting Restrictions on Trade within 
the EEC. North-Hoiland (1985), at 2.
146. For the text of Article 36, see supra. Part I, note 96 ; 
for a discussion on Article 36, see infra. §2.2.2.5.
147. Case 8/74 (1974) CLR 837, 852.
148. According to Gormley, however, in this case "the 
discrimination criterion was firmly rejected in favor of 
the central importance of the actual or potential, direct 
or indirect effect on trade between member States" ,
cf. Gormley, supra. note 145, at 22, emphasis added ; for 
Gormley, the Court "demonstrated that the crucial 
question is whether a measure is capable of hindering 
trade between Member States", id. at 72, emphasis added. 
We obviously dessent.
149. First, a remark on terminology : when the Court uses the 
expression "discrimination", it normally does it to 
designate "open discrimination". We will use it in the 
broder sense encompassing open and hidden discrimination. 
On the substantive level now, Marenco has proposed a 
unitary reading of the case law of the European Court of 
Justice regarding our issue to which we generally 
subscribe ; see generally Marenco, Pour une 
interprétation traditionnelle de la notion de mesure 
d'effet équivalent à une restriction Quantitative. 20 
Cahiers D. Eur. 291 (1984). According to Marenco, "la 
piste à explorer est (...) que le noyau du concept de 
mesure d'effet équivalent serait l'idée de 
discrimination, soit que la discrimination soit 
directement constatée, soit que le défaut d'une 
constatation directe soit suppléé par d'autres éléments 
révélant, de manière indirecte, l'existence d'une forme 
subtile de discrimination." See at 304.
150. case 231/78, Commission v. United Kingdom (1979) ECR 
1447 ; case 232/78, Commission v. France (1979) ECR 
2729 ; case 53/76, Bouhelier (1977) ECR 197 ; case 95/81,
V. Italv (1982) ECR 2187 ; case 132/80, United 
Foods etc v. Belgium (1981) ECR 995.
151. For a similar approach, see generally Marenco, supra, 
note 149.
152. F. Burrows, Free Movement in European Community Law, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press (1987), at 52.
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153. Contra. Gormley, supra. note 145, at 96.
154. Case 15/79, P.B. v. Produktshap voor Vee en Vlees (1979) ECR 3409.
155. As in the case 53/76, Procureur de la Rfepublioue de 
Besancon v. Bouhelier et al. (1977) ECR 197, where the 
Court struck down a French measure according to which 
exporters of watches were required to obtain a licence 
for their exportation, unless covered by a specified 
technical standard.
156. The Court ruled that Article 34 "concerns national 
measures which have as their specific object the 
restriction of patterns of export and thereby the 
establishment of a difference in treatment between the 
domestic trade of a Member State and its export trade in 
such a way as to provide a particular advantage for 
national production or for the domestic market of the 
State in question at the expense of the production or of 
the trade of other Member States." Case 15/79 (1979) ECR 
3409,3415.
157. Case 15/79 (1979) ECR 3405, 3416 ; emphasis added.
158. Another case where the Court fortunately rejected the 
effect-on-trade test is the Oebel case. Mr. Oebel was 
charged, in Germany, with having his employees engaged in 
the production of bread working at night, contrary to a 
provision in German law. Mr. Oebel counter-attacked by 
saying that Germany was the only Member State with such 
prohibition ; that the law prevented fresh bread from 
being delivered in neighbouring Member States in time for 
sale in the early morning ; that - therefore - the German 
legislation was an unjustified discrimination and a 
restriction on competition within the Community... The 
Court answered that do not fall under the prohibition of 
Article 34 rules regulations "...which are part of 
economic and social policy and apply by virtue of 
objective criteria to all the undertakings in a 
particular country which are established within the 
national territory without leading to anv difference in 
treatment whatsoever on the ground of the nationality of 
traders and without distinguishing between the domestic 
trade of the state in question and the export trade."
159. For example, Gormley, supra. note 145.
160. Id* at 102. Gormley acknowledging that the case law under
Article 34 is "correct in its results", is then forced to
the logical conclusion that the Court has to be "somewhat 
perverse in its reasoning" ; Gormley, ¿d. The Court has 
no perverse reasonings. They are such only if one wants a 
priori the Court to apply an effect-on-trade criterion, 
which is what Gormley thinks the court is applying in 
Article 30 cases.
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161. According to G. Marenco, "La notion de mesure d'effet 
équivalant à une restriction quantitative ne peut qu'être 
fondamentalement la même, tant lorsqu'elle s'applique à 
l'importation, que lorsqu'elle s'applique à 
l'exportation" ; see in Marenco, suora. note 149, at 301.
162. See Marenco, supra. note 149, at 303.
163. See supra. note 147.
164. Case 8/74 (1974) ECR 837, 852.
165. This is the so-called lacunae issue, in the terminology
used by those considering that the actual solution of 
centralized/decentralized regulation is only transitory ; see, for example, Gormley, supra. note 145, at 3.
However, we do not think there is a lacunae here, but a
systemic problem necessarily faced in a multi-state 
economic integration.
166. The Dassonville case, used by the protectionist effect
doctrine in support of its theory is an odd case. It
arose out of the prosecution of an importer of Scotch 
whisky, practicing parallel imports from France to 
Belgium. The importer did not possess the appropriate 
British customs documentation which would have provided 
the certification of origin required by the Belgian 
authorities, and it had falsified it. Although it would 
have been easy for a direct importer to obtain the 
certification of origin, it was in fact extremely 
difficult for an indirect importer to obtain such 
certificate. In addition to the criminal proceedings, the 
importer faced a civil claim for damages from the two 
firms which held the exclusive concession for Belgium for 
the brands of whisky involved. Therefore, the Court was 
faced with two related questions î one as to the effect 
of the Belgian law ; and one as to the effect of the 
exclusive distributorship agreement. In Dassonville. we 
submit here that the.Court was militant in its interpretation because of the oddness of the case. The 
Dassonville case is a parallel importation case ; and the 
promotion of parallel imports is quite an efficient way 
of preventing private parties from partitioning the 
market — prevention that the Court is eager to ensure.
The Belgian rules on certificate of authenticity were not 
directed at helping a prevention of parallel imports. 
However, without the militantism of the Court, they would 
be too easy to use for private parties willing to reduce 
competition in the Common market. Odd cases make bad law, 
and the p^ssonville case is more important for the 
broadness of the judicial review it proclaims than for 
its a-typical test. Sêê also Marenco, supra, note 149, at
318-321.
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167. Case 113/80 (1981) ECR 1625.
168. Nor could the Irish government rely on Article 36 because 
the same grounds were not listed in that Article. Then 
the Court turned to the application of Article 30 to the 
facts and said, after reciting an Irish argument to the 
effect that there was in fact no discrimination and the 
Commission's contention that there was : "It is therefore 
necessary to consider whether the contested measures are 
indeed discriminatory or whether they constitute 
discrimination in appearance only. "The Court decided 
that there was discrimination and therefore a breach of 
Article 30*
169. Marenco, supra. note 149, at 303-304.
170. Burrows, supra. note 152, at 56.
171. In the case 35/76, Simmental (1976) ECR 1871, the Court
of Justice held that : "Article 36 is not designed to 
reserve certain matters to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
member states but permits national laws to derogate from
the principle of the free movement of goods to the extent
to which such derogation is and continues to be justified 
for the attainment of the objectives referred to in that 
Article." See case at 1886.
172. Case 4/75 (1975) ECR 843.
173. Hence, in the de Peijper case, 104/75 (1976) ECR 613, the 
Court wrote that : "Health and the life of humans rank 
first among the property or interest protected by Article 
36 and it is for the Member States, within the limits 
imposed bv the Treaty, to decide what degree of 
protection they intend to assure and in particular how 
strict the checks to be carried out are to be. 
Nevertheless. it emerges from Article 36 that national 
rules or practices which do restrict imports of 
pharmaceutical products or are capable of doing so are 
only compatible with the treaty to the extent to which 
they are necessary for the effective protection of health 
and life of humans. National rules or practices do not 
fall within the exceptions specified in Article 36 if the 
health and life of humans can as effectively be protected 
by measures which do not restrict intra-Communitv trade 
as much." See case at 635, emphasis added.
174. As said in Bauhuis. 46/76 (1977) ECR 5, "... this 
provision constitutes a derogation from the basic rules 
that all obstacles to the free movement of goods between 
Member States shall be eliminated and must be interpreted 
strictly..." After the "Cassis de Dijon" case, some could 
believe that the Court was now extending its
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interpretation of Article 36. In any case, such was the 
understanding of the Irish government when, in the 
Commission v. Ireland case, it tried to defend 
restrictions on intra-Community trade it had created on the ground that they were justified by consumer 
protection and the maintaining of fairness in commercial 
transactions. The Court held, however, that the Irish 
government was mistaken in relying on Article 36. That 
Article constitutes a derogation to the basic rule of 
free movement, and the exceptions listed in it could not
be extended. Those exceptions did not include protection
of consumer or fairness of commercial transactions.
175. The word "exceptions" is the one used by the Court itself 
in the case 113/80, Commission v. Ireland (1981) ECR 
1625, 1639, to describe the principles it had created in 
the cases to which it referred, the first of them being 
the case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v.
Bundersmonopolverwaltung fur Brabbtwein (1979) ECR 649, 
Commonly known as the "Cassis de Dinon" case.
176. Case 120/78 (1979) ECR 649, 662.
177. As to the extent of state powers, the Court wrote :
"Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting
from disparities between the national laws relating to 
the marketing of the products in question must be 
accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognized 
as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory 
requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness 
of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, 
the fairness of commercial transactions and the defense 
of the consumer." Case 120/78 (1979) ECR 649, 665.
178. According to Marenco :
"... les règles du traité n'ont pas pour but (...) d'interdire les réglementations des Etats membres en 
tant que telles, afin de parvenir à l'uniformité de 
ces réglementations par leur simple suppression. Ces 
règles se préoccupent des effets que ces 
réglementations éxercent de manière spécifique sur les 
échanges entre Etats membres, non pas de l'effet 
restrictif général, qui est propre à toute réglementation, du seul fait de son existence, et qui 
affecte, de manière générale, la liberté économique 
privée." In Marenco, supra, note 149, at 318-319, 
emphasis in original.
179. As it did subsequently.
180. See supra. §2.2.2.5.
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181. In conclusion to his study, Marenco writes :
"L'étude entreprise montre que la libre circulation 
des marchandises organisée par le traité de Rome est, 
comme les autres libertés, une expression du principe 
de non-discrimination ; et que tel est le fondement de 
la notion de mesure d'effet équivalant à une 
restriction quantitative". In Marenco, suora. note
149, at 349.
182. Case 113/80 (1981) ECR 1625.
183. Case 120/78, Rewe (1979) ECR 649 ; case 788/79, Gilli 
(1980) ECR 2071 ; case 130/80, Kelderman (1981).
184. Case 113/80 (1981) ECR 1625, 1639 ; emphasis added.
185. Id* i emphasis added.
186. Id. at 1640 ; emphasis added.
187. Id. ; emphasis added.
188. According to Gormley, because the Court had already
concluded that the measure did have an effect on trade
between Member States - which was not in dispute -, it
pronounced itself on the discrimination issue only out of 
deference to the Irish government's point... see Gormley, 
supra. note 145, at 265.
189. Sandalow & Stein, supra. note 67, at 27 ; emphasis added.
190. See supra, notes 119 to 125 and accompanying text.
191. Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark (1988), under no.2.
192. Making reference to the cases 120/78, Rewe (1979) ECR 
649, and 261/81, Bail (1982) ECR 3961.
193. Case 302/86 (1988) under no.6.
194. Mentioning the case 240/83, Association de défense des 
brftleurs d'huiles. .as.aqfegg (1985) ecr 5 3 1.
195. Case 302/86 (1988) under nos. 8-9.
196. Case 302/86 (1988), Submissions and Arguments of the
Parties, at 5.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. case 240/83 (1985) ECR 531.
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2 0 0.
201.
2 0 2.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
Case 302/86 (1988) under no.13.
Id. under no.12.
Id- under no.13.
Id. under no.20.
Id. under no.16.
See supra. note 138.
Case 302/86 (1988) under no.21.
Id.
States can have individual policies only as long as there 
is no legally valid Community action. When the Community 
adopts rules designed to protect public policy, public 
health, and the other matters mentioned in Article 36 - 
as well as the ones falling under the so-called "rule of 
reason" - these rules are prima facie exhaustive ans so, 
unless they specifically provide otherwise, there is no 
longer any room for national measures. If the Community 
rules take the form of a harmonization directive under 
Article 100, national rules can not go beyond what is 
permitted by, or necessary to give effect to, the 
directive ; see Burrows, supra. note 152, at 63.
PART III
Jacquemin and Schrans remark that : *
"... notre économie de marché suppose l'existence 
d'institutions juridiques optimales qui assurent son 
épanouissement. Parmi les conditions ... qui sont 
requises ... peuvent être évoquées :
A) En général, un bien n'acquiert une utilité 
économique, ou encore une chose ne se convertit en 
bien, que grâce aux droits qu'on a sur elle. Ainsi, 
une certaine forme de propriété est à la base des 
échanges. Cette propriété confère, en effet, un 
contrôle du bien ou du service ... . Elle assure la 
possibilité d'exclure jusqu'à un certain degré 
l'utilisation par autrui. En outre, elle comporte le 
droit d'être transférée ou échangée. Plus les 
principes d'exclusivité et de transférabilité de la 
propriété d'un bien sont stricts, plus la valeur 
marchande de ce bien tendra à être élevée. A la 
limite, le véritable bien est moins la chose que les 
droits eux-mêmes. (...) Le fait que la valeur 
marchande des biens ou des services tend à croître 
avec le degré de protection par les droits de 
propriété est donc une importante motivation pour 
rechercher un système légal qui assure semblable 
protection ou qui facilite le passage d'un droit 
d'usage à un droit de propriété. (...)
B) Un autre fondement de l'économie de marché est la 
liberté contractuelle. Cette liberté traduit une 
décentralisation du processus législatif, comme il y a 
décentralisation de la décision économique. ... les 
conventions légalement formées tiennent lieu, en 
effet, de loi & ceux qui les ont faites. (...)
C) Le régime de responsabilité patrimoniale assure, 
lui aussi, le cadre de l'économie de marché. (...) 
Monnaie et crédit, brevets, propriété privée, liberté 
contractuelle, responsabilité patrimoniale, tout est 
déterminant pour la réalisation d'un système de prix 
destiné à être un fidèle indicateur de rareté." See in 
A. Jacquemin & G. Schrans, Le Droit Economique. Paris, 
P.U.F. (1982, 1ère ed. 1970), at 11-14.
The définition and enforcement of property rights, the 
enforcement of contracts and the récognition of 
patrimonial liability is usually made by state norms 
and through state institutions. The définition and 
enforcement of property rights, particularly in the 
field of intellectual property, may require, however,
- 363 -
international norms and institutions. This is one of 
the issues addressed during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.
2. See supra, Part II, §2.2.
3. Id.
4. See supra, Part I, §1.3.2.
5. See supra. Part I, §1.3.2 (2) & (3).
6. See supra, Part I, §1.2.2.
7. See supra, Part I, §1.2.2.2.
8. See in particular supra. Part I, §1.2.1.3.
9. Within federal systems, such as the United
European Community, this need translates in a increased 
capacity for "federal" institutions to create central 
norms ; see supra. Part II, §2.1.
10. W. Friedman notes that :
"La conception fonctionelle permet d'imaginer, au fur 
et à mesure que les Etats tenteront de répondre aux 
défis que représente tel ou tel problème précis, qu'un 
réseau de plus en plus étendu d'organisations 
internationales viendra progressivement combler les 
lacunes de l'ordre juridique international et que, 
progressivement, l'interdépendance véritable des 
diverses organisations et de leurs objectifs les 
amèneront à établir entre elles des liens." In De 
l'efficacité des Institutions internationales. 
Collection U., série "Relations et institutions 
internationales", Paris (1970), at 105-106.
11. See supra. Part I, note 94.
12. However, integrated policies must share a common view of 
what is the proper role of government in society, a point 
which we have stressed at the outset ; see supra. Part I, 
note 127 and accompanying text.
13. See supra, Part I, §1.3.
14. See supra. Part II, §2.2.1.2(2).
1 5t For an example of a Voluntary Export Restraint, sgg
supra. Part I, note 379.
16. Sêê supra. Part I, §1.2.2 for tariff protection.
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17. See infra, in Part I, Introduction, §0.(2). See Kahn,
"Droit international économique - Droit du développement 
- Lex mercatoria - Concept unique ou pluralisme des 
ordres juridiques ?" in Le droit des relations 
économiques internationales - Etudes offertes à B. 
Goldman. 97, Paris, Librairies Techniques (1982), at 99. 
For some, the words international, transnational and 
global are to be taken as synonyms ; Id* For others, 
their progression evidences a reduction in the 
significance of states' frontiers for the participants in 
the international economy ; id* M. Beau proposes the 
following definitions, which make a lot of sense, but are 
not universally used :
"National, se rapporte principalement à 1'Etat-nation 
et à la formation sociale nationale qui se constitue 
en son cadre.
International. s'applique aux relations repérables 
entre deux Etats-nationaux.
Multinational ou transnational, s'applique aux espaces 
que les firmes, banques, organismes financiers 
constituent sur la base de (et à travers) plusieurs 
Etats-nations.
International. se décompose dès lors en deux :
1) au sens strict, relations entre deux agents 
distincts situés dans deux Etats-nations;
2) l'autre composante, correspondant à des relations 
(entre Etats-nations) internes à l'espace 
multinational d'une firme ou banque.
Plurinational. s'applique à l'action conjointe de 
plusieurs Etats-nations (exemple : coopération, 
concertation, planification plurinationales).
Mondial, s'applique à ce qui concerne le monde entier, 
ou l'ensemble, la plus grande partie du monde, en 
débordant & la fois l'espace des Etats-nations et 
celui des firmes multinationales..." In M. Beaud, Lê 
système national mondial hiérarchisé. Paris, AGALMA,
La découverte (1987), at 5.
18. See supra. Part I, note 4.
19. See supra. Part I, note 6.
2 0 . £££ generally Demaret, L'.extraterritorial it* ties lois sfcles relations transatlantiques - Une question de droit ou
de diplomatie? 21 R.T.D.E. 1 (1985).
21. See supra. Part I, Introduction, §0.(3).
22. But also individuals, such as rock-stars, sportsmen,...
who, however, make the market for state play only with
regards to limited issues such as personal income
taxation for very wealthy individuals ; while companies 
make the game play for all aspects of economic regulation 
or taxation.
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23. §eg, for example, The Economist's. May 6, 1991, at 11.
24. Beaud, supra, note 17, at 102.
25. This is the lesson French Socialists' learned the hard 
way in 1981-1983 ; see supra in Part I, note 37 and accompanying text.
26. Id.
27. Susan Strange remarks that :
"... the nature of the competitive game between states 
is not what it was* Instead of competing for territory (because land was the prime source of wealth and 
therefore wealth and political power for the state 
could be achieved through control over the territory), 
states are now increasingly engaged in a different 
kind of game : they are competing for world market 
shares as the surest means to greater wealth and 
therefore greater economic security" ; in The 
Persistent Mvth of Lost Hegemony. 41 Int'l Org. 551(1987), at 564.
28. See supra. Introduction, §3.
29. See supra. Part I, §1.1.3.
30. See supra, note 27.
31. See Strange, The Study of Transnational Relations. 52
Int'l Aff. 333 (1976), at 334-335. The struggle among
states continues even after they have eventually created 
federal structures above themselves, such as in the 
European Community, but also in the United States ; see 
Pescatore, Private and Public Aspects of European 
Competition Law. 10 Fordham Int'l L. J. 373 (1987). In 
the commonwealth of peoples and states that the European 
Community is, in addition to private companies, the 
Member States themselves remain extremely powerful 
competitors. An accurate description of the rules on 
competition in EEC law must therefore include 
consideration of both the rules applicable to private 
operators ("undertakings") and the rules applicable to 
public operators. The theses of Pescatore is that even 
though the rules regulating the activities of the Member 
States are not organized systematically, they are based 
on the same principles as the rules applicable to 
undertakings. It is therefore possible to discern a 
coherent system of competition control applicable to 
private operators and members states alike. Id. at 373.
366 -
32. But it is different in developing countries where war may
appear as still making sense as a mode of appropriation 
of economic resources, and still occurs.
33. See supra. note 27.
34. For Dupuy,
"Le territoire est la notion primordiale du droit des 
gens, il est l'assise spatiale des compétences de 
l'Etat, la zone irréductible, le siège de 
l'indépendance : on ne défend celle-ci que par 
celui-là. L'autorité du territoire n'a pas cessé de se 
développer dans le monde présent." in R.-J. Dupuy, La
communauté internationale entre le mvthe et
l'histoire. Paris, Economica/UNESCO (1986), at 43.
35. This is so because many micro-economic actors, who
control at least 3 factors of production (capital, 
knowledge and organization) out of 4 (the fourth being 
raw materials), are increasingly global and able to move 
to wherever they find the best returns. This mobility of 
factors of production also challenges classical notions
of international economics ; see, for example, DeAnne
Julius, Global companies and public policy : the growing 
challenge of foreign direct investment. Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, Pinter publishers, 1991, at 
7-8. For Beaud,
"... on traîne depuis un siècle et demi une définition 
contestable - à la fois simpliste et biaisée - de la 
nation : un espace clos de facteurs - les facteurs de 
production étant absolument ou relativement immobiles 
dans le cadre des frontières, alors que les 
marchandises, elles, les traversent ; sur cette base a 
été élaborée une construction de plus en plus 
sophistiquée sur l'échange international, la 
spécialisation et la division internationale du 
travail ; chacun s'accorde sur le caractère 
extrêmement rudimentaire et inadéquat d'une telle 
définition de la nation, mais, pourrait-on dire, elle 
"fonctionne" et chacun s'en accomode." lu Beaud, 
supra. note 17, at 33.
36. Companies, in particular, are so important in the global 
economy that they tend to get a sort of recognition in 
international economic law. If, in classical 
international law, states are the only subjects 
considered, it is not so in more recent developments 
which can be encompassed in the development of the 
"relational model" of international law.
Dupuy, for example, distinguishes two separate models 
which co-exist in international law :
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"Le modèle relationnel part de la situation qui s'est 
développée tout au long des siècles ... Composé 
d'Etats souverains, c'est un système qui refuse toute 
transcendance. (...) ... à partir du XVI° siècle,
1'enrichissement qui résulte des grandes découvertes 
pour certains pays va y susciter 1'Etat moderne (...)
... entre Etats se nouent des rapports horizontaux : 
les relations du pouvoir et du droit s'établissant latéralement.
L'autre modèle, celui du système institutionnel, part 
du phénomène qui tend à regrouper les Etats et à 
ériger parmi eux et au-dessus d'eux des normes 
juridiques et des organes chargés d'en faciliter, d'en 
contrôler, voire d'en assumer eux-même 1'effectivité. 
(...) ce qui est essentiel à saisir, c'est que l'ordre 
institutionnel ne s'est pas substitué à l'ordre 
relationnel. (...) ... les deux modèles que nous avons 
retenus sont synchrones ï l'institutionel, et c'est là 
qu'est la tension dialectique, coexiste avec le 
relationnel." supra. note 34, at 41-42.
In the "relational model" of international law, Dupuy 
notes "D'une part, le quasi-monopole par les Etats de la 
qualité d'agent juridique, de l'autre, l'exclusion des 
individus du droit international public" ; id. at 43.
With the development of what Dupuy calls the 
institutional model in international law, which is 
necessary to explain the surge in international economic 
organizations, other institutions than states are 
becoming subjects of rights and obligations in 
international law. It is true in particular in the 
European Community, where the "institutional" aspects are 
in fact so important that this field of international law 
may have become of a "constitutional" nature.
An interesting parallel can be made here between 
developments in economic and in legal doctrines : while 
micro-economic organizations increasingly tend to become 
subjects of international economic law, which gives them 
access to some forms of international justice, some 
economists attempt to understand the nation not as a 
closed space of production factors (see supra, note 35), 
but as a "groupe de groupes orientés et arbitrés par un 
Etat qui use de la contrainte légitimée et organisée" ; 
or as a "groupe de groupes orientés, coordonnés et 
arbitrés par l'Etat qui éxerce le monopole de la contrainte publique" (see Beaud, supra, note 17, at 37, 
citing Perroux). This book can in some sense be 
understood as an attempt to merge these two developments : today's world-economy, studied in an 
institutional perspective, is comprised of international 
organizations (groups of states), of states (which are 
groups of groups) and of companies other types of 
groups, not necessarily comprised within the territory of 
1 1 b single state) in which the distribution and control 
of power requests new procedures to allow for a smooth 
functioning of competition.
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37. See supra. Part I, §1-1-2.
38. E. Gaillard has developped a fascinating theory of power
in French private law : Le pouvoir en droit privé. Paris,
Masson (1985). A «nmm* djvisio in law may be between the 
exercize of property rights and the exercise of power, 
the first being a prerogative of the individual, the 
second a consequence of the structuring of individuals' 
actions in organizations ; and while the first should be 
made independently and freely (because it is considered 
has having consequences only for the individual making 
the decision), the second should be subject to some form 
of control (because it has consequences for the one 
making the decision as well as for others). The summa 
divisio in a liberal legal system is then NOT between 
"public" and "private", and in each instance where there 
is exercise of power in any organization, there should 
exist procedures to control such use. Gaillard's analysis 
shows that even in private law, "Si l'on devait définir 
d'un mot la prérogative qu'emporte tout pouvoir, c'est le 
terme de décision qui viendrait aussitôt & l'exprit. Le 
titulaire du pouvoir est en effet investi du droit de 
faire prévaloir sa décision, de trancher, par l'exercice 
de sa volonté, une situation juridique et d'imposer à 
autrui la décision prise : le titulaire du pouvoir est 
bien le "décideur" que décrivent les économistes." at 138 
(emphasis added). What this book does is actually attempt 
to offer a demonstration of the need and possibility to 
extend procedures of control of creators of norms 
(constitutional review) to prevent the adoption of 
protectionism. The goal is to develop procedures of 
constitutional review which are necessary to set the 
foundations of a sound international economic regime. We 
will see below that the procedures needed to make such 
control effective require a recognition of the role of 
"private" economic actors in the functioning of the legal 
system of allocation of power ; if proper procedures are 
open to private economic actors, their use, made in the 
pursuit of the sole interest of the firm using them, may
entail large social benefits ; see infra §3.1.2.2.
39. See supra. Part II, notes 119 to 125 and accompanying
text.
40. On the taxonomy of issues presented by integrated 
multi-state economies, and on the mechanisms to use to 
address them, see Part II, S2.0.1 & §2.0.2. On point
(ii), see, for a general description of the circumvention 
of public institutions by sectional interests in the 
field of trade regulation in the United states context, 
Part I SI.3.2.
41. See generally supra Part I, Introduction and $1*1*
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
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See supra. Part I, note 10.
See, for example, The Economist's. June 23, 1990, at 69, 
on the role of foreign direct investments in forcing 
governments to compete. With regard to the beneficial 
aspects of state competition in the field of regulation, 
Collins notes in the context of the United States federal system :
^Efficiency of local lawmaking is a basic 
justification for state autonomy in the federal 
system. Local lawmaking can be more exactly tailored 
to particular problems and can more readily experiment 
with different solutions. Competition among legal 
systems generates efficiencies as jurisdictions 
compete to attract and retain people and capital."
However, Collins also notes that this works only if 
economic resources are mobile (i.e. economic frontiers 
are eliminated) and if there is no cost-exporting 
legislation (of which protectionist legislation is but 
one kind) :
"Local lawmaking best serves these ends when people 
and resources are mobile and when local laws do not 
export significant costs. When government cost borne 
at home become relatively large, a state's products 
are less competitive than products of states imposing 
lower costs. Local politics then restrain the 
legislature. When the same costs are largely exported, 
political restraint weakens or disappears." See 
Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value. 63 
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 43 (1988), at 68
See supra, Part I, 5 1.1.1 (2)(i).
On the concept of the international society as an 
anarchy, see supra. Part I, note 3. In a recent note on 
the Developments in the Law - International Environmental 
Law. 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1484 (1991) [hereinafter the 
"Note"), the connection between anarchy and sovereignty 
was straightforwardly made : "The international system is 
most appropriately characterized by anarchy ; states are 
sovereign." See at 1553.
One has to realize, however, that even though there is no 
legal principle of international law legally constraining 
any state to have a particular internal mode of 
organization of its economy, the existence of a 
globalizing liberal economic system creates unavoidable 
constraints.
47. SS£ supra. Part I, Sl-1-2 & 1.1.3.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
See supra. Part I, §1.1.2.
Id.
See supra. S3.1.2(1) t  S3.1.2(3)(i).
See supra. Part I, Introduction 1.(2).
See supra. Part I, SI-1.2.
Even when they decide to create organizations among 
themselves, for example if they think it is an efficient 
way of allocating their economic resources, which 
internally will then function according to the rules set 
by the hierarchy managing the organization, and not 
according to market mechanism (which is the "nature of 
the firm" ; see Coase, The Nature of the Firm. 1937 
Economica N.S. 386), It is always, at the end, market 
competition which disciplines the functioning of 
organizations. Such organizations may become big and 
inefficient but, at least theoretically, and practically 
more often than not, market selection eliminates the 
inefficient organizations. As for the individuals subject 
to the authority of those in control of the organization, 
they are, as employees, protected by labor law, and by 
their right to leave the organization. In this manner, 
the liberal system allows society (as opposed to the 
government) to determine the changing equilibrium between 
market competition and organization, individuals' rights 
and their alienation in structures of command (firms), 
etc... It is the role of antitrust law is to preserve the 
very existence of competition in national economies from 
private actions by holders of power which would destroy 
competition, which would have as a consequence to damage 
the whole foundations of the liberal regulatory system 
and of market society in general.
This explains why, with economic development, there has 
been, everywhere, a tremendous increase in state 
regulation, a modification of the social role of the 
state from that of the night watchman to that of a 
positive actor in the economy.
gee A. Cassese, International Law in a Divided World. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford (1986), at 13.
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See supra. Part I, $1*2.2. 6 SI-3.
There are several means of protecting the proper 
functioning of a liberal society. One of them is to 
decentralize power ; another one is judicial review of 
norms. We can follow Cappelletti, who remarks :
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"... constitutional justice [implies] the adoption of 
a new kind of constitutional norms, institutions. and 
processes in an attempt to thereby limit and control 
the political power. There are, of course, a variety 
of ways to achieve that end. These include 
regionalism, which brings about a decentralization of at least part of the political power, one form of a 
"vertical sharing" of that power. [They also include] 
judicial review of the constitutionality of state 
action, and particularly of legislation." in 
Cappelletti, "Repudiating Montesquieu ? The Expansion 
and Legitimacy of "Constitutional Justice"", in Noi si roura. Selected Working Papers of the European 
University Institute, European University Institute, 
Badia Fiesolana, Florence (1986), 191, at 193-194.
58. Cappelletti remarks :
"Austria since 1945, Japan since 1947, Italy since 
1948, Germany since 1949 ; emerging from the nightmare 
of tyranny and war, all these countries have followed 
a similar path in their effort to build a new form of 
government, civil-libertarian and democratic. (...)
... even in the United States the role of 
constitutional adjudication has acquired its current 
importance only in the post-World War II epoch, when 
it became the foremost instrument for the enforcement 
of certain basic civil rights of individuals and 
minority groups against reluctant majorities in the 
states, and against the inaction of the political 
branches at the federal level." Id. at 194.
The European Court of Justice's role in reviewing the 
"constitutional" validity of Community and state norms 
within the fields covered by the Rome Treaty and the 
other documents founding the European Community has been 
instrumental for the definition of the allocation of 
regulatory power among states and the community's 
institutions, and to set limits to such powers. On 
France, see infra, note 60.
59. On this issue, Cappelletti notes :
"Constitutions and bills of rights, of course, have 
existed in France, Germany and elsewhere for many 
years. Until the post—World War II epoch, however, 
their meaning tended to be that ofpolitical-philosophical declarations rather than that 
of legally binding enactments. For, with few sporadic 
and short-lived exceptions (most notably that of 
Austria in the 1920's and early 1930's), no independent body was entitled to supervise their 
actual application. The constitutional revolution - 
and I do mean what this word says - occurred in Europe
only with the suffered acquisition of the awareness 
that a constitution, and a constitutional bill of 
rights, need judicial machinery to be made effective. 
The United States certainly provided an influential 
precedent. But the most compelling lesson came from 
domestic experience, the existence of tyranny and 
oppression by a political power unchecked by machinery 
both accessible to the victims of governmental abuse, 
and capable of restraining such abuse." Id. at 194-195.
60. France has been, and still is, reluctant to participate 
in the "constitutional revolution" ; (on this revolution, 
see supra. note 58). Parliamentary democracy having been 
its political credo since the 1789 Revolution, the 
Parliament is considered as being immune from judicial 
control ; see id. at 196. However, the Constitution of 
1958 has created a Conseil Constitutionnel. which has 
asserted itself for the first time as an independent, 
quasi-judicial organ whose role is to review the 
constitutionality of Parliamentary legislation violative 
of fundamental rights. However, such legislation can be 
attacked only by a minority of at least 60 members of 
either Chamber of Parliament, or by the President of 
either Chamber of Parliament, or by the President of the 
Republic pending promulgation of a loi ; individuals have 
no possibility to bring their complaints before the 
Conseil Constitutionnel ; see id. at 200. President 
Mitterrand proposed to amend the Constitution so that 
individuals' standing would be recognized, which would 
allow them to invoke violations of their fundamental 
rights in front of ordinary courts during an interview on 
French TV on July 14, 1989, exactly 200 years after the 
Revolution, which is at the origin of the very particular 
French understanding of the meaning of the doctrine of 
separation of power. But the proposal hasn't arose a 
great deal of enthusiasm, and no change has been made in 
the French constitution since. Review of the 
constitutionality of the actions of the Executive is made 
by the Conseil d'Etat ; see id. at 199.
61. See generally supra. Part II, §2.2 on the role played by 
case law (and therefore by litigants) in determining in 
both the United States and the European Community what is 
appropriate and inappropriate (because protectionist) 
state action.
62. On the extension of the control of abuse of power to 
holders of power in firms, see generally Gaillard, supra. 
note 38. The increasing control of the use of power in 
so-called "private" firms amounts to an extension of 
constitutional justice in now non-democratic micro 
structures of exercize of power, which construction is 
possible by a concentration of property rights, which 
allows the construction of large formal and normative 
organizations.
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63. Miller, Toward the "Techno-Corporate" State? - An Essav 
in American Constitutionalism. 14 Vill. L. Rev. l (1968) at 18-19.
64. Id.
65. Miller, The Modern Corporate State : Private Governments 
and the American Constitution. Greenwood Press, Conn.
(1976) at 30.
66. Miller, supra. note 63, at 19. The organization of social 
activity in groups has for consequence that sovereignty 
is splintered. It is shared by public government and the 
private governments of enterprises. This is so because if 
power can be defined as the capacity to make decisions 
that influence others, then enterprises certainly have a 
great deal of power in our industrial societies. Speaking 
of sovereignty being to speak of power, enterprises in 
fact share sovereignty with public governments, Bodin and 
Austin to the contrary. See e.g. Miller, supra. note 65, 
at 29.
67. M. Lerner, America as a Civilization. 289 (1957), as
cited by Miller, supra. note 65, at 20.
68. See supra. Part II, $2.1.1 & $2.2.1 ; see generally.
McCloskey, The American Supreme Court. Chicago, The U. of 
Chicago Press (1960).
69. P.J. Slot, Technical and Administrative Obstacles to
Trade in the EEC. Leyden, A.-W. Sijthoff (1975), at 126.
70. Id.
71. Smith, P., The Shaping of America, vol. 3, New York, 
McGraw-Hill (1980), at 50.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 231.
74. See supra. Part I, $1.2.2.2.
75. Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits
the imposition of duties by states. See supra. Part II,
$2.1.1(1)(ii).
76. Slot, supra. note 69, at 132.
77. Id. at 133.
78. Id. at 132.
79. Id. at 131.
80. See supra. Part II, §2.1.1.
81. Slot, supra. note 69, at 141.
82. See supra. Part I, §2.1.1. *
83. Id.
84. £ee, for example, T.L. Lowi, The End of Liberalism - The
Second Republic of the United States. WW Norton & Co., 
(2nd ed., 1969 - 1979 ed.), particularly in Part I, §2.
85. See Gottlieb, Relationisa : Legal Theory for a Relational
Society. 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 567 (1983), at 594.
86. Id. at 9.
87. Id. at 18-19.
88. With the limited signification we give to this notion of 
unified or single market ; see supra. Part I,
Introduction, 2.
89. £.g. Lerner, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism.
42 Yale L. J. 658 (1933), at 671.
90. See Miller, supra. note — , at 3 ; See F. Frankfurter,
The Commerce Clause - Under Marshall. Tanev and Waite.
The U. Of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill (1937) at 63.
91. See Kommers & Waelbroeck, "Legal Integration and the Free
Movement of Goods : the American and European
Experience", in Integration through Law : Europe and the 
American Federal Experience. Vol. l, Bk. 3, 165, de
Gruyter, Berlin (M. Cappelletti, M. Secombe & J. Weiler
eds. 1986), at 168.
92. L.M. Friedman, A History of American Law. New York, Simon 
& Schuster (1973), at 456.
93. Id. at 455.
94. See supra. Part I, §2.2.1.1.
95 See Brewster, "The Corporation and Economic Federalism",
in The Corporation in Modern Society 72, Cambridge, 
Harvard U. Press (Mason ed. 1959), at 76.
96. Collins, supra. note 43, at 46. Collins remarks that :
"The Framers' concern with economic union arose from 
conflicts among the states and problems of foreign 
trade, not from disputes between the states and
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individual merchants. Many enumerated federal powers 
were intended to ameliorate interstate conflicts.
(...) ... the Court's doctrine is ... based on 
resolving commercial conflicts between the states.
(...) The doctrine's use of the concept of 
discrimination does not mean personal discrimination 
against outsiders ; it is an instrumental device to 
identify protectionist actions by state governments 
that are hostile to other states. Although merchants 
often sue to enforce the doctrine, they do so as 
surrogates for their own state, acting in effect as 
private attorneys general." Id.
97. See supra. Part II, $2 .1 .2 .
98 G. Mally, The European Community in Perspective - The New 
Europe, the United States and the World. Lexington Books, 
Lexington, Mass. (1973), at 3.
99. According to Weiler, normative supranationalism is 
concerned with the relationship and hierarchy which 
exists between Community policies and legal measures on 
the one hand and competing policies and legal measures of 
the Member States on the other. Decisional 
supranationalism relates to the institutional framework 
and decision-making process by which Community policies 
are initiated, debated ans formulated, then promulgated, 
and finally executed ; ££. Weiler, The Community system : 
the Dual Character of Supranationalism 1. Y. B. Eur. L. 
267 (1981), at 271.
100. See Louis, L'ordre juridique communautaire. Office des 
Publications Officielles des Communautés Européennes, (5° 
ed., 1990), at 44.
101. Id-
102. Id.
103. Id*
104. See supra. in Part II, S 2.1.1(2).
105. Weiler, supra. note 99, at 271.
106. See Sandholtz & Zysman, 1992 : Recasting the European 
Bargain. Draft (1989), at 27.
107. Id.
108. Id*
109. Id*
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110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120. 
121. 
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
Id- at 28.
See supra. Part I, §2.1.2.
Id*
See Sandholtz & Zysman, supra. note 106, at 18.*
Id.
Id. at 29.
Wisse Dekker of Philips and Jacques Solvay of Belgium's 
Solvay's chemical company, in particular, were vigorously 
arguing for the unification of the European Community's 
fragmented market ; fi.g. id.
As cited by Sandholtz & Zysman, id.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 30-31
Id. at 31. See infra note 129.
Id. at 3.
Recherche sur le coût de la non-Europe, Office des 
publications officielles des communautés européennes
(1988).
Sandholtz & Zysman, supra. note 106, at 29.
See générallv Bourdieu, Décrire et prescrire - Note sur 
les conditions de possibilité et les limites de 
l'efficacité politigue. 38 Actes de la recherche en 
sciences sociales, 69 (1981) :
"L'action proprement politique est possible parce que 
les agents, qui font partie du monde social, ont une 
connaissance (plus ou moins adéquate) de ce monde. 
Cette action vise à produire et à imposer des 
représentations (...) du monde social qui soient 
capables d'agir sur ce monde en agissant sur la 
représentation que s'en font les agents (...) Mais la 
rupture hérétique avec l'ordre établi (...) suppose la 
rencontre entre le discours critique et une crise 
objective, capable de rompre la concordance immédiate 
entre les structures incorporées et les structures 
objectives." id. at 69.
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127. I owe in part the structure of my argument here to a 
seminar given by M. Emerson, who is Director General of 
Economic and Financial Affairs (DG II) of the European 
Commission, held at the European University Institute of 
Florence, in April 1989.
128. But a recent report of the Commission warned that 
"worrying delays" in the implementation by several Member 
States were threatening the creation of the Single 
Market ; see Int'l Herald Tribune, September 7, 1989, at 
1.
More recently, The Economist's indicated that if the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament have 
approved 198 of the Community's programme of 282 measures 
to remove internal barriers by the end of 1992, of the 
126 single market laws that should by now have been 
implemented, only 37 have been passed by all Member 
States. The best performers are Denmark, which has
implemented 107, France with 103, Britain with 99 and
Portugal with 96. Among the laggards, Italy has 
implemented only 52 laws, Ireland 74, Luxembourg 81 and 
Spain 83. Interestingly, The Economist's recalls that "A 
company that wants to get EC rules enforced does not have 
to rely on the Commission's help. Recourse to national 
courts costs money, but can be quicker. National judges 
are slowly becoming more familiar with EC case histories,
but many of them remain reluctant to interpret European
law." It indicates however that "The Commission is eager 
for national courts to take a greater role." See the 
issue of June 22, 1991, at 84.
129. See supra. Part I, Introduction, §I.(2)(iii), on national 
economies as networks of micro-economic transactions. The 
increasing density of the networks of micro-economic 
exchange relationships at the European level means that 
there is creation of a European Economy in a sensible 
sense.
130. On the mechanisms used to address the issues raised by 
the federal structure of governments, see supra. Part II, 
§2.0.2. On the way in which issues are solved in America 
and in Europe, see generally Part II.
131. See supra. §3.1.2(3)(i).
132. See supra. §3.1.1(1)(ii).
133. See supra. §3.1.2(4).
134. See supra. §3.1.2(3)(ii).
135. See, for example, Collins, gupffl/ note 43.
- 378
136. See supra. S3.1.3.2.
137. See supra. §3.1.3.2(3).
138. See supra. Part II, §2.0.1.
139. The Economist's. December 22, 1990, at 76.
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Italy) formally represented by the European Community - 
regularly met to eliminate deadlocks in the negotiations 
in the so-called Quadrilateral Group. See, for example, 
The Financial Times, issue of September 16, 1991.
289. See supra. Part I, note 328 to 331 and accompanying text.
290. Tumlir, supra. note — , at 62 ; the European Economic
Community is here considered as one country, the
percentage of world imports being expressed net of 
intra-Community exchange.
291. Id.
292. Id. According to Bergsten, international relations will 
look very different by 2000 because of three global 
transformations which are well under way : First, the end 
of the cold war ; second, economics will move much closer 
to the top of the global agenda ; third, the 
world-economy will complete its evolution from the 
American-dominated regime of the first postwar generation 
to a state of U.S.-European-Japanese "tripolarity" ; see 
Bergsten, supra. note 196, at 96.
"International relations will look very different by 
2000 as a result of these transformations. The 
hierarchy of nations will shift considerably. The Big 
Three of economics will supplant the Big Two of 
nuclear competition as the powers that will shape much 
of the 21st century." id.
293. A US administration official said "we should have had 
more modest targets on agriculture" ; see in 
International Herald Tribune, issue of August 9, 1991, 
Doubts Arise on U.S. Stance at GATT.
294. An OECD Report recently showed that all governments 
subsidize their farmers, and that the OECD-wide total 
amount of subsidization was around 300 billion US dollars 
for 1990 ; gee The Wall Street Journal Europe, issue of 
May 22, 1991. The OECD report showed that, in addition to 
direct subsidies from the European Community and Member 
States of nearly $50 billion in 1990, European consumers 
paid $85 billion more for food than they otherwise would 
have. It figures American farmers received $47 billion in 
direct payments, and that American consumers paid $28 
billion more of subsidies. Id.
295. F. Teulon, La politique agricole commune. P.U.F.,
Paris (1991) at 114.
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296. For Teulon, for example, "les agriculteurs sont incités à 
produire trop, au-delà des besoins communautaires. C'est 
ainsi que nombre d'entre eux ont cultivé le maïs, plante 
très consommatrice en eau, qui entraine une forte 
pollution et qui est exportée aux frais du contribuable. 
Si l'on souhaite soutenir le revenu des agriculteurs, il 
serait sans doute plus rationnel de leur verser 
directement les sommes que l'on souhaite leur voir 
attribuer." see id. at 116. Similarly , the OECD 
considers that direct payments unrelated to production 
and aids to rural development would create fewer 
distorsions ; see. £.s* Les Echos, issue of January 5, 1991.
297. The CAP has systematized the national systems of price 
support created in the inter-war period (in a period of 
shortages) in countries such as France ; see. Teulon, 
supra. note 229b, at 21. While such systems were well 
adapted to increase production (id* at 43) the CAP has 
prevented the localization of farm production according 
to relative comparative advantage ; id. at 45.
298. While the monthly tax cost of the CAP was for each
European taxpayer of about FF 15 in the early 1980's, it 
has more than doubled now : the amount paid by each 
European taxpayer each month to maintain the CAP is of 
more than FF 30 ; see id. at 65. But this is just a small 
fraction of the price paid by Europeans, since the cost
of the CAP is mostly borne by consumers ; id.
299. See, for example, Teulon who remarks :
"De fait, ce sont les pays en voie de développement
qui font les frais de ces politiques agricoles,
protectionistes sur les marchés intérieurs et 
agressives sur les marchés mondiaux. Ils ont un accès 
limité aux marchés agricoles des pays développés et 
ils sont concurrencés sur leurs propres marchés 
vivriers par les excédents bradés à vil prix en 
provenance de la CEE ou des Etats-Unis." In Teulon,
supra. note 230, at 83.
300. Apart from the system of deficiency payments, seen below,
American farmers receive subsidies to irrigate and to let
their lands rest for ecological reasons.
301. See generally Teulon supra. note 296, at 71-84.
302 See id. at 82.
303. See, s.g. The Wall Street Journal Europe, supra, note
229a, which notes that "In France and germany, where the 
political left and right are evenly split, the farmers' 
swing vote carriers disproportionate weight."
394
304. The Economist's wonders :
"What is not explicable is the way that Jacques Delors 
in Brussels, John Major in London and Helmut Kohl in 
Bonn have failed to grasp that the needed farm reform 
is made for the GATT, and that the GATT is a vital 
reason for farm reform. They could combine the two 
imperatives to make Europe the force that tugs the 
Americans and Japanese towards freer trade, rather 
than remaining a fortress-building reprobate." issue 
of May 4, 1991, at 20.
305. Mr. MacSharry, the European Community farm commissioner, 
has elaborated a plan to reform the CAP which would cut 
prices by 35% over three years and turn to an 
American-type income-support system. See g.g. The 
Economist's, issue of July 6 , 1991. It has aroused 
virulent opposition, but there are few alternatives since 
any option based on price support will encourage farmers 
to produce more to earn more ; ¿g. However, the plan 
would increase the farm budget by 4 billion ECUs over 3 
years, prior to reduce incurred expenses by 10% a year 
from 1997 onwards ; see. £.g. Les Echos, issue of July 
16, 1991.
306. MacSharry, in the beginning at least, did not admit any 
connection between his reform and the GATT. He would not 
want European farmers to think that reform was being 
undertaken for foreigners ; £.g. The Economist's, issue 
of May 4, 1991, at 20. However, The Economist's rightly 
noted that the MacSharry plan could just about bridge the 
gap at the Uruguay Round of negotiations between the big 
cut in farm subsidies sought by the Americans and other 
exporters and the offer made by the European Community ; 
£.g. The Economist's, issue of July 6 , 1991, at 25. Just 
a few weeks before the MacSharry plan was announced, GATT 
negotiators succeeded in clarifying ideas on how to 
reduce government supports for agriculture. They agreed 
that aid must be reduced in three areas : domestic farm 
support, border protection and export subsidies. Two 
basic criteria have been suggested to define which type 
of domestic support do not distort trade and do not need 
to be cut : (i) the support must come from a 
publicly-funded government programme not involving 
transfers from consumers ; (ii) the support must not 
boost prices paid to producers.
307. The Community appeared confident during a meeting of the 
Quadrilateral Group (see supra. note 288) on September 
13-14 that its proposed reform of the CAP was allowing 
GATT talks to be resumed, see £.g. Le Monde, issue of 
September 15-16. After the same meeting, Carla Hills, the 
United States Trade Representative, said that progress in
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the GATT talks would depend on reform of the European 
Community's CAP ; e.g. The Financial Times, issue of 
September 16, 1991.
308. See supra. Part I, §1.2.2.
309. See supra. Part I, §1 .3 .
310. See, for example, The Financial Times, issue of September 18, 1991.
311. As noted by The Wall Street Journal Europe. "Farmers, one 
of the most politically powerful interest groups in 
Europe, have dominated the trade debate in recent months. 
(...) Although dozens of European Industries - such as 
financial services companies and pharmaceutical 
concerns - had much to gain from a successful outcome of 
the trade talks, the farmers' interest ended up 
dominating the talks. (...) Hr. Dunkel [who heads the 
GATT] called on manufacturing and service sectors in 
Europe, as well as European consumers, to make themselves 
heard more on trade issues." see issue of May 15, 1991.
312. The International Herald Tribune remarked that "... large 
scale reduction in farm subsidies must be included to 
provide an incentive for less-developed countries to 
participate in the 108-nation talks. Industrial countries 
want poor countries to protect Western patents and 
copyrights and to lower their barriers to investment and 
financial services. "Our problem in getting access for 
our financial institutions in other countries are far 
less with the U.K. and far more with Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Brazil and Argentina," the trade representative, Carla A. 
Hils, said in a recent interview. "And so if you want to 
keep those countries, the latter group, at the bargaining 
table, you have to deal with what if of interest for them 
- and what is of interest for them is liberalization of 
agriculture", in issue of August 9, 1991.
313. As soon as the impasse on agriculture seemed to have been
resolved, a meeting of the countries principally 
interested in liberalizing trade in textiles and clothing 
was called by A. Dunkel ; see. £.g. The Financial Times, 
issue of February 21, 1991.
314. See in Oxley, supra. note 196, at 33-34.
315. Id. at 42.
316. For a description of the bargaining position of the most
important actors in the Uruguay Round of negotiations, 
see Oxley's recent work, id.
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